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“Regarding the scope and limits of discovery, our Legislature has provided, in pertinent part, as follows: parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . .” (See Friday Invs., LLC v. Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. (2017) 370 N.C. 235, 237-38.)
“It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (See Willis v. Power Co. (1976) 291 N.C. 19, 33.)
However, “upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judge of the court in which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” (See Light v. Prasad (2020) 837 S.E.2d 383.)
“Rule 26(c), which authorizes entry of a protective order upon motion and good cause shown, also provides that [i]f the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery." (See Lovendahl v. Wicker (2010) 702 S.E.2d 529, 9.)
“A motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c) that is denied, therefore, may end in the same result as a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a): an order compelling discovery.” (See id.)
“We hold that violation of an order compelling discovery that results from a motion for a protective order may be the basis for sanctions under Rule 37(b).” (See id.)
“A Rule 26(c) protective order is discretionary and is reviewable only for abuse of that discretion." (See Patterson v. Sweatt (2001)146 N.C. App. 351, 356, 553 S.E.2d 404, 408.)
"Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court may only disturb a trial court's ruling if it was manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." (See Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. College (2019) 832 S.E.2d 223, 233.)
"Findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence." (See Light v. Prasad (2020) 837 S.E.2d 383.)
It is well settled that “the authority of the trial judge to issue [a] protective order [under Rule 26(c)] is not unqualified. The statute provides that such order may be issued only for good cause shown.” (See Hudson v. Hudson (1977) 34 N.C. App. 144, 146.)
It is also well settled that “a protective order is [a] court order prohibiting or restricting a party from engaging in a legal procedure (esp. discovery) that unduly annoys or burdens the opposing party or a third-party witness.” (See Novak v. City of High Point (2003) 582 S.E.2d 726.)
Oct 26, 2023
Active
Johnston County
Johnston County, NC
Civil Domestic without Claim for absolute divorce
Family
Divorce,Separation
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