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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
'
' | SUFFCILK, ss SUFFOLK SUPERIOR COURT
DOCKET NO. 1784.CV 04021
1
LISA E:. WADE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Of the ‘3STATE OF KEITH WADE,
Plaintiff
'
Vv.
OMAR YUSEF KUDSI, M.D.
THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, P.A.,
™~™ STEW.ARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC., and '
STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER
Defendants. 1
~} DFEENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY STATEMENTS
CONCERNING STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC. AND/OR STEWARD |
|
GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER’S FOR-PROFIT STATUS
tS
yy NOW COME the Defendants, Omar Yusef Kudsi, M.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Kudsi”), Thomas
1
on
BY
McLaughlin, P.A. (hereinafter “PA McLaughlin”), Steward Medical Group, Inc. (hereinafter |
“SMG’), and Steward Good Samaritan Medical Center (hereinafter “GSMC” and/or collectively
“Defen Jants”), and by and through counsel, respectfully move this Honorable Court in limine to
preclude the Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and/or their' witnesses from referencing SMG’s and/or
‘
GSMC js for-profit status, whether in opening statemients, presentation of evidence, or argument
before the jury.
As further grounds in support of this motion, the Defendants submit as follows
ARGUMENT
A. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion in Jimine is intended “to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial matters
from be ing admitted in evidence. Boston v. Bd. of Education, 392 Mass. 788, 796 (1984). Further.
' “it is within the judge’s discretion to exclude evidencé that, while relevant, presents the danger of
i : 1
confusion, unfair prejudice, or undue consumption, of time in trial of collateral issues that
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Read v. Mt. Tom Ski Area, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct.
901, 90:: (1994). '
|. LESTIMONY AND/OR EVIDENCE CONCERNING SMG’S AND/OR GSMC’S For-PROFIT
i¥TATUS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE A T TRIAL.
lividence of SMG’s and/or GSMC’s status as for-profit organizations should be excluded
from evidence at trial because such evidence is irrelevant to the substantive issues of this matter
| and would be highly prejudicial to the Defendants. The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants
’
|1 only concern whether Dr. Kudsi, PA McLaughlin, and/or any employees, agents, or servants of
SMG ar,d/or GSMC were negligent in their respective care and treatment of Mr. Wade. The fact
that SViG and GSMC are for-profit organizations ‘is not relevant to prove or disprove any
element's) of the claims in this case. Moreover, evidence as to SMG’s and/or GSMC’s for-profit
‘
status would undoubtedly run the risk of an exaggerated award or an undeserved verdict by the
jury bel:eving that the Defendants can afford to pay an award of damages.
“There is no valid reason for admitting any evidence concerning the Defendants’ status as
for-profit organizations. In Troeder v. Hyams, 153 Mass. 536 (1891), evidence of the reputed
wealth of the defendant was held inadmissible. The Court in Troeder found that the fact that the
t
i defendait was in business did not amount to evidence that he was well-to-do, or exclude the
: suggestion that plaintiff had not sued because he did not think he could get anything by doing so.
Id. The Defendants’ corporate status has no impact on the underlying facts of this case and will
1
not provide the jury with relevant evidence to consider in determining whether the Defendants
were neligent,
'
pe Ve.
we
vl
CONCLUSION
1
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth abo’ Nes the Defendants respectfully requests that
the Court preclude Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel, and Plaintiffs’ witnesses from making any
reference to the Defendant, SMG’s and/or Defendant, GSMC’s, status as for-profit organizations.
Respectfully submitted,
The Defendants, OMAR YUSEF KupsI, M.D.,
THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, PA, STEWARD
GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER, &
STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC.
By Their Attorneys,
|
| Myson L. Gate,
MatuewR. C6nnOrs, BBO # 636358
ALLYSON L. Gay, BBO # 693429
Capplis, Connors, Carroll, & Ennis, PC
6 Beacon Street, Suite 1100
Boston, MA 02108
meonnors@ccclaw.org
agay@ccclaw.org
Dated: 12/26/23
|
‘t
kre ae
' COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFO LK, ss |
11 SUPERIOR COURT
' ‘ CIVIL ACTION
NO. 1784CVv04021
koe ek kk ee ke eR RR ROK OK
‘
LISA R, WADE, as she is PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF KE.TH M. WADE,
Plaintiff
Vv.
'
THOMAS J. MCLAUGHLIN, PA,
OMAR YUSEFKUDSI, M_D.,
STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC.,
and STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN
MEDIC'AL CENTER, INC,
Defendants
ee RR ee ew
1
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE ANY STATEMENTS CONCERNING
STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, ING., AND/OR STEWARD GOOD
SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER’S FOR-PROFIT STATUS
Now comes the Plaintiff, Lisa R. Wade, as she is Personal Representative of the
Estate Keith M. Wade and opposes the Defendants’ Motion in Limine for an order
excluding any statements concerning the for-profit status of the Defendants, Steward
Medical Group, Inc. and Steward Good Samaritan Medical Center, Inc. (hereinafter
referrel to as the “Corporate Defendants”). thd corporate structure of the Corporate
1
i PAGE 1 OF5
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Defend ants is relevant and orienting background information that the Plaintiff intends
l
to use at trial. Excluding such background information would allow the jury to
wrongly surmise or speculate that the Corporate Defendants are a charitable
not-for ‘profit organization, an inference which per se is supported by the Defendant's
name. To preclude evidence of the Defendants' corporate status would foster surmise
and speculation, confuse the jury and prejudice the Plaintiff.
I. SUMMARY OFTHE LAW
&vidence is relevant and therefore presumed to be admissible if it meets two
criteria: “(1) the evidence must have some tendency (probative value) to prove or
t
dispro‘re a particular fact, and (2) that particular fact must be material to an issue (of
conseqitence) in the case.” See Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485 (2004);
see alsi) Federico v. Ford Motor Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct, 454, 460-61 (2006). To be
admissible, it is not necessary that the evidence be conclusive of the issue.
Comme nwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 624-25 (1998). The inquiry lies in whether it will
assist the factfinder. Asa rule, relevant evidence is always prejudicial and harmful to
the pai ty against whom it is offered. Commonwealth v. Kindell, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 183,
187-88, (2013).
Ul. ARGUMENT
The Defendant Hospital, GSMC, is a for-profit corporation and the jury is
entitle to know this. Unlike GSMC, many well-known hospitals in Massachusetts are
1 1
not-fo1l_profit, charitable organizations. The largest and most well-known hospitals in
the situs of this trial, Suffolk County, are charitable organizations such as Mass General
|
PAGE 2 OF 5
|t
Brighar a, New England Baptist Hospital and Boston Medical Center. The Defendant
Hospital, Good Samaritan Medical Center, has a name that, absent evidence of its actual
'
corporate status, could reasonably be assumed to be a catholic organization ora
I
charitaple organization. Obviously, whether overtly or unconsciously, this plays on the
amount of damages a jury may award an injured plaintiff. Here, standing alone, the
'
Defendant Hospital's name implies a charitable not-for-profit entity and makes
introduction of the for-profit status of the Corporate Defendants essential. GSMC isa
1
for-pra fit corporation, this is not disputed; it cannot be improper or prejudicial to
inform ‘the jury of this basic fact. Otherwise, especially given Defendants’ choice of
name, tis the Plaintiff who will be prejudiced by the jury’s confusion, surmise and
specul ition. '
1
in their Motion in Limine, the Corporate Defendants argue that the Plaintiff, by
exposiig the for-profit status of the Corporate Defendants, will somehow expose them
to und se prejudice in the form of an “exaggerated award” or an “undeserved verdict.”
To the contrary, depriving the jury of this information exposes plaintiff to an
: '
undeserved risk of an inadequate or insufficient award, The catastrophic injuries and
rt 1
damages at issue here require a full and fair award by the jury, not one reduced by the
jury besed on a misguided belief that the Corporate Defendants are a charitable
not-fo1-profit organization.
Contrary to the cases relied on by Defendants, informing the jury of the for-profit
status >f the Corporate Defendants has no bearing on the wealth of the Corporate
Defen ants or their ability to pay the award. A for-profit entity is fundamentally
PAGE 3 OF 5
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\
differer it than a charitable organization which exists solely for the benefit to the public
I
and acd ‘ordingly, has long been recognized in Massachusetts to be protected for this
|'
importint public purpose by charitable immunity from tort liability. McDonald v.
Massac.tusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 435 (1876); see also G.L. c. 231 §85K. Itis proper
and fair to inform a jury of the Corporate Defendants’ profit motive in rendering
treatment and to argue its impact on care where and when it arises throughout the trial.
1
I. CONCLUSION
The Corporate Defendants seek to preverit the Plaintiff from informing the jury
as to their status as for-profit corporate entities. In short, they are asking to be allowed
to let the jury infer and surmise that they are charitable organizations, an unfair
inferer ce that is supported by the Defendants’ own name. The jury is entitled to know
that th> Corporate Defendants operate as for-profit entities. Accordingly, the
1
Defenciants' Motion must be denied.
'
Respectfully submitted,
LISA R. WADE, AS SHE IS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
KEITH M. WADE,
By her attorneys,
/f Benjamin T. Carroll
J. Michael Conley (BBO #094090)
Benjamin T. Carroll (BBO ##703280)
Kenney & Conley, P.C.
100 Grandview Road, Suite 218
Post Office Box 9139
Braintree, Massachusetts 02185-9139
Telephone: 781-848-9891
michael@kenneyconley.com
benjamin@kenneyconley.com 1
PAGE 4 OF 5
ty
A
fof John R. Danzi
John'R. Danzi (Pro Hac Vice)
Christine C. Coscia (Pre Hac Vice)
Danzi Law Partners LLP
500 North Broadway, Suite 124
Jericho, New York 11753
Telephone: 516-228-4226
john@danzilaw.com
Dated: January 4, 202/ christine@danzilaw.com.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i
1
, Benjamin T. Carroll, hereby certify on this 4th day of January, 2024, that I
! forwar. ied a copy of the foregoing Opposition by email transmission to counsel for the
' Defendants, Attorney Allyson L. Gay, (agay@ccclaw.org), Matthew R. Connors, Esq. -
(mconn »rs@ccelawv.org), Capplis, Connors & Carroll & Ennis, P.C., Six Beacon Street,
Suite 1100, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. 1
L/ Benjamin T. Carroll
Benjamin T. Carroll (BBO #703280)
PAGE 5 OF 5
Preview
eo [ee § zs Ajo / COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ' ' | SUFFCILK, ss SUFFOLK SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET NO. 1784.CV 04021 1 LISA E:. WADE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE Of the ‘3STATE OF KEITH WADE, Plaintiff ' Vv. OMAR YUSEF KUDSI, M.D. THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, P.A., ™~™ STEW.ARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC., and ' STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER Defendants. 1 ~} DFEENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY STATEMENTS CONCERNING STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC. AND/OR STEWARD | | GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER’S FOR-PROFIT STATUS tS yy NOW COME the Defendants, Omar Yusef Kudsi, M.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Kudsi”), Thomas 1 on BY McLaughlin, P.A. (hereinafter “PA McLaughlin”), Steward Medical Group, Inc. (hereinafter | “SMG’), and Steward Good Samaritan Medical Center (hereinafter “GSMC” and/or collectively “Defen Jants”), and by and through counsel, respectfully move this Honorable Court in limine to preclude the Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and/or their' witnesses from referencing SMG’s and/or ‘ GSMC js for-profit status, whether in opening statemients, presentation of evidence, or argument before the jury. As further grounds in support of this motion, the Defendants submit as follows ARGUMENT A. LEGAL STANDARD A motion in Jimine is intended “to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial matters from be ing admitted in evidence. Boston v. Bd. of Education, 392 Mass. 788, 796 (1984). Further. ' “it is within the judge’s discretion to exclude evidencé that, while relevant, presents the danger of i : 1 confusion, unfair prejudice, or undue consumption, of time in trial of collateral issues that outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Read v. Mt. Tom Ski Area, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 90:: (1994). ' |. LESTIMONY AND/OR EVIDENCE CONCERNING SMG’S AND/OR GSMC’S For-PROFIT i¥TATUS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE A T TRIAL. lividence of SMG’s and/or GSMC’s status as for-profit organizations should be excluded from evidence at trial because such evidence is irrelevant to the substantive issues of this matter | and would be highly prejudicial to the Defendants. The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants ’ |1 only concern whether Dr. Kudsi, PA McLaughlin, and/or any employees, agents, or servants of SMG ar,d/or GSMC were negligent in their respective care and treatment of Mr. Wade. The fact that SViG and GSMC are for-profit organizations ‘is not relevant to prove or disprove any element's) of the claims in this case. Moreover, evidence as to SMG’s and/or GSMC’s for-profit ‘ status would undoubtedly run the risk of an exaggerated award or an undeserved verdict by the jury bel:eving that the Defendants can afford to pay an award of damages. “There is no valid reason for admitting any evidence concerning the Defendants’ status as for-profit organizations. In Troeder v. Hyams, 153 Mass. 536 (1891), evidence of the reputed wealth of the defendant was held inadmissible. The Court in Troeder found that the fact that the t i defendait was in business did not amount to evidence that he was well-to-do, or exclude the : suggestion that plaintiff had not sued because he did not think he could get anything by doing so. Id. The Defendants’ corporate status has no impact on the underlying facts of this case and will 1 not provide the jury with relevant evidence to consider in determining whether the Defendants were neligent, ' pe Ve. we vl CONCLUSION 1 WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth abo’ Nes the Defendants respectfully requests that the Court preclude Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel, and Plaintiffs’ witnesses from making any reference to the Defendant, SMG’s and/or Defendant, GSMC’s, status as for-profit organizations. Respectfully submitted, The Defendants, OMAR YUSEF KupsI, M.D., THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, PA, STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER, & STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC. By Their Attorneys, | | Myson L. Gate, MatuewR. C6nnOrs, BBO # 636358 ALLYSON L. Gay, BBO # 693429 Capplis, Connors, Carroll, & Ennis, PC 6 Beacon Street, Suite 1100 Boston, MA 02108 meonnors@ccclaw.org agay@ccclaw.org Dated: 12/26/23 | ‘t kre ae ' COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFO LK, ss | 11 SUPERIOR COURT ' ‘ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1784CVv04021 koe ek kk ee ke eR RR ROK OK ‘ LISA R, WADE, as she is PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KE.TH M. WADE, Plaintiff Vv. ' THOMAS J. MCLAUGHLIN, PA, OMAR YUSEFKUDSI, M_D., STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC., and STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN MEDIC'AL CENTER, INC, Defendants ee RR ee ew 1 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY STATEMENTS CONCERNING STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, ING., AND/OR STEWARD GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER’S FOR-PROFIT STATUS Now comes the Plaintiff, Lisa R. Wade, as she is Personal Representative of the Estate Keith M. Wade and opposes the Defendants’ Motion in Limine for an order excluding any statements concerning the for-profit status of the Defendants, Steward Medical Group, Inc. and Steward Good Samaritan Medical Center, Inc. (hereinafter referrel to as the “Corporate Defendants”). thd corporate structure of the Corporate 1 i PAGE 1 OF5 ae Phy oe eae Defend ants is relevant and orienting background information that the Plaintiff intends l to use at trial. Excluding such background information would allow the jury to wrongly surmise or speculate that the Corporate Defendants are a charitable not-for ‘profit organization, an inference which per se is supported by the Defendant's name. To preclude evidence of the Defendants' corporate status would foster surmise and speculation, confuse the jury and prejudice the Plaintiff. I. SUMMARY OFTHE LAW &vidence is relevant and therefore presumed to be admissible if it meets two criteria: “(1) the evidence must have some tendency (probative value) to prove or t dispro‘re a particular fact, and (2) that particular fact must be material to an issue (of conseqitence) in the case.” See Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485 (2004); see alsi) Federico v. Ford Motor Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct, 454, 460-61 (2006). To be admissible, it is not necessary that the evidence be conclusive of the issue. Comme nwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 624-25 (1998). The inquiry lies in whether it will assist the factfinder. Asa rule, relevant evidence is always prejudicial and harmful to the pai ty against whom it is offered. Commonwealth v. Kindell, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 187-88, (2013). Ul. ARGUMENT The Defendant Hospital, GSMC, is a for-profit corporation and the jury is entitle to know this. Unlike GSMC, many well-known hospitals in Massachusetts are 1 1 not-fo1l_profit, charitable organizations. The largest and most well-known hospitals in the situs of this trial, Suffolk County, are charitable organizations such as Mass General | PAGE 2 OF 5 |t Brighar a, New England Baptist Hospital and Boston Medical Center. The Defendant Hospital, Good Samaritan Medical Center, has a name that, absent evidence of its actual ' corporate status, could reasonably be assumed to be a catholic organization ora I charitaple organization. Obviously, whether overtly or unconsciously, this plays on the amount of damages a jury may award an injured plaintiff. Here, standing alone, the ' Defendant Hospital's name implies a charitable not-for-profit entity and makes introduction of the for-profit status of the Corporate Defendants essential. GSMC isa 1 for-pra fit corporation, this is not disputed; it cannot be improper or prejudicial to inform ‘the jury of this basic fact. Otherwise, especially given Defendants’ choice of name, tis the Plaintiff who will be prejudiced by the jury’s confusion, surmise and specul ition. ' 1 in their Motion in Limine, the Corporate Defendants argue that the Plaintiff, by exposiig the for-profit status of the Corporate Defendants, will somehow expose them to und se prejudice in the form of an “exaggerated award” or an “undeserved verdict.” To the contrary, depriving the jury of this information exposes plaintiff to an : ' undeserved risk of an inadequate or insufficient award, The catastrophic injuries and rt 1 damages at issue here require a full and fair award by the jury, not one reduced by the jury besed on a misguided belief that the Corporate Defendants are a charitable not-fo1-profit organization. Contrary to the cases relied on by Defendants, informing the jury of the for-profit status >f the Corporate Defendants has no bearing on the wealth of the Corporate Defen ants or their ability to pay the award. A for-profit entity is fundamentally PAGE 3 OF 5 I =: \ differer it than a charitable organization which exists solely for the benefit to the public I and acd ‘ordingly, has long been recognized in Massachusetts to be protected for this |' importint public purpose by charitable immunity from tort liability. McDonald v. Massac.tusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 435 (1876); see also G.L. c. 231 §85K. Itis proper and fair to inform a jury of the Corporate Defendants’ profit motive in rendering treatment and to argue its impact on care where and when it arises throughout the trial. 1 I. CONCLUSION The Corporate Defendants seek to preverit the Plaintiff from informing the jury as to their status as for-profit corporate entities. In short, they are asking to be allowed to let the jury infer and surmise that they are charitable organizations, an unfair inferer ce that is supported by the Defendants’ own name. The jury is entitled to know that th> Corporate Defendants operate as for-profit entities. Accordingly, the 1 Defenciants' Motion must be denied. ' Respectfully submitted, LISA R. WADE, AS SHE IS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KEITH M. WADE, By her attorneys, /f Benjamin T. Carroll J. Michael Conley (BBO #094090) Benjamin T. Carroll (BBO ##703280) Kenney & Conley, P.C. 100 Grandview Road, Suite 218 Post Office Box 9139 Braintree, Massachusetts 02185-9139 Telephone: 781-848-9891 michael@kenneyconley.com benjamin@kenneyconley.com 1 PAGE 4 OF 5 ty A fof John R. Danzi John'R. Danzi (Pro Hac Vice) Christine C. Coscia (Pre Hac Vice) Danzi Law Partners LLP 500 North Broadway, Suite 124 Jericho, New York 11753 Telephone: 516-228-4226 john@danzilaw.com Dated: January 4, 202/ christine@danzilaw.com. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i 1 , Benjamin T. Carroll, hereby certify on this 4th day of January, 2024, that I ! forwar. ied a copy of the foregoing Opposition by email transmission to counsel for the ' Defendants, Attorney Allyson L. Gay, (agay@ccclaw.org), Matthew R. Connors, Esq. - (mconn »rs@ccelawv.org), Capplis, Connors & Carroll & Ennis, P.C., Six Beacon Street, Suite 1100, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. 1 L/ Benjamin T. Carroll Benjamin T. Carroll (BBO #703280) PAGE 5 OF 5