Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
DIANE ABBEY, Index No. 651776/2022
Plaintiff,
Motion Sequence No. 2
-against-
ALEXANDER PERROS, ANNE-MARIE CORBEIL
BRISIGHELLO, “JOHN DOE,” and “JANE DOE,”
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO TRANSFER
TO CIVIL COURT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A STAY
ROSENBERG & ESTIS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
733 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 867-6000
ALEXANDER LYCOYANNIS
KENNETH W. ENG
Of Counsel
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................3
POINT I DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION AND
TRANSFER THE CLAIMS TO CIVIL COURT SHOULD BE DENIED ............3
A. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement States a Cause
of Action ..................................................................................................................4
B. Plaintiff Has Stated a Valid Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment....................15
C. Supreme Court is the Proper Venue for Plaintiff’s Claims....................................16
POINT II DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A STAY OF THIS ACTION PENDING
THE OUTCOME OF THE HP PROCEEDING, NONPAYMENT
PROCEEDING, AND DHCR PROCEEDING SHOULD BE DENIED ..............18
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................21
WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION .............................................................................................22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
19 W. 45th St. Realty Co. v Darom Elec. Corp.,
233 AD2d 184 (1st Dept 1996) ................................................................................................16
288/98 W. End Tenants Corp. v Mosesson,
128 Misc 2d 176 (Sup Ct, NY County 1984) ..........................................................................17
Abbey v Perros and Brisighello,
L&T Index Number 302013-22/NY ..........................................................................................1
Achieves LLC v Volpe,
2022 WL 326377 (Sup Ct, NY County, Jan 31, 2022) ......................................................19, 20
Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v Fritzen,
68 NY2d 968 (1986) ..................................................................................................................8
Alexander Perros v Stanley Bernard,
Index No. LT-000603-20/NY ....................................................................................................7
Alexander Perros v Town of Southold,
Sup Ct, Suffolk County, Index No. 806049/2015 ..................................................................5, 6
Arfa v Zamir,
76 AD3d 56 (1st Dept 2010),
affd, 17 NY3d 737 (2011) ........................................................................................................13
Bank of New York v Irwin Intern. Imports, Inc.,
197 AD2d 462 (1st Dept 1993) ................................................................................................16
Bank of New York Mellon v Porfert,
187 AD3d 1110 (2d Dept 2020) ................................................................................................4
Black v Chittenden,
69 NY2d 665 (1986) ................................................................................................................10
Braddock v Braddock,
60 AD3d 84 (1st Dept 2009) ....................................................................................................10
CCML Holdings LLC, JSCL Holdings, LLC v Kalmenson,
2022 WL 1135926 (Sup Ct, NY County, Apr 14, 2022) .............................................17, 19, 20
Churchill Fin. Cayman, Ltd. v BNP Paribas,
95 AD3d 614 (1st Dept 2012) ..................................................................................................11
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Cohn v Lionel Corp.,
21 NY2d 559 (1968) ................................................................................................................15
Coppola v Applied Electric Corp.,
288 AD2d 41 (1st Dept 2001) ..................................................................................................14
DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C.,
15 NY3d 147 (2010) ..........................................................................................................10, 11
Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc.,
68 NY2d 954 (1986) ................................................................................................................13
Diane Abbey v Alexander Perros and Anne-Marie Corbeil Brisighello, “John
Doe” and “Jane Doe”,
L&T Index No. 302013-22/NY ..............................................................................................16
Francisco Pineda and Alexander Perros v AB Painting & Construction, Inc.,
Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 152506/2015 ........................................................................5, 6
Francisco Pineda v Alexander Perros,
Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 656185/2016 ............................................................................6
Friedman Residence LLC v Denson,
2021 WL 4352700 (Sup Ct, NY County, Sept 24, 2021) ..................................................19, 20
Gonzalez v 40 W. Burnside Ave. LLC,
107 AD3d 542 (1st Dept 2013) ....................................................................................10, 12, 13
Green v Glenbriar Co.,
131 AD2d 363 (1st Dept 1987) ................................................................................................17
Guggenheimer v Ginzburg,
43 NY2d 268 (1977) ..................................................................................................................4
HSH Nordbank AG v UBS AG,
95 AD3d 185 (1st Dept 2012) ............................................................................................11, 12
Leon v Martinez,
84 NY2d 83 (1994) ................................................................................................................3, 4
Man Advisors, Inc. v Selkoe,
174 AD3d 435 (1st Dept 2019) ................................................................................................15
Manas v VMS Assoc., LLC,
53 AD3d 451 (1st Dept 2008) ..................................................................................................14
McKenney v Kapin,
53 AD2d 603 (2d Dept 1976) ..................................................................................................12
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Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and Steeplechase RE Development
LLC, v Alexander Perros,
Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 655618/2016 ............................................................................6
Perros v Abbey, et al.,
Index Number LT-006055-21/NY .............................................................................................2
Perrotti v Becker, Glynn, Melamed & Muffly LLP,
82 AD3d 495 (1st Dept 2011) ....................................................................................................5
Pineda v Perros,
Index No. 656185/2016 .............................................................................................................6
Rovello v Orofino Realty Co.,
40 NY2d 633 (1976) ..................................................................................................................4
Schlaifer Nance & Co. v Estate of Warhol,
119 F3d 91 (2d Cir 1997).........................................................................................................10
Snyder v Puente De Brooklyn Realty Corp.,
297 AD2d 432 (3d Dept 2002),
app denied, 99 NY2d 506 (2003) ..............................................................................................7
Solovieff Gallery Co. v Langston,
167 AD2d 325 (1st Dept 1990) ................................................................................................17
Steinberg v Campanella Group Inc.,
2002 NY Slip Op 50127(U) (App Term, 1st Dept, Apr 4, 2002) ............................................16
Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC,
110 AD3d 87 (1st Dept 2013) ....................................................................................................4
Underwood v Urban Homesteading Assistance (U-HAB), Inc.,
191 AD3d 550 (1st Dept 2021) ..................................................................................................5
W. 59th St. Partners, LLC v Lalo,
2022 WL 1063328 (Sup Ct, NY County, Apr 7, 2022) .....................................................19, 20
Whitney v Whitney,
57 NY2d 731 (1982) ..................................................................................................................4
Zito v New York City Office of Payroll Admin.,
130 AD3d 1326 (1st Dept 2015) ................................................................................................3
Statutes
RPAPL 743 ....................................................................................................................................16
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Other Authorities
CPLR 325(a) ....................................................................................................................................1
CPLR 1101.......................................................................................................................................7
CPLR 2201.......................................................................................................................................1
CPLR 3014.................................................................................................................................2, 15
CPLR 3211(a)(1) .........................................................................................................................1, 4
CPLR 3211(a)(4) .........................................................................................................................1, 4
CPLR 3211(a)(7) .........................................................................................................................1, 4
Gregory Schmidt, 'At Their Breaking Point': Tenants Fight to Stay in Their
Homes, NY TIMES (June 26, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/business/bronx-housing-court-
evictions.html ...........................................................................................................................18
Jeffrey M. Johnson, Silver Sands Motel Sold; New Owner Will Spend $4 Million
on Upgrades, ROBINS ISLAND, (Apr 17, 2022), https://robins-island.org/silver-
sands-motel-sold-new-owner-will-spend-4-million-on-upgrades/ (last visited
June 29, 2022) ............................................................................................................................3
New York State Constitution Article VI, § 7 .................................................................................17
New York State Constitution Article VI § 19(a) .............................................................................1
Stacey Lastoe, Silver Sands Motel Owner Fights 'Hamptons Style' Resort
Makeover, NY Post (May 14, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/05/14/silver-
sands-motel-owner-fights-hamptons-style-makeover/ (last visited June 29,
2022) ..........................................................................................................................................7
Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts § 202.13(a) ....................................................1
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
DIANE ABBEY, Index No. 651776/2022
Plaintiff,
-against-
ALEXANDER PERROS, ANNE-MARIE CORBEIL
BRISIGHELLO, “JOHN DOE,” and “JANE DOE,”1
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO TRANSFER
TO CIVIL COURT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A STAY
Plaintiff Diane Abbey (“Plaintiff”) submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the
motion (the “Motion”) filed by defendants Alexander Perros (“Perros”) and Anne-Marie Corbeil
Brisighello (“Brisighello”, collectively with Perros, “Defendants”) for an Order:
(i) Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), 3211(a)(4) and 3211(a)(7),
dismissing Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, as
contained in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint dated March 3, 2022
[NYSCEF Doc. No. 1] (the “Complaint”);
(ii) Pursuant to § 19(a) of Article VI of the New York State
Constitution, CPLR 325(a), and the Uniform Rules for the New York
State Trial Courts § 202.13(a), removing the Complaint to the Civil
Court of the City of New York, in and for New York County, to join
that certain pending action styled: Abbey v. Perros and Brisighello,
L&T Index Number 302013-22/NY (the “Non-Payment
Proceeding”);
(iii) Alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 2201, staying all proceedings
in the present action pending the resolution of: (1) the Non-Payment
Proceeding; (2) the proceeding before the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal, Docket Number KP410001R; and, (3) the
1
The names of the “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants in this action are fictitious and unknown to Plaintiff. The
intended defendants in this action are Alexander Perros, Anne-Marie Corbeil Brisighello and whoever else is in
possession of the Premises as described in the Verified Complaint.
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Housing Court proceeding styled Perros v. Abbey, et al., Index
Number LT-006055-21/NY.
(iv) Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Motion should be denied because Defendants have failed to meet their burden in
demonstrating that Plaintiff’s causes of action based on fraudulent inducement and unjust
enrichment do not fit into any cognizable legal theory. Indeed, in evaluating Plaintiff’s claims at
this preliminary juncture by accepting the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true and allowing
Plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, Plaintiff’s claims should clearly survive
dismissal.
Plaintiff’s cause of action based on fraudulent inducement alleges that Defendants made a
false representation in the rental application for the subject apartment; that the false representation
was made for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to enter the Lease with Defendants; Plaintiff
justifiably relied on Defendants’ false representation; and Plaintiff suffered damages in connection
with renting the subject apartment to tenants that have waged a premeditated, bad-faith campaign
against her and her family. Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ claims, CPLR 3014 explicitly
permits Plaintiff to allege alternative causes of actions. As such, it is improper to dismiss any of
Plaintiff’s causes of action.
Since Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment claims survive dismissal, it
naturally follows that Defendants’ branch of the Motion seeking to transfer the claims in this action
to the Civil Court should be denied because the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate those
claims.
Moreover, Defendants’ branch of the Motion seeking to stay this action must also be denied
because Defendants are well-educated and affluent (Perros is an Ivy League-educated real estate
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developer whose company, Thunderbowl Capital, recently purchased the Silver Sands Motel in
Greenport, New York and, in fact, has been described in press reports as a resident of Southold,
New York and not the subject apartment [see Jeffrey M. Johnson, Silver Sands Motel Sold; New
Owner Will Spend $4 Million on Upgrades, ROBINS ISLAND, Apr. 17, 2022, https://robins-
island.org/silver-sands-motel-sold-new-owner-will-spend-4-million-on-upgrades/ [last visited
June 29, 2022]]) and are not in need of the unpaid legal services available to some Housing Court
litigants -- notwithstanding that Perros falsely represented to the Civil Court that he was a “poor
person” who did not have sufficient resources to pay court filing fees (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 81).
Finally, this action does not involve claims that are identical to those pending in the Civil
Court, as the claims in the nonpayment proceeding concern Defendants’ nonpayment of rent
during the term of the lease, while Plaintiff’s ejectment claims herein concern Defendants’ refusal
to vacate after the lease’s expiration.
Accordingly, and as explained below, the Motion must be denied in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the Affidavit of Diane Abbey, sworn to on June
29, 2022 (“Abbey Affidavit” or “Abbey Aff.”), and the exhibits annexed thereto, for a full and
complete recitation of the facts relevant to this motion.
POINT I
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION AND
TRANSFER THE CLAIMS TO CIVIL COURT SHOULD BE DENIED
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the alleged facts as true,
accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the
facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Zito
v New York City Office of Payroll Admin., 130 AD3d 1326 [1st Dept 2015]).
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Under CPLR 3211(a)(1), dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence
submitted by the defendants conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter
of law (Leon, 84 NY2d at 88).
CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides that a party may move for dismissal of one or more causes of
action if: “there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in
a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make
such order as justice require.” Dismissal is inappropriate pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) where the
plaintiff seeks different relief based on different injuries (see Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan
Sec. LLC, 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013]). While CPLR 3211(a)(4) vests the Court with
authority to dismiss an action if there is already another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, a dismissal of the second action is never mandatory and is at the
Court’s broad discretion (see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]; Bank of New York
Mellon v Porfert, 187 AD3d 1110 [2d Dept 2020]).
In assessing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the
proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one (see Leon,
84 NY2d at 88 [citing Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Rovello v Orofino
Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976] [internal citations and quotations omitted]).
A. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for
Fraudulent Inducement States a Cause of Action
Defendants’ attempt to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent inducement
fails. A review of the Motion confirms that Defendants have failed to meet their burden to
demonstrate that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim does not fit into any cognizable legal
theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994] [“We accept the facts as alleged in the
complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine
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only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”]). In fact, as set forth in
the Complaint and established herein, Plaintiff has far exceeded its burden in alleging a cause of
action based on fraudulent inducement. Therefore, the Motion should be denied.
It is well settled that in order to state a claim for fraudulent inducement, the plaintiff must:
(1) allege a false representation, (2) made for the purpose of inducing another to act on it, (3) that
the party to whom the false representation was made justifiably relied on it, and (4) the party
relying on false representation was damaged (see Underwood v Urban Homesteading Assistance
(U-HAB), Inc., 191 AD3d 550 [1st Dept 2021]; see also Perrotti v Becker, Glynn, Melamed &
Muffly LLP, 82 AD3d 495, 498 [1st Dept 2011]).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made a false representation on the rental application
for the Premises (the “Rental Application”) by failing to accurately detail Perros’s litigation history
for the five years prior thereto (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26). Specifically,
the Rental Application asked the applicant: “In the last 5 years have you been a party to any
lawsuits?” (see id.). In response, Defendants’ response to same on the Rental Application was:
“No” (see id.).
Contrary to Defendants’ response, Perros misrepresented his prior litigation history on the
Rental Application because he was a named party in several lawsuits within the five years prior to
December 8, 2019 (the Rental Application’s date of completion) (see Abbey Aff., ¶¶ 11-12). In
fact, Perros was a party to at least five lawsuits that were pending between December 8, 2015 and
December 8, 2019, which include:
• Alexander Perros v. Town of Southold, New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County,
Index No. 806049/2015;
• Francisco Pineda and Alexander Perros v. AB Painting & Construction, Inc., New
York Supreme Court, New York County, Index No. 152506/2015;
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• Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and Steeplechase RE Development
LLC, v. Alexander Perros, New York Supreme Court, New York County, Index
No. 655618/2016;
• Francisco Pineda v. Alexander Perros, New York Supreme Court, New York
County, Index No. 656185/2016; and
• Alexander Perros v. Town of Southold, New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County,
Index No. 700974/2017.
(Abbey Aff., ¶ 14).
Had Defendants disclosed Perros’s extensive litigation history during such five-year period
-- and in particular the Pineda and Rahman cases and the fraud allegations contained therein --
Plaintiff (as set forth in her accompanying affidavit) never would have rented the Premises to
Defendants (see id. at ¶ 17).
According to the Verified Petition in Francisco Pineda v. Alexander Perros, Perros’s
partner in a real estate development company alleged that Perros defrauded one of their real estate
investors in connection with the purchase and sale of the building located at 531 W. 159th Street,
New York, New York (see Pineda v. Perros, Index No. 656185/2016, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1).
In another action, Perros was sued in Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and
Steeplechase RE Development LLC v. Alexander Perros (Index No. 655618/2016, NYSCEF Doc.
No. 1). According to the complaint, Rahman commenced an action against Perros for, inter alia,
breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing by using real estate investment funds for personal use, fraud,
and fraudulent concealment (see id.).
It is apparent that Defendants concealed Perros’s litigation history to entice Plaintiff to rent
the Premises to them. Indeed, had Defendants truthfully disclosed on the Rental Application that
Perros was a party to the above-identified actions, Plaintiff would not have rented the Premises to
an individual who was repeatedly accused of fraud and dishonest conduct (Abbey Aff., ¶ 17).
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Indeed, mere weeks after Defendants’ tenancy at the Premises commenced in 2020, Perros
commenced the proceeding entitled Alexander Perros v. Stanley Bernard with Index No. LT-
000603-20/NY (the “Initial HP Proceeding”). In the Initial HP Proceeding, Perros outrageously
affirmed that he qualified for Poor Person relief pursuant to CPLR 1101 and, based on such
falsehood, induced Judge Ortiz to sign an Ex Parte Order granting such relief (NYSCEF Doc. No.
81).
Of course, the Initial HP Proceeding was but a prelude to the bad-faith barrage of litigation
and abusive commandeering of HPD and other New York City agencies that Defendants would
soon unleash on Plaintiff and her family, as detailed in Plaintiff’s accompanying affidavit and the
many prior affidavits annexed thereto (which collectively detail the sordid history of Defendants’
bad-faith campaign against Plaintiff and Building ownership and management). It was not for no
reason that the New York Post referred to Defendant Perros as the “investor from hell” (see Stacey
Lastoe, Silver Sands Motel Owner Fights ‘Hamptons Style’ Resort Makeover, NY Post [May 14,
2021], https://nypost.com/2021/05/14/silver-sands-motel-owner-fights-hamptons-style-
makeover/ [last visited June 29, 2022]).
Moreover, the affidavits of Perros (NYSCEF Doc. No. 23) and Brisighello (NYSCEF Doc.
No. 36) do not refute that Perros misrepresented his litigation history on the Rental Application.
As such, it is unequivocal that Defendants made false representations on the Rental Application.
Defendants cynically attempt to dismiss the fraudulent inducement claims as against
Brisighello. This gambit fails because, upon information and belief, Brisighello participated in a
conspiracy, with Perros, to fraudulently induce Plaintiff into entering into the Lease. In Snyder v
Puente De Brooklyn Realty Corp., 297 AD2d 432, 435 [3d Dept 2002], app. denied, 99 NY2d 506
[2003], the Court held:
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Notably, conspiracy to commit a tort such as fraud is not an
independent cause of action in this State but, rather, “[a]llegations
of conspiracy are permitted only to connect the actions of separate
defendants with an otherwise actionable tort” . . . While plaintiff
need not allege and prove that each defendant committed every
element of fraud, plaintiff must establish facts which “support an
inference that defendants knowingly agreed to cooperate in a
fraudulent scheme, or shared a perfidious purpose . . .”
(See also Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v Fritzen, 68 NY2d 968, 969 [1986]).
Here, Brisighello, as Perros’ wife, should have known that Perros was a party to several
lawsuits within the relevant inquiry period contained in the Rental Application. Additionally,
Brisighello was copied to Perros’ December 8, 2019 email transmitting the Rental Application to
the real estate broker and, therefore, had every opportunity to review the Rental Application for
the truth or falsity of its contents (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26). Moreover,
Brisighello may have very well discussed the contents of the Rental Application with Perros prior
to its competition and submission to Plaintiff, and whether to disclose Perros’ storied litigation
history to Plaintiff. Indeed, there is at least an inference, that Brisighello discussed the questions
in the Rental Application and how they, as co-tenants, were to complete and answer such questions.
Nonetheless, Brisighello, at a minimum, had a shared perfidious purpose to entice Plaintiff to rent
the Premises to Defendants because Brisighello benefitted from the Lease and occupancy of the
Premises. As a result, Plaintiff has asserted a viable cause of action against Brisighello based on
fraudulent inducement.
Second, Defendants clearly made the false representation in the Rental Application for the
purpose of inducing Plaintiff to act on it by renting the Premises to Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff
affirms that she would not have rented the Premises to Defendants had she known that Perros was
involved in so many lawsuits, especially those involving allegations of fraud (Abbey Aff., ¶ 17).
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In his sworn affidavit, Perros feigns ignorance of the straightforward question in the Rental
Application and challenges the Court’s intellect by asserting that he “assumed that the
application’s inquiry about being a party to lawsuits related specifically to landlord/tenant matters”
(See Affidavit of Perros, sworn to on May 27, 2022 [hereinafter “Perros Affidavit” or “Perros
Aff.”], NYSCEF Doc. No. 23, at ¶ 9). This absurd explanation is refuted by the Rental
Application’s plain language, and Perros -- an Ivy League-educated real estate investor -- surely
understood exactly what the words written in plain English meant.
In fact, the other questions in the Rental Application were not limited to landlord/tenant
matters and, therefore, there was no reasonable basis for Perros to believe that the Rental
Application was limited to only landlord/tenant lawsuits (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF
Doc. No. 26, 4 [requiring, inter alia, Defendants to indicate whether there are any outstanding
judgments; whether they have declared bankruptcy; whether they have defaulted on any loan,
mortgage, or other financial obligation]). Indeed, if Perros was unclear about any of the directions
contained in the Rental Application, he had every opportunity to contact the real estate broker with
whom he admits to emailing (see Perros Aff., NYSCEF Doc. No. 23, at ¶ 6) or qualify his response
in the Rental Application by filling in the “additional information” section indicated on the Rental
Application (Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, 4). Therefore, assuming the truth of
the Complaint’s allegations, Defendants’ misrepresentations on the Rental Application were
intended to induce Plaintiff to rent the Premises to Defendants.
Third, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fraudulent inducement claim should be denied
because the question of whether Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendants’ misrepresentations is
an issue of fact.
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NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022
It is well-settled that the question of justifiable reliance on a defendant’s false
representation is an issue of material fact (see DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 NY3d
147, 155 [2010] [“The question of what constitutes reasonable reliance is always nettlesome
because it is so fact-intensive”] [citing Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91,
98 [2d Cir.1997]]; Black v Chittenden, 69 NY2d 665, 669 [1986] [denying the defendant’s motion
for judgment based on fraudulent inducement because whether the condition of the bowling lanes
at issue was a matter “peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge” and whether plaintiffs could have
discovered the truth about them through the “exercise of ordinary intelligence” constituted
questions of fact for a jury]; Gonzalez v 40 W. Burnside Ave. LLC, 107 AD3d 542, 544 [1st Dept
2013] [“Whether the plaintiff could justifiably rely on the false representation is an issue of fact”];
Braddock v Braddock, 60 AD3d 84, 88 [1st Dept 2009] [“[I]t might be emphasized that the issues
[of justifiable reliance] is a generally one of fact.”] [citations omitted]). Therefore, on this basis
alone, the Motion should be denied.
Moreover, Plaintiff had no obligation to conduct her own diligence to verify Perros’s
statements in the Rental Application because Perros represented, in writing, that he was not a party
to any lawsuits. In DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C. (to which Defendants copiously cite),
the Court of Appeals held:
Where, however, a plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to protect
itself against deception, itshould not be denied recovery merely
because hindsight suggests that it migh
Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK DIANE ABBEY, Index No. 651776/2022 Plaintiff, Motion Sequence No. 2 -against- ALEXANDER PERROS, ANNE-MARIE CORBEIL BRISIGHELLO, “JOHN DOE,” and “JANE DOE,” Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO TRANSFER TO CIVIL COURT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A STAY ROSENBERG & ESTIS, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiff 733 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 (212) 867-6000 ALEXANDER LYCOYANNIS KENNETH W. ENG Of Counsel RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 1 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................3 POINT I DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION AND TRANSFER THE CLAIMS TO CIVIL COURT SHOULD BE DENIED ............3 A. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement States a Cause of Action ..................................................................................................................4 B. Plaintiff Has Stated a Valid Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment....................15 C. Supreme Court is the Proper Venue for Plaintiff’s Claims....................................16 POINT II DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A STAY OF THIS ACTION PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE HP PROCEEDING, NONPAYMENT PROCEEDING, AND DHCR PROCEEDING SHOULD BE DENIED ..............18 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................21 WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION .............................................................................................22 -i- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 2 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases 19 W. 45th St. Realty Co. v Darom Elec. Corp., 233 AD2d 184 (1st Dept 1996) ................................................................................................16 288/98 W. End Tenants Corp. v Mosesson, 128 Misc 2d 176 (Sup Ct, NY County 1984) ..........................................................................17 Abbey v Perros and Brisighello, L&T Index Number 302013-22/NY ..........................................................................................1 Achieves LLC v Volpe, 2022 WL 326377 (Sup Ct, NY County, Jan 31, 2022) ......................................................19, 20 Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v Fritzen, 68 NY2d 968 (1986) ..................................................................................................................8 Alexander Perros v Stanley Bernard, Index No. LT-000603-20/NY ....................................................................................................7 Alexander Perros v Town of Southold, Sup Ct, Suffolk County, Index No. 806049/2015 ..................................................................5, 6 Arfa v Zamir, 76 AD3d 56 (1st Dept 2010), affd, 17 NY3d 737 (2011) ........................................................................................................13 Bank of New York v Irwin Intern. Imports, Inc., 197 AD2d 462 (1st Dept 1993) ................................................................................................16 Bank of New York Mellon v Porfert, 187 AD3d 1110 (2d Dept 2020) ................................................................................................4 Black v Chittenden, 69 NY2d 665 (1986) ................................................................................................................10 Braddock v Braddock, 60 AD3d 84 (1st Dept 2009) ....................................................................................................10 CCML Holdings LLC, JSCL Holdings, LLC v Kalmenson, 2022 WL 1135926 (Sup Ct, NY County, Apr 14, 2022) .............................................17, 19, 20 Churchill Fin. Cayman, Ltd. v BNP Paribas, 95 AD3d 614 (1st Dept 2012) ..................................................................................................11 - ii - RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 3 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Cohn v Lionel Corp., 21 NY2d 559 (1968) ................................................................................................................15 Coppola v Applied Electric Corp., 288 AD2d 41 (1st Dept 2001) ..................................................................................................14 DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 NY3d 147 (2010) ..........................................................................................................10, 11 Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 NY2d 954 (1986) ................................................................................................................13 Diane Abbey v Alexander Perros and Anne-Marie Corbeil Brisighello, “John Doe” and “Jane Doe”, L&T Index No. 302013-22/NY ..............................................................................................16 Francisco Pineda and Alexander Perros v AB Painting & Construction, Inc., Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 152506/2015 ........................................................................5, 6 Francisco Pineda v Alexander Perros, Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 656185/2016 ............................................................................6 Friedman Residence LLC v Denson, 2021 WL 4352700 (Sup Ct, NY County, Sept 24, 2021) ..................................................19, 20 Gonzalez v 40 W. Burnside Ave. LLC, 107 AD3d 542 (1st Dept 2013) ....................................................................................10, 12, 13 Green v Glenbriar Co., 131 AD2d 363 (1st Dept 1987) ................................................................................................17 Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 (1977) ..................................................................................................................4 HSH Nordbank AG v UBS AG, 95 AD3d 185 (1st Dept 2012) ............................................................................................11, 12 Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 (1994) ................................................................................................................3, 4 Man Advisors, Inc. v Selkoe, 174 AD3d 435 (1st Dept 2019) ................................................................................................15 Manas v VMS Assoc., LLC, 53 AD3d 451 (1st Dept 2008) ..................................................................................................14 McKenney v Kapin, 53 AD2d 603 (2d Dept 1976) ..................................................................................................12 - iii - RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 4 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and Steeplechase RE Development LLC, v Alexander Perros, Sup Ct, NY County, Index No. 655618/2016 ............................................................................6 Perros v Abbey, et al., Index Number LT-006055-21/NY .............................................................................................2 Perrotti v Becker, Glynn, Melamed & Muffly LLP, 82 AD3d 495 (1st Dept 2011) ....................................................................................................5 Pineda v Perros, Index No. 656185/2016 .............................................................................................................6 Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 (1976) ..................................................................................................................4 Schlaifer Nance & Co. v Estate of Warhol, 119 F3d 91 (2d Cir 1997).........................................................................................................10 Snyder v Puente De Brooklyn Realty Corp., 297 AD2d 432 (3d Dept 2002), app denied, 99 NY2d 506 (2003) ..............................................................................................7 Solovieff Gallery Co. v Langston, 167 AD2d 325 (1st Dept 1990) ................................................................................................17 Steinberg v Campanella Group Inc., 2002 NY Slip Op 50127(U) (App Term, 1st Dept, Apr 4, 2002) ............................................16 Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 110 AD3d 87 (1st Dept 2013) ....................................................................................................4 Underwood v Urban Homesteading Assistance (U-HAB), Inc., 191 AD3d 550 (1st Dept 2021) ..................................................................................................5 W. 59th St. Partners, LLC v Lalo, 2022 WL 1063328 (Sup Ct, NY County, Apr 7, 2022) .....................................................19, 20 Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731 (1982) ..................................................................................................................4 Zito v New York City Office of Payroll Admin., 130 AD3d 1326 (1st Dept 2015) ................................................................................................3 Statutes RPAPL 743 ....................................................................................................................................16 - iv - RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 5 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Other Authorities CPLR 325(a) ....................................................................................................................................1 CPLR 1101.......................................................................................................................................7 CPLR 2201.......................................................................................................................................1 CPLR 3014.................................................................................................................................2, 15 CPLR 3211(a)(1) .........................................................................................................................1, 4 CPLR 3211(a)(4) .........................................................................................................................1, 4 CPLR 3211(a)(7) .........................................................................................................................1, 4 Gregory Schmidt, 'At Their Breaking Point': Tenants Fight to Stay in Their Homes, NY TIMES (June 26, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/business/bronx-housing-court- evictions.html ...........................................................................................................................18 Jeffrey M. Johnson, Silver Sands Motel Sold; New Owner Will Spend $4 Million on Upgrades, ROBINS ISLAND, (Apr 17, 2022), https://robins-island.org/silver- sands-motel-sold-new-owner-will-spend-4-million-on-upgrades/ (last visited June 29, 2022) ............................................................................................................................3 New York State Constitution Article VI, § 7 .................................................................................17 New York State Constitution Article VI § 19(a) .............................................................................1 Stacey Lastoe, Silver Sands Motel Owner Fights 'Hamptons Style' Resort Makeover, NY Post (May 14, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/05/14/silver- sands-motel-owner-fights-hamptons-style-makeover/ (last visited June 29, 2022) ..........................................................................................................................................7 Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts § 202.13(a) ....................................................1 -v- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 6 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK DIANE ABBEY, Index No. 651776/2022 Plaintiff, -against- ALEXANDER PERROS, ANNE-MARIE CORBEIL BRISIGHELLO, “JOHN DOE,” and “JANE DOE,”1 Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO TRANSFER TO CIVIL COURT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A STAY Plaintiff Diane Abbey (“Plaintiff”) submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the motion (the “Motion”) filed by defendants Alexander Perros (“Perros”) and Anne-Marie Corbeil Brisighello (“Brisighello”, collectively with Perros, “Defendants”) for an Order: (i) Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), 3211(a)(4) and 3211(a)(7), dismissing Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, as contained in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint dated March 3, 2022 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 1] (the “Complaint”); (ii) Pursuant to § 19(a) of Article VI of the New York State Constitution, CPLR 325(a), and the Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts § 202.13(a), removing the Complaint to the Civil Court of the City of New York, in and for New York County, to join that certain pending action styled: Abbey v. Perros and Brisighello, L&T Index Number 302013-22/NY (the “Non-Payment Proceeding”); (iii) Alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 2201, staying all proceedings in the present action pending the resolution of: (1) the Non-Payment Proceeding; (2) the proceeding before the Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Docket Number KP410001R; and, (3) the 1 The names of the “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants in this action are fictitious and unknown to Plaintiff. The intended defendants in this action are Alexander Perros, Anne-Marie Corbeil Brisighello and whoever else is in possession of the Premises as described in the Verified Complaint. RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 7 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Housing Court proceeding styled Perros v. Abbey, et al., Index Number LT-006055-21/NY. (iv) Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Motion should be denied because Defendants have failed to meet their burden in demonstrating that Plaintiff’s causes of action based on fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment do not fit into any cognizable legal theory. Indeed, in evaluating Plaintiff’s claims at this preliminary juncture by accepting the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true and allowing Plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, Plaintiff’s claims should clearly survive dismissal. Plaintiff’s cause of action based on fraudulent inducement alleges that Defendants made a false representation in the rental application for the subject apartment; that the false representation was made for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to enter the Lease with Defendants; Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendants’ false representation; and Plaintiff suffered damages in connection with renting the subject apartment to tenants that have waged a premeditated, bad-faith campaign against her and her family. Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ claims, CPLR 3014 explicitly permits Plaintiff to allege alternative causes of actions. As such, it is improper to dismiss any of Plaintiff’s causes of action. Since Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment claims survive dismissal, it naturally follows that Defendants’ branch of the Motion seeking to transfer the claims in this action to the Civil Court should be denied because the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims. Moreover, Defendants’ branch of the Motion seeking to stay this action must also be denied because Defendants are well-educated and affluent (Perros is an Ivy League-educated real estate -2- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 8 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 developer whose company, Thunderbowl Capital, recently purchased the Silver Sands Motel in Greenport, New York and, in fact, has been described in press reports as a resident of Southold, New York and not the subject apartment [see Jeffrey M. Johnson, Silver Sands Motel Sold; New Owner Will Spend $4 Million on Upgrades, ROBINS ISLAND, Apr. 17, 2022, https://robins- island.org/silver-sands-motel-sold-new-owner-will-spend-4-million-on-upgrades/ [last visited June 29, 2022]]) and are not in need of the unpaid legal services available to some Housing Court litigants -- notwithstanding that Perros falsely represented to the Civil Court that he was a “poor person” who did not have sufficient resources to pay court filing fees (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 81). Finally, this action does not involve claims that are identical to those pending in the Civil Court, as the claims in the nonpayment proceeding concern Defendants’ nonpayment of rent during the term of the lease, while Plaintiff’s ejectment claims herein concern Defendants’ refusal to vacate after the lease’s expiration. Accordingly, and as explained below, the Motion must be denied in its entirety. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the Affidavit of Diane Abbey, sworn to on June 29, 2022 (“Abbey Affidavit” or “Abbey Aff.”), and the exhibits annexed thereto, for a full and complete recitation of the facts relevant to this motion. POINT I DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION AND TRANSFER THE CLAIMS TO CIVIL COURT SHOULD BE DENIED When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the alleged facts as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Zito v New York City Office of Payroll Admin., 130 AD3d 1326 [1st Dept 2015]). -3- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 9 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Under CPLR 3211(a)(1), dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (Leon, 84 NY2d at 88). CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides that a party may move for dismissal of one or more causes of action if: “there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice require.” Dismissal is inappropriate pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) where the plaintiff seeks different relief based on different injuries (see Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013]). While CPLR 3211(a)(4) vests the Court with authority to dismiss an action if there is already another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, a dismissal of the second action is never mandatory and is at the Court’s broad discretion (see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732 [1982]; Bank of New York Mellon v Porfert, 187 AD3d 1110 [2d Dept 2020]). In assessing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one (see Leon, 84 NY2d at 88 [citing Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). A. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement States a Cause of Action Defendants’ attempt to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent inducement fails. A review of the Motion confirms that Defendants have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim does not fit into any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994] [“We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine -4- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 10 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”]). In fact, as set forth in the Complaint and established herein, Plaintiff has far exceeded its burden in alleging a cause of action based on fraudulent inducement. Therefore, the Motion should be denied. It is well settled that in order to state a claim for fraudulent inducement, the plaintiff must: (1) allege a false representation, (2) made for the purpose of inducing another to act on it, (3) that the party to whom the false representation was made justifiably relied on it, and (4) the party relying on false representation was damaged (see Underwood v Urban Homesteading Assistance (U-HAB), Inc., 191 AD3d 550 [1st Dept 2021]; see also Perrotti v Becker, Glynn, Melamed & Muffly LLP, 82 AD3d 495, 498 [1st Dept 2011]). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made a false representation on the rental application for the Premises (the “Rental Application”) by failing to accurately detail Perros’s litigation history for the five years prior thereto (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26). Specifically, the Rental Application asked the applicant: “In the last 5 years have you been a party to any lawsuits?” (see id.). In response, Defendants’ response to same on the Rental Application was: “No” (see id.). Contrary to Defendants’ response, Perros misrepresented his prior litigation history on the Rental Application because he was a named party in several lawsuits within the five years prior to December 8, 2019 (the Rental Application’s date of completion) (see Abbey Aff., ¶¶ 11-12). In fact, Perros was a party to at least five lawsuits that were pending between December 8, 2015 and December 8, 2019, which include: • Alexander Perros v. Town of Southold, New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Index No. 806049/2015; • Francisco Pineda and Alexander Perros v. AB Painting & Construction, Inc., New York Supreme Court, New York County, Index No. 152506/2015; -5- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 11 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 • Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and Steeplechase RE Development LLC, v. Alexander Perros, New York Supreme Court, New York County, Index No. 655618/2016; • Francisco Pineda v. Alexander Perros, New York Supreme Court, New York County, Index No. 656185/2016; and • Alexander Perros v. Town of Southold, New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Index No. 700974/2017. (Abbey Aff., ¶ 14). Had Defendants disclosed Perros’s extensive litigation history during such five-year period -- and in particular the Pineda and Rahman cases and the fraud allegations contained therein -- Plaintiff (as set forth in her accompanying affidavit) never would have rented the Premises to Defendants (see id. at ¶ 17). According to the Verified Petition in Francisco Pineda v. Alexander Perros, Perros’s partner in a real estate development company alleged that Perros defrauded one of their real estate investors in connection with the purchase and sale of the building located at 531 W. 159th Street, New York, New York (see Pineda v. Perros, Index No. 656185/2016, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). In another action, Perros was sued in Omar Rahman, d/b/a Reem US Holdings LLC and Steeplechase RE Development LLC v. Alexander Perros (Index No. 655618/2016, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). According to the complaint, Rahman commenced an action against Perros for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing by using real estate investment funds for personal use, fraud, and fraudulent concealment (see id.). It is apparent that Defendants concealed Perros’s litigation history to entice Plaintiff to rent the Premises to them. Indeed, had Defendants truthfully disclosed on the Rental Application that Perros was a party to the above-identified actions, Plaintiff would not have rented the Premises to an individual who was repeatedly accused of fraud and dishonest conduct (Abbey Aff., ¶ 17). -6- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 12 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Indeed, mere weeks after Defendants’ tenancy at the Premises commenced in 2020, Perros commenced the proceeding entitled Alexander Perros v. Stanley Bernard with Index No. LT- 000603-20/NY (the “Initial HP Proceeding”). In the Initial HP Proceeding, Perros outrageously affirmed that he qualified for Poor Person relief pursuant to CPLR 1101 and, based on such falsehood, induced Judge Ortiz to sign an Ex Parte Order granting such relief (NYSCEF Doc. No. 81). Of course, the Initial HP Proceeding was but a prelude to the bad-faith barrage of litigation and abusive commandeering of HPD and other New York City agencies that Defendants would soon unleash on Plaintiff and her family, as detailed in Plaintiff’s accompanying affidavit and the many prior affidavits annexed thereto (which collectively detail the sordid history of Defendants’ bad-faith campaign against Plaintiff and Building ownership and management). It was not for no reason that the New York Post referred to Defendant Perros as the “investor from hell” (see Stacey Lastoe, Silver Sands Motel Owner Fights ‘Hamptons Style’ Resort Makeover, NY Post [May 14, 2021], https://nypost.com/2021/05/14/silver-sands-motel-owner-fights-hamptons-style- makeover/ [last visited June 29, 2022]). Moreover, the affidavits of Perros (NYSCEF Doc. No. 23) and Brisighello (NYSCEF Doc. No. 36) do not refute that Perros misrepresented his litigation history on the Rental Application. As such, it is unequivocal that Defendants made false representations on the Rental Application. Defendants cynically attempt to dismiss the fraudulent inducement claims as against Brisighello. This gambit fails because, upon information and belief, Brisighello participated in a conspiracy, with Perros, to fraudulently induce Plaintiff into entering into the Lease. In Snyder v Puente De Brooklyn Realty Corp., 297 AD2d 432, 435 [3d Dept 2002], app. denied, 99 NY2d 506 [2003], the Court held: -7- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 13 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 Notably, conspiracy to commit a tort such as fraud is not an independent cause of action in this State but, rather, “[a]llegations of conspiracy are permitted only to connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort” . . . While plaintiff need not allege and prove that each defendant committed every element of fraud, plaintiff must establish facts which “support an inference that defendants knowingly agreed to cooperate in a fraudulent scheme, or shared a perfidious purpose . . .” (See also Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v Fritzen, 68 NY2d 968, 969 [1986]). Here, Brisighello, as Perros’ wife, should have known that Perros was a party to several lawsuits within the relevant inquiry period contained in the Rental Application. Additionally, Brisighello was copied to Perros’ December 8, 2019 email transmitting the Rental Application to the real estate broker and, therefore, had every opportunity to review the Rental Application for the truth or falsity of its contents (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26). Moreover, Brisighello may have very well discussed the contents of the Rental Application with Perros prior to its competition and submission to Plaintiff, and whether to disclose Perros’ storied litigation history to Plaintiff. Indeed, there is at least an inference, that Brisighello discussed the questions in the Rental Application and how they, as co-tenants, were to complete and answer such questions. Nonetheless, Brisighello, at a minimum, had a shared perfidious purpose to entice Plaintiff to rent the Premises to Defendants because Brisighello benefitted from the Lease and occupancy of the Premises. As a result, Plaintiff has asserted a viable cause of action against Brisighello based on fraudulent inducement. Second, Defendants clearly made the false representation in the Rental Application for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to act on it by renting the Premises to Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff affirms that she would not have rented the Premises to Defendants had she known that Perros was involved in so many lawsuits, especially those involving allegations of fraud (Abbey Aff., ¶ 17). -8- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 14 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 In his sworn affidavit, Perros feigns ignorance of the straightforward question in the Rental Application and challenges the Court’s intellect by asserting that he “assumed that the application’s inquiry about being a party to lawsuits related specifically to landlord/tenant matters” (See Affidavit of Perros, sworn to on May 27, 2022 [hereinafter “Perros Affidavit” or “Perros Aff.”], NYSCEF Doc. No. 23, at ¶ 9). This absurd explanation is refuted by the Rental Application’s plain language, and Perros -- an Ivy League-educated real estate investor -- surely understood exactly what the words written in plain English meant. In fact, the other questions in the Rental Application were not limited to landlord/tenant matters and, therefore, there was no reasonable basis for Perros to believe that the Rental Application was limited to only landlord/tenant lawsuits (see Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, 4 [requiring, inter alia, Defendants to indicate whether there are any outstanding judgments; whether they have declared bankruptcy; whether they have defaulted on any loan, mortgage, or other financial obligation]). Indeed, if Perros was unclear about any of the directions contained in the Rental Application, he had every opportunity to contact the real estate broker with whom he admits to emailing (see Perros Aff., NYSCEF Doc. No. 23, at ¶ 6) or qualify his response in the Rental Application by filling in the “additional information” section indicated on the Rental Application (Defendants’ Exhibit C, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, 4). Therefore, assuming the truth of the Complaint’s allegations, Defendants’ misrepresentations on the Rental Application were intended to induce Plaintiff to rent the Premises to Defendants. Third, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fraudulent inducement claim should be denied because the question of whether Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendants’ misrepresentations is an issue of fact. -9- RE\04685\0003\4491789v3 15 of 28 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/30/2022 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 651776/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 90 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/30/2022 It is well-settled that the question of justifiable reliance on a defendant’s false representation is an issue of material fact (see DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 15 NY3d 147, 155 [2010] [“The question of what constitutes reasonable reliance is always nettlesome because it is so fact-intensive”] [citing Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 [2d Cir.1997]]; Black v Chittenden, 69 NY2d 665, 669 [1986] [denying the defendant’s motion for judgment based on fraudulent inducement because whether the condition of the bowling lanes at issue was a matter “peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge” and whether plaintiffs could have discovered the truth about them through the “exercise of ordinary intelligence” constituted questions of fact for a jury]; Gonzalez v 40 W. Burnside Ave. LLC, 107 AD3d 542, 544 [1st Dept 2013] [“Whether the plaintiff could justifiably rely on the false representation is an issue of fact”]; Braddock v Braddock, 60 AD3d 84, 88 [1st Dept 2009] [“[I]t might be emphasized that the issues [of justifiable reliance] is a generally one of fact.”] [citations omitted]). Therefore, on this basis alone, the Motion should be denied. Moreover, Plaintiff had no obligation to conduct her own diligence to verify Perros’s statements in the Rental Application because Perros represented, in writing, that he was not a party to any lawsuits. In DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C. (to which Defendants copiously cite), the Court of Appeals held: Where, however, a plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to protect itself against deception, itshould not be denied recovery merely because hindsight suggests that it migh