Preview
Opinion issued October 17, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00985-CV
———————————
ELIZABETH C. PEREZ, Appellant
V.
SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, KARUN SREERAMA, DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING, AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2015-34786
OPINION ON REHEARING
This is a suit contesting a City of Houston drainage fee ordinance.
Appellees—Mayor Sylvester Turner, the Director of Public Works and
Engineering Karun Sreerama, and the City of Houston (collectively, “the City”)—
moved for rehearing of the case. We granted the motion. We now withdraw our
opinion and judgment issued on August 30, 2018, and issue the following opinion
and judgment in their place.1
Appellant, Elizabeth C. Perez, appeals the trial court’s December 9, 2016
order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the City and dismissing all of her
claims.2 Perez seeks a judgment declaring the drainage fee ordinance invalid; an
injunction against the assessment, collection, and expenditure of taxes and fees
pursuant to the ordinance; and reimbursement, “on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated persons or entities,” of taxes and fees assessed and collected
pursuant to the ordinance and paid “under duress.”
In four points of error, Perez argues that (1) she has standing to assert a legal
claim for reimbursement for wrongfully-collected drainage charges that she paid
under duress pursuant to the purportedly invalid city ordinance; (2) the named
individual defendants—the Mayor and the Director of Public Works and
Engineering—do not have governmental immunity from her claims based on their
enforcement of the purportedly invalid city ordinance, and, therefore, the trial court
1
We dismiss as moot the motion for rehearing filed by Perez on November 27,
2018, and we likewise dismiss as moot the City’s motion for en banc
reconsideration of the August 30, 2018 opinion and judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P.
49.2, 49.3; Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).
2
Perez originally named Annise Parker and Dale A. Rudick in their official
capacities as defendants. However, both Parker and Rudick have since been
replaced in office.
2
has subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
against these defendants; (3) the City’s governmental immunity from her
declaratory and injunctive relief claims was waived by the statutory requirement
that the City be joined as a necessary party to her claims asserting the
unconstitutionality and/or the illegality of specific city ordinances conferring the
authority to assess, collect and expend drainage charges for street improvements;
and (4) the trial court wrongly dismissed her constitutional claims on the ground
that they were not ripe. We affirm.
Background
A. The Charter Amendment
Houston is a home rule city governed by a city charter. In 2010, a citizen-
initiated petition sought to amend the charter to address the need for drainage and
street improvements through Proposition One, which would change the method of
financing such projects from bond debt to “Pay-As-You-Go.” The amendment
proposed a Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund that would be
funded from various sources including a fixed percentage of ad valorem tax
revenue shifted from debt service to the DDSR Fund, federal grants, and drainage
fee and developer impact fee revenue. Because the percentage of ad valorem tax
revenue shifted to the DDSR Fund and the drainage and developer fees added by
3
the charter amendment could affect Houston’s revenue caps,3 the amendment
provided that “funding for the [DDSR Fund] that is not derived from ad valorem
taxes levied by the City (i.e., that portion derived from fees, charges and third party
payments) shall not be included in those ad valorem tax revenues limited by this
Charter.”
On November 2, 2010, the City of Houston voters voted on and approved
“PROPOSITION I—CHARTER AMENDMENT PROPOSITION Relating to the
Creation of a Dedicated Funding Source to Enhance, Improve and Renew Drainage
Systems and Streets.” The body of Proposition I stated, in its entirety, “Shall the
City Charter of the City of Houston be amended to provide for the enhancement,
improvement and ongoing renewal of Houston’s drainage and streets by creating a
Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for Drainage and Streets?”
Perez and two other registered voters filed an election contest in December
2010 to challenge the legality of Proposition I, asserting that the Proposition’s
language was defective and illegally deceptive. This case proceeded through the
trial court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Mayor,
and the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment (Dacus I), to the
Texas Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the appellate court and
3
A revenue cap was added to the city charter in 2004 that requires voter approval
for increases in ad valorem taxes above a certain level, as determined year-by-year
based on a formula set out in the charter.
4
ruled in favor of Perez and her co-plaintiffs. Dacus v. Parker, 466 S.W.3d 820,
822 (Tex. 2015) (Dacus II). The supreme court held that because Proposition I
failed to mention that drainage charges would be imposed on most real property
owners, and therefore omitted a chief feature of the measure, the measure was not
submitted “with such definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled.”
Id. at 828–29. The court remanded the case to the trial court “for further
proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.” Id. at 829.
On remand from Dacus II, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Perez and her co-plaintiffs. It held that the November 2, 2010 election on
Proposition I, amending the City’s charter, was void. The Fourteenth Court of
Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court denied the City’s subsequent
petition for review. City of Houston v. Dacus, No. 14-16-00123-CV, 2017 WL
536647, at *2, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 9, 2017, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (Dacus III).
B. The Drainage Fee Ordinance
In April 2011, after the Dacus case was filed, and while it was still pending,
the City passed an ordinance under Local Government Code Chapter 552, the
“Municipal Drainage Utility Systems Act,” creating a drainage utility and allowing
that utility to assess, collect, and spend drainage fees (the Drainage Fee
Ordinance). The Drainage Fee Ordinance defines “drainage” as including streets,
5
curbs, and other manmade or natural “conduits . . . that are used to draw off surface
water from land, carry the water away, collect, store, or treat the water, or divert
the water into natural or artificial watercourses or into which the surface water
flows.” The Ordinance identifies the authority to collect drainage fees as arising
from both Chapter 552 and the City’s home rule authority.
The City subsequently collected drainage fees from Perez and others. For
example, Perez presented evidence that she paid a monthly drainage fee of $11.38
on her current residence.
Following the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Dacus II, and while that suit
was pending on remand, on June 17, 2015, Perez filed her original petition in this
suit4 against the City and City officers charged with implementing the Drainage
Fee Ordinance, challenging the legality of the Ordinance and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief and reimbursement of taxes paid pursuant to it. Perez alleged
that the City and the individual defendants “unconstitutionally and illegally
assessed, collected and expended hundreds of millions of dollars from 2011 to
2105 purportedly for drainage and street improvements and repairs” from
“Houston taxpayers and landowners pursuant to a void Charter Amendment,”
Proposition I, and “a void City Ordinance,” the Drainage Fee Ordinance.
4
Perez pleaded her suit as a class-action lawsuit but no class certification ever
occurred.
6
Perez claimed, “Simply put, the [Drainage Fee Ordinance] is void, and has
always been void.” Perez claimed that she has standing to bring claims against the
City and the “ultra vires defendants” because she “is a municipal taxpayer who
paid, and continues to pay, the [i]llegal [drainage] [t]ax under duress.” She alleged
that the drainage fee has been illegally assessed and collected “pursuant to a void
Charter Amendment and/or to a void City Ordinance” and that the current mayor,
Sylvester Turner, has announced his intention to continue to assess and collect the
drainage fee. She also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the City and
individual defendants from passing future budgets or future spending of public
monies which “exceed the caps of the Revenue Cap and/or the Spending Cap
contained in the Houston City Charter,” as, she alleged, the City had been doing
under “the now Void Charter Amendment.” She claimed standing to sue as a
resident, municipal taxpayer, and registered voter who had paid the drainage fee
“under duress.”
In her original petition, Perez sought a judicial declaration that the drainage
fee imposed by the Drainage Fee Ordinance is “illegal and/or unconstitutional” and
that “all assessed amounts must be reimbursed to those persons and entities that
paid them.” She also sought reimbursement for past payment of the monthly
drainage fee charged to her residence, and she sought an injunction against the
7
expenditure of all amounts assessed but not yet spent and against further
assessments, with any money collected to be paid into the registry of the Court.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a motion for
summary judgment, asserting, in relevant part, that Perez lacked standing to bring
her claims because she had suffered no particularized injury. The City further
argued that Perez lacked standing to seek money damages and that governmental
immunity barred her claims for a refund of amounts paid. The trial court held a
hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction and expressed concerns regarding Perez’s
standing based on her original pleadings; accordingly, the trial court afforded Perez
the opportunity to replead her claims.
Perez filed an amended petition, continuing to assert that “the City and/or
the Ultra Vires Defendants had unconstitutionally and illegally assessed, collected
and expended hundreds of millions of dollars from 2011 to 2015 purportedly for
drainage and street improvements and repairs” pursuant to “a void Charter
Amendment . . . and/or pursuant to a void City Ordinance.” Perez argues that the
drainage fees have been used illegally because they have been used not only for
drainage projects but for “projects clearly unrelated to drainage systems such as
traffic signal reconstruction, bridge replacement, street intersection improvements,
concrete panel replacement, and asphalt overlays, among others.” She continued to
seek a judgment declaring that the drainage fee is “illegal and/or unconstitutional,
8
that all assessed amounts must be reimbursed to those persons and entities that paid
them,” that “all assessed but not yet to be spent amounts must not be expended but
segregated and protected and paid into the registry” of the trial court, and that “no
further [drainage fee] assessments be assessed or collected.” Perez also asserted a
variety of constitutional claims challenging the City’s Charter Amendment and the
implementation of the drainage utility, including the assessment and collection of
fees, authorized by the Drainage Fee Ordinance.
Specifically relevant to her standing, Perez pleaded the following allegations
and facts:
• “Perez has been a named party in [the] related [Dacus] litigation
which is the sole and exclusive reason why the current lawsuit is
now available to reimburse everyone for their pro rata payment of
the” drainage fee.
• Because of the supreme court’s ruling in Dacus II, the trial court
on remand in Dacus “had no discretion but to enter summary
judgment in favor of Perez. Simply put, the Illegal Rain Tax [i.e.,
the drainage fee] is void, and has always been void.”
• Perez has standing “to bring claims against the City of Houston
and/or Ultra Vires Defendants because [she] is a municipal
taxpayer who paid, and continues to pay, the [drainage fees] under
duress” because “the City has been illegally assessing and
collecting hundreds of millions of dollars . . . purportedly for
drainage and street improvements and repairs . . . pursuant to a
void Charter Amendment and/or to a void City Ordinance.”
Finally, regarding the Drainage Fee Ordinance, Perez asserted in her
amended pleading that “state law provides the City with the authority to impose a
9
drainage charge for drainage costs associated with specific drainage systems,” but
“state law does not provide the City with the authority to impose a drainage charge
for street, curb, and other non-drainage related improvements and repairs.” She
thus asserted that, because the Charter Amendment was “void,” the fees authorized
by the Drainage Fee Ordinance are “likewise void” and, “[a]ccordingly, none of
the monies collected by the [Drainage Fee Ordinance] were validly collected.” And
Perez further asserted that the collected monies were “illegally and
unconstitutionally exempted from the Revenue Cap,” causing City budgets to
exceed the caps.
The trial court held another hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction,
and, ultimately, on December 9, 2016, the trial court dismissed Perez’s lawsuit for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court found that Perez’s “purported
constitutional claims” were not ripe for adjudication, that Perez had “no standing to
challenge the validity, legality, and/or constitutionality of the assessment and/or
collection of City of Houston drainage fees, the November 2010 Pay-As-You-Go
charter amendment [Proposition I], and/or the April 2011 [D]rainage [Fee]
[O]rdinance because she has suffered no particularized injury as a matter of law,”
that she had “no standing to seek money damages and/or a refund as a taxpayer as
a matter of law,” and that governmental immunity also barred her refund claim.
10
The trial court found that Perez was not entitled to any award of attorney’s
fees. The court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all of
Perez’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, observing that she had “failed to replead any
viable claim after this court’s having given her sufficient opportunity and time in
which to do so.” Perez appealed.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A. Standard of Review of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Both ripeness and standing are components of subject-matter jurisdiction.
McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. 2001).
The ripeness doctrine prohibits suits involving “uncertain or contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”
Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2001). An issue is ripe for decision
when at the time a lawsuit is filed the facts are sufficiently developed “so that an
injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.”
Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000).
The standing doctrine prohibits suits by those who are not personally
aggrieved. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008). A
party’s standing is never presumed, cannot be waived, and can be raised for the
first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
443–45 (Tex. 1993). “For a plaintiff to have standing, a controversy must exist
11
between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.”
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). If the issues are no longer live
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the case becomes
moot. Id.; see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past exposure to
illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects.”).
Like ripeness, “[s]tanding is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and
subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). We review standing
under the same standard by which we review subject-matter jurisdiction generally.
Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
Mootness is also relevant to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider a case. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex.
2010). A controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal
proceedings, including the appeal. Bd. of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende, 92
S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. 2002). “If a controversy ceases to exist—‘the issues
presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome’—the case becomes moot.” Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting Murphy
v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)). A case is moot when a judgment cannot have a
practical effect on an existing controversy. Reule v. RLZ Invs., 411 S.W.3d 31, 32
12
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see Meeker v. Tarrant Cty. Coll.
Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). When a
case becomes moot on appeal, we set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss
the case. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex.
2006); Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32; Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759.
The absence of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the
jurisdiction, among other procedural vehicles. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d
at 554. Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
B. Impact of Dacus on Perez’s Claims in this Suit
As a preliminary matter, we address the portions of Perez’s pleadings and
issues on appeal in which she asserts complaints related to the Charter
Amendment, including her claim that the Drainage Fee Ordinance has already been
determined to be invalid because of the litigation surrounding the Charter
Amendment, and, therefore, the collection of revenue under the Ordinance is
illegal.
In Dacus II, the Texas Supreme Court declared that Proposition I, providing
for the creation of the Pay-As-You-Go Fund (the DDSR Fund), was not submitted
to the voters in November 2010 “with such definiteness and certainty that voters
13
would not be misled.” 466 S.W.3d at 829. On remand for further proceedings, the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in Dacus III, affirmed the judgment of the trial court
on remand holding that the election on Proposition I, amending the City charter to
provide for the DDSR Fund, was void, and it ordered the City to hold a new
election on the measure. 2017 WL 536647, at *2, 5. The supreme court denied the
City’s petition for review of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in Dacus
III, finally resolving the controversy regarding the validity of the Charter
Amendment.
In this suit, Perez challenges the legality of the DDSR Fund established in
December 2011 pursuant to Proposition I. Perez filed this suit after the supreme
court held, in Dacus II, that the language of Proposition I was too uncertain to
enable voters to make an informed choice on the Proposition, but before the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals held, in Dacus III, that the election was void and
ordered a new one. Because of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in
Dacus III, which became final after Perez filed this suit and while this appeal was
pending, issues relating to the Charter Amendment have been resolved by the
judgment declaring the Charter Amendment void and ordering a new election on
the measure. Therefore, any further complaints regarding validity of the Charter
Amendment are moot. See Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32; Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759.
It is void.
14
Perez alleges, first, that the City and other individual defendants wrongfully
relied upon authority granted pursuant to a void Charter Amendment. However,
the controversy regarding the validity of the Charter Amendment was not yet
resolved at the time Perez filed her petition. Any claims that the City or City
officials acted improperly in failing to recognize the invalidity of the Charter
Amendment before its invalidity was judicially determined were premature at the
time Perez filed this suit. See Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 250; Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851–
52 (holding that issue is ripe for decision when “at the time a lawsuit is filed, the
facts are sufficiently developed ‘so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur,
rather than being contingent or remote’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Patterson
v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.
1998)).
Moreover, the judicial declaration that the Charter Amendment is void does
not help Perez’s case here. Although the Dacus line of cases addressed the Charter
Amendment, it did not address the Drainage Fee Ordinance. Nothing in the Dacus
cases invalidated or called into question the City’s authority to pass the Drainage
Fee Ordinance pursuant to its constitutional home-rule authority or Local
Government Code Chapter 552. Thus, to the extent that Perez’s claims are based
on her allegations that the Dacus cases have invalidated the Drainage Fee
Ordinance and that, as a result, the City or individual defendants have acted
15
improperly in enforcing the Ordinance, her claims are misplaced. See Perry, 66
S.W.3d at 250; Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851–52.
We conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any
claims dependent on the Charter Amendment’s having been declared void, and,
thus, it properly dismissed those claims based on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
C. Ripeness of Perez’s Claim for a Declaratory Judgment that the Ordinance
is Invalid
Perez also argues, however, that the Drainage Fee Ordinance itself is illegal
and invalid in its own right. Perez challenges the validity of the Drainage Fee
Ordinance based in part on her assertion that the judgment voiding the Charter
Amendment likewise invalidated the Drainage Fee Ordinance because the City
otherwise lacked the authority to collect the fees pursuant to the Ordinance and,
accordingly, those fees are being illegally collected. She also argues that the fees
were used in part for projects “clearly unrelated to drainage systems such as traffic
signal reconstruction, bridge replacement, [and] street intersection improvements.”
But she fails to plead any such “illegal” expenditure with specificity.
The City contests Perez’s assertion. The City asserted both in the trial court
and on appeal that it had authority independent of the Charter Amendment to pass
and enforce the Drainage Fee Ordinance as it did. The City asserts that the
Drainage Fee Ordinance was passed pursuant to the City’s authority as a home-rule
city governed by a city charter and pursuant to authority granted by Local
16
Government Code Chapter 552. The City further argues in its brief on appeal that
the Charter Amendment was unnecessary to impose a drainage fee but was
proposed solely because it “shifts a portion of ad valorem tax revenue from debt
service to the DDSR Fund and possibly affects Houston’s revenue caps, [and thus]
Houston’s charter was best served by an amendment and election.”
The Texas Constitution provides for home-rule authority. See TEX. CONST.
art. XI, § 5; see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 9.001–.008 (addressing adoption of
charters for home-rule municipalities). A home-rule city derives its power from the
Texas Constitution, operates by its charter, and “possess[es] the full power of self
government and look[s] to the Legislature not for grants of power, but only for
limitations on their power.” See Town of Lakewood Vill. v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527,
531 (Tex. 2016).
Local Government Code Chapter 552, also known as the Municipal
Drainage Utility Systems Act, sets out procedures for municipalities to address
concerns regarding drainage. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.041–.054 (setting
out procedures for municipalities to create drainage utility that can address
drainage concerns). The Drainage Fee Ordinance itself states:
[T]his Ordinance has been prepared for consideration by City Council
in conformance with Subchapter C of Chapter 552 of the Texas Local
Government Code and the City’s Home-Rule powers under Article
XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution to create a City of Houston
Municipal Drainage Utility System to accomplish the objective and
17
directives of Section 22, Article IX of the City Charter with regard to
streets and drainage[.]
We conclude that Perez’s claims based on the validity of the Drainage Fee
Ordinance in its own right are ripe for determination. We therefore turn to Perez’s
standing to bring these claims.
D. Perez’s Standing to Seek a Judgment Declaring the Ordinance Invalid,
Reimbursement for “Illegally Collected” Drainage Fees, and an
Injunction Against the Future Collection of Drainage Fees
In her first issue on appeal, Perez argues that she has standing to assert a
legal claim for reimbursement of all drainage charges made under the Drainage
Fee Ordinance because, as a municipal taxpayer who paid, and continues to pay
under duress, an illegal drainage fee assessed by the City, she can demonstrate both
that she has standing to sue as a taxpayer and that she has suffered a particularized
injury.
1. Perez’s claim that this is a suit to recover illegally collected drainage
fees
We begin our analysis by recognizing that although Perez has pleaded that
she paid “illegal” drainage fees, she has cited to no authority declaring illegal the
Drainage Fee Ordinance pursuant to which the fees were assessed and collected.
Perez herself seeks such a declaration in the underlying suit, but she does not cite
to, nor could we find, any authority declaring the Drainage Fee Ordinance invalid
or void. Perez makes multiple references to the Dacus case; however, as discussed
18
above, that case addressed only the validity of the ballot language for the
Proposition I Charter Amendment and did not address the validity of the Drainage
Fee Ordinance. See, e.g., Dacus III, 2017 WL 536647, at *2. Nor has she identified
what measurable added illegal activity is supported by the fee that was not
authorized by the City’s ability to collect drainage fees conferred on it by the Local
Government Code. Thus, Perez misconstrues the facts of this case when she
asserts that she was forced to pay “illegal” fees.
Accordingly, Perez cannot rely on the line of cases she cites in her brief on
appeal, which provide for, as she characterizes it, “reimbursement of illegal fees
and taxes . . . when the public entity compels compliance with a void law and
subjects a person to punishment if he refuses or fails to comply.” See, e.g., State v.
Akin Prods. Co., 286 S.W.2d 110, 110–12 (Tex. 1956) (holding, where supreme
court had previously held tax on citrus industry unconstitutional in its entirety and
plaintiffs/taxpayers had obtained permission to sue State for recovery of funds
subsequently collected under that unconstitutional act, that taxes paid under duress
were recoverable). These cases do not apply to a situation, like the one here,
where the underlying law—here, the Drainage Fee Ordinance—has not been
declared invalid and no specific showing of any illegality of the fees collected has
been made.
19
2. Perez’s standing to maintain her suit for declaratory relief
Perez argues that her pleadings and jurisdictional evidence are sufficient to
establish her standing to pursue her claims for a judgment declaring the Drainage
Fee Ordinance illegal. We disagree.
“In general, taxpayers do not have a right to bring suit to contest government
decision-making[.]” Bland Ind. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. The Texas Supreme
Court has explained why lawsuits such as Perez’s are disfavored as a matter of
public policy:
Generally, a citizen lacks standing to bring a lawsuit challenging the
lawfulness of governmental acts. This is because governments cannot
operate if every citizen who concludes that a public official has
abused his discretion is granted the right to come into court and bring
such official’s public acts under judicial review. Thus, standing
doctrines reflect in many ways the rule that neither citizens nor
taxpayers can appear in court simply to insist that the government and
its officials adhere to the requirements of law.
Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 136–37 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The supreme court has further held that “[t]his
pragmatic approach ensures that there is a real need to exercise the power of
judicial review in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion
Preview
Opinion issued October 17, 2019 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00985-CV ——————————— ELIZABETH C. PEREZ, Appellant V. SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, KARUN SREERAMA, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING, AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellees On Appeal from the 11th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2015-34786 OPINION ON REHEARING This is a suit contesting a City of Houston drainage fee ordinance. Appellees—Mayor Sylvester Turner, the Director of Public Works and Engineering Karun Sreerama, and the City of Houston (collectively, “the City”)— moved for rehearing of the case. We granted the motion. We now withdraw our opinion and judgment issued on August 30, 2018, and issue the following opinion and judgment in their place.1 Appellant, Elizabeth C. Perez, appeals the trial court’s December 9, 2016 order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the City and dismissing all of her claims.2 Perez seeks a judgment declaring the drainage fee ordinance invalid; an injunction against the assessment, collection, and expenditure of taxes and fees pursuant to the ordinance; and reimbursement, “on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons or entities,” of taxes and fees assessed and collected pursuant to the ordinance and paid “under duress.” In four points of error, Perez argues that (1) she has standing to assert a legal claim for reimbursement for wrongfully-collected drainage charges that she paid under duress pursuant to the purportedly invalid city ordinance; (2) the named individual defendants—the Mayor and the Director of Public Works and Engineering—do not have governmental immunity from her claims based on their enforcement of the purportedly invalid city ordinance, and, therefore, the trial court 1 We dismiss as moot the motion for rehearing filed by Perez on November 27, 2018, and we likewise dismiss as moot the City’s motion for en banc reconsideration of the August 30, 2018 opinion and judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.2, 49.3; Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). 2 Perez originally named Annise Parker and Dale A. Rudick in their official capacities as defendants. However, both Parker and Rudick have since been replaced in office. 2 has subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against these defendants; (3) the City’s governmental immunity from her declaratory and injunctive relief claims was waived by the statutory requirement that the City be joined as a necessary party to her claims asserting the unconstitutionality and/or the illegality of specific city ordinances conferring the authority to assess, collect and expend drainage charges for street improvements; and (4) the trial court wrongly dismissed her constitutional claims on the ground that they were not ripe. We affirm. Background A. The Charter Amendment Houston is a home rule city governed by a city charter. In 2010, a citizen- initiated petition sought to amend the charter to address the need for drainage and street improvements through Proposition One, which would change the method of financing such projects from bond debt to “Pay-As-You-Go.” The amendment proposed a Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund that would be funded from various sources including a fixed percentage of ad valorem tax revenue shifted from debt service to the DDSR Fund, federal grants, and drainage fee and developer impact fee revenue. Because the percentage of ad valorem tax revenue shifted to the DDSR Fund and the drainage and developer fees added by 3 the charter amendment could affect Houston’s revenue caps,3 the amendment provided that “funding for the [DDSR Fund] that is not derived from ad valorem taxes levied by the City (i.e., that portion derived from fees, charges and third party payments) shall not be included in those ad valorem tax revenues limited by this Charter.” On November 2, 2010, the City of Houston voters voted on and approved “PROPOSITION I—CHARTER AMENDMENT PROPOSITION Relating to the Creation of a Dedicated Funding Source to Enhance, Improve and Renew Drainage Systems and Streets.” The body of Proposition I stated, in its entirety, “Shall the City Charter of the City of Houston be amended to provide for the enhancement, improvement and ongoing renewal of Houston’s drainage and streets by creating a Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for Drainage and Streets?” Perez and two other registered voters filed an election contest in December 2010 to challenge the legality of Proposition I, asserting that the Proposition’s language was defective and illegally deceptive. This case proceeded through the trial court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Mayor, and the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment (Dacus I), to the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the appellate court and 3 A revenue cap was added to the city charter in 2004 that requires voter approval for increases in ad valorem taxes above a certain level, as determined year-by-year based on a formula set out in the charter. 4 ruled in favor of Perez and her co-plaintiffs. Dacus v. Parker, 466 S.W.3d 820, 822 (Tex. 2015) (Dacus II). The supreme court held that because Proposition I failed to mention that drainage charges would be imposed on most real property owners, and therefore omitted a chief feature of the measure, the measure was not submitted “with such definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled.” Id. at 828–29. The court remanded the case to the trial court “for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.” Id. at 829. On remand from Dacus II, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Perez and her co-plaintiffs. It held that the November 2, 2010 election on Proposition I, amending the City’s charter, was void. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court denied the City’s subsequent petition for review. City of Houston v. Dacus, No. 14-16-00123-CV, 2017 WL 536647, at *2, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Dacus III). B. The Drainage Fee Ordinance In April 2011, after the Dacus case was filed, and while it was still pending, the City passed an ordinance under Local Government Code Chapter 552, the “Municipal Drainage Utility Systems Act,” creating a drainage utility and allowing that utility to assess, collect, and spend drainage fees (the Drainage Fee Ordinance). The Drainage Fee Ordinance defines “drainage” as including streets, 5 curbs, and other manmade or natural “conduits . . . that are used to draw off surface water from land, carry the water away, collect, store, or treat the water, or divert the water into natural or artificial watercourses or into which the surface water flows.” The Ordinance identifies the authority to collect drainage fees as arising from both Chapter 552 and the City’s home rule authority. The City subsequently collected drainage fees from Perez and others. For example, Perez presented evidence that she paid a monthly drainage fee of $11.38 on her current residence. Following the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Dacus II, and while that suit was pending on remand, on June 17, 2015, Perez filed her original petition in this suit4 against the City and City officers charged with implementing the Drainage Fee Ordinance, challenging the legality of the Ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and reimbursement of taxes paid pursuant to it. Perez alleged that the City and the individual defendants “unconstitutionally and illegally assessed, collected and expended hundreds of millions of dollars from 2011 to 2105 purportedly for drainage and street improvements and repairs” from “Houston taxpayers and landowners pursuant to a void Charter Amendment,” Proposition I, and “a void City Ordinance,” the Drainage Fee Ordinance. 4 Perez pleaded her suit as a class-action lawsuit but no class certification ever occurred. 6 Perez claimed, “Simply put, the [Drainage Fee Ordinance] is void, and has always been void.” Perez claimed that she has standing to bring claims against the City and the “ultra vires defendants” because she “is a municipal taxpayer who paid, and continues to pay, the [i]llegal [drainage] [t]ax under duress.” She alleged that the drainage fee has been illegally assessed and collected “pursuant to a void Charter Amendment and/or to a void City Ordinance” and that the current mayor, Sylvester Turner, has announced his intention to continue to assess and collect the drainage fee. She also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the City and individual defendants from passing future budgets or future spending of public monies which “exceed the caps of the Revenue Cap and/or the Spending Cap contained in the Houston City Charter,” as, she alleged, the City had been doing under “the now Void Charter Amendment.” She claimed standing to sue as a resident, municipal taxpayer, and registered voter who had paid the drainage fee “under duress.” In her original petition, Perez sought a judicial declaration that the drainage fee imposed by the Drainage Fee Ordinance is “illegal and/or unconstitutional” and that “all assessed amounts must be reimbursed to those persons and entities that paid them.” She also sought reimbursement for past payment of the monthly drainage fee charged to her residence, and she sought an injunction against the 7 expenditure of all amounts assessed but not yet spent and against further assessments, with any money collected to be paid into the registry of the Court. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, asserting, in relevant part, that Perez lacked standing to bring her claims because she had suffered no particularized injury. The City further argued that Perez lacked standing to seek money damages and that governmental immunity barred her claims for a refund of amounts paid. The trial court held a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction and expressed concerns regarding Perez’s standing based on her original pleadings; accordingly, the trial court afforded Perez the opportunity to replead her claims. Perez filed an amended petition, continuing to assert that “the City and/or the Ultra Vires Defendants had unconstitutionally and illegally assessed, collected and expended hundreds of millions of dollars from 2011 to 2015 purportedly for drainage and street improvements and repairs” pursuant to “a void Charter Amendment . . . and/or pursuant to a void City Ordinance.” Perez argues that the drainage fees have been used illegally because they have been used not only for drainage projects but for “projects clearly unrelated to drainage systems such as traffic signal reconstruction, bridge replacement, street intersection improvements, concrete panel replacement, and asphalt overlays, among others.” She continued to seek a judgment declaring that the drainage fee is “illegal and/or unconstitutional, 8 that all assessed amounts must be reimbursed to those persons and entities that paid them,” that “all assessed but not yet to be spent amounts must not be expended but segregated and protected and paid into the registry” of the trial court, and that “no further [drainage fee] assessments be assessed or collected.” Perez also asserted a variety of constitutional claims challenging the City’s Charter Amendment and the implementation of the drainage utility, including the assessment and collection of fees, authorized by the Drainage Fee Ordinance. Specifically relevant to her standing, Perez pleaded the following allegations and facts: • “Perez has been a named party in [the] related [Dacus] litigation which is the sole and exclusive reason why the current lawsuit is now available to reimburse everyone for their pro rata payment of the” drainage fee. • Because of the supreme court’s ruling in Dacus II, the trial court on remand in Dacus “had no discretion but to enter summary judgment in favor of Perez. Simply put, the Illegal Rain Tax [i.e., the drainage fee] is void, and has always been void.” • Perez has standing “to bring claims against the City of Houston and/or Ultra Vires Defendants because [she] is a municipal taxpayer who paid, and continues to pay, the [drainage fees] under duress” because “the City has been illegally assessing and collecting hundreds of millions of dollars . . . purportedly for drainage and street improvements and repairs . . . pursuant to a void Charter Amendment and/or to a void City Ordinance.” Finally, regarding the Drainage Fee Ordinance, Perez asserted in her amended pleading that “state law provides the City with the authority to impose a 9 drainage charge for drainage costs associated with specific drainage systems,” but “state law does not provide the City with the authority to impose a drainage charge for street, curb, and other non-drainage related improvements and repairs.” She thus asserted that, because the Charter Amendment was “void,” the fees authorized by the Drainage Fee Ordinance are “likewise void” and, “[a]ccordingly, none of the monies collected by the [Drainage Fee Ordinance] were validly collected.” And Perez further asserted that the collected monies were “illegally and unconstitutionally exempted from the Revenue Cap,” causing City budgets to exceed the caps. The trial court held another hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, and, ultimately, on December 9, 2016, the trial court dismissed Perez’s lawsuit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court found that Perez’s “purported constitutional claims” were not ripe for adjudication, that Perez had “no standing to challenge the validity, legality, and/or constitutionality of the assessment and/or collection of City of Houston drainage fees, the November 2010 Pay-As-You-Go charter amendment [Proposition I], and/or the April 2011 [D]rainage [Fee] [O]rdinance because she has suffered no particularized injury as a matter of law,” that she had “no standing to seek money damages and/or a refund as a taxpayer as a matter of law,” and that governmental immunity also barred her refund claim. 10 The trial court found that Perez was not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees. The court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all of Perez’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, observing that she had “failed to replead any viable claim after this court’s having given her sufficient opportunity and time in which to do so.” Perez appealed. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction A. Standard of Review of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Both ripeness and standing are components of subject-matter jurisdiction. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. 2001). The ripeness doctrine prohibits suits involving “uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2001). An issue is ripe for decision when at the time a lawsuit is filed the facts are sufficiently developed “so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000). The standing doctrine prohibits suits by those who are not personally aggrieved. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008). A party’s standing is never presumed, cannot be waived, and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–45 (Tex. 1993). “For a plaintiff to have standing, a controversy must exist 11 between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). If the issues are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the case becomes moot. Id.; see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects.”). Like ripeness, “[s]tanding is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). We review standing under the same standard by which we review subject-matter jurisdiction generally. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Mootness is also relevant to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a case. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. 2010). A controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. Bd. of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. 2002). “If a controversy ceases to exist—‘the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome’—the case becomes moot.” Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)). A case is moot when a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy. Reule v. RLZ Invs., 411 S.W.3d 31, 32 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see Meeker v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). When a case becomes moot on appeal, we set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32; Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759. The absence of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction, among other procedural vehicles. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554. Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). B. Impact of Dacus on Perez’s Claims in this Suit As a preliminary matter, we address the portions of Perez’s pleadings and issues on appeal in which she asserts complaints related to the Charter Amendment, including her claim that the Drainage Fee Ordinance has already been determined to be invalid because of the litigation surrounding the Charter Amendment, and, therefore, the collection of revenue under the Ordinance is illegal. In Dacus II, the Texas Supreme Court declared that Proposition I, providing for the creation of the Pay-As-You-Go Fund (the DDSR Fund), was not submitted to the voters in November 2010 “with such definiteness and certainty that voters 13 would not be misled.” 466 S.W.3d at 829. On remand for further proceedings, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in Dacus III, affirmed the judgment of the trial court on remand holding that the election on Proposition I, amending the City charter to provide for the DDSR Fund, was void, and it ordered the City to hold a new election on the measure. 2017 WL 536647, at *2, 5. The supreme court denied the City’s petition for review of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in Dacus III, finally resolving the controversy regarding the validity of the Charter Amendment. In this suit, Perez challenges the legality of the DDSR Fund established in December 2011 pursuant to Proposition I. Perez filed this suit after the supreme court held, in Dacus II, that the language of Proposition I was too uncertain to enable voters to make an informed choice on the Proposition, but before the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held, in Dacus III, that the election was void and ordered a new one. Because of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in Dacus III, which became final after Perez filed this suit and while this appeal was pending, issues relating to the Charter Amendment have been resolved by the judgment declaring the Charter Amendment void and ordering a new election on the measure. Therefore, any further complaints regarding validity of the Charter Amendment are moot. See Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32; Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759. It is void. 14 Perez alleges, first, that the City and other individual defendants wrongfully relied upon authority granted pursuant to a void Charter Amendment. However, the controversy regarding the validity of the Charter Amendment was not yet resolved at the time Perez filed her petition. Any claims that the City or City officials acted improperly in failing to recognize the invalidity of the Charter Amendment before its invalidity was judicially determined were premature at the time Perez filed this suit. See Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 250; Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851– 52 (holding that issue is ripe for decision when “at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are sufficiently developed ‘so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). Moreover, the judicial declaration that the Charter Amendment is void does not help Perez’s case here. Although the Dacus line of cases addressed the Charter Amendment, it did not address the Drainage Fee Ordinance. Nothing in the Dacus cases invalidated or called into question the City’s authority to pass the Drainage Fee Ordinance pursuant to its constitutional home-rule authority or Local Government Code Chapter 552. Thus, to the extent that Perez’s claims are based on her allegations that the Dacus cases have invalidated the Drainage Fee Ordinance and that, as a result, the City or individual defendants have acted 15 improperly in enforcing the Ordinance, her claims are misplaced. See Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 250; Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851–52. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any claims dependent on the Charter Amendment’s having been declared void, and, thus, it properly dismissed those claims based on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. C. Ripeness of Perez’s Claim for a Declaratory Judgment that the Ordinance is Invalid Perez also argues, however, that the Drainage Fee Ordinance itself is illegal and invalid in its own right. Perez challenges the validity of the Drainage Fee Ordinance based in part on her assertion that the judgment voiding the Charter Amendment likewise invalidated the Drainage Fee Ordinance because the City otherwise lacked the authority to collect the fees pursuant to the Ordinance and, accordingly, those fees are being illegally collected. She also argues that the fees were used in part for projects “clearly unrelated to drainage systems such as traffic signal reconstruction, bridge replacement, [and] street intersection improvements.” But she fails to plead any such “illegal” expenditure with specificity. The City contests Perez’s assertion. The City asserted both in the trial court and on appeal that it had authority independent of the Charter Amendment to pass and enforce the Drainage Fee Ordinance as it did. The City asserts that the Drainage Fee Ordinance was passed pursuant to the City’s authority as a home-rule city governed by a city charter and pursuant to authority granted by Local 16 Government Code Chapter 552. The City further argues in its brief on appeal that the Charter Amendment was unnecessary to impose a drainage fee but was proposed solely because it “shifts a portion of ad valorem tax revenue from debt service to the DDSR Fund and possibly affects Houston’s revenue caps, [and thus] Houston’s charter was best served by an amendment and election.” The Texas Constitution provides for home-rule authority. See TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5; see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 9.001–.008 (addressing adoption of charters for home-rule municipalities). A home-rule city derives its power from the Texas Constitution, operates by its charter, and “possess[es] the full power of self government and look[s] to the Legislature not for grants of power, but only for limitations on their power.” See Town of Lakewood Vill. v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex. 2016). Local Government Code Chapter 552, also known as the Municipal Drainage Utility Systems Act, sets out procedures for municipalities to address concerns regarding drainage. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.041–.054 (setting out procedures for municipalities to create drainage utility that can address drainage concerns). The Drainage Fee Ordinance itself states: [T]his Ordinance has been prepared for consideration by City Council in conformance with Subchapter C of Chapter 552 of the Texas Local Government Code and the City’s Home-Rule powers under Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution to create a City of Houston Municipal Drainage Utility System to accomplish the objective and 17 directives of Section 22, Article IX of the City Charter with regard to streets and drainage[.] We conclude that Perez’s claims based on the validity of the Drainage Fee Ordinance in its own right are ripe for determination. We therefore turn to Perez’s standing to bring these claims. D. Perez’s Standing to Seek a Judgment Declaring the Ordinance Invalid, Reimbursement for “Illegally Collected” Drainage Fees, and an Injunction Against the Future Collection of Drainage Fees In her first issue on appeal, Perez argues that she has standing to assert a legal claim for reimbursement of all drainage charges made under the Drainage Fee Ordinance because, as a municipal taxpayer who paid, and continues to pay under duress, an illegal drainage fee assessed by the City, she can demonstrate both that she has standing to sue as a taxpayer and that she has suffered a particularized injury. 1. Perez’s claim that this is a suit to recover illegally collected drainage fees We begin our analysis by recognizing that although Perez has pleaded that she paid “illegal” drainage fees, she has cited to no authority declaring illegal the Drainage Fee Ordinance pursuant to which the fees were assessed and collected. Perez herself seeks such a declaration in the underlying suit, but she does not cite to, nor could we find, any authority declaring the Drainage Fee Ordinance invalid or void. Perez makes multiple references to the Dacus case; however, as discussed 18 above, that case addressed only the validity of the ballot language for the Proposition I Charter Amendment and did not address the validity of the Drainage Fee Ordinance. See, e.g., Dacus III, 2017 WL 536647, at *2. Nor has she identified what measurable added illegal activity is supported by the fee that was not authorized by the City’s ability to collect drainage fees conferred on it by the Local Government Code. Thus, Perez misconstrues the facts of this case when she asserts that she was forced to pay “illegal” fees. Accordingly, Perez cannot rely on the line of cases she cites in her brief on appeal, which provide for, as she characterizes it, “reimbursement of illegal fees and taxes . . . when the public entity compels compliance with a void law and subjects a person to punishment if he refuses or fails to comply.” See, e.g., State v. Akin Prods. Co., 286 S.W.2d 110, 110–12 (Tex. 1956) (holding, where supreme court had previously held tax on citrus industry unconstitutional in its entirety and plaintiffs/taxpayers had obtained permission to sue State for recovery of funds subsequently collected under that unconstitutional act, that taxes paid under duress were recoverable). These cases do not apply to a situation, like the one here, where the underlying law—here, the Drainage Fee Ordinance—has not been declared invalid and no specific showing of any illegality of the fees collected has been made. 19 2. Perez’s standing to maintain her suit for declaratory relief Perez argues that her pleadings and jurisdictional evidence are sufficient to establish her standing to pursue her claims for a judgment declaring the Drainage Fee Ordinance illegal. We disagree. “In general, taxpayers do not have a right to bring suit to contest government decision-making[.]” Bland Ind. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. The Texas Supreme Court has explained why lawsuits such as Perez’s are disfavored as a matter of public policy: Generally, a citizen lacks standing to bring a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of governmental acts. This is because governments cannot operate if every citizen who concludes that a public official has abused his discretion is granted the right to come into court and bring such official’s public acts under judicial review. Thus, standing doctrines reflect in many ways the rule that neither citizens nor taxpayers can appear in court simply to insist that the government and its officials adhere to the requirements of law. Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 136–37 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The supreme court has further held that “[t]his pragmatic approach ensures that there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion