Preview
1 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon (SBN 127969) FILING FEE EXEMPT PURSUANT TO
E-mail: mkenyon@bwslaw.com GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103
2 Kevin D. Siegel (SBN194787)
E-mail: ksiegel@bwslaw.com
3 Albert Tong (SBN 208439)
E-mail: atong@bwslaw.com
4 Maxwell A. Blum (SBN 299336)
E-mail: mblum@bwslaw.com 11/15/2023
5 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
1 California Street, Suite 3050
6 San Francisco, California 94111-5432
Tel: 415.655.8100 Fax: 415.655.8099
7
Attorneys for Defendant
8 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
11
12 FRANCESCA FAMBROUGH, CHRIS Case No. 17CIV05387
TAVENNER, NINA PESCHCKE-KOEDT,
13 EMILIO DIAZ, DAN SLANKER, DAWN Assigned for All Purposes to the
SLANKER, BRENDA SMITH, THUMPER Honorable Marie S. Weiner, Dept. 2
14 SMITH,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD
15 Plaintiffs, CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF
POSSESSION
16 v.
17 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY,
18 Defendant.
Action Filed: November 22, 2017
19
ALISON MADDEN, WILLIAM MICHAEL Judgment Entered: October 19, 2023
20 FLEMING, EDWARD STANCIL, JEDRICK
HUMPHRIES, ALBA LUCIA DIAZ, Hearing: November 22, 2023
21 JONATHAN REID, TINA REID, AND JOHN Time: 9:00 a.m.
CHAMBERS, Dept.: 2
22
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
23
v.
24
CITY OF REDWOOD CITY,
25
Defendant.
26
27
28
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 1
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
1 Defendant City of Redwood City (“City”) submits this Reply in response to Plaintiff Nina
2 Peschcke-Koedt, and Plaintiff-Intervenors Edward Stancil and Jed Humphries’ (collectively
3 “Plaintiffs”) November 9, 2023 Opposition to the City’s Ex Parte Application for an Order of
4 Possession.1
5 I. INTRODUCTION
6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not accurately describe Salton Bay Marina v. Imperial
7 Irrigation District (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914 (“Salton Bay”) and largely misses the points raised
8 in the City’s application. Plaintiffs miss that: (1) the taking identified in the Judgment occurred in
9 the past; (2) Plaintiffs consistently described the scope of that taking as total, not mere partial
10 damage, or temporary; (3) Plaintiffs obtained an award of money damages for inverse
11 condemnation, and in so doing, conceded the propriety of that past taking; and (4) Plaintiffs
12 received due process in the form of a phase I court trial on liability, and a phase II jury trial on the
13 amount of just compensation to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Now that the City has deposited the
14 just compensation identified in the Judgment, it is time for Plaintiffs to move out.
15 II. ARGUMENT
16 A. Plaintiffs’ Description of Salton Bay is Inaccurate; It Supports Granting the
17 City Possession.
18 Plaintiffs’ description of Salton Bay is not accurate. Plaintiffs contend that Salton Bay
19 held that courts must make a pre-requisite finding that the “taking conduct was necessary to
20 support a public use” to award a property interest to a condemning agency after judgment in an
21 inverse condemnation matter. (Opposition (“Opp.”) at 2.) Not so; the court held the opposite.
22 (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) The property owner in that case, Marina, argued that such a finding was
23 a pre-requisite to awarding the condemning agency a property interest at the conclusion of a
24 typical condemnation action, so the same rule ought to apply in an inverse condemnation action.
25 (Ibid.) The court rejected this, responding that no such pre-requisite finding is necessary in an
26
1
27 At the ex parte hearing on November 13, 2023, the Court re-set the hearing on the City’s
ex parte application to the law and motion calendar for Department 2 for November 22, 2023. It
28 also authorized the City to file a reply brief.
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 2
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
1 inverse condemnation case. It explained, “in an inverse condemnation proceeding, there is no
2 question whether the taking should occur because it has already occurred, rather the focus is on the
3 amount of compensation, if any, that should be awarded. The landowner who brings an inverse
4 condemnation action for a taking of his or her property essentially concedes the issue of propriety
5 of the taking by choosing to seek monetary damages for the taking rather than an injunction or
6 writ of mandate.” (Ibid.)
7 This passage highlights the key issue: Plaintiffs have consistently argued that their
8 leaseholds and vessels (collectively “Property”) have already been taken and that they are owed
9 the Property’s total fair market value in monetary damages. They obtained a Judgment on this
10 theory after a phase I court trial on liability and a phase II jury trial on the fair market value of the
11 Property. In so doing, they “concede[d] the issue of propriety of the taking by choosing to seek
12 monetary damages.” (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) Plaintiffs cannot now demand payment under the
13 Judgment and still insist that they retain the right to challenge the propriety of the City taking their
14 vessels and slips through unlawful detainer proceedings or otherwise.
15 Salton Bay’s holding on this issue was not novel. (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) Salton Bay
16 cites several prior consistent decisions:
17 Mehl v. People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, (1975) 13 Cal.3d 710, 715
18 Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 185, 198
19 Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 38, 53
20 Beckley v. Reclamation Board (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 734, 746
21 Inns v. San Juan Unified School Dist. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 174, 180
22 While it is true that this body of law concerned public agencies’ acquisition of easements
23 in real property through inverse condemnation actions, Plaintiffs offer no argument as to why the
24 same logic does not apply and why the City would not acquire a right to possess the Property
25 given the facts in this case. In an inverse condemnation case, a successful plaintiff’s contentions
26 as to the scope of what property was taken, and what compensation is due, should control the
27 scope of the commiserate property interest acquired by the public agency upon judgment. Here,
28 Plaintiffs alleged a total taking and obtained a judgment to that effect. With the Court having
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 3
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
1 legally determined that a total taking occurred, the City should be able to proceed with the total
2 taking, in fact, upon deposit of just compensation.
3 B. The Court May Apply Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210 In This Case.
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210 provides a procedure for the Court to act as a quasi-
5 escrow, receive the City’s deposit, and award possession of the Property to the City. The Court
6 should hold that this procedure applies to this inverse condemnation matter. “Trial courts have
7 inherent and statutory authority to devise and utilize procedures appropriate to the specific
8 litigation before them.” (Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th
9 at 863.) There is no other established procedure available for the Court to resolve the incongruity
10 between its determination that the City already took the Property in the past and the Plaintiffs’
11 ongoing retention of the Property, so the Court is free to apply aspects of the eminent domain law
12 that are well-suited to the situation at hand. (Id. at 864.)
13 Plaintiffs contend that doing so would violate due process, but the argument is without
14 merit. City of Needles v. Griswold, 6 Cal.App. 4th 1881 (“City of Needles”), cited by Plaintiffs, is
15 inapposite. In that case, “Two licensees of a golf course owned by the City of Needles appeal[ed]
16 from a portion of a preliminary injunction which enjoin[ed] them from preventing the city from
17 taking possession of and using their private personal property. Concluding that the injunction
18 deprive[d] the licensees of their property without constitutionally guaranteed just compensation,
19 [the Court] modif[ied] the injunction by striking that invalid portion. As modified, the injunction
20 [wa]s affirmed.” (Id. at 1885.)
21 City of Needles was not an inverse condemnation case. Further, it involved an appeal of a
22 preliminary injunction, not an appeal of an order of possession post-judgment and post-deposit.
23 City of Needles held that “payment of compensation must be made concurrently with the order
24 permitting the taking” and may not be deferred. (6 Cal.App. 4th at 1891.) But payment of
25 compensation has already happened here. A jury was impaneled and determined the fair market
26 value of the Property. The City then deposited that amount. That is all the process that is due.
27 Further, the quotation from City of Needles noted in the Opposition is not on point. (Opp.
28 at 3.) Unlike the case in City of Needles, this is a condemnation action; it is just one initiated by
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 4
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
1 Plaintiffs for a taking they alleged already occurred, the propriety of which Plaintiffs conceded by
2 obtaining a judgment awarding them monetary compensation. (Salton Bay, 172 Cal.App.3d at
3 963.) It also misses that by issuing an order of possession here, the Court would not “order the
4 taking or damage of private property for a public use” because the Court determined that this
5 taking already occurred in the past. (Opp. at 3, citing 6 Cal.App.4th at 1895.) Instead, the Court
6 would act as a quasi-escrow to help ensure that Plaintiffs receive just compensation for the past
7 taking. The jurisdictional concern identified in City of Needles is not raised by the City’s post-
8 judgment request for an order of possession under the unique circumstances at bar.
9 C. The City Has Complied with Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210.
10 The City has deposited the amount of money awarded by the jury and has thus met its
11 obligations under Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210. The Opposition asserts that the City has
12 not complied with section 1268.210 but does not identify anything specific that the City still needs
13 to do to comply. (Opp. at 3.) It is unclear what Plaintiffs’ argument is on this issue.
14 III. CONCLUSION
15 The Court should grant the City’s request for an Order of Possession.
16
17 Dated: November 15, 2023 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
18
19
By:
20 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon
21 Kevin D. Siegel
Maxwell A. Blum
22 Attorneys for Plaintiff
CITY OF REDWOOD CITY
23
24
25
26
27
28
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 5
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 County of San Mateo
Fambrough, et al. vs. City of Redwood City
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 1 California
Street, Suite 3050, San Francisco, CA 94111-5432.
6
On November 15, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
7 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF
POSSESSION on the interested parties in this action as follows:
8
Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., Esq. Attorneys for all Plaintiffs/Intervenors, except
9 Karen R. Frostrom, Esq. Alison Madden
Audrey Kennedy, Esq.
10 Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire LLP
2550 Fifth Avenue, 11th Floor
11 San Diego, CA 92103
E-Mail: frostrom@tbmlawyers.com;
12 kennedy@tbmlawyers.com
13
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the
14 document(s) to be sent from e-mail address thenry@bwslaw.com to the persons at the e-mail
addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
15 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
16 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
17
Executed on November 15, 2023, at San Francisco, California.
18
19
20 Theresa Henry
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
B URKE , W I LLI AMS &
S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 6
ATTO RNEY S AT LAW
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION
SAN FRA NCI S CO
Preview
1 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon (SBN 127969) FILING FEE EXEMPT PURSUANT TO E-mail: mkenyon@bwslaw.com GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103 2 Kevin D. Siegel (SBN194787) E-mail: ksiegel@bwslaw.com 3 Albert Tong (SBN 208439) E-mail: atong@bwslaw.com 4 Maxwell A. Blum (SBN 299336) E-mail: mblum@bwslaw.com 11/15/2023 5 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 1 California Street, Suite 3050 6 San Francisco, California 94111-5432 Tel: 415.655.8100 Fax: 415.655.8099 7 Attorneys for Defendant 8 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 11 12 FRANCESCA FAMBROUGH, CHRIS Case No. 17CIV05387 TAVENNER, NINA PESCHCKE-KOEDT, 13 EMILIO DIAZ, DAN SLANKER, DAWN Assigned for All Purposes to the SLANKER, BRENDA SMITH, THUMPER Honorable Marie S. Weiner, Dept. 2 14 SMITH, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD 15 Plaintiffs, CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION 16 v. 17 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, 18 Defendant. Action Filed: November 22, 2017 19 ALISON MADDEN, WILLIAM MICHAEL Judgment Entered: October 19, 2023 20 FLEMING, EDWARD STANCIL, JEDRICK HUMPHRIES, ALBA LUCIA DIAZ, Hearing: November 22, 2023 21 JONATHAN REID, TINA REID, AND JOHN Time: 9:00 a.m. CHAMBERS, Dept.: 2 22 Plaintiffs-Intervenors, 23 v. 24 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, 25 Defendant. 26 27 28 B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 1 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO 1 Defendant City of Redwood City (“City”) submits this Reply in response to Plaintiff Nina 2 Peschcke-Koedt, and Plaintiff-Intervenors Edward Stancil and Jed Humphries’ (collectively 3 “Plaintiffs”) November 9, 2023 Opposition to the City’s Ex Parte Application for an Order of 4 Possession.1 5 I. INTRODUCTION 6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not accurately describe Salton Bay Marina v. Imperial 7 Irrigation District (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914 (“Salton Bay”) and largely misses the points raised 8 in the City’s application. Plaintiffs miss that: (1) the taking identified in the Judgment occurred in 9 the past; (2) Plaintiffs consistently described the scope of that taking as total, not mere partial 10 damage, or temporary; (3) Plaintiffs obtained an award of money damages for inverse 11 condemnation, and in so doing, conceded the propriety of that past taking; and (4) Plaintiffs 12 received due process in the form of a phase I court trial on liability, and a phase II jury trial on the 13 amount of just compensation to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Now that the City has deposited the 14 just compensation identified in the Judgment, it is time for Plaintiffs to move out. 15 II. ARGUMENT 16 A. Plaintiffs’ Description of Salton Bay is Inaccurate; It Supports Granting the 17 City Possession. 18 Plaintiffs’ description of Salton Bay is not accurate. Plaintiffs contend that Salton Bay 19 held that courts must make a pre-requisite finding that the “taking conduct was necessary to 20 support a public use” to award a property interest to a condemning agency after judgment in an 21 inverse condemnation matter. (Opposition (“Opp.”) at 2.) Not so; the court held the opposite. 22 (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) The property owner in that case, Marina, argued that such a finding was 23 a pre-requisite to awarding the condemning agency a property interest at the conclusion of a 24 typical condemnation action, so the same rule ought to apply in an inverse condemnation action. 25 (Ibid.) The court rejected this, responding that no such pre-requisite finding is necessary in an 26 1 27 At the ex parte hearing on November 13, 2023, the Court re-set the hearing on the City’s ex parte application to the law and motion calendar for Department 2 for November 22, 2023. It 28 also authorized the City to file a reply brief. B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 2 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO 1 inverse condemnation case. It explained, “in an inverse condemnation proceeding, there is no 2 question whether the taking should occur because it has already occurred, rather the focus is on the 3 amount of compensation, if any, that should be awarded. The landowner who brings an inverse 4 condemnation action for a taking of his or her property essentially concedes the issue of propriety 5 of the taking by choosing to seek monetary damages for the taking rather than an injunction or 6 writ of mandate.” (Ibid.) 7 This passage highlights the key issue: Plaintiffs have consistently argued that their 8 leaseholds and vessels (collectively “Property”) have already been taken and that they are owed 9 the Property’s total fair market value in monetary damages. They obtained a Judgment on this 10 theory after a phase I court trial on liability and a phase II jury trial on the fair market value of the 11 Property. In so doing, they “concede[d] the issue of propriety of the taking by choosing to seek 12 monetary damages.” (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) Plaintiffs cannot now demand payment under the 13 Judgment and still insist that they retain the right to challenge the propriety of the City taking their 14 vessels and slips through unlawful detainer proceedings or otherwise. 15 Salton Bay’s holding on this issue was not novel. (172 Cal.App.3d at 963.) Salton Bay 16 cites several prior consistent decisions: 17 Mehl v. People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, (1975) 13 Cal.3d 710, 715 18 Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 185, 198 19 Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 38, 53 20 Beckley v. Reclamation Board (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 734, 746 21 Inns v. San Juan Unified School Dist. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 174, 180 22 While it is true that this body of law concerned public agencies’ acquisition of easements 23 in real property through inverse condemnation actions, Plaintiffs offer no argument as to why the 24 same logic does not apply and why the City would not acquire a right to possess the Property 25 given the facts in this case. In an inverse condemnation case, a successful plaintiff’s contentions 26 as to the scope of what property was taken, and what compensation is due, should control the 27 scope of the commiserate property interest acquired by the public agency upon judgment. Here, 28 Plaintiffs alleged a total taking and obtained a judgment to that effect. With the Court having B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 3 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO 1 legally determined that a total taking occurred, the City should be able to proceed with the total 2 taking, in fact, upon deposit of just compensation. 3 B. The Court May Apply Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210 In This Case. 4 Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210 provides a procedure for the Court to act as a quasi- 5 escrow, receive the City’s deposit, and award possession of the Property to the City. The Court 6 should hold that this procedure applies to this inverse condemnation matter. “Trial courts have 7 inherent and statutory authority to devise and utilize procedures appropriate to the specific 8 litigation before them.” (Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 9 at 863.) There is no other established procedure available for the Court to resolve the incongruity 10 between its determination that the City already took the Property in the past and the Plaintiffs’ 11 ongoing retention of the Property, so the Court is free to apply aspects of the eminent domain law 12 that are well-suited to the situation at hand. (Id. at 864.) 13 Plaintiffs contend that doing so would violate due process, but the argument is without 14 merit. City of Needles v. Griswold, 6 Cal.App. 4th 1881 (“City of Needles”), cited by Plaintiffs, is 15 inapposite. In that case, “Two licensees of a golf course owned by the City of Needles appeal[ed] 16 from a portion of a preliminary injunction which enjoin[ed] them from preventing the city from 17 taking possession of and using their private personal property. Concluding that the injunction 18 deprive[d] the licensees of their property without constitutionally guaranteed just compensation, 19 [the Court] modif[ied] the injunction by striking that invalid portion. As modified, the injunction 20 [wa]s affirmed.” (Id. at 1885.) 21 City of Needles was not an inverse condemnation case. Further, it involved an appeal of a 22 preliminary injunction, not an appeal of an order of possession post-judgment and post-deposit. 23 City of Needles held that “payment of compensation must be made concurrently with the order 24 permitting the taking” and may not be deferred. (6 Cal.App. 4th at 1891.) But payment of 25 compensation has already happened here. A jury was impaneled and determined the fair market 26 value of the Property. The City then deposited that amount. That is all the process that is due. 27 Further, the quotation from City of Needles noted in the Opposition is not on point. (Opp. 28 at 3.) Unlike the case in City of Needles, this is a condemnation action; it is just one initiated by B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 4 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO 1 Plaintiffs for a taking they alleged already occurred, the propriety of which Plaintiffs conceded by 2 obtaining a judgment awarding them monetary compensation. (Salton Bay, 172 Cal.App.3d at 3 963.) It also misses that by issuing an order of possession here, the Court would not “order the 4 taking or damage of private property for a public use” because the Court determined that this 5 taking already occurred in the past. (Opp. at 3, citing 6 Cal.App.4th at 1895.) Instead, the Court 6 would act as a quasi-escrow to help ensure that Plaintiffs receive just compensation for the past 7 taking. The jurisdictional concern identified in City of Needles is not raised by the City’s post- 8 judgment request for an order of possession under the unique circumstances at bar. 9 C. The City Has Complied with Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210. 10 The City has deposited the amount of money awarded by the jury and has thus met its 11 obligations under Code of Civil Procedure § 1268.210. The Opposition asserts that the City has 12 not complied with section 1268.210 but does not identify anything specific that the City still needs 13 to do to comply. (Opp. at 3.) It is unclear what Plaintiffs’ argument is on this issue. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 The Court should grant the City’s request for an Order of Possession. 16 17 Dated: November 15, 2023 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 18 19 By: 20 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon 21 Kevin D. Siegel Maxwell A. Blum 22 Attorneys for Plaintiff CITY OF REDWOOD CITY 23 24 25 26 27 28 B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 5 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 County of San Mateo Fambrough, et al. vs. City of Redwood City 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 1 California Street, Suite 3050, San Francisco, CA 94111-5432. 6 On November 15, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION on the interested parties in this action as follows: 8 Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., Esq. Attorneys for all Plaintiffs/Intervenors, except 9 Karen R. Frostrom, Esq. Alison Madden Audrey Kennedy, Esq. 10 Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire LLP 2550 Fifth Avenue, 11th Floor 11 San Diego, CA 92103 E-Mail: frostrom@tbmlawyers.com; 12 kennedy@tbmlawyers.com 13 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the 14 document(s) to be sent from e-mail address thenry@bwslaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the 15 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 16 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 17 Executed on November 15, 2023, at San Francisco, California. 18 19 20 Theresa Henry 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B URKE , W I LLI AMS & S ORENS EN , LLP 4854-6217-6912 v1 6 ATTO RNEY S AT LAW REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REDWOOD CITY’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF POSSESSION SAN FRA NCI S CO