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Filing # 178045269 E-Filed 07/24/2023 10:31:33 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
Rodney Bernard Singleton Civil Case No.16-2022-CA-006257
Plaintiff, Div: CV-C
v.
Martina Lanfersiek, Michael J Lynott,
Crystal Arocha, Fire Central Solutions, LLC
& Future Computer Systems, LLC
Milber, Makris, Plousaidis, & Seiden, LLP
___________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN., RULE 2.330(I). PRIOR RULINGS
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Rodney Singleton, an indigent non-lawyer,
appearing pro se, and pursuant to Fla. R. Jud. Admin., Rule 2.330(i) moves for this
Honorable Court to reconsider the order previously entered granting the motion to
dismiss for the Defendants. In support, the Plaintiff files this verified motion to
reconsider prior rulings of Judge Bruce M. Dees, and states:
1. I move to reconsider the prior rulings of Judge Bruce M. Dees (“Judge
Dees”) in this case under Rule 2.330(i), Florida Rules of Judicial Administration:
RULE 2.330. DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES
(i) Prior Rulings. Prior factual or legal rulings by a disqualified judge may be
reconsidered and vacated or amended by a successor judge based upon a
motion for reconsideration, which must be filed within 20 days of the order of
ACCEPTED: DUVAL COUNTY, JODY PHILLIPS, CLERK, 07/27/2023 08:34:56 AM
disqualification, unless good cause is shown for a delay in moving for
reconsideration or other grounds for reconsideration exist.
1. On April 12, 2023 Plaintiff filed his motion to recuse Judge Dees with the
court and served said motion on Judge Dees pursuant to Fla. R. Gen. Prac.
Jud. Admin. 2.516 on the same date.
2. On May 15, 2023, more than 30 days after the filing and effected service of
the aforementioned motion to recuse, the court held a non-evidentiary
motion hearing. (Of note here is, despite the Plaintiff pleading with the
court for an evidentiary hearing, his request was repeatedly ignored and
subsequently denied by the judicial assistant without notifying Judge Dees
of the Plaintiff’s request.)
3. Judge Dees opened the May 15 hearing by stating he had not seen the
motion to recuse himself and would need to check with his judicial assistant
to see if the motion had been received as the 30 day time limit to rule on it
had passed. Consequently Judge Dees could not rule on the pending motion
for reconsideration filed by the Plaintiff.
4. After the hearing, for reasons unknown to the Plaintiff, again, the court
allowed another 30 days to lapse without ruling on the motion to recuse.
When the Plaintiff tried reaching out to the court to inquire about the
administrative task of issuing the order of recusal, the court mysteriously
went silent until June 28, 2023. More than 30 days after the May 15 hearing,
the court had still not issued the due order of recusal and could not answer
when such order would be issued.
5. On July 13, 2023, approximately 92 days after the initial filing and effected
service of the motion to recuse, and 58 days after the May 15 hearing, the
order of recusal was finally issued by the court. These types of actions
constitute a continuing violation of the Plaintiffs due process rights and
serve as proof that the Plaintiff has had to deal with unnecessary obstacles
to merely have his day in court. A right protected by the Constitution.
6. The actions by the court serve as a microcosm of the issues the Plaintiff,
who is pro se, indigent, and unable to afford legal representation has dealt
with in his 4 years of trying to litigate a 2015 car accident. The Plaintiff has
been repeatedly denied an opportunity to fully present his case in the
underlying car accident case (filed April 22, 2019) and this subsequent case
which was filed due to the breach of insurance contract, civil conspiracy,
and fraud upon the court committed by the defendants to secure dismissal of
the April 2019 lawsuit.
7. I hereby move for rehearing, under Rule 2.330(i), of all prior rulings of
Judge Dees that affect my rights. See Attached
Summary of Arguments
I. The order granting dismissal issued by Judge Dees goes against Florida
Procedural Laws governing the application of the Res Judicata
Doctrine. See Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205
II. The 4 identities required to apply the Res Judicata Doctrine have not
been satisfied for both cases. See Huff Groves Trust v. Caulkin
Indiantown Citrus Co; Palm AFC Holdings, INC v. Palm Beach County
III. The order issued by Judge Dees would work a manifest injustice.
IV. The current suit is an independent action that supersedes the original
car accident suit, includes different and distinct claims of civil
conspiracy and civil aiding and abetting, and, in addition, is being
brought in accordance with Rule 1.540(b)(3). Independent actions are
appropriate where fraud upon the court is being claimed under a Rule
1.540(b)(3) pleading.
Argument
I. The order granting dismissal issued by Judge Dees goes against Florida
Law governing the application of the Res Judicata Doctrine.
The order issued by Judge Dees on 03/09/2023 was granted due to the
erroneous application of the doctrine of Res Judicata. Several conditions must be
met before a party can invoke Res Judicata. Decisional law has emphasized each
element of this definition, requiring, as an initial matter, 1) a judgment, 2 ) on the
merits, 3) in a former suit. In addition, the application of res judicata requires that
certain similarities exist between the previous action and the new one.
The similarities to the previous case that is required in this case ends at the
parties and their privies. Some of the defendants are the same, but the cause of
action and the thing being sued for are completely different in both cases. To
further clarify, the initial case (16-2019-CA-002962) sought damages stemming
from a car accident on May 04, 2015 in which the lawsuit was initiated on April
22, 2019 by the filing of the original complaint. The subsequent lawsuit (16-2022-
CA-006257) stems from the damages caused by the Defendants actions during the
litigation of the initial case. The new complaint adds new defendants who engaged
in and aided a civil conspiracy to breach the Defendant’s insurance contract
through fraud upon the court. The alleged civil conspiracy and fraud upon the court
were tactics used by the Defendants and their counsel to secure the order of
dismissal in the initial lawsuit.
The Defendants actions in the first lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff are the
reason for the ensuing lawsuit as those actions work to constitute a violation of his
right to due process. Courts have declined to invoke the Res Judicata doctrine
“where it will work an injustice.” Thus, like the law of the case doctrine and
collateral estoppel, Res Judicata should not be applied where it would defeat the
ends of justice. In this case the Plaintiff’s right to due process has been violated
and would result in a manifest injustice. Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205
II. The four identities required to apply the Res Judicata Doctrine are not
satisfied and therefore does not preclude a second lawsuit against the same
defendants.
Application of Res Judicata requires that certain similarities exist between
the previous action and the new one. Under the Res Judicata doctrine the “four
identities,” are “1. Identity in the thing sued for. 2. Identity of the cause of action.
3. [Identity] of persons and of parties to the action. 4. Identity of the quality in the
persons for or against whom the claim is made.”
The use of the application of the doctrine of res Judicata to preclude the
second lawsuit has been erroneously applied because the two cases do not share the
same necessary four identities. All four identities are required in order for the
doctrine to apply and it is clear prima facie that the causes of action in both cases is
different.
Cases that take legal precedence, such as Albrecht v State and Gold v
Bankier, establish that an identity in the cause of action occurs where the facts to
sustain both actions are identical. This is clearly not the case here as one lawsuit is
for an automobile negligence tort and the subsequent lawsuit is for a civil
conspiracy and breach of contract through fraud upon the court, which is an
intentional tort.
The damages being sued for are different in both cases as well. The initial
complaint sought compensation, otherwise known as general and special damages,
for past and future medical bills, past and future lost wages, and pain and suffering.
The second lawsuit alleges a civil conspiracy to breach the insurance contract
between the defendants and also seeks sanctions against the defendants and their
counsel for committing fraud upon the court via suborned perjury. The current
lawsuit also seeks punitive damages to deter the Defendants from doing this again
to anyone else in the future. The requirements to apply the Res Judicata doctrine as
an affirmative defense have not been satisfied and therefore do not preclude the
Plaintiff’s second suit for civil conspiracy, breach of insurance contract, and fraud
upon the court.
III. The order issued by Judge Dees would work a significant manifest
injustice.
The plaintiff is an indigent non-lawyer, a father of 6, and has been rendered
unable to work due to debilitating injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence in
the initial claim. Even with these facts, the plaintiff has been forced to
unnecessarily continue litigating an issue that has now evolved to a second lawsuit
four years after the initiation of the first lawsuit. The defendants have sought to
deprive the Plaintiff of his right to due process by continuing to misdirect the court
and have gone so far as to knowingly perjure themselves.
The Plaintiff has been subjected to a series of intentionally malicious actions
by the Defendants in which he has to continue to fight for his rights guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. The Defendants have also shown a willingness to
disrespect the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure when they admit that they have not
done an investigation to even disprove the Plaintiff’s claims against them and have
engaged in abusive discovery tactics by refusing to participate whatsoever.
The Plaintiff filed for a recusal of the judge because his judicial assistant
refused to allow the Plaintiff an evidentiary hearing without ever consulting with
Judge Dees. Actions like these, as well as the illogical application of a doctrine that
clearly has not been satisfied to dismiss this lawsuit, gives the appearance of
impropriety by the trial court and further illustrates that no one outside of the
Plaintiff has taken his allegations of fraud upon the court seriously. The Defendants
continue to attempt to distract the courts from the merits of the cases and an
evidentiary hearing should be held where the Plaintiff will undoubtedly prove his
allegations against the Defendants.
It is hard to see an angle in this lawsuit where the judges actions and failure
to direct his employees to act within the rules of the court would not appear to be
acts of impropriety. The Plaintiff has not done anything to disrespect the court and
has only utilized every legal avenue available to him to seek the justice he
deserves. In turn, the defendants have sought to have him sanctioned and labeled as
a vexatious litigant. It is not enough for the Defendants to seek to deprive the
Plaintiff of his right to proper compensation for the damages that they caused him,
the Defendants now seek to further deprive him by seeking to completely take
away his access to the courts as a pro se litigant. The court should not allow this
type of bullying of a pro se litigant in its proceedings.
IV. The current suit is an independent action that supersedes the original
car accident suit and is brought along with claims of fraud upon the court
pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(3). Independent actions are appropriate where
fraud upon the court is being claimed under a Rule 1.540(b)(3) pleading.
Rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a Final
Judgment may be set aside for mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence, fraud, etc. This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order,
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.”
For the trial court to properly exercise its discretion regarding dismissal of a
case (or relief from a judgment) for fraud on the court, "it must have an evidentiary
basis to make that decision." Howard v. Risch, 959 So.2d 308, 310-311. "Trial
court rulings are given less deference when" there is no evidentiary hearing and the
trial court's decision is "based on the same cold document record that is before the
reviewing court." Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Despite the fact the court has not allowed the Plaintiff to have an evidentiary
hearing, both cases have been dismissed on motion hearings alone without any
evidence being offered to prove or counter the claims of fraud upon the court.
The inherent power of the court to hear the Plaintiff’s second case against
these Defendants is apparent. In both cases the Plaintiff has been denied an
evidentiary hearing to further show the elements of his case. The result of which
has allowed for the cases being dismissed based on technicalities and a doctrine
that clearly does not apply. Instead, the Defendants are allowed to continue
misdirecting the court with frivolous arguments and fraud upon the court.
Such a serious claim being levied against the Defendants normally would
justify the need for an evidentiary hearing and yet in four years and two separate
cases, the Plaintiff has repeatedly been denied this opportunity with no explanation
or justification. The Defendants’ actions have been designed to deceive and
outright cover up what the facts of the cases are and these actions have previously
been ignored by the court. The result is more court action being taken to prevent
such injustices from happening to the Plaintiff and any other law abiding citizens
in the future.
Further, court action, including the dismissal of claims, for fraud upon the
court involving similar circumstances have been upheld in numerous cases. See,
e.g., Papadopoulos v. Cruise Ventures Three Corp., 974 So.2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA
2007); Hutchinson v. Plantation Bay Apartments, LLC, 931 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2006); Distefano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 846 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2003); Long v. Swofford, 805 So.2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Baker v.
Myers Tractor Servs., Inc., 765 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Metro.
Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So.2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
The significant difference in these cases from the Plaintiff’s case is that, in
the aforementioned cases, evidence was allowed to be introduced and witnesses
were allowed to testify. The Plaintiff has repeatedly been denied this fundamental
right. The Plaintiff has also not been allowed to engage in discovery in either case.
The Defendants have refused to engage in any meaningful dialogue (meet and
confer requirements) outside the court room, have blatantly acknowledged to the
court that they have not and will not investigate the cases, and have refused to
engage in any discovery. These types of actions are not only an affront to the
justice system, but they undermine the legal system in its entirety and must be
handled appropriately. The Plaintiff is doing nothing more than seeking to handle
himself according to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as he continues to pursue
justice.
CONCLUSION
The Order entered by the Honorable Judge Bruce M. Dees should be reconsidered
for all of the above stated reasons.
WHEREFORE, Rodney Singleton, requests that this court reconsiders the Order
Granting Dismissal of this action and vacates the order in its entirety.
July 24, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Rodney Singleton
4217 High Park Lane
Atlanta, Georgia 30344
(904) 662-6093
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to Bruce Calderon, Barri
Reisch, via the preferred emails listed on 07/24/2023.
MILBER MAKRIS PLOUSADIS & SEIDEN,
LLP
Attorneys for Defendants, MARTINA
LANFERSIEK, MICHAEL J. LYNOTT,
CRYSTAL AROCHA, FIRE CENTRAL
SOLUTIONS, LLC and FUTURE
COMPUTER SYSTEMS, LLC
1900 NW Corporate Blvd., East Tower,
Suite 440 Boca Raton, Florida 33431
bcalderon@milbermakris.com
breisch@milbermakris.com
kmcdowell@milbermakris.com
sskowronski@milbermakris.com
Telephone: 561-994-7310
Facsimile: 561-994-7313
Bruce R. Calderon
Florida Bar No. 50448
Barri A. Reisch
Florida Bar No. 107052
Filing # 168395326 E-Filed 03/09/2023 01:52:02 PM
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ACCEPTED: DUVAL COUNTY, JODY PHILLIPS, CLERK, 03/09/2023 04:21:37 PM
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