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DOCKET NO. NNI-CV23-6029632S SUPERIOR COURTIN
MAHAGANY BIVENS J.D. OF NEW HAVEN
vs. AT MERIDEN
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE CO. JANUARY 10, 2024
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE:
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY DISCOVERY (#113.00)
Introduction.
The plaintiffs, Mahagany Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany Bivens claim injuries
and losses arising from a motor vehicle collision which occurred on May 22, 2022, and which they
claim was caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Counts One and Three of the
complaint set forth uninsured motorist claims against defendant Progressive Direct Insurance
Company (“Progressive”) on behalf of Mahagany Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany
Bivens, respectively. Counts Two and Four set forth claims against Progressive for violation of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing — so-called “bad faith claims” — on behalf ofMahagany
Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany Bivens, respectively. The defendant now moves the
court to bifurcate the trial of the uninsured motorist and bad faith claims and to stay discovery in
the bad faith claims pending the outcome of the trial of the uninsured motorist claims, arguing that
litigating these claims at the same time will unduly prejudice the defendant and that, in any event,
the bad faith claims are not ripe for adjudication until the uninsured motorist claims have been
Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden
SUPERIOR COURT
FILED
JAN 19 2024
CHIEF CLERK’S OFFICE
[-10-24 TOW Sent Fo ApPertng Covrgel. SHerpil
7700
fully and fairly litigated and, further, that the interest of judicial economy will best be served
through bifurcation as the outcome of the uninsured motorist claims “may eliminate the need for
litigating the extra-contractual [bad faith] claim.” The plaintiff objects, arguing, to the contrary,
that bifurcation will result in a waste of judicial resources; that the interest of judicial economy
outweighs any prejudice to the defendant from the simultaneous litigation of these claims; that
consideration of bifurcation is premature and should be deferred until discovery has been
completed; and that, in any event, there is no need to stay discovery in the bad faith claims.
Discussion.
“Tn all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may
determine that one or more of the issues be tried before the others.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-205,
Practice Book Section 15-1. “The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation
of prejudice and judicial efficiency.” Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 423, 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 252 Conn.
774, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000). “Bifurcation is appropriate when the litigation of one issue could
obviate the need to litigate other issues.” Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424,
448-49, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), as cited in Fowler v. Connecticut Life & Cas. Ins. Co., No.
CV075010045S, 2008 WL 4150290, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2008) (Lager, J.).
“Bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court ...” Swenson v.
Sawoska, 18 Conn. App. 597, 601, 559 A.2d 1153 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 148, 575 A.2d 206
(1990), as cited in Jello-Pitkin v. Geico Indem. Co., No. CV095012395, 2011 WL 6934703, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (Cosgrove, J.). The complaint In Fowler v. Connecticut Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., supra, was in three counts, the first of which claimed underinsured motorist
benefits and the second and third of which claimed bad faith. The defendant moved to bifurcate
the trial of the underinsured motorist and bad faith claims. While acknowledging that the overlap
of proof of the various claims would ordinarily militate against bifurcation, the court noted that a
verdict on the underinsured motorist claim for an amount that was within the plaintiff's policy
limit would avoid the bad faith claims. Furthermore, the trial of the bad faith claim would
necessarily call into question the claims settlement process. The defendant having posited that it
might have to call plaintiff's counsel as a witness to settlement negotiations, the court granted the
motion to bifurcate, precluding the advancement of evidence or arguments regarding settlement
negotiations or the claims investigation during the trial of the underinsured motorist claim and
adding that “[iJn the discretion of the trial judge, a reasonable continuance may be granted between
the conclusion of the trial of the underinsured motorist benefits claim and the bad faith claims [but
that] all claims shall be heard by the same jury.” Id.
The complaint in Jello-Pitkin v. Geico Indemnity Co., supra also joined together claims for
underinsured motorist benefits and bad faith. The defendant moved to bifurcate both discovery in
and the trial of the underinsured motorist and bad faith claims. Noting that the underinsured
motorist claims were predicates to the bad faith claim that adjudicating the bad faith claims without
first resolving the underinsured motorist claims would be “difficult” and that the potential
prejudice to the defendant from a unitary trial was “high, given the presence of privileged content
in the defendant’s file for Jello-Pitkin’s claim, as well as the possibility that defense counsel
[would] be called to testify about the defendant’s handling of Jello-Pitkin’s claim”, the court
(Cosgrove, J.), concluded that “issue bifurcation before trial would solve such dilemmas in
judicially efficient fashion” and, so, granted the motion and ordered a bifurcated trial and a stay of
discovery on the bad faith claims pending a resolution of the underinsured motorist claims.
The overriding consideration for this court is that the trial of the bad faith claim will
necessarily implicate the claims settlement process, and Section 4-8(a) of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence renders inadmissible evidence of offers to settle a disputed claim on the issues of liability
and the amount of the claim. By extension, an insurer’s alleged failure to negotiate a settlement
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in good faith is irrelevant to the question that will be squarely before the jury in the trial of an
uninsured motorist claim, i.e., what amount represents fair, just and reasonable compensation to
the plaintiff for injuries and losses caused by the negligence of the uninsured motorist? While
trying the uninsured motorist and bad faith claims together might, indeed, be convenient, the
convenience is overridden by the potential prejudice to the defendant that it would engender — not
to mention, as did the courts in Fowler and Jello-Pitkin, supra, that the outcome of the trial of the
uninsured motorist claim may obviate the need for a trial on the bad faith claim. The same concern
does not abide the discovery process. Indeed, allowing discovery to proceed apace in the uninsured
motorist and bad faith claims will serve the end of judicial efficiency without any countervailing
prejudice to the defendant.
Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to bifurcate is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The claims for uninsured motorist benefits (Count One) and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Two) shall be tried separately. A reasonable
continuance may be granted between the conclusion of the trial of the underinsured motorist
benefits claim and the commencement of the bad faith claim but both claims shall be heard by the
same jury. The court denies the defendant’s motion to stay discovery.
Honorable Stevefi D. Jacobs
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DOCKET NO. NNI-CV23-6029632S SUPERIOR COURTIN MAHAGANY BIVENS J.D. OF NEW HAVEN vs. AT MERIDEN PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE CO. JANUARY 10, 2024 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY DISCOVERY (#113.00) Introduction. The plaintiffs, Mahagany Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany Bivens claim injuries and losses arising from a motor vehicle collision which occurred on May 22, 2022, and which they claim was caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Counts One and Three of the complaint set forth uninsured motorist claims against defendant Progressive Direct Insurance Company (“Progressive”) on behalf of Mahagany Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany Bivens, respectively. Counts Two and Four set forth claims against Progressive for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing — so-called “bad faith claims” — on behalf ofMahagany Bivens and Ryleigh Bivens, ppa Mahagany Bivens, respectively. The defendant now moves the court to bifurcate the trial of the uninsured motorist and bad faith claims and to stay discovery in the bad faith claims pending the outcome of the trial of the uninsured motorist claims, arguing that litigating these claims at the same time will unduly prejudice the defendant and that, in any event, the bad faith claims are not ripe for adjudication until the uninsured motorist claims have been Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden SUPERIOR COURT FILED JAN 19 2024 CHIEF CLERK’S OFFICE [-10-24 TOW Sent Fo ApPertng Covrgel. SHerpil 7700 fully and fairly litigated and, further, that the interest of judicial economy will best be served through bifurcation as the outcome of the uninsured motorist claims “may eliminate the need for litigating the extra-contractual [bad faith] claim.” The plaintiff objects, arguing, to the contrary, that bifurcation will result in a waste of judicial resources; that the interest of judicial economy outweighs any prejudice to the defendant from the simultaneous litigation of these claims; that consideration of bifurcation is premature and should be deferred until discovery has been completed; and that, in any event, there is no need to stay discovery in the bad faith claims. Discussion. “Tn all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may determine that one or more of the issues be tried before the others.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-205, Practice Book Section 15-1. “The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice and judicial efficiency.” Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 423, 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 252 Conn. 774, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000). “Bifurcation is appropriate when the litigation of one issue could obviate the need to litigate other issues.” Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 448-49, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), as cited in Fowler v. Connecticut Life & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV075010045S, 2008 WL 4150290, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2008) (Lager, J.). “Bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court ...” Swenson v. Sawoska, 18 Conn. App. 597, 601, 559 A.2d 1153 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 148, 575 A.2d 206 (1990), as cited in Jello-Pitkin v. Geico Indem. Co., No. CV095012395, 2011 WL 6934703, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (Cosgrove, J.). The complaint In Fowler v. Connecticut Life & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, was in three counts, the first of which claimed underinsured motorist benefits and the second and third of which claimed bad faith. The defendant moved to bifurcate the trial of the underinsured motorist and bad faith claims. While acknowledging that the overlap of proof of the various claims would ordinarily militate against bifurcation, the court noted that a verdict on the underinsured motorist claim for an amount that was within the plaintiff's policy limit would avoid the bad faith claims. Furthermore, the trial of the bad faith claim would necessarily call into question the claims settlement process. The defendant having posited that it might have to call plaintiff's counsel as a witness to settlement negotiations, the court granted the motion to bifurcate, precluding the advancement of evidence or arguments regarding settlement negotiations or the claims investigation during the trial of the underinsured motorist claim and adding that “[iJn the discretion of the trial judge, a reasonable continuance may be granted between the conclusion of the trial of the underinsured motorist benefits claim and the bad faith claims [but that] all claims shall be heard by the same jury.” Id. The complaint in Jello-Pitkin v. Geico Indemnity Co., supra also joined together claims for underinsured motorist benefits and bad faith. The defendant moved to bifurcate both discovery in and the trial of the underinsured motorist and bad faith claims. Noting that the underinsured motorist claims were predicates to the bad faith claim that adjudicating the bad faith claims without first resolving the underinsured motorist claims would be “difficult” and that the potential prejudice to the defendant from a unitary trial was “high, given the presence of privileged content in the defendant’s file for Jello-Pitkin’s claim, as well as the possibility that defense counsel [would] be called to testify about the defendant’s handling of Jello-Pitkin’s claim”, the court (Cosgrove, J.), concluded that “issue bifurcation before trial would solve such dilemmas in judicially efficient fashion” and, so, granted the motion and ordered a bifurcated trial and a stay of discovery on the bad faith claims pending a resolution of the underinsured motorist claims. The overriding consideration for this court is that the trial of the bad faith claim will necessarily implicate the claims settlement process, and Section 4-8(a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence renders inadmissible evidence of offers to settle a disputed claim on the issues of liability and the amount of the claim. By extension, an insurer’s alleged failure to negotiate a settlement - in good faith is irrelevant to the question that will be squarely before the jury in the trial of an uninsured motorist claim, i.e., what amount represents fair, just and reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for injuries and losses caused by the negligence of the uninsured motorist? While trying the uninsured motorist and bad faith claims together might, indeed, be convenient, the convenience is overridden by the potential prejudice to the defendant that it would engender — not to mention, as did the courts in Fowler and Jello-Pitkin, supra, that the outcome of the trial of the uninsured motorist claim may obviate the need for a trial on the bad faith claim. The same concern does not abide the discovery process. Indeed, allowing discovery to proceed apace in the uninsured motorist and bad faith claims will serve the end of judicial efficiency without any countervailing prejudice to the defendant. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to bifurcate is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The claims for uninsured motorist benefits (Count One) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Two) shall be tried separately. A reasonable continuance may be granted between the conclusion of the trial of the underinsured motorist benefits claim and the commencement of the bad faith claim but both claims shall be heard by the same jury. The court denies the defendant’s motion to stay discovery. Honorable Stevefi D. Jacobs