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  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • NESTOR SEVILLA  vs.  JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
						
                                

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FILED 3/3/2022 6:28 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Brandon Keys DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-19-16649 NESTOR SEVILLA, IN THE DISTRICT COURT VS. 68TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT .IUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS, AWAD SUNEMAN ALHAZMA, and MARY BRAYTON-HAMILTON DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDAN TS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: NOW COMES JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS AND AWAD SUNEMAN ALHAZMA, hereinafter referred to as "Defendant," and before any proceedings before the jury, makes and files this MOTION IN LIMINE, and respectfully moves the Court to instruct Plaintiff(s) and Plaintiff(s)' counsel to refrain from either directly or indirectly, upon voir dire examination, opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, introduction of any evidence, argument, objections before the jury, reading of any portion of the pleadings, or by any other means or in any other manner, informing the jury, or bringing to the jury‘s attention, any of the matters set forth in the numbered paragraphs below, unless and until such matters have been first called to the attention of the Court, out of the presence and/or hearing of the jury, and a favorable ruling has been obtained from the Court as to the admissibility and relevance of any such matters: Defendant would also note that due to the current pandemic climate and the premium being placed on getting a live jury to Show up for jury selection, that these matters be strictly enforced. A mistrial in this atmosphere is no more or less justified based upon violation of the parties’ motions in limine, but it may be more costly to all parties involved and the community and courts as a whole. Sevilla vs. Villegas et a1 PAGE l DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION 1N LIMINE 1. Insurance. Unless an insurance company is a named Defendant, that the Defendant is or is not protected, in Whole or in part, by liability insurance, or that defense counsel was retained by, or all or any part of the costs of defense, or of any resulting judgment, are or will be paid by an insurance company, or any other matter suggesting an involvement of any insurance company with the defense of the case. 2. Jurors' Connection with Insurance Industry. Inquiring of potential jurors as to their present or past employment or connection with the insurance industry, or present or past connection of any family member with the insurance industry, except that: a) If a potential juror's juror information card discloses employment in the insurance industry, such potential juror may be questioned concerning same. b) Inquiry may be made of potential jurors concerning their experience (or that of members of their family), if any, reviewing, adjusting or allowing/disallowing claims, as long as no express reference is made to "insurance." 3. Liability or Non-Liabilitv for Judgment. That the named Defendant(s) may or may not have to pay any resulting judgment. 4. Attorneys' Fees. That any party will have to pay attorneys' fees, or any reference to the amount or basis of any attorneys' fees, unless a claim for recovery of attorneys' fees in the case Will be submitted to the jury. 5. Criminal Offenses. That any party or witness has been suspected of, arrested for, charged with or convicted of any criminal offense unless there is evidence of a specific conviction that the Court has previously ruled is admissible in the case. 6. Alcohol or Drug Use. That any party or witness uses or abuses alcohol, tobacco, or any controlled substance, unless and until such alleged use or abuse is shown to be specifically relevant to the matters in controversy. Amoco Chemicals Corp. vs. Stafford, 663 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App—Houston [15‘ Dist] 1983, no writ).; TRCE 801(d); TRCE 403. 7. Settlement Negotiations or Mediation. Any negotiations, offers or demands with respect to any attempted settlement or mediation. TRCE 408; Beutel vs. Paul, 741 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). 8. Discovery Disputes. Any reference to discovery disputes that arose during the preparation of the case for trial, any position taken by any party with respect thereto, or to the Court's rulings thereon. 9. Hearsay Medical Opinions. Any hearsay statement offered for the truth of the statement by an allegedly injured person concerning any diagnosis or medical Sevilla vs. Villegas et a1 PAGE 2 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION IN LIMINE opinions communicated to such person by a physician or other health care provider. Such would be an attempt to introduce before the jury expert testimony Without a proper predicate concerning the expert’s qualifications and abilities to give such testimony. Defendant would note that TRE 803(4) specifically excepts statements made t0 a medical provider for diagnosis or treatment from the hearsay rule. This does not apply to statements by a medical provider to the patient. The idea is that an individual is unlikely to lie to a medical provider since they want an accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment. Conversely, there is not the same reassurance of truthfulness when it comes to an individual stating What the doctor told them in the middle of a personal injury jury trial for money damages. 10. Reguests for Stipulations. Any request or demand in the presence of the jury for a stipulation to any fact, or that counsel admit or deny any fact. 11. Reguests for Files. Any request or demand in the presence of the jury that opposing counsel produce any document or thing, or that opposing counselor any party or witness exhibit, turn over or allow examination of the contents of any file or briefcase (except that a party may demand to see a document used by a witness on the stand to refresh his/her recollection, or that a witness testifies that he/she has used previously to refresh his/her recollection). 12. Discrimination. Any argument that a party should be treated more or less favorably because of such party's race, gender, national origin, nationality, religion, marital status, occupation, or financial status (except in the second phase of a bifurcated trial). 13. Hardship or Privation. Any argument or suggestion that a failure to award damages will cause a Plaintiff privation or financial hardship except that Plaintiff’s counsel may certainly argue that Plaintiff has a particular amount of money outstanding for past medical bills. 14. Golden Rule. Any argument or suggestion that the jurors should put themselves in the position of a party. World Wide Tire Co. vs. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref’ d n.r.e.). 15. Effect of Answers to Jury Questions. Any argument that any finding or failure to find in response to a particular jury question will or will not result in a judgment favorable to any party. This provision does not bar argument by counsel that a particular jury question should be answered in a particular way. Cooper vs. Argonaut Insurance Co., 430 S.W. 2d. 35 (Tex. Civ. App—Dallas 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Such argument is improper under the Texas special verdict system because it advises the jury of the effect of its answers. 16. Obi ections to Evidence Not Produced in Discovery. Any objection based on failure to disclose evidence in pre-trial discovery. Any party desiring to urge any such objection shall request to approach the bench and urge such objection outside the hearing of the jury. To the extent possible or predictable, such matters should be addressed and a ruling sought at pretrial once the case is assigned for trial, although Sevilla vs. Villegas et a1 PAGE 3 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION IN LIMINE the objection may be urged for the record outside the hearing of the jury at the time such evidence is offered in the event the Court has overruled the objection at pretrial. 17. Oualifving Exnert Witness. Calling any witness to testify as an expert without having first been qualified as an expert for those matters which were disclosed in response to Request for Disclosure. In addition, prior to the expert stating any opinion he must be required to disclose the underlying facts or data which forms his “expert” opinion pursuant to Rule 705 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 18. Available Assets. Any inquiry into or reference to the assets Defendant has available for investigating, preparing and defending this cause. First Nat ’l Bank of Marshall vs. Beavers, 619 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Wimoth vs. Limestone Prods. C0., 255 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. App—Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 19. Superseded Pleadings. The contents of any pleadings which have been superseded by the current pleadings on file in this case. Zock vs. Bank of the Southwest National Association, Houston, 464 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). 20. Voir Dire — Pre-testing Evidence / Previewing Verdict. Any inquiry attempting to determine the weight jurors will give to the evidence. If a question does not seek to discover a disqualifying bias or prejudice but seeks to determine the weight jurors will give to the evidence, such question is an improper attempt to pre-test the evidence and preview the verdict and therefore objectionable. Hflndai Motor Co. V. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006). 21. Prior Automobile Accidents. Any inquiry into or disclosing that the Defendant(s) has/have been involved in any prior or subsequent automobile accident. Any testimony regarding previous or subsequent accidents is irrelevant and far too prejudicial to discuss before the jury. 22. Prior Speeding Tickets. Any inquiry into or disclosing that the Defendant has ever been issued any speeding tickets prior to or subsequent to this accident. As the Texas Supreme Court wrote in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. vs. May, 600 S.W.2d. 755 (Tex. 1980), “as a general rule, evidence of similar acts is inadmissible on the issue of whether someone was a negligent in doing or not doing a particular act.” 23. Investigative Officer’s Opinion. Any inquiry or reference to the fact that the investigative officer has formed an opinion or determined a cause of the accident or that one of the drivers was at fault until the qualifications of the officer has been established. Pilgrim ’s Pride Corp. vs. Smoak, 134 S.W. 3rd 880, (Tex. App.— Texarkana, 2004, pet. denied) (investigating officer's testimony on accident causation was required to be given by a qualified person in science of accident reconstruction.) See also DeLarue vs. State, 102 S.W.3d 388, Tex. App—Houston, [14th Dist.] 2003; and Ter-Vartanyan vs. R&R Freight, Ina, 111 S.W. 3rd 779, Tex. App—Dallas, 2003, pet. denied). Sevilla vs. Villegas et a1 P AGE 4 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION 1N LIMINE 24. Issuance of any traffic ticket. Any inquiry or reference to the fact that Defendant was issued a ticket for a traffic Violation arising out of the alleged negligence giving rise to the charge, absent proof of a “guilty plea in open court”. Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 410; Cox v. Bohman, 683 S.W.2d 757, (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, writ refused n.r.e.); Switzer v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 164 (TeX.App. — Houston, 1968 no wn't). 25. Lost Wages or Lost Wage Earning Capacitv. Any inquiry or reference to whether Plaintiff missed time from work or the effect of their injuries on their job or whether they lost their job as a result of this motor vehicle collision and any alleged injuries from it. This is being requested since Plaintiff has not timely enumerated any lost wage or lost wage earning capacity calculations in response to Defendant(s) Request for Disclosure (D) as well as Defendant’s Interrogatory # 11. 26. Comments on “effects 0n society” and “sending a message” or “protecting sociefl as a Whole.” Plaintiff be prohibited from making any argument, comment or inference during any phase of this trial that Defendant should be held accountable or responsible for the purpose of sending a message on behalf of society as a whole, to protect ‘community safety’, or sending a message that a particular behavior will not be tolerated. This is because it appeals to a juror’s fear and plays upon bias, prejudice or sympathy rather than a principled weighing of what the credible evidence shows. 27. Photographs. Showing any photographs to the jury until the same has been tendered to opposing counsel and admitted into evidence. 28. Future Medical Expenses. Any argument, inquiry or reference as to whether Plaintiff will need future medical. This is being requested since Plaintiff has not timely enumerated any future medical calculations in response to Defendant(s) Request for Disclosure (D). 29. Causation. Plaintiffs counsel be prohibited from making any statements regarding any relationship between any medical condition outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors and the accident made the basis of this lawsuit. Specifically, Plaintiff, Plaintiffs attorney or any witness for the Plaintiff be prohibited from telling the jury that any injury or condition of the Plaintiff outside the common knowledge of jurors was caused by the accident made the basis of this lawsuit until such time as there is expert testimony to establish causation and unless such injury was an obvious overt injury that could have been caused by the accident such as broken bones or lacerations. (See: Guevara vs. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2007)). This is not applicable if there is a dueling affidavits agreement that caps Plaintiff’ s damages at the policy limits of Defendant. 30. Excessive Emotional Display. That Plaintiffs counsel, and through Plaintiffs counsel, Plaintiffs witnesses and supporters present in the courtroom, be instructed to avoid extreme emotional displays such as crying, outbursts, and/or hysterics in the presence of the Jury. Such displays of emotion constitute an improper appeal for Sevilla vs. Villegas et a1 PAGE 5 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION 1N LIMINE sympathy, and are primarily calculated to inflame and prejudice the jury against Defendant and lead to the rendition of excessive awards. TEX. R. EVID. 403. 31. Redaction of anv “future” expenses. The Medical Records exception to the hearsay rule (Rule 803(6)) “is intended to include routine, systematic entries in a patient’s medical records that are necessary for the proper rendition of medical services.” Grove V Overby, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6822 (Tex. App. 7 Austin July 29, 2004, no pet.). Within the medical records may be “opinions” regarding the necessity and cost of future care. While past medical expenses can be proved up Via CPRC 18.001 Affidavit (in effect, making an exception to the hearsay rule for admission of otherwise inadmissible material), future medical expenses and the need for such care must be proved up Via live expert testimony, to a “reasonable medical probability”, a standard which is not mentioned in the plaintiffs records, nor are those opinions sworn by an appropriate medical professional. Defendant requests that any “future costs” or treatment be redacted from any medical records, absent any sworn testimony supporting that expert testimony. This is not applicable if there is a dueling affidavits agreement that caps Plaintiff’s damages at the policy limits of Defendant. 32. Evidence Not Produced in Written Discovery Response. Calling any witness, or offering any document into evidence, if the identity of such witness or the document has not been disclosed as part of a party’s initial disclosure responses or in response to a proper discovery request. 33. Late 18.001 affidavits. Offering any past billing records from a health care provider into evidence without a timely CPRC 18.001 affidavit or live testimony from a treating physician from the same provider. This is not applicable if there is a dueling affidavits agreement that caps Plaintiff’s damages at the policy limits of Defendant. Sevilla vs. Villegas et al PAGE 6 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION 1N LIMINE Respectfully submitted, LISA CHASTAIN & ASSOCMTES WM YOUNG C. JENKINS TBN: 24034505 1201 Elm Street, Suite 5050 Dallas, TX 75270 E-Service Only: DallasLegal@allstate.com (214) 659-4346 (877) 67 8-4763 (fax) ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT(S) JUAN HERNANDEZ VILLEGAS AND AWAD SUNEMAN ALHAZMA CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on March 3, 2022 to: Cassandra M. Gandara Gandara & Gonzalez PLLC 400 S. Zang Blvd., Suite 1022 Dallas, TX 75208 WW YOUNG C. JENKINS Sevilla vs. Villegas et al PAGE 7 DEFENDANTS VILLEGAS & ALHAZMA’S MOTION 1N LIMINE Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Young Jenkins Bar No. 24034505 yjena@allstate.com Envelope ID: 62289769 Status as of 3/4/2022 9:54 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jessica Gonzalez 24076176 Service@OakCliffLawyers.com 3/3/2022 6:28:42 PM SENT Young Jenkins dallaslegal@allstate.com 3/3/2022 6:28:42 PM SENT CASSANDRA MGANDARA cassandra@oakclifflawyers.com 3/3/2022 6:28:42 PM SENT Associated Case Party: NESTOR SEVILLA Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jessica Gonzalez jessica@oakclifflawyers.com 3/3/2022 6:28:42 PM SENT