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  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID HILL  vs.  DICKY LEE HALE, et alMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
						
                                

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FILED 7/16/20213:19 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Darling Tellez DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-17-03053 DAVID HILL; IN THE DISTRICT COURT P1aintiff(s), 101 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT vs. DICKY LEE HALE; and HEATH DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS WHITESIDE; Defendant(s). DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: NOW COMES DICKY LEE HALE, hereinafter referred to as "Defendant," and before any proceedings before the jury, makes and files this MOTION [N LIMINE, and respectfully moves the Court to instruct Plaintiff(s) and Plaintiff(s)' counsel to refrain from either directly or indirectly, upon voir dire examination, opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, introduction of any evidence, argument, objections before the jury, reading of any portion of the pleadings, or by any other means or in any other manner, informing the jury, or bringing to the jury's attention, any of the matters set forth in the numbered paragraphs below, unless and until such matters have been first called to the attention of the Court, out of the presence and/or hearing of the jury, and a favorable ruling has been obtained from the Court as to the admissibility and relevance of any such matters: l. Insurance. Unless an insurance company is a named Defendant, that the Defendant is or is not protected, in whole or in part, by liability insurance, or that defense counsel was retained by, or all or any part of the costs of defense, or of any resulting judgment, are or will be paid by an insurance company, or any other matter suggesting an involvement of any insurance company with the defense of the case. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 2. Jurors' Connection with Insurance Industry. Inquiring of potential jurors as to their present or past employment or connection with the insurance industry, or present or past connection of any family member with the insurance industry, except that: Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 1 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION IN LIMINE a) If a potential juror's juror information card discloses employment in the insurance industry, such potential juror may be questioned concerning same. b) Inquiry may be made of potential jurors concerning their experience (or that of members of their family), if any, reviewing, adjusting or allowing/disallowing claims, as long as no express reference is made to "insurance." GRANTED DENIED AGREED Collateral Source. That any portion of the damages sought by Plaintiff have been, or will be, paid by any collateral source, including but not limited to: a) health and accident or disability insurance. b) any employee benefit plan, formal or informal, including payment of wages for time not actually worked. c) social security or welfare. d) veterans or other benefits. e) provisions of medical services free of charge or for less than reasonable and customary charges, provided that the foregoing does not prohibit reference to unpaid charges of any health care provider who actually testifies for Plaintiff (or whose medical records are offered by Plaintiff), or to any letter of protection securing any such charges, if mention of such is contained within evidence admitted in this case. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 4. Retention of Attorney. The time or circumstances under which either party consulted or retained an attorney provided that if any attorney referred a party to a health care provider who testifies in the case (or whose medical records are introduced by such party), such fact may be a subject of inquiry if mention of such is contained within evidence admitted in this case. GRANTED DENIED AGREED Prior Suits or Claims. That any party has been a party to any prior lawsuit, or has asserted any prior claim, or that any prior claim has been asserted against a party; provided that this clause does not prohibit inquiry about a prior injury that may have been the subject of a claim, as distinguished from the claim, suit or settlement with reference thereto, if the nature of injuries claimed in the present suit make the same relevant. GRANTED DENIED AGREED I-Iill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 2 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE Q; Parte Statements of Witnesses. Any reference to any ex parte statement of any Witness or alleged witness, other than an adverse party or agent of an adverse party, unless and until such witness has been called to testify and has given testimony conflicting with such ex parte statement. A deposition or a statement in business or medical records that have been proved up as required by the Rules of Evidence is not an ex parte statement. GRANTED DENIED AGREED Testimony of Absent Witness. Any statement or suggestion as to the probable testimony of any witness or alleged witness who is unavailable to testify, or Whom the party suggesting such testimony does not, in good faith, expect testify in the trial. If the party to is expected to testify by deposition, this provision does not apply to testimony contained in the deposition expected to be offered. Sanders v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. C0,, 429 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1968, writ re’d n.r.e.). GRANTED DENIED AGREED Failure to Call Witness. Any reference to the failure of an opposing party to call any witness. GRANTED DENIED AGREED Photographs and Visual Aids. Showing any documents, photographs or visual aids to the jury, or displaying same in such manner that the jury or any member thereof can see the same, unless and until the same has been tendered to opposing counsel, and has been admitted in evidence or approved for admission or use before the jury, either by the Court or by all counsel. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 10. Hardship or Privation. Any argument or suggestion that a failure to award damages will cause Plaintiff privation or financial hardship. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 11. Golden Rule. Any argument or suggestion that the jurors should put themselves in the position of a party. World Wide Tire C0. vs. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist] 1982, writ rend n.r.e.). GRANTED DENIED AGREED 12. ginsel’s Opinion of Credibility. Any expression of counsel's personal opinion regarding the credibility of any witness. Wallace vs. Liberty Mutual Ins. C0,, 413 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Civ. App—Houston 1967, writ ref‘d n.r.e.). GRANTED DENIED AGREED Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 3 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE 13. Effect of Answers to Jug Questions. Any argument that any finding or failure to find in response to a particular jury question will or will not result in a judgment favorable to any party. This provision does not bar argument by counsel that a particular jury question should be answered in a particular way. Cooper vs. Argonaut Insurance C0., 430 S.W. 2d. 35 (Tex. CiV. App—Dallas 1968, writ ref‘d n.r.e.). Such argument is improper under the Texas special verdict system because it advises the jury of the effect of its answers. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 14. Evidence Not Produced in Discovery Response t0 a Proper Reqgest. Calling any Witness, or offering any document in evidence, if the identity of such witness or the document has not been disclosed in response to a proper discovery request. If a party has a good faith basis to urge that such Witness or document should be received either because (a) no discovery request properly called for its disclosure, or (b) good cause existed for failure timely to disclose, such party shall first approach the bench and secure a ruling thereon. Counsel are advised that to the extent possible or predictable, such matters should be addressed and a ruling sought at pretrial once the case is assigned for trial. City of San Antonio vs. Fulcher, 749 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App—San Antonio 1988, writ den). TRCP 215. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 15. Obiections to Evidence Not Produced in Discovery. Any objection based on failure to disclose evidence in pre-trial discovery. Any party desiring to urge any such objection shall request to approach the bench and urge such objection outside the hearing of the jury. To the extent possible or predictable, such matters should be addressed and a ruling sought at pretrial once the case is assigned for trial, although the objection may be urged for the record outside the hearing of the jury at the time such evidence is offered in the event the Court has overruled the objection at pretrial. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 16. Prior Automobile Accidents. Any inquiry into or disclosing that the Defendant has been involved in any prior or subsequent automobile accident. Any testimony regarding previous or subsequent accidents is irrelevant and far too prejudicial to discuss before the jury. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 17. Prior Tickets. Any inquiry into or disclosing that the Defendant has ever been issued any moving violations prior to or subsequent to this accident. As the Texas Supreme Court wrote in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. vs. May, 600 S.W.2d. 755 (Tex. 1980), “as a general rule, evidence of similar acts is inadmissible on the issue of whether someone was a negligent in doing or not doing a particular act." GRANTED DENIED AGREED Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 4 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE 18. Existence of Motion in Limine. Any reference to this Motion in Limine being filed or that all or any portion of the relief requested herein has been granted or denied. Burdz'ck vs. York Oil C0,, 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1963, writ refd n.r.e.). GRANTED DENIED AGREED 19. Calculation of Economic Damages. Plaintiff be prohibited from introducing any evidence, offering any testimony, or making any argument regarding economic damages not timely disclosed in response to Request for Disclosures. Pursuant to TRCP 194.2, Plaintiff is required to disclose the amount and method of calculating economic damages. Pursuant to TRCP 193.6, information and material not disclosed through discovery may not be introduced into evidence. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 20. Statements of Law. Counsel be prohibited from making any statement of the law other than that regarding the burden of proof and the basic legal definitions before the Charge conference. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 21. Cellphone Usage. Plaintiff and counsel be prohibited from making any argument or testifying as to any alleged use of a cellphone/mobile device by the Defendant as there is no evidence or records to support such allegation. There is no mention of cellphone usage being a factor on the Crash Report, nor any evidence or admission of cellphone usage being a factor. The clear prejudicial nature of such argument or testimony outweighs any probative value. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 22. Untimely CPRC 818.001 affidavits. That no Affidavits pursuant to CPRC §18.001 be introduced into evidence that were not timely produced and notice of same timely filed. Pursuant to CPRC 18.001(d), effective 1/ 1/2020, the party offering the affidavit must serve a copy of the affidavit by the earlier of (1) 90 days after the date the defendant files an answer; (2 and 3) the date the offering party must designate any expert witness. Plaintiff failed to comply with the time constraints provided by statute, therefore has not complied with the statute, making them inadmissible hearsay documents. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 23. CPRC 818.001 affidavits. That no Affidavits pursuant to CPRC §18.001 be introduced into evidence without the corresponding deductions or write-offs under the “paid vs incurred” line of cases. In particular, that Plaintiff not be allowed to introduce evidence or argue the total amount of medical expenses billed, but be limited to that amount that was either paid or is still due and owing (not having been written off by the medical care provider). Haygood V De Escabedo (Tex. 2011). GRANTED DENIED AGREED Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 5 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE 24. Statements of Law regarding 18.001 counter affidavits. Plaintiff’s counsel be prohibited from making any statements regarding the legal procedures and legal effects relating to the filing of 18.001 Medical Billing Affidavits under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Specifically, Plaintiff attorney be prohibited from telling the jury that Defendant did not file counter affidavits, as that “fact” is not in evidence at any trial. Further, the Plaintiffs counsel be prohibited from stating that the 18.001 Affidavits filed by Plaintiff are undisputed and/0r uncontroverted: such an argument improperly shifts the burden of proof to the Defense. It is Plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment, not the Defense burden to “disprove” their reasonableness or necessity. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 25. Argument regarding 18.001 counter affidavits. Defendant’s counsel be allowed to argue the reasonableness and/or necessity of the medical billing and/or treatment given to the plaintiff in this case. Statutory or case law does not preclude argument about the reasonableness or necessity of medical treatment and/or cost, only the exclusion of evidence to the contrary. See Grove V Overby, 2004 Tex. Ap. LEXIS 6822, 2004 WL 168326 (Tex. App. » Austin July 29, 2004, no pet); Gutierrez, et a1. v Martinez, 2008 Texas App. LEXIS 9632 (Tex. App. i Houston Dec. 19, 2008, no pet); Gunn V. McCoy, 489 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App. — Houston, 2016); and Beauchamp v Hambrick, 901 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex.App. — Eastland 1995, no writ). GRANTED DENIED AGREED 26. Exclusion of non-authors’ documents as business/medical records. Plaintiff’ s counsel be prohibited from attempting to include records of one doctor or treating provider within the records of another doctor or treating provider. Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 902(10) indicates that business records proved up by affidavit must be made by the affiant “with knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded to make the record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such record; ...” Throughout the “business records” affidavits filed in this case may be documents NOT authored by the Affiant (or employee or representative of the medical provider), nor can the affiant testify as to the “correctness” of the included documents, thus they are not true “business records”, but hearsay documents and should be excluded from inclusion as “business records” under Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. They are also duplicative and may confuse the jury be being found in multiple places, when the sole place they should be is within the records sworn to by an appropriate custodial individual. See Southwest Industries Investment Co. V. Scalf, 604 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Knollenberg v. Steel Tank Construction, 600 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Civ.App-Houston (lst Dist.) 1980, no writ); Wills v. R. G. Beneke & Q, 570 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref‘d n. r. e.); Matrix Computing, Inc. v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ); Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tetens, 538 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Vahlsing Christina Corp. v. Ryman, 512 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ). Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 6 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE GRANTED DENIED AGREED 27. Msion of written report as not “true” medical records. Plaintiff’ s counsel be prohibited from attempting to include any written report by a medical provider that was not done in the regular course of medical care provided to the plaintiff. The Medical Records exception to the hearsay rule (Rule 803(6)) “is intended to include routine, systematic entries in a patient’s medical records that are necessary for the proper rendition of medical services.” Grove v Overby, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6822 (Tex. App. — Austin July 29, 2004, no pet). Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 902(10) indicates that business records proved up by affidavit must be made by the affiant “with knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded to make the record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such record; ...” Any such “report” is NOT done for the purpose of treatment, but rather for litigation purposes, thus they are not true “business records”, but hearsay documents and should be excluded from inclusion at “business records” under Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 28. Redaction of any “future” expenses. The Medical Records exception to the hearsay rule (Rule 803(6)) “is intended to include routine, systematic entries in a patient’s medical records that are necessary for the proper rendition of medical services.” Grove v Overby, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6822 (Tex. App. 7 Austin July 29, 2004, no pet.). Within the medical records may be “opinions” regarding the necessity and cost of future care. While past medical expenses can be proved up Via CPRC 18.001 Affidavit (in effect, making an exception to the hearsay rule for admission of otherwise inadmissible material), future medical expenses and the need for such care must be proved up Via live expert testimony, to a “reasonable medical probability”, a standard which is not mentioned in the plaintiffs records, nor are those opinions sworn by an appropriate medical professional. Defendant requests that any “future costs” or treatment be redacted from any medical records, absent any sworn testimony supporting that expert testimony. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 29. Amount of Property Damage Expense. Plaintiff is not seeking any claim for the amount of property damage. The actual dollar cost to repair a vehicle may not be relevant for any admissible purpose, as the “cost of repair” of vehicle varies wildly between cars of different models/makes/years. For example, a bumper scratch on a Rolls Royce presumably would cost much more to repair than a bumper scratch on a Honda Civic: without a reference (such as expert witness testimony), the “dollar cost” of repairs is of no value to the trier of fact, and may be highly prejudicial. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 30. Property Damage Photos. Plaintiff may not attempt to mention, show to the Jury, refer to, or introduce into evidence the property damage photos taken at the scene of the incident or shortly thereafter because Plaintiff is not claiming property damage, and therefore, such evidence is not relevant under TEX. R. EVID. 401, and, alternatively, if determined relevant, Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 7 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION IN LIMDIE its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, per TEX. R. EVID. 403. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not designated an expert on causation (i.e. that major or minor property damage can or cannot proximately cause, Within reasonable degree of probability, the injuries Plaintiff alleges in this suit). GRANTED DENIED AGREED 31. Lizard Theogy. Any reference or insinuation that the jury should act as a conscience of the community, protect the community from risk, consider community safety, cast the Defendant as a danger to society, or punish the Defendant to discourage similar conduct. Such references or insinuations Violate the golden rule, are irrelevant, and simply appeal to the bias, prejudice, and fears of the jury. GRANTED DENIED AGREED 32. Exclusion of unpaid medical costs more than 4 years old. Plaintiff may not seek to introduce a claim for any unpaid medical bill/cost that has never been collected and is more than 4 years from the date of service. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.0105 limits a claimant’s recovery of medical expenses to those which have been or must be paid by the claimant. Haygood v. Escobedo, S.W. 3d 2011, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1377, Tex., 2011 (emphasis added). Texas law states that a person seeking to collect a debt must bring suit Within four years from the date the cause of action accrues. The accrual date is the day the parties ceased their dealings for the purpose for which they were interested together. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code & 16.004. GRANTED DENIED AGREED Respectfully submitted, LISA CHASTAIN & ASSOCLATES aw WW SCOTT A. WHITCOMB TBN: 24053546 1201 Elm Street, Suite 5050 Dallas, TX 75270 E-Service Only: DallasLegal@allstate.com (214) 659-4325 (877) 678-4763 (fax) ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT DICKY LEE HALE Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 8 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the 16th day of July, 2021, to: Attorney for Plaintiff Hill Rachel Hatten Adams, Esquire Eberstein & Witherite, LLP 10440 N Central Expy Ste 400 Dallas TX 75231-2228 fimfi' ”KW SCOTT A. WHITCOMB Hill vs. Hale, Whiteside PAGE 9 DEFENDANT, DICKY LEE HALE’S, MOTION 1N LIMINE Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Scott Whitcomb Bar No. 24053546 swhim@allstate.com Envelope ID: 55436749 Status as of 7/20/2021 9:19 AM CST Associated Case Party: DAVID HILL Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Rachel Hatten rachel.hatten@witheritelaw.com 7/16/2021 3:19:50 PM SENT