arrow left
arrow right
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
  • PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al ANTITRUST/UNFAIR COMPETITION document preview
						
                                

Preview

WOMAN SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Document Scanning Lead Sheet Jan-14-2010 11:51 am Case Number: CGC-10-496030 Filing Date: Jan-14-2010 11:45 Juke Box: 001 Image: 02732610 COMPLAINT PATRICIA MCALLISTER VS. NESTLE USA, INC. et al 001002732610 Instructions: Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.SUM-100 (cracion NCYAL) colt BE bee NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO): NESTLE USA, INC., and DOES 1-50 inclusive YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTA DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE): PATRICIA McALLISTER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below. You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy, served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www. courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not fle your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attomey referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal ‘Services Web site (www. lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selthelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar ‘association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of $10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. JAVISO! Lo han demandado. Sino responde dentro de 30 dias, la corte puede decidir en su contra sin escuchar su version. Lea la informacion a continuacion. Tiane 30 DIAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citacion y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta 0 una llamada telefonica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y mas informacion en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en fa biblioteca de leyes de su condado 0 en la corte que le quede mas cerca. Sino puede pagar la cuota de presentaci6n, pida al secretario de la corte que le 06 un formulario de exencién de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podra quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin mas advertencia. Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. ‘Sino conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remision a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogads, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines ‘de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Services, (www lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca. gov) 0 poniéndose en contacto con la corte o ef colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperacion de $10,000 6 mas de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesién de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso. The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y direcci6n de la corte es): CASE NUMBER: San Francisco Superior Court ( 2 “PRB 10-496 030 400 MacAllister Street, San Francisco, CA 94102 The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la direccién y el nimero de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): R. Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., 706 Sansom: Stree cisco, CA 94111, 415-217-6810 weraon Parke DATE: JAN 7 4 2010 Clerk, by ~ SBR Ade puty (Fecha) (Secretario) (Adjunto) (For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).) (Para prueba de entrega de esta citation use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)). NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served 4. [] as an individual defendant. 2. [[] as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): 3, (1 on behalf of (specify): under, [__] CCP 416.10 (corporation) C4 CCP 416.60 (minor) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) [) ccp 416.70 (conservatee) [—] CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) [_] CCP 416.90 (authorized person) {} other (specify): 4. [__] by personal delivery on (date): Page 1 of 1 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use IMO! ‘Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 465 Judicial Council of California SUMMONS ‘wiww.courtingo.ca. gov ‘SUM-100 [Rev. July 1, 2008] [American LegaiNet, ne. |] wiew.FormsWorkffow.com|CM-010 [ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, tate Bar number, and actress) FOR COURT USE ONLY R. Alexander Saveri (173102) Saveri & Saveri, Inc., 706 Sansome Street San Francisco, CA 94111 reverroneno 415-217-6810 raxno: 415-217-6813 F I E D artorney For (Name. Plaintiff Patricia McAllister Swpetior of Cal if [SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San. Francisco ° Francisco street aporess: 400 MacAlister Street ALLNG ADDRESS JAN 1 4 2010 city anozp cove. San Francisco, CA 94102 ean NANE GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk CASE NAME: . B McALLISTER v. NESTLE USA, INC. Deputy Clerk 4 CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation «~ a gl Limited a “BEP- 10-496 030 (Amount (Amount Counter Joinder demanded demanded is Filed with first appearance by defendant exceeds $25,000) $25,000 or less) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402) DEPT: items 1-6 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2). i. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case: Cor JUDGE! ‘Auto Tort ntract Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation ‘Auto (22) [oT Breach of contractwvarranty (06) (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403) Uninsured motorist (46) 1 Rute 3.740 collections (09) [Z1 antitrust/Trade regulation (03) Other P/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Other collections (09) CI Construction defect (10) Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort (1 insurance coverage (18) [_] Mass tort (40) ‘Asbestos (04) [1 other contract (37) 1 securities litigation (28) [_] Product liability (24) Real Property [_] Environmental/Toxic tort (30) LE) Medicat matpractice (45) [1 Eminent domain/inverse [J insurance coverage claims arising from the [1 other PuPDMD (23) condemnation (14) above listed provisionaly complex case Non-PUPDIWD (Other) Tort L21 Wrongful eviction (33) ‘ypes (41) usiness torVunfar business practice (07) [1 Other real property (26) Enforcement of Judgment C1 civit rights (08) Unlawful Detainer [J Enforcement of judgment (20) Defamation (13) LJ commercial (31) Miscellaneous Civil Complaint [2] Fraud (16) [__] Residential (32) C2 rico @7) [—] intellectual property (19) [1 ongs (38) Other complaint (not specified above) (42) [__] Professional negligence (25) dudicial Review Miscellaneous Civil Petition |__| Other non-PI/PDIWD tort (35) L_] Asset forfeiture (05) Partnership and corporate governance (21) Esgloyment [1 Petition re: arbitration award 11) [—] otner petition (not specified above) (43) Wrongful termination (36) [_] writ of mandate (02) Other employment (15) [1 other judicial review (39) 2. This case Ww is L_Jisnot complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management: a. Large number of separately represented parties d.L¥_] Large number of witnesses b. OO Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel e. Z| Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts issues that will be time-consuming to resolve in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court c. LY] Substantial amount of documentary evidence f. Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision 3. Remedies sought (check ail that apply): Ww monetary bv] nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief L Jpunitive 4, Number of causes of action (specify): 2 5. Thiscase Lv J is Jis not aclass action suit. 6. Ifthere are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.) Date: January 14, 2010 hh ‘ R. Alexander Saveri > x ancbe Chetty) (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) {SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY. FOR PARTY) NOTICE « Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, ‘or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions. © File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. © If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding. © Unless this is a collections case under rule 3. 740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only. ge 4 o 2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use ‘Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2,30, 3.220, 3.400-3.403, 3.740; Juda! Goucl of Calfora CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Gar Stance of Judie Admistraton, st. 210 Moro Rev. ly +2007] tv courinfo.c8 gov [American LegaiNet, inc www. FormsWorkflow.com|SUMMONS ISSJED Guido Saveri (22349) R. Alexander Saveri (173102) Geoffrey C. Rushing (126910) F odie ddadienD of 2 || William Heye (233249) “ASE MANAGEMENT ‘CONFERENCE SEI SAVERI & SAVERL, INC. 3 | 706 Sansome Street JAN 1 4 2010 San Francisco, California 94111 UN 18 2010 -9# 4 | Telephone: (415) 217-6810 9 MAGORDON PARK-L], Clerk Facsimile: (415) 217-6813 * Cie 5 RAND 6 | Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class 7 || [Additional Counsel Appear On Signature Page] 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 1 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 12 13 | PATRICIA McALLISTER, on behalf of Case No. ff GDBe 10 “49 603 0 herself and all others similarly situated, 14 CLASS ACTION Plaintiffs, 15 16 v. COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED x NESTLE USA, INC., and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, oO © Defendants. Ny So won we YY NY YN YN ou A AW FF WN = -1- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTPlaintiff Patricia McAllister, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 2 | brings this Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) for treble damages under the antitrust and 3 | unfair competition laws of the State of California. Plaintiff states and alleges as follows: 4 | JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5 | 1. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California Business and Professions Code 6 | Section 16750(a), to recover treble damages that Plaintiff and the members of the Class, as 7 | defined below, have sustained due to violations by the Defendant of California Business and 8 | Professions Code Section 16720 (the “Cartwright Act”). Plaintiff's claims also are brought 9 | pursuant to Sections 17203 and 17204 of the Business and Professions Code to obtain restitution 10 | from the Defendant due to its violations of Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code 11 || (the “Unfair Competition Law”). Plaintiff and the proposed Class assert no claims under federal 12 | law. 13 2. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to the provisions of Section 14 | 16750(a) of the Business and Professions Code and Sections 395(a) and 395.5 of the California 15 | Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant either maintains an office, transacts business, has an agent or 16 || is found in the City and County of San Francisco. Plaintiff's causes of action arose in part within 17 | the City and County of San Francisco and Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 18 | The unlawful acts committed and the conduct undertaken pursuant to the combination or 19 | conspiracy alleged herein has a direct effect on consumers within the State of California, 20 | including the City and County of San Francisco, and the trade and commerce described below is 21 | carried on within the State of California, as well as within the City and County of San Francisco. 22 | DEFINITIONS 23 3. As used in this Complaint, the following terms are defined as follows: 24 (a) Chocolate is a confectionary product created by processing cocoa beans and 25 | mixing the processed beans with milk, sugar, and other ingredients. As used in this Complaint, 26 | the term “Chocolate Products” includes chocolate bars and other chocolate confectionery 27 | products packaged for retail sale (e.g., Snickers, Kit Kats, 3 Musketeers, Hershey Bars, Hershey’s 2 | | 2 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTow ND Kisses, M&Ms, etc.). (b) “Person” or “persons” have the same meaning as set forth in Business and Professions Code Sections 16702 and 17201. THE PARTIES PLAINTIFF 4, Plaintiff Patricia McAllister is a resident of California, and purchased Chocolate Products in the State of California for her own use and not for resale, and suffered injury as a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct described in this Complaint. DEFENDANT AND CO-CONSPIRATORS 5. NESTLE USA, INC. (hereafter “Nestlé” or “Defendant”) is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Glendale, California. Nestlé is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle S.A. Throughout the Class Period, Nestle manufactured and/or indirectly sold Chocolate Products to purchasers in California. 6. Various other individuals, partnerships, firms, trade associations, and corporations, who have not been named as defendants in this Complaint, have participated as co-conspirators with the Defendant in the violations alleged herein, and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance thereof. These co-conspirators include The Hershey Company, Hershey Canada Inc., Mars, Incorporated, Mars Canada, Inc., Mars Snackfood US, LLC, Nestlé S.A., Nestlé Canada, Inc., Cadbury ple, Cadbury Holdings Ltd. (formerly known as Cadbury Schweppes plc), and Cadbury Adams Canada, Inc. In addition there are other individuals, partnerships, firms, trade associations, and corporations, who have participated as co-conspirators with the Defendant in the violations alleged herein whose identities are presently unknown, and are named as Doe defendants. 7. The acts alleged in this Complaint were done by the Defendant, were authorized, ordered, or done by duly authorized officers, agents, employees or representatives of the Defendant, while actively engaged in the management, direction or control of Defendant’s business or affairs. 8. The acts that this Complaint alleges were done by each of the co-conspirators, were fully authorized by each of those co-conspirators, or ordered or done by duly authorized 3- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINToon nun ss | officers, agents, employees or representatives of each co-conspirator while actively engaged in the management, direction, or control of such co-conspirator’s business or affairs. DOE DEFENDANTS 9. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, representative, or otherwise of defendants named herein as Does One through Fifty are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and they are therefore sued by such fictitious names pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of Does One through Fifty when Plaintiff knows them. Each of Does One through Fifty is in some manner legally responsible for the violations of law alleged herein. Hereafter, the term “Defendant” shall include the Doe Defendants. 10. The acts that this Complaint alleges were done by each of the Doe Defendants were authorized, ordered or done by duly authorized officers, agents, employees, or representatives, while actively engaged in the management, direction or control of such Doe Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ business or affairs. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Lec yx—————————— 11. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 382, on her own behalf and as representative of a Class defined as follows: All persons and/or entities residing in California who indirectly purchased Chocolate Products, at any time during the period from December 9, 2002 to the present, for their own use and not for resale. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its co- conspirators, all present or former parents, predecessors, subsidiaries or affiliates of Defendant, and all governmental entities. 12. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of class members. Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, however, Plaintiff believes that the total number of class members is at least in the hundreds of thousands and members of the class are so numerous and geographically dispersed across the State of California that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 13. There are questions of law or fact common to all members of the Class, including, but not limited to: 4. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINToe ND HW FY N wmoN MY NY NNR NKR SF SF S| SF SC FE SH rm sS RBexR®R BPR BK FS GCHAR AHwH RYN = SO a pe (a) Whether Defendant engaged with its co-conspirators in a trust, contract, combination or conspiracy among the world’s leading manufacturers of Chocolate Products to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize prices for those products in California and the United States; (b) The duration and extent of the trust, contract, combination or conspiracy alleged in this Complaint; (c) Whether the alleged trust, contract, combination or conspiracy violates the California Cartwright Act; (d) Whether Defendant’s conduct alleged herein violates California’s Unfair Competition Law; (e) The effect of Defendant’s trust, contract, combination or conspiracy on the world’s leading manufacturers of Chocolate Products to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize prices for those products in California and the United States during the Class Period; and (f) The appropriate measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and other members of the class. (g) | Whether Defendant and its co-conspirators engaged in a conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize the price of Chocolate Products; (h) Whether Defendant’s combination or conspiracy with its co-conspirators caused prices for Chocolate Products to be higher than they would have been in the absence of Defendant’s conduct; (i) Whether Defendant's combination or conspiracy caused injury to the business or property of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; Gg) Whether Defendant’s conduct violates the Unfair Competition Law, (k) Whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched through overpayments by Plaintiff and members of the Class; ad The appropriate Class-wide measure of damages; and (m) The appropriate nature of Class-wide equitable relief. 14. Plaintiff, who is a member of the Class, and who has claims that are typical of the claims of the class members, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff 5. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTis a typical purchaser of Chocolate Products made by Defendant for sale in California and her interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Class. In addition, Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of antitrust and class action litigation. 15. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 16. The questions of law or fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and factual issues relating to liability and damages. 17. Actass action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Treatment as a class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to adjudicate their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of claims by many class members who could not afford individually to litigate antitrust and unfair competition claims such as those asserted in this Complaint. This class action presents no difficulties in management that would preclude maintenance as a class action. Finally, the class is readily ascertainable. NATURE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE 18. The Chocolate Products market constitutes a distinct product market recognized by Defendant and its co-conspirators, the trade associations that serve the confectionery industry, and other bodies that have examined the industry. According to statistics reported by the United States Department of Agriculture, wholesale sales of chocolate candy in the United States totaled approximately $10.2 billion, while retail sales totaled $15.6 billion. A June 2007 report published in Matrade New York, entitled Trends in USA the USA Cocoa and Cocoa Product Market, reported that United States chocolate candy sales in 2006 totaled approximately 56% of all United States candy sales. 19. Important characteristics of the chocolate market facilitate anticompetitive collusion -6- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTamong the Defendant and its co-conspirators. 20. Chocolate is a commodity-like product. Thus, each Defendant and co- conspirator can and do produce and sell, for example, a certain type of chocolate candy bar, seasonal novelty chocolate, or boxed chocolate that is similar to a chocolate candy bar, seasonal novelty chocolate, or boxed chocolate offered by Defendant or another co-conspirator, respectively. 21. The market for Chocolate Products is highly concentrated. Defendant and its co- conspirators collectively control more than 40% of the global chocolate confectionery products market, with Nestlé controlling 12.6%, while its co-conspirators Hershey controls 8.2%, Cadbury 7.5%, and Mars 14.8%. Defendant Nestlé and its co-conspirators Hershey and Mars collectively possess approximately 80% of the United States chocolate market, with Hershey possessing about 45%, Mars about 27%, and Nestlé about 9%. Nestlé Canada, Hershey Canada, Mars Canada, and Cadbury Adams Canada collectively possess about 64% of the Canadian chocolate market. By contrast, the buyer side of the market for Chocolate Products is diffuse, comprised of many buyers without the ability to influence pricing significantly. 22. The chocolate industry is conducive to price fixing agreements. First, the industry is highly concentrated with Nestlé, Hershey and Mars controlling more than 75% of the United States market for chocolate candy. 23. Second, that concentration is substantially exacerbated by licensing agreements between Defendant and its co-conspirators. Hershey has a licensing agreement with Nestlé whereby Hershey has a right to sell and/or manufacture certain Nestlé products (i.e., Kit Kat bars and Rolo candy) in the United States. In addition, Hershey and Cadbury have a licensing arrangement whereby Hershey has the exclusive right to manufacture and/or sell Cadbury products in the United States. 24. Asaresult, Hershey and Cadbury control 45% of the market, and Hershey’s share is further increased by sales of certain Nestlé products. For Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI” purposes, a concentration in the market greater than 1,800 in the market is indicative of oligopolistic market power. The chocolate industry has a HHI rating based on the three firms -7- ) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |1 2 3 4 wn io oe ND 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 (Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé) of 2,835. 25. The terms of the licensing agreements between Hershey and Nestlé, and also Hershey and Cadbury, are similar in that both agreements contain terms that allow Hershey to manufacture and sell competitors’ products in the United States in exchange for Hershey paying quarterly royalty payments based upon net sales of the licensed products. 26. Both licenses also contain a right for Cadbury and Nestlé, respectively, to audit Hershey’s sales of the licensed products. The audit rights allow Cadbury and Nestlé to obtain key information from Hershey pertaining to the licensed products. 27. The exchange of data among multiple competitors provides Defendant and its co- conspirators with opportunities to collude on product pricing. 28. The exchange of pricing and cost data also provides a mechanism where, for at least the licensed products, Defendant and its co-conspirators can insure compliance with any conspiratorial price fixing agreements. It also further enhances the Defendant’s and its co- conspirators’ ability to enforce price fixing agreements on non-licensed products as well. 29. Hershey’s licensing agreements with Cadbury and Nestlé also provide Hershey with pricing control over a larger percentage of the United States chocolate market than it would possess in the absence of such licensing agreements, also resulting in further concentration of the United States chocolate market. 30. In addition, there are high barriers to entry into the chocolate market in the form of technical know-how, advertising, and access to distribution channels. The manufacture of confectionery products is highly technical, requiring considerable understanding of food technology, including hardware (processing machinery and computers), software, and formulation technology. There is significant spending on advertising and access to supply channels is critical to gain a foothold, as wholesale distributors, chain grocery stores, mass merchandisers, chain drug stores, vending companies, wholesale clubs, convenience stores, dollar stores, concessionaires, and department stores form the most significant distribution channel for 27 | confectionery sales. Because of their high collective market share globally, as well as in the United States and Canada, Defendant and its co-conspirators collectively are able to exercise -8- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTmarket power in each of these markets, including the ability to raise prices and erect barriers to entry. Pricing for Chocolate Products in the United States and Canada, during the Class Period was characterized by industry-wide price increases. Moreover, during the Class Period, price increases in the same or similar amounts for Chocolate Products were announced by Defendant and multiple of its co-conspirators and/or became effective at or near the same time. 31. The United States is the leading exporter of Chocolate Products to Canada as well as the leading importer of Chocolate Products from Canada. A 2004 United States Department of Agriculture report noted that in 2003, 46% of United States confectionery exports were to Canada. A 2005 United States Department of Agriculture report noted that “the United States supplied 45% of Canadian chocolate candy imports by value.” The 2007 Matrade New York 10 11 | report, referenced above, indicated that Canada was the largest exporter of chocolate food products 12 } to the United States in 2004 through 2006, with annual total customs values ranging from $690 to 13 } $705 million United States dollars. THE CONSPIRACY OF DEFENDANT AND. ITS CO-CONSPIRATORS 32. The market for Chocolate Products was ripe for collusion. In addition to the collective market power exercised by the Defendant and its co-conspirators, as detailed above, demand for these products has stagnated in recent years because of increasing health concerns and changing consumer preferences with respect to chocolate consumption. 33. The Canadian and United States operations of the Defendant and its co- conspirators are tightly interwoven. For example, sales of Hershey’s chocolate in the United States and Canada are overseen by its North American Commercial Group. Likewise, Cadbury’s confectionery sales in the United States and Canada are overseen by its Americas Confectionery operating unit. Similarly, Nestlé conducts its chocolate business through a Chocolate, Confectionery and Biscuits Strategic Business Unit, and Nestlé also organizes its businesses by geographic zone, with its “Zone Americas” including the United States and Canada. Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ geographically integrated operations for their Canadian and U.S. operations suggest that decisions related to Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ pricing in Canada either affected or reflected pricing decisions applicable to the U.S. operations of Defendant and its co- -9- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT| conspirators. | 34. The prices of Chocolate Products in North America had been generally stable from 1996 to 2002. In the face of waning demand, Defendant and its co-conspirators responded by instituting uniform parallel price increases during the Class Period in the United States and Canada. | 35. Inthe United States, for example: (a) On or about December 9, 2002, Mars (via its Masterfoods USA division) increased wholesale prices on standard-size chocolate bars by approximately 10.7%. A few days later, on or about December 11, 2002, Hershey announced a price increase (which was effective January 1, 2003) for the wholesale price of its domestic standard size, king size, variety pack, six-pack, and ten-pack candy bar lines. The increase raised the price of standard-size candy bars in particular by approximately 10.7%. Hershey spokeswoman Christine Dugan said Hershey raised prices after rival Mars recently raised its prices. On or about December 13, 2002, Nestlé announced a price increase of approximately 10.3% on its standard-size chocolate bars. (b) Onor about December 15, 2004, Hershey again increased the wholesale prices for many of its Chocolate Products. Hershey increased the price of its standard-size bars by approximately 5.5% and also increased prices for king-size bars, six-packs, variety packs, and peg bags. Significantly, Hershey’s increase came weeks after Mars (via its Masterfoods USA division) raised its prices for its Chocolate Products baglines by similar amounts on or about November 19, 2004. On or about December 17, 2004 (only two days after Hershey’s price increase), Mars increased the price of its standard-size bars by approximately 5.5% and also increased prices for its king-size bars and six-packs. Nestlé then increased prices on its standard- size bars by approximately 5.7% on or about December 22, 2004, and also increased prices on its king-size bars, six-packs, and peg bags. (c) On or about March 23, 2007, Mars announced price increases of approximately 5.3% on its standard-size bars, six-packs, and variety packs and also increased prices for other Chocolate Products, citing the need to help offset costs. Hershey then announced price increases on or about April 4, 2007, purportedly due to rising costs, particularly cocoa. Hershey increased its prices for standard-size bars, six-packs, and variety-packs by approximately 5.2% -10- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTwon and also increased prices for other Chocolate Products. Mars and Hershey both publicly noted that their previous price increases were more than two years ago. Nestlé also raised prices for its chocolate confectionery products on or about April 5, 2007, by an average of approximately 5%, including a 5.4% increase in the price of its standard-size bars, purportedly due to rising commodity, packaging, and energy costs. 36. In Canada, for example, on July 19, 2005, Nestlé Canada announced a chocolate price increase for 5-8%, effective October 31, 2005, for base confectionery, and April 18, 2006, for seasonal confectionery. Cadbury Adams Canada announced a price increase on average of 5.2% on its chocolate portfolio soon thereafter, effective October 31, 2005. In addition, Hershey announced a price increase on most chocolate, also effective October 31, 2005. Mars announced a price increase on average of 6% on select items in its chocolate confectionery portfolio, effective November 7, 2005. 37. Defendant and its co-conspirators falsely asserted that these price changes were fully justified by increases in costs. The price increases were instead the product of a conspiracy among Defendant and its co-conspirators, and cannot be explained solely by purported changes in the price of raw materials for these products. 38. Defendant and its co-conspirators offered various explanations in the media for their price increases on Chocolate Products, including rising costs in commodity prices such as cocoa, sugar, milk, or fuel prices. However, examination of commodity prices throughout the Class Period show that these prices cannot explain price increases on Chocolate Products as commodity and raw material costs remained relatively constant throughout periods when Defendant and its co-conspirators claimed a price increase was necessary. 39. For example, as discussed above, Defendant Hershey announced a price increase on standard-size candy bars of approximately 5.5% in December 2004. Defendant Mars had also raised prices around the same time. Hershey blamed the increase at least in part on higher fuel prices. However, an examination of the United States On-Highway Diesel Fuel Price Index published by the United States Energy Information Administration shows that fuel prices were relatively stable at less than $2.00 per gallon at the time this price increase was announced. -l1- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT0 oe ND HW F&F YN — o woN NN NY SF SF SF Fe SC FE SH Tt RP BB FF Ss Ow A DHF YP NR | | | | | nN n 26 27 | | 28 | | 40. Similarly, in April 2007, Defendant Hershey announced an approximate 5.2% increase in the price of standard-size chocolate candy bars and other Chocolate Products. Nestlé and Mars also announced similar price increases at approximately the same time. Hershey stated that the price increase was necessary to “help offset the company’s input costs, including raw and packaging materials ... While there has been no change in list prices on these impacted items since December 2004, over this period costs have continued to rise.” However, the raw material prices for the key ingredients in chocolate, i.e., cocoa, sugar, and milk, showed virtually no net increase in the commodity prices between December 2004 and April 2007. 41. Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ other purported reasons for price increases, such as increased packaging and employee benefit costs, were also only pretextual reasons for their price increases during the Class Period. 42. Inacompetitive market operating free of Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ conspiracy, cost increases would have resulted in decreases to Defendant’s and its co- conspirators’ profit margins because Defendant and its co-conspirators would have been able to only partially offset any cost increases by increasing prices. 43. However, due to Defendant’s and its co-conspirators’ price fixing agreement, Defendant and its co-conspirators were able to raise prices repeatedly to maintain their margins at or about the same levels. For example, Hershey’s gross margins from 2001 through 2007 were 35.5%, 37.8%, 39.0%, 39.5%, 38.7%, 37.8%, and 33% respectively. Nestlé’s Chocolate, Confectionary and Biscuits operating segment reported EBIT margins from 2001 through 2007 of 11.0%, 10.9%, 10.3%, 11.2%, 11.7%, 11.4%, and 11.4% respectively. 44. Moreover, during the Class Period, demand for Chocolate Products was declining or stagnant. Defendant and its co-conspirators were nonetheless able to maintain their profit margins as a result of their price fixing conspiracy. 45. From a date unknown, but at least January 1, 2002 through the present, Defendant and its co-conspirators engaged in a continuing contract, combination, or conspiracy with respect to the sale of Chocolate Products in the United States or for delivery in the United States in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in violation of the Cartwright Act, -J2- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINToo ND AW FF Ye YN wmpopmey vy Pw NNNNK Se Eee ESBH AS preePRR BS FS Swe AAA FY NFS California Business & Professions Code Section 16720 et seq. 46. The contract, combination, or conspiracy consisted of an agreement among Defendant and its co-conspirators to fix, raise, stabilize, or maintain at artificially high levels the prices they charged for Chocolate Products in the United States or for delivery in the United States. 47. In formulating and effectuating this conspiracy, Defendant and its co-conspirators did those things that they combined and conspired to do, including: (a) Participating in meetings and conversations among themselves during which they agreed to charge prices at certain levels, and otherwise to fix, increase, maintain, or stabilize prices of Chocolate Products in the United States and California; (b) Issuing price announcements consistent with, and selling Chocolate Products at, the agreed upon prices; and (c) Participating in meetings and conversations among themselves to implement, adhere, and police the agreements they reached. 48. The Canadian Competition Bureau (“Bureau”) currently is investigating Defendant and its co-conspirators for alleged price fixing of Chocolate Products and recently received permission to search their Canadian offices, The Bureau submitted two sets of information on November 19 and November 28, 2007, in support of its request to obtain search warrants. On November 21, 2007, Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the November 19, 2007 search warrants. 49. The search warrants were based in part on information obtained from a “Cooperating Party,” which according to news reports is believed to be Cadbury. Cadbury is believed to be the party cooperating with Canadian authorities because Cadbury is not named in the warrants as one of the companies under investigation, despite its large Canadian market share. 50. The Information of Daniel Wilcock, sworn November 19, 2007 (“November 19, 2007 Information”), details many meetings and communications regarding pricing of Chocolate Products beginning at least as early as February 2004, including meetings at coffee shops, restaurants, conventions, and the offices of Nestlé, amongst Hershey, Mars, Nestlé, and the “Cooperating Party.” In the November 19, 2007 Information, the Bureau set forth the following: -13- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT |1 owe ND HW FF YN _ o 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 (a) “Cooperating Individual 1” attended a breakfast meeting with the President and | CEO of Nestlé Canada, Bob Leonidas, on February 23, 2004, at which time the parties discussed the topic of “trade spend” (the industry practice of providing discounts, rebates, and allowances to customers, often linked to promotions). According to the November 19, 2007 Information, (b) Cooperating Individual 1 indicated that it was known in the industry that he disagreed with the industry’s prevailing approach to trade spend and that the Cooperating Party was going to reduce trade spend onchocolate. Cooperating Individual | indicated that he left the meeting with the impression that Leonidas “sees the world the way” that he did. Cooperating Individual 1 also understood that he had an open line to call Leonidas if there were any issues in the market, including trade spend practices. “Cooperating Party” informed the Bureau of an internal email exchange, which began on June 1, 2005, regarding a discussion with their customer, ITWAL Limited, a distributor, concerning chocolate pricing: (©) Cooperating Individual 11 sent an email with the subject heading “Chocolate pricing” to Cooperating Individual 12 and Cooperating Individual 13 stating: “At ITWAL I was informed by a reliable source that both Nestlé and Effem have been to customers hinting at 2005 price increases. No details or confirmation. I suggested that we would seriously consider appropriate actions once firm details known, and that I would be concerned about the other leading player not following Which [sic] my contact said they would inquire about. This is similar to info we had picked up a couple of months ago. Martin I would send out a note to ADWM’s to start digging.” “Cooperating Individual 1” met Leonidas of Nestlé at Manoir Richelieu during a Confectionary Manufacturers Association of Canada annual meeting, held from June 2 to 5, 2005. According to the November 19, 2007 Information, @) Cooperating Individual 1 stated that Leonidas said words to him to the effect of “I want you to hear it from the top — I take my pricing seriously” or “[w]e are going to take a price increase and I want you to hear it from the top.” Leonidas handed Cooperating Individual 1 an envelope. Cooperating Individual 1 accepted the envelope without objection. Cooperating Individual 1 said “I may have said ‘we like to take pricing too, we take it seriously.’ T don’t think [Leonidas] took a negative impression. Tjust don’t know if he thought it was favorable.” Cooperating Individual 1 agreed that Leonidas would have left the meeting with the idea that the Cooperating Party would follow a price increase led by Nestlé. “Cooperating Individual 1” informed the Bureau that the envelope contained -14- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTinformation concerning Nestlé’s planned price increases for chocolate in 2005. He understood that there was a problem with him receiving this information, and advised the Bureau that “you shouldn’t talk about pricing. I didn’t want to be rude to Bob [Leonidas] so I said OK, was neutral, but I didn’t want him to think, in any way, that I was coordinating with him.” Cooperating Individual 1 also stated that the letter was similar to another Nestlé price increase letter he had received. (ec) Anemail exchange provided by the Cooperating Party, dated July 6, 2005, indicates that by at least that date a letter containing confidential Nestlé price increase information was | circulating around the Cooperating Party’s office: | One of the emails observed that the letter was a draft, as it was dated July 15, 2005 . . .. was unsigned and contained spelling mistakes. The information was that Nestlé was increasing the price of its | confectionery portfolio by approximately 5 to 7%, effective October 31, 2005 for base confectionery and April 18, 2006 for seasonal confectionery. This pricing information was discussed among the Cooperating Party’s leadership team and prompted the Cooperating Party to consider and announce a price increase on chocolate. The Cooperating Party has also provided the Bureau with a copy ofa letter located in its files that appears to be the July 15 letter. (f) Cooperating Individual 2 stated that Cooperating Individual 1 called her on J uly 6, 2005 from Europe and instructed her to go to the Nestlé [Canada] offices to pick up something from Leonidas. Cooperating Individual 2 got Leonidas’ phone number from Cooperating Individual 1’s contacts and called Leonidas to arrange a time. Cooperating Individual 2 went to the Nestlé [Canada] offices with a colleague and was met by Leonidas downstairs. He said something to the effect that it was better not to be seen in his office and handed Cooperating Individual 2 an | envelope. Cooperating Individual 2 subsequently opened the envelope and it contained | information about a planned price increase by Nestlé [Canada]. Counsel for the Cooperating | Party provided the Bureau with a copy of the document that Cooperating Individual 2 had retrieved | from the files and Cooperating Individual 2 believes it is the document that was contained in | the envelope from Leonidas. The document is an unsigned letter on Nestlé letterhead announcing | a chocolate price increase to the trade and was forward dated July 19, 2005.... The July 19 | letter is substantively the same as the July 15 letter, except that spelling mistakes had been | -15- | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINTwn io em ND 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 corrected and the percentage price increase had been increased to “5 to 8%.” (g) Cooperating Individual 2 stated that when she returned to the office on July 6, 2005, she called Cooperating Individual 1 in Europe, as he had requested, and left a voice- mail reading the contents of the letter. Cooperating Individual 2 also states that she sent an email message to Cooperating Individual 1 informing him that she had left him a voice-mail regarding the Nestlé letter. The Cooperating Party has provided the Bureau with a copy of an email from Cooperating Individual 2 to Cooperating Individual 1 dated July 6, 2005 that states “[s]ent voice- mail re Nestlé letter.” (h) Regarding the email from Cooperating Individual 2 dated July 6, 2007, Cooperating Party 1 explained: that earlier that day he had got a confirmation on voice-mail that Nestlé [Canada] was going to have a price increase. Cooperating Individual 1 thinks he sent a voice-mail or email message to Cooperating Individual 2 and asked her to forward the message by voice-mail to others in the Cooperating Party along the lines of “[i]f Nestlé is going to take a price increase then we will too.” (i) Counsel for the Cooperating Party gave the Bureau a price increase letter from the Cooperating Party dated July 29, 2005: The Cooperating Party announced a price increase on average of 5.2% on its Chocolate portfolio, effective October 31, 2005. The price increase for the Cooperating Party was such as to align its prices ona number of common formats with those of Nestlé [Canada]. G) Counsel for the Cooperating Party gave the Bureau a Hershey [Canada] price increase letter dated August 23, 2005 that was located in the files of Cooperating Party... . Hershey [Canada] announced a price increase of an unknown percentage on most chocolate and candy products effective 31 October, 2005. (k) Counsel for the Cooperating Party gave the Bureau a “Mars [Canada] price increase letter dated September 6, 2005 .... Mars [Canada] announced a price increase on average of 6% on select items in its confectionery portfolio, effective November 7, 2005.” (ay Counsel for the Cooperating Party stated that Cooperating Individual 3 was contacted by Nestlé [Canada] employee Lynn Hashinsky in late fall 2005 regarding pricing at a key account. Cooperating Individual 3 reported this to the Cooperating Party’s in-house counsel -16- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT| | 14 15 16 17 18 19 | | 25 26 | 27 | 28 who in turn informed Cooperating Individual 1 of the incident. (m) Counsel for the Cooperating Party provided the Bureau with an email exchange between Leonidas and Cooperating Individual 1 beginning on January 18, 2006 .... Cooperating Individual 1 congratulated Leonidas on his promotion to President and CEO of Nestlé [Canada]. Leonidas responded on January 19, 2006: “Thanks [first name of Cooperating Individual 1], still want to see you Feb 7th 8am to TALK.” (n) Counsel for the Cooperating Party gave the Bureau a “copy of an entry from Cooperating Individual 1’s calendar dated February 15, 2006 showing a meeting scheduled for 7:30am with Leonidas at a Second Cup coffee shop.” Cooperating Individual 1 met Leonidas in February 2006, at a Second Cup coffee shop in Toronto: During this meeting they discussed the price of seasonal chocolate. Leonidas said he wanted Cooperating Individual | to take a price increase. Cooperating Individual 1 states that he refused to commit to taking a price increase. ... On October 30, 2006 the Cooperating Party announced a price increase on seasonal chocolate to take effect February 5, 2007 — 5% for Halloween products and 4% for Easter products. (0) Cooperating Individual 1 received a phone call from Sandra Martinez de Arevalo, the new President of Nestlé Confectionery, in mid 2007, and stated that Martinez wanted to meet and talk. Cooperating Individual 1 and Martinez met for lunch at Auberge du Pommier on July 4, 2007 in Toronto. The discussion covered a number of issues, both personal and professional. Martinez suggested that the Cooperating Party lead a price increase in 2007, as Nestlé wanted to take a price increase in the third quarter. Cooperating Individual 1 replied that he was not prepared to take a price increase in 2007, but indicated that the Cooperating Party might take one in 2008. Cooperating Individual 1 said he would follow on chocolate but not lead. Martinez said she would call him back in two weeks. Cooperating Individual 1 said that he was of the view that the discussion did not matter because he was leaving the Cooperating Party; he could lead her down the garden path because he would not be making the decisions. Martinez could “say whatever she wants and hear whatever she wants” because Cooperating Individual 1 would not be making pricing decisions. Cooperating Individual 1 also states that Martinez would have understood that “they were on the same page.” Counsel for t