Preview
1
EULEQ 9
FEED, 22 .
l
FRESNOCOUNTYSUPEMORCOURT
2
By DEPUTY
3
4
5 SUPERIOR COURT 0F CALIFORNIA, COUNTY 0F FRESNO
4
6 CENTRAL DIVISION
7
ALPINE COUNTY UNIFIED SCHOOL Case No. l6CECGOl6l7
8 DISTRICT, and THE BOARD OF Department 404
TRUSTEES 0F THE ALPINE COUNTY
9 UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
10 Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
11 V_
12 COUNTY 0F SAN BERNARDINO; STATEMENT OF DECISION
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES;
l3 ADOPTIONS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMN;
and DOES 1—20 INCLUSIVE,
l4
Respondents/Defendants;
15 VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV
16
and
17
18 ALPINE COUNTY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT STUDENT J.K., a minor;
19
STUDENT J.K.’S parent/guardian
20 C.K.
21 Real Party in Interest.
22
23
The court has considered all of the papers submitted in
24
support of the petition for writ of mandate, the opposition and
25
reply, and the oral arguments made by counsel and the parties.
26
The court rules as follows.
27
28
'
COUNTY0F FRESNO
Fresno
. CA
1. Standard of Review
An examination of case law and various treatises reveals that
in zoning actions it is customary to combine a complaint with a
cause of action for declaratory relief. See California Forms of
Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender & Co.) Volume 51 atVChapter
570: “Zoning and Planning” § 579—210 citing Residents of Beverly
Glen, Inc. v. City bf Los Angeles (1973) 34 Ca1.App.3d 117, 121].
In addition, California Civil Writ Practice (CEB) Chapter 5 §
5.119 entitled “Combining Writ Petition and Complaint” states:
10
In some situations, a writ may not provide full and
11
complete relief. In such case, the petitioner can file a
12
combined initial pleading—a petition and a complaint for
damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief, as may be
l3 appropriate. See Morehart v County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7
Ca1.4th 725, 735; California Sch. Bds. Ass'n V State (2009)
l4 171 Ca1.App.4th 1183 (combined complaint for declaratory
relief and writ petition); County of San Diego v State (2008)
15 164 Ca1.App.4th 580 (same).
l6
l7 But, Morehart, supra was zoning
a action. California School
18 Boards, sought to declare statute invalid
gngga, a and County of
19 San Diego, sought reimbursement under article
EEEEE, XII B,
20: section 6 of the California Constitution for the costs of
21 providing state—mandated programs and services. Notably, with
22 regard to the latter, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
23 overturned the trial court and determined that the court lacked
24 the power to order the Legislature through a writ of mandate to
25 appropriate sufficient funds in
and, general, the writ of mandate
26 was improper. It also held that declaratory relief did not lie
27 and monetary damages were not available.
28
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There is no authority for combining a petition seeking a writ
of mandate with a “cause of action” seeking damages. Indeed, such
combination would contradict the writ requirement that no other
remedy is adequate. §§§ 8 Witkin California Procedure (5th Ed.
2008) “Extraordinary Writs” § 122; Spangenberg v. Western Heavy
Hardware & Iron Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 284, 285, 135 P. 1127; Pomona
Police Officers' Assn. V. Pomona (1997) 58 Ca1.App.4th 578, 590
and 300 DeHaro Street Investors V. Department of Housing &
Community Dev. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1252. Ordinarily,
10 the remedy for an improperly drafted pleading is to move to strike
ll pursuant to CCP § 436(b) on the grounds that it was not drawn in
12 conformity with the laws of this state. Respondent did not do so.
13 Therefore only the Petition seeking a writ will be addressed.
14 Where a petition challenges an agency’s failure to perform an
15 act required by law rather than the conduct or result of an
l6 administrative hearing, the remedy is by ordinary mandate pursuant
l7 to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, not by administrative
18 mandate pursuant to section 1094.5. Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102
19 Cal.App.4th 745, 751—752. A traditional writ of mandate brought
20 under section 1085 lies “to compel the performance of an act which
21 the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office,
22 trust or station.” Under this section, mandate will lie to compel
23 performance of a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty in
24 cases where a petitioner has a clear, present and beneficial right
25 to performance of that duty. Mbrris V. Harper (2001) 94
26 Cal.App.4th 52, 58.
27 A mandamus action under section 1085 addresses an abuse of
28 discretion by an administrative official. Common Cause v. Board
COUNTY OF FRESNO
Fresno,CA
3
of Supervisors (1989) 49 Ca1.3d 432, 442. Under this statute, the
trial court reviews an administrative action to determine if an
agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy,
unlawful or procedurally unfair. Weiss V. City of Los Angeles
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 194, 204.
In determining the proper interpretation of a statute, the
administrative agency’s construction is entitled to great weight,
and if there appears to be a reasonable basis for it, a court will
10 not substitute it judgment for that administrative body. Family
ll Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc. v. Belshe (1998) 62
12 Ca1.App.4th 999, 1004. This court should defer to the agency’s
13 interpretation unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized.
14 Physicians and Surgeons Laboratories, Inc. v. Dept. of Health
15 Services (1992) 6 Ca1.App.4th 968, 986-978.
16 Petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving facts
17 upon which its petition is based. Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v.
18 County of Riverside (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 1285, 1289. Petitioner
19 further has the burden of proof to show that the decision was
20 unreasonable or invalid as a matter of law, and there is a
21 presumption that the agency ascertained the existence of necessary
22 facts to support its action, and the “necessary facts” are those
23 required by the applicable standards which guided the agency.
24 Weinstein V. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Ca1.App.4th 944,
25 966.
26 Petitioners Alpine County Unified School District and the
27 Board of Trustees of the Alpine County Unified School District
28 (“Petitioners”) bring this Writ of Mandate requesting this court
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to order Respondents County of San Bernardino; Children and Family
Services; Adoptions Assistance Program (“Respondents”) to pay and
continue Adoptions Assistance Program (“AAP”) funding at the April
2015 rate to help pay for student fi.K.’s placements, from May,
2015 to the present. In addition, Petitioners‘seek a writ of
mandate directing Respondents to reimburse Petitioners for a11
funds paid by Petitioner Alpine County Unified School District to
cover and replace full AAP funding from May 2015 forward, and for
other declaratory and injunctive relief.1
10 2. Factual Summary
11 The factual issues in this case are not in dispute. Student
12 J.K. is a student of the Alpine County Unified School District who
13 turned seventeen (l7) years of age on June 4, 2015. He has one
14 parent and guardian via adoption, who is his mother C.K. Student
15 J.K. was adopted by C.K.‘at age two, from San Bernardino County,
16 after living in foster care situations from six months of age.
17 His birth mother was an adolescent drug user and his birth father
18 had a history of methamphetamine abuse. Since at least age six,
19 J.K. has exhibited severe behavioral, social and emotional
20 problems, and developmental and learning delays.
21 California has a program designed to encourage people to
22 adopt children who would otherwise reside in foster homes. It is
23 called the Adoption Assistance Program, or AAP. The program
24 includes financial benefits on behalf of children who have special
25 needs that might discourage prospective adoptive parents from
26 adopting them. J.K. was one such special needs child. J.K. was
27
28
1
Venue for this action was transferred to Fresno County pursuant to a stipulation of the
COUNTY OF FRESNO parties filed on April 5, 2016.
Fresno.CA
adopted by C.K. in 2000 and C.K. has received AAP benefits from
the County of San Bernardino ever since.
Due to J.K.’s behavioral and emotional issues, C.K.
frequently found it necessary to have J.K. removed from her home
and placed in a residential treatment center (“RTC”) for children
with emotional disturbances. Pursuant to the AAP, C.K. received
money from the County of San Bernardino every‘month. When J.K.
lived at home with C.K.,lshe received a basic subsidy. However,
when it was necessary for J.K. to live in a RTC, the County of San
10 Bernardino funded those stays. The educational component of such
ll a stay would often be paid for by the school district in which
12 J.K. was a student — in this case the Alpine County School
l3 District. Stays at RTC’s_are meant to be temporary and of limited
l4 duration.
15 A review of the pleadings reveals that J.K. has spent years
l6 in residential treatment facilities. The County of San Bernardino
l7 paid for the residential component of those stays up until May 6,
18 2015, after J.K. had just spent 18 months living at the Devereux
19 Treatment Center in League City, Texas. J.K. was at Devereux for
20 exactly 18 months, from November 7, 2013 to May 6, 2015. J.K.
21 went home for a few days and then went to live at another
22 residential treatment center called Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis
23 Center in Utah, moving into that facility en May 11, 2015. The
24 County of San Bernardino did not pay Cinnamon Hills for J.K.’s
25 stay. While he was at Cinnamon Hills, the County provided mother
26 C.K. an AAP basic benefit of $674 per month, plus a special care
27 increment of $800 per month, for a total of $1,474 per month.
28 Thus, San Bernardino County continued to pay C.K. basic and
COUNTY 0FFRESNO
Fresno,CA
special care AAP benefits, even though the County did not believe
it could justify paying the costs of another RTC stay for J.K.
Petitioners Alpine County Unified School District paid for
the residential care component of J.K.’s stay at Cinnamon Hills.
It also paid for its educational component. Petitioners now claim
that Respondents should have paid the residential care component
of J.K.’s stay at Cinnamon Hills for the nine months J.K. was at
the center. This writ of mandate ensued.
3. Legal Analysis
10 The issue in this case turns on the interpretation and
ll application of Welfare and Institutions Code § 16121(b) and its
12 corresponding regulation, 22 C.C.R. § 35334(a).
l3 Section 16121 entitled “Adoption assistance; amount; out—of—
l4 home placements; maximum time; application; adjustment to adoption
15 assistance payment rate structure” states in relevant part:
16
(b) Payment may be made on behalf of an otherwise
17 state-approved group home residential
eligible child in a or
18
care treatment facility if the department or county
responsible for determining payment has confirmed that the
19 placement is necessary for the temporary resolution of mental
or emotional problems related to a condition that existed
20 prior to the adoptive placement. Out—of—home placements shall
be in accordance with the applicable provisions of Chapter 3
21 (commencing with Section 1500) of Division 2 of the Health
and Safety Code and other applicable statutes and regulations
22
governing eligibility for AFDC—FC payments for placements in
23 in—state and out—of—state facilities. The designation of the
placement facility shall be made after consultation with the
24 family by the department or county welfare agency responsible
for determining the Adoption Assistance Program (AAP)
25 eligibility and authorizing financial aid. Group home or
residential placement shall only be made as part of a plan
26
for return of the child to the adoptive family, that shall
27 actively participate in the plan. Adoption Assistance Program
benefits may be authorized for payment for an eligible
28 child's group home or residential treatment facility
COUNTY 0F FRESNO
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placement if the placement is justified by a specific episode
or condition and does not exceed an 18—month cumulative
period of time. After an initia1_adthorized group home or
residential treatment facility placement, subsequent
authorizations for payment for a group home or residential
treatment facility placement may be based on an eligible
child's subsequent specific episodes or conditions.
(e) Subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) shall apply only to
adoption assistance agreements signed on or after October 1,
1992. An adoption assistance agreement executed prior to
October 1, 1992, shall continue to be paid in accordance with
the terms of that agreement, and shall not be eligible for
,
any increase in the basic foster care maintenance rate
structure that occurred after December 31, 2007.
(f) This section shall supersede the requirements of
10
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of Section 35333 of Title
ll 22 of the California Code of Regulations.
12 (g) The adoption assistance payment rate structure
identified in subdivisions (a) and (e) shall be adjusted by
l3 the percentage changes in the California Necessities Index,
beginning with the 2011—12 fiscal year, and shall not require
l4
a~reassessment.
15 Regarding interpretatien of the statute, where its language
16 is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic indicia of intent should not
17 be considered. Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 785,
18 800, 801; Sacramento v. Public Employees' Retirement System (1994)
19 22 Ca1.App.4th 786, 793; Ceridian Corp. V. Franchise Tax Bd.
20 (2000) 85 Ca1.App.4th 875, 889.
21 Here, the statute is not ambiguous and its laughage is clear.
22 It sets forth a number of conditions:
23
24 1. The Department or County responsible for making the
25 payment confirms that placement is necessary for temporary
26 resolution of pre—adoption mental or emotional problems;
27
28
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2. The family must be consulted prior to the designation of
the facility by the Department or County responsible for
determining AAP eligibility and financial aid.
3. The placement is made as part of a plan to return the
minor to his adoptive family.
4. The placement must be justified by a specific episode or
condition and the placement must not exceed an 18 month cumulative
period of time.
In the instant case, unless there is proof that all of the
10 foregoing conditions were met, the County of Bernardino cannot be
ll compelled to pay for the placement of J.K. at Cinnamon Hills Youth
12 Crisis Center, St. George, Utah.
l3 22 CCR § 35334 entitled “AAP Benefits for a Child in
l4 Temporary Out—of—Home Placement” provides in pertinent part:
15
(a) The responsible public agency shall confirm the
l6 amount and duration of the AAP benefit when the child is
placed, either on a voluntary basis or as a dependent or ward
l7
of the court, in out—of—home care to treat a condition that
18 the agency has determined to have existed before the adoptive
placement.
l9
(1) The agency shall conclude that the child would have
20 been placed in the same out-of—home care facility if the
child had not been placed for adoption if, after consultation
21
with the adoptive parents, the agency has determined that:
22
(A) Out—of—home placement is necessary to meet the
23 child's needs,
24 (B) The specific placement is able to meet the child's
needs appropriately, and
25
26 (C) The facility's rate classification level is
appropriate to the child's needs.
27
(2) The agency shall determine the maximum AAP benefit
28 for which the child is eligible for out—of—home placement.
COUNTYOF FRESNO
Fresno,CA
9
(A) If the adoptive parents are paying for the cost of
the placement directly, the available AAP benefit
is the state—approved foster care facility rate for
which the child is eligible.
(B) If the placement cost is paid by another agency
(e.g., county welfare department, probation office,
regional center), the available AAP benefit shall
be either the age—related, state—approved foster
family home care rate or the adoptive parent‘s
actual share of cost for support of the child,
whichever is greater, but not to exceed the foster
family home rate as determined under Section
35333(c).
l. The maximum share of cost is the state—
approved foster family home rate, eligible SCI rate
10
or dual agency rate, and any applicable
ll supplemental rate the child would have received had
they remained in foster care.
12 2. Under Title 2 California Code of
Regulations Section 60020(c), the county
l3 financially responsible for making AAP payments is
responsible for the provision of mental health
l4
assessments and mental health services.
15 (3) If the initial Adoption Assistance Program
Agreement (AD 4320) for the child was signed on or
16 after October 1, 1992, the duration of a child‘s
placement in a group home or_residentia1 treatment
17 facility shall be limited to an 18—month cumulative
period of time for a specific episode or incident
18 that placement.
justifying
19
“‘Regulation’ means every rule, regulation, order, or
20
standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or
21
revision of any rule, regulation, order or standard adopted by any
22
state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law
23
ll
enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure. [Gov.
24
Code § 11342.600 (emphasis added)] Therefore, 22 CCR § 35334 was
25
adopted by the Department of Social Services—Department of Health
26
Services to implement, interpret, or make specific We1.& Inst.
27
Code § 16121.
28
COUNTY 0FFRESNO
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10
A r/“x
Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a
state agency has authority to adopt regulations to implement,
interpret, make specific, or otherwise carry out the provisions of
the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or effective unless it
is consistent and not in conflict with the statute. [Gov. Code, §
11342.2] An agency also does not have the authority to alter or
amend a statute or enlarge or impair its scope. Interinsurahce
Exchange of Automobile Club v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal. App.
4th 1218.
10 In particular, an administrative agency has no authority to
11 promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with the controlling
12 law. Mineral Associations Coalition V. State.Mining and Geology
l3 Bd. (2006) 138 Cal. App. 4th 574; City of Lodi V. Randtron (2004)
14 118 Cal. App. 4th 337. There is no agency discretion to
15 promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with the governing
l6 statute. California School Boards Assn. v. State Bd. of Educ.
l7 (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 530. Thus, administrative regulations
18 that vio1ate acts of the legislature are void and cannot be
l9 rehabilitated as mere exercises of administrative discretion.
20 Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. V. Sfiperior Court (5th Dist.
21 1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1489, as modified on denial of reh'g,
‘22 (Sept. 20, 1996).
23 The issue ofvwhether the cost of the stay of J.K. at
24 Cinnamon Hillsy five days after an 18-month stay at Devereux
25 Treatment Center, without a justification that such a stay was due
26 to a specific episode or incident, should be borne by the
27 Respondents must be addressed in light of the above statutes,
28
COUNTY 0FFRESNO
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11
regulations and case law. The court holds that such costs should
not be borfie by Respondents.
J.K. was admitted to Devereux Treatment Center on November 7,
2013. As noted by Respondents in their Opposition papers, the
admission date of‘November 7, 2013 is a critical date because it
restarts the eighteen (18) month time limit for County
reimbursement for a stay at an RTC. Notably, J.K.’s stay-at
Devereux was exactly l8 months. As noted by Respondents, Devereux
was aware that the County of San Bernardino would cease covering
10 the residential cost of the stay at the 18—month mark. This is
11 consistent with the language in Welfare and Institutions Code §
12 16121(b) and 22 C.C.R. § 35334(a) (3). See also Exhibit 33 to
l3 Respondent’s Trial Brief.
l4 Once J.K.’s stay at Devereux was completed, in order to
15 justify a new placement at an RTC, a finding must be made of
l6 changed circumstances showing an additional new “episode or
l7 condition” that would justify another stay at an RTC. Petitioners
18 can cite to no new changed circumstances that would justify the
l9 County of San Bernardino paying for a subsequent stay at an RTC
20 under the statute or regulations cited above.
21 Respondents County of San Bernardino had several individuals
22 reviewing J.K.’s care and placement. Ms. Charlotte Laiva was the
23 post—adoptions social worker responsible for J.K. and C.K. Ms.
24 Marlene Evans was the supervisor to Ms. Laiva. Ms. Karen Hill was
25 the manager, the person who oversees Ms. Laiva and Ms. Evans. The
26 record before the court indicates that discussions were held by
27 and between Ms. Laiva, Evans and Hill regarding whether it was
28 possible for the County to pay for additional residential
COUNTY OFFRESNO
Fresno,CA
12
treatment care at Cinnamon Hills. See, Exhibit 34 to Respondents’
Trial Brief, at pp. 43, 53 and 122. Ms. Hill, the manager, made
the ultimate decision to discontinue payments for residential care
in 2015 based upon her interpretation of 22 C.C.R. § 35334. See,
Exhibit 35 to Respondents’ Trial Brief, at
Preview
1 EULEQ 9 FEED, 22 . l FRESNOCOUNTYSUPEMORCOURT 2 By DEPUTY 3 4 5 SUPERIOR COURT 0F CALIFORNIA, COUNTY 0F FRESNO 4 6 CENTRAL DIVISION 7 ALPINE COUNTY UNIFIED SCHOOL Case No. l6CECGOl6l7 8 DISTRICT, and THE BOARD OF Department 404 TRUSTEES 0F THE ALPINE COUNTY 9 UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 10 Petitioners/Plaintiffs, 11 V_ 12 COUNTY 0F SAN BERNARDINO; STATEMENT OF DECISION CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES; l3 ADOPTIONS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMN; and DOES 1—20 INCLUSIVE, l4 Respondents/Defendants; 15 VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV 16 and 17 18 ALPINE COUNTY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT STUDENT J.K., a minor; 19 STUDENT J.K.’S parent/guardian 20 C.K. 21 Real Party in Interest. 22 23 The court has considered all of the papers submitted in 24 support of the petition for writ of mandate, the opposition and 25 reply, and the oral arguments made by counsel and the parties. 26 The court rules as follows. 27 28 ' COUNTY0F FRESNO Fresno . CA 1. Standard of Review An examination of case law and various treatises reveals that in zoning actions it is customary to combine a complaint with a cause of action for declaratory relief. See California Forms of Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender & Co.) Volume 51 atVChapter 570: “Zoning and Planning” § 579—210 citing Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City bf Los Angeles (1973) 34 Ca1.App.3d 117, 121]. In addition, California Civil Writ Practice (CEB) Chapter 5 § 5.119 entitled “Combining Writ Petition and Complaint” states: 10 In some situations, a writ may not provide full and 11 complete relief. In such case, the petitioner can file a 12 combined initial pleading—a petition and a complaint for damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief, as may be l3 appropriate. See Morehart v County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Ca1.4th 725, 735; California Sch. Bds. Ass'n V State (2009) l4 171 Ca1.App.4th 1183 (combined complaint for declaratory relief and writ petition); County of San Diego v State (2008) 15 164 Ca1.App.4th 580 (same). l6 l7 But, Morehart, supra was zoning a action. California School 18 Boards, sought to declare statute invalid gngga, a and County of 19 San Diego, sought reimbursement under article EEEEE, XII B, 20: section 6 of the California Constitution for the costs of 21 providing state—mandated programs and services. Notably, with 22 regard to the latter, the Fourth District Court of Appeal 23 overturned the trial court and determined that the court lacked 24 the power to order the Legislature through a writ of mandate to 25 appropriate sufficient funds in and, general, the writ of mandate 26 was improper. It also held that declaratory relief did not lie 27 and monetary damages were not available. 28 COUNTY OFFRESNO Fresno,CA There is no authority for combining a petition seeking a writ of mandate with a “cause of action” seeking damages. Indeed, such combination would contradict the writ requirement that no other remedy is adequate. §§§ 8 Witkin California Procedure (5th Ed. 2008) “Extraordinary Writs” § 122; Spangenberg v. Western Heavy Hardware & Iron Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 284, 285, 135 P. 1127; Pomona Police Officers' Assn. V. Pomona (1997) 58 Ca1.App.4th 578, 590 and 300 DeHaro Street Investors V. Department of Housing & Community Dev. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1252. Ordinarily, 10 the remedy for an improperly drafted pleading is to move to strike ll pursuant to CCP § 436(b) on the grounds that it was not drawn in 12 conformity with the laws of this state. Respondent did not do so. 13 Therefore only the Petition seeking a writ will be addressed. 14 Where a petition challenges an agency’s failure to perform an 15 act required by law rather than the conduct or result of an l6 administrative hearing, the remedy is by ordinary mandate pursuant l7 to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, not by administrative 18 mandate pursuant to section 1094.5. Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102 19 Cal.App.4th 745, 751—752. A traditional writ of mandate brought 20 under section 1085 lies “to compel the performance of an act which 21 the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, 22 trust or station.” Under this section, mandate will lie to compel 23 performance of a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty in 24 cases where a petitioner has a clear, present and beneficial right 25 to performance of that duty. Mbrris V. Harper (2001) 94 26 Cal.App.4th 52, 58. 27 A mandamus action under section 1085 addresses an abuse of 28 discretion by an administrative official. Common Cause v. Board COUNTY OF FRESNO Fresno,CA 3 of Supervisors (1989) 49 Ca1.3d 432, 442. Under this statute, the trial court reviews an administrative action to determine if an agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy, unlawful or procedurally unfair. Weiss V. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 194, 204. In determining the proper interpretation of a statute, the administrative agency’s construction is entitled to great weight, and if there appears to be a reasonable basis for it, a court will 10 not substitute it judgment for that administrative body. Family ll Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc. v. Belshe (1998) 62 12 Ca1.App.4th 999, 1004. This court should defer to the agency’s 13 interpretation unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized. 14 Physicians and Surgeons Laboratories, Inc. v. Dept. of Health 15 Services (1992) 6 Ca1.App.4th 968, 986-978. 16 Petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving facts 17 upon which its petition is based. Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v. 18 County of Riverside (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 1285, 1289. Petitioner 19 further has the burden of proof to show that the decision was 20 unreasonable or invalid as a matter of law, and there is a 21 presumption that the agency ascertained the existence of necessary 22 facts to support its action, and the “necessary facts” are those 23 required by the applicable standards which guided the agency. 24 Weinstein V. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Ca1.App.4th 944, 25 966. 26 Petitioners Alpine County Unified School District and the 27 Board of Trustees of the Alpine County Unified School District 28 (“Petitioners”) bring this Writ of Mandate requesting this court COUNTY 0FFRESNO Fresno,CA to order Respondents County of San Bernardino; Children and Family Services; Adoptions Assistance Program (“Respondents”) to pay and continue Adoptions Assistance Program (“AAP”) funding at the April 2015 rate to help pay for student fi.K.’s placements, from May, 2015 to the present. In addition, Petitioners‘seek a writ of mandate directing Respondents to reimburse Petitioners for a11 funds paid by Petitioner Alpine County Unified School District to cover and replace full AAP funding from May 2015 forward, and for other declaratory and injunctive relief.1 10 2. Factual Summary 11 The factual issues in this case are not in dispute. Student 12 J.K. is a student of the Alpine County Unified School District who 13 turned seventeen (l7) years of age on June 4, 2015. He has one 14 parent and guardian via adoption, who is his mother C.K. Student 15 J.K. was adopted by C.K.‘at age two, from San Bernardino County, 16 after living in foster care situations from six months of age. 17 His birth mother was an adolescent drug user and his birth father 18 had a history of methamphetamine abuse. Since at least age six, 19 J.K. has exhibited severe behavioral, social and emotional 20 problems, and developmental and learning delays. 21 California has a program designed to encourage people to 22 adopt children who would otherwise reside in foster homes. It is 23 called the Adoption Assistance Program, or AAP. The program 24 includes financial benefits on behalf of children who have special 25 needs that might discourage prospective adoptive parents from 26 adopting them. J.K. was one such special needs child. J.K. was 27 28 1 Venue for this action was transferred to Fresno County pursuant to a stipulation of the COUNTY OF FRESNO parties filed on April 5, 2016. Fresno.CA adopted by C.K. in 2000 and C.K. has received AAP benefits from the County of San Bernardino ever since. Due to J.K.’s behavioral and emotional issues, C.K. frequently found it necessary to have J.K. removed from her home and placed in a residential treatment center (“RTC”) for children with emotional disturbances. Pursuant to the AAP, C.K. received money from the County of San Bernardino every‘month. When J.K. lived at home with C.K.,lshe received a basic subsidy. However, when it was necessary for J.K. to live in a RTC, the County of San 10 Bernardino funded those stays. The educational component of such ll a stay would often be paid for by the school district in which 12 J.K. was a student — in this case the Alpine County School l3 District. Stays at RTC’s_are meant to be temporary and of limited l4 duration. 15 A review of the pleadings reveals that J.K. has spent years l6 in residential treatment facilities. The County of San Bernardino l7 paid for the residential component of those stays up until May 6, 18 2015, after J.K. had just spent 18 months living at the Devereux 19 Treatment Center in League City, Texas. J.K. was at Devereux for 20 exactly 18 months, from November 7, 2013 to May 6, 2015. J.K. 21 went home for a few days and then went to live at another 22 residential treatment center called Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis 23 Center in Utah, moving into that facility en May 11, 2015. The 24 County of San Bernardino did not pay Cinnamon Hills for J.K.’s 25 stay. While he was at Cinnamon Hills, the County provided mother 26 C.K. an AAP basic benefit of $674 per month, plus a special care 27 increment of $800 per month, for a total of $1,474 per month. 28 Thus, San Bernardino County continued to pay C.K. basic and COUNTY 0FFRESNO Fresno,CA special care AAP benefits, even though the County did not believe it could justify paying the costs of another RTC stay for J.K. Petitioners Alpine County Unified School District paid for the residential care component of J.K.’s stay at Cinnamon Hills. It also paid for its educational component. Petitioners now claim that Respondents should have paid the residential care component of J.K.’s stay at Cinnamon Hills for the nine months J.K. was at the center. This writ of mandate ensued. 3. Legal Analysis 10 The issue in this case turns on the interpretation and ll application of Welfare and Institutions Code § 16121(b) and its 12 corresponding regulation, 22 C.C.R. § 35334(a). l3 Section 16121 entitled “Adoption assistance; amount; out—of— l4 home placements; maximum time; application; adjustment to adoption 15 assistance payment rate structure” states in relevant part: 16 (b) Payment may be made on behalf of an otherwise 17 state-approved group home residential eligible child in a or 18 care treatment facility if the department or county responsible for determining payment has confirmed that the 19 placement is necessary for the temporary resolution of mental or emotional problems related to a condition that existed 20 prior to the adoptive placement. Out—of—home placements shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of Chapter 3 21 (commencing with Section 1500) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code and other applicable statutes and regulations 22 governing eligibility for AFDC—FC payments for placements in 23 in—state and out—of—state facilities. The designation of the placement facility shall be made after consultation with the 24 family by the department or county welfare agency responsible for determining the Adoption Assistance Program (AAP) 25 eligibility and authorizing financial aid. Group home or residential placement shall only be made as part of a plan 26 for return of the child to the adoptive family, that shall 27 actively participate in the plan. Adoption Assistance Program benefits may be authorized for payment for an eligible 28 child's group home or residential treatment facility COUNTY 0F FRESNO Fresno.CA placement if the placement is justified by a specific episode or condition and does not exceed an 18—month cumulative period of time. After an initia1_adthorized group home or residential treatment facility placement, subsequent authorizations for payment for a group home or residential treatment facility placement may be based on an eligible child's subsequent specific episodes or conditions. (e) Subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) shall apply only to adoption assistance agreements signed on or after October 1, 1992. An adoption assistance agreement executed prior to October 1, 1992, shall continue to be paid in accordance with the terms of that agreement, and shall not be eligible for , any increase in the basic foster care maintenance rate structure that occurred after December 31, 2007. (f) This section shall supersede the requirements of 10 subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of Section 35333 of Title ll 22 of the California Code of Regulations. 12 (g) The adoption assistance payment rate structure identified in subdivisions (a) and (e) shall be adjusted by l3 the percentage changes in the California Necessities Index, beginning with the 2011—12 fiscal year, and shall not require l4 a~reassessment. 15 Regarding interpretatien of the statute, where its language 16 is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic indicia of intent should not 17 be considered. Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 785, 18 800, 801; Sacramento v. Public Employees' Retirement System (1994) 19 22 Ca1.App.4th 786, 793; Ceridian Corp. V. Franchise Tax Bd. 20 (2000) 85 Ca1.App.4th 875, 889. 21 Here, the statute is not ambiguous and its laughage is clear. 22 It sets forth a number of conditions: 23 24 1. The Department or County responsible for making the 25 payment confirms that placement is necessary for temporary 26 resolution of pre—adoption mental or emotional problems; 27 28 COUNTY OF FRESNO Fresno,CA 2. The family must be consulted prior to the designation of the facility by the Department or County responsible for determining AAP eligibility and financial aid. 3. The placement is made as part of a plan to return the minor to his adoptive family. 4. The placement must be justified by a specific episode or condition and the placement must not exceed an 18 month cumulative period of time. In the instant case, unless there is proof that all of the 10 foregoing conditions were met, the County of Bernardino cannot be ll compelled to pay for the placement of J.K. at Cinnamon Hills Youth 12 Crisis Center, St. George, Utah. l3 22 CCR § 35334 entitled “AAP Benefits for a Child in l4 Temporary Out—of—Home Placement” provides in pertinent part: 15 (a) The responsible public agency shall confirm the l6 amount and duration of the AAP benefit when the child is placed, either on a voluntary basis or as a dependent or ward l7 of the court, in out—of—home care to treat a condition that 18 the agency has determined to have existed before the adoptive placement. l9 (1) The agency shall conclude that the child would have 20 been placed in the same out-of—home care facility if the child had not been placed for adoption if, after consultation 21 with the adoptive parents, the agency has determined that: 22 (A) Out—of—home placement is necessary to meet the 23 child's needs, 24 (B) The specific placement is able to meet the child's needs appropriately, and 25 26 (C) The facility's rate classification level is appropriate to the child's needs. 27 (2) The agency shall determine the maximum AAP benefit 28 for which the child is eligible for out—of—home placement. COUNTYOF FRESNO Fresno,CA 9 (A) If the adoptive parents are paying for the cost of the placement directly, the available AAP benefit is the state—approved foster care facility rate for which the child is eligible. (B) If the placement cost is paid by another agency (e.g., county welfare department, probation office, regional center), the available AAP benefit shall be either the age—related, state—approved foster family home care rate or the adoptive parent‘s actual share of cost for support of the child, whichever is greater, but not to exceed the foster family home rate as determined under Section 35333(c). l. The maximum share of cost is the state— approved foster family home rate, eligible SCI rate 10 or dual agency rate, and any applicable ll supplemental rate the child would have received had they remained in foster care. 12 2. Under Title 2 California Code of Regulations Section 60020(c), the county l3 financially responsible for making AAP payments is responsible for the provision of mental health l4 assessments and mental health services. 15 (3) If the initial Adoption Assistance Program Agreement (AD 4320) for the child was signed on or 16 after October 1, 1992, the duration of a child‘s placement in a group home or_residentia1 treatment 17 facility shall be limited to an 18—month cumulative period of time for a specific episode or incident 18 that placement. justifying 19 “‘Regulation’ means every rule, regulation, order, or 20 standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or 21 revision of any rule, regulation, order or standard adopted by any 22 state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law 23 ll enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure. [Gov. 24 Code § 11342.600 (emphasis added)] Therefore, 22 CCR § 35334 was 25 adopted by the Department of Social Services—Department of Health 26 Services to implement, interpret, or make specific We1.& Inst. 27 Code § 16121. 28 COUNTY 0FFRESNO Fresno,CA 10 A r/“x Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency has authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific, or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or effective unless it is consistent and not in conflict with the statute. [Gov. Code, § 11342.2] An agency also does not have the authority to alter or amend a statute or enlarge or impair its scope. Interinsurahce Exchange of Automobile Club v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1218. 10 In particular, an administrative agency has no authority to 11 promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with the controlling 12 law. Mineral Associations Coalition V. State.Mining and Geology l3 Bd. (2006) 138 Cal. App. 4th 574; City of Lodi V. Randtron (2004) 14 118 Cal. App. 4th 337. There is no agency discretion to 15 promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with the governing l6 statute. California School Boards Assn. v. State Bd. of Educ. l7 (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 530. Thus, administrative regulations 18 that vio1ate acts of the legislature are void and cannot be l9 rehabilitated as mere exercises of administrative discretion. 20 Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. V. Sfiperior Court (5th Dist. 21 1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1489, as modified on denial of reh'g, ‘22 (Sept. 20, 1996). 23 The issue ofvwhether the cost of the stay of J.K. at 24 Cinnamon Hillsy five days after an 18-month stay at Devereux 25 Treatment Center, without a justification that such a stay was due 26 to a specific episode or incident, should be borne by the 27 Respondents must be addressed in light of the above statutes, 28 COUNTY 0FFRESNO Fresno,CA 11 regulations and case law. The court holds that such costs should not be borfie by Respondents. J.K. was admitted to Devereux Treatment Center on November 7, 2013. As noted by Respondents in their Opposition papers, the admission date of‘November 7, 2013 is a critical date because it restarts the eighteen (18) month time limit for County reimbursement for a stay at an RTC. Notably, J.K.’s stay-at Devereux was exactly l8 months. As noted by Respondents, Devereux was aware that the County of San Bernardino would cease covering 10 the residential cost of the stay at the 18—month mark. This is 11 consistent with the language in Welfare and Institutions Code § 12 16121(b) and 22 C.C.R. § 35334(a) (3). See also Exhibit 33 to l3 Respondent’s Trial Brief. l4 Once J.K.’s stay at Devereux was completed, in order to 15 justify a new placement at an RTC, a finding must be made of l6 changed circumstances showing an additional new “episode or l7 condition” that would justify another stay at an RTC. Petitioners 18 can cite to no new changed circumstances that would justify the l9 County of San Bernardino paying for a subsequent stay at an RTC 20 under the statute or regulations cited above. 21 Respondents County of San Bernardino had several individuals 22 reviewing J.K.’s care and placement. Ms. Charlotte Laiva was the 23 post—adoptions social worker responsible for J.K. and C.K. Ms. 24 Marlene Evans was the supervisor to Ms. Laiva. Ms. Karen Hill was 25 the manager, the person who oversees Ms. Laiva and Ms. Evans. The 26 record before the court indicates that discussions were held by 27 and between Ms. Laiva, Evans and Hill regarding whether it was 28 possible for the County to pay for additional residential COUNTY OFFRESNO Fresno,CA 12 treatment care at Cinnamon Hills. See, Exhibit 34 to Respondents’ Trial Brief, at pp. 43, 53 and 122. Ms. Hill, the manager, made the ultimate decision to discontinue payments for residential care in 2015 based upon her interpretation of 22 C.C.R. § 35334. See, Exhibit 35 to Respondents’ Trial Brief, at