Motion for Summary Judgment in FARAH GOHARI et al vs MCDONALD?S CORPORATION et al| Trellis.Law

On June 20, 2016 a Exhibit,Appendix was filed involving a dispute between Farah Gohari, Gohari Farah, and Mcdonald?S Corporation, Mcdonald?S Fran. O?Hare T, Mcdonald?S Fran. O'Hare T, for Class Actions in the District Court of Cook County.

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Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled
Location: <>
J udge: Calendar, 9
FILED
10/21/2022 5:36 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION
COOK COUNTY, IL
2016CH08261
FARAH GOHARI as the Named Calendar, 9
Class Representative Plaintiff, and all 20001500
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2016 CH 08261
Vv.
Hon. Cecilia A. Horan
McDONALD’S CORPORATION,
LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise at
O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse C,
and LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise at
O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse B,

Defendants.

EXHIBITS C-H

DEFENDANT McDONALD’S CORPORATION’S MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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[Senders IP Address: 10.1.33.254
|Form: restmatters:
Mobile: Y
‘Twitter: N
‘Secial: None
[App: none
NameTitle: Ms.
‘FirstHlame: Farah
‘LastName:
{ Gohari
912 n.redbrush ct
||! CustAddres:
CustAddress2
[CustCity: Wichita, kansas
|CustState: KS
iCustZip: 67206
DayPhone: 316-640-8314
EvePhone: 316-640-8314
iContactTime: Any time
E-mailAddress: Globaltrends@cox.net
Date: 05/28/2016 10:45 AM
VisitType: In-Store
NationalStore:
RestAddress: Chicago airport concourse 1
RestCity: Chicago share
RestState:
'RestLandmark: Chicago
iFollowUp: YES
[OtherChannel:
(Commer was at the airport chicago ohare. I looke at the menu and chose breakfast meal 4.75 and asked for a
‘egg biscuit which usually is 99 cents. Iwas asked to pay 11 dollars. When i asked why they said steak egg buscuit
was 6.70 and the rest was egg . Ithen asked why the menu price was 4.75 and you charge 6.70. The cashier
isaid that is the price menu was wrong. Then itold her to delete the egg sandwich and replace with another meal
\from menu. This time my total was 14.70ish. I was upset because again they charged almost 7 dollars for
‘something that on the display was 4.70. Then i asked to remeve it and just give me the first meal and pancake.
she brought her manager
who i believe was less than 20 years old . She said mcdonal knows about the proce
difference. Then i said advertisied price should be the price but she said no she can not honor that price. I took
jicture of the board and have my reciept. 1 am planning to go viral as i was humiliated , over charged and food
was not good. Customer has rights and you can not advertose wrong proce and charge people who are in rush
more money without them knovsing. My email address is globaltrends@cox.net
|
||

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EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT E
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

FARAH GOHARI as the Named )
Class Representative Plaintiff, and all )
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2016 CH 08261
Vv.

McDONALD’S CORPORATION, Hon. Anna M. Loftus
LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise at
O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse C,
and LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise
at O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse B,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY ANDERSEN
I, Kathy Andersen, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and state as follows:

1 I am currently employed by McDonald’s USA, LLC as Manager, Customer

Satisfaction and Engagement. In that position, I am responsible for overseeing McDonald’s

Customer Contact Center to make sure McDonald’s customer service agents have the tools,

knowledge, and procedures necessary to properly respond to communications from

McDonald’s customers,

2 McDonald’s USA, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of McDonald’s

Corporation and the franchisor of McDonald’s-branded restaurant locations throughout the

United States. I have been employed by McDonald’s USA, LLC or its predecessor-in-

interest, McDonald’s Corporation, for approximately 34 years.

3 The facts set forth in this Affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge

and upon my review of documents kept in the ordinary course of business at McDonald’s. If

called as a witness, I could testify competently thereto.
4 McDonald’s solicits feedback from its customers on its website,

medonalds.com. One way customers may provide this feedback is to access the “Restaurant

Feedback” page, where customers can electronically input information about their restaurant

experiences. The precise web address for this page is https://www.mcedonalds.com/us/en-

us/contact-us/restaurant-feedback.html.

5 The “Restaurant Feedback” page allows customers to populate various fields

by providing details about their trip to a McDonald’s restaurant, such as the restaurant they

visited, the date and time of their visit, their contact information, a narrative description of

their restaurant experience, and whether they would like a response to their comment or

inquiry from the restaurant owner’s organization.

6 When a customer hits the “submit” button at the bottom of this webpage, the

information he or she has inputted into the fields on the webpage is electronically transmitted

to a McDonald’s-owned email box, where it is put in a queue for customer service agents to

review and process.

7 Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a screenshot of the information

someone identifying herself as the plaintiff in this case, Farah Gohari, inputted into

McDonald’s website using a mobile device on May 28, 2016. I am familiar with the data

fields set forth on this screenshot in my capacity as a Manager with oversight responsibility

for McDonald’s customer service personnel.

8 On Exhibit A, all of the data from the field that reads, “NameTitle: Ms.”

through the end of the document was supplied by Ms. Gohari. The “Comment” section at the

bottom was a narrative written entirely by Ms. Gohari on the Restaurant Feedback website

page. At McDonald’s, we refer to this narrative as a customer “email” (even though,

technically, it is information inputted into fields on a webpage that the customer knows will

-2-
be sent to McDonald’s). Ms. Gohari also identified the McDonald’s restaurant she visited;

provided her name, address, telephone number, and email address; identified the date of her

visit as May 28, 2016; and requested a response from the restaurant owner’s organization.

9 The narrative description Ms. Gohari provided in the “Comment” section of

Exhibit A to this Affidavit has not been altered, edited, amended, or revised in any way. The

text of this description appears exactly as it appeared when it arrived in McDonald’s email

box on May 28, 2016.

10. The data on the attached screenshot (Exhibit A) was generated through an

automated process (described above) that is part of a regularly conducted business activity at

McDonald’s. This data has been maintained by McDonald’s in the ordinary course of its

regularly conducted business activities since its receipt on May 28, 2016.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Keshas dodo
KA@HY ANDERSEN

STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) Ss.
COUNTY OF COOK )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on April 22, 2019 by Kathy
Andersen, known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who
executed the foregoing instrument, and she thereupon duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same to be her free act and deed,

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Si bebtankacbran
v
cure
Notary Public

ARRAS
OFFICIAL SEAL
SRBOBRANKA.
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF ILLINOIS
‘MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:09/26/22
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EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT F
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EXHIBIT G
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT—CHANCERY DIVISION

FARAH GOHARI, as the Named Class
Representative Plaintiff, and all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

Vv. 16 CH 8261
Hon. Kathleen M. Pantle
McDONALD’S CORPORATION; McDONALD’S
FRANCHISE AT O’HARE AIRPORT,
TERMINAL 1, CONCOURSE C; and
McDONALD’S FRANCHISE AT O’ HARE
AIRPORT, TERMINAL 1, CONCOURSE B,

Defendants.

ORDER

Defendant McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s) has moved to dismiss the Class
Action Complaint filed by Plaintiff Farah Gohari (“Gohari”) pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615. The
essence of Gohari’s complaint is that McDonald’s committed fraud when it sold items for a
higher price than was listed on the price board. The issues are (1) whether Gohari has stated a
cause of action where she has pleaded that she knew, at the time she paid for her food items, that
the prices actually charged by McDonald’s were higher than listed on the price board and (2)
whether Gohari can prosecute class action claims based on two separate incidents where she
purchased food items only at Concourse C in Terminal 1 and she not present at Concourse B in
Terminal 1 when her lawyer’s investigator allegedly purchased food items. Both locations are at
O’Hare International Airport in Chicago (“O’ Hare”).

McDonald’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background Allegations

Gohari, a citizen of the state of Kansas, was travelling through O’Hare on or about May
28, 2016 due to a layover. (Compl. {J 2, 18, 19). She decided to get breakfast during the
layover and went to the McDonald’s franchise located in Terminal 1, Concourse C. (Compl. 4
21, 4, 23). After waiting in line, she placed an order. (Compl. ¥ 23). When the cashier

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announced the total of the order, Gohari inquired about the price of her items because it appeared
that the amount seemed greater than it should be. (Compl. § 24). The cashier informed Gohari
that the amounts on the electronic menu board were wrong. (Compl. 25). Gohari then chose
new items, and again noticed that the amount charged seemed greater than expected. (Compl. §
26). Gohari inquired again and received the same response from the cashier. (/d.). Additionally,
the cashier chastised Gohari for not wanting to pay the higher price. (Compl. § 27). The cashier
also informed Gohari that the advertised prices had been wrong for some time, and that neither
she nor a McDonald’s manager would alter or lower the price of the order to adhere to the price
advertised. (Compl. { 28).

Gohari selected other items to order, and complained to the cashier that it was not fair to
have mis-advertised prices on the menu. (Compl. {§ 29, 33, 31). Gohari requested a complete
correction of the price, but the cashier refused to alter the price. (Compl. § 32). When Gohari
received the receipt for her final order she discovered that the prices were in excess of what was
listed on the menu board; specifically, Gohari was charged $6.20 for a Steak and Egg
McMuffin® which was advertised on the menu board for $4.80. (Compl. 4.33).

Prior to filing this complaint, as late as June 19, 2016, Gohari’s lawyer sent an
investigator to O’Hare. (Compl. § 39). The investigator found similar overcharges on the menu
boards at the McDonald’s franchise located at O’Hare Terminal 1, Concourse B. (/d.).

Based on the operative group of facts, Gohari filed a class action complaint containing
two counts: Count I alleges common law fraud and Count II alleges a violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.

Motion to Dismiss

McDonald’s has filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. McDonald’s contends that
dismissal of the common law fraud count is appropriate because the allegations of Gohari’s
complaint show that she did not reasonably rely on the prices on the electronic menu board
where she had been advised that the prices were incorrect before she paid for her meal.
McDonald’s also contends that dismissal of the ICFA count is appropriate because Gohari was
not deceived by false menu board prices. Finally, McDonald’s contends that, since Gohari did
not purchase anything at the franchise located in Concourse B, Gohari cannot be a class
representative for anything that occurred in Concourse B.

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Section 2-615

A motion to dismiss brought under 735 ILCS 5/2-615 questions the legal sufficiency of
the complaint. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 85-86 (2002) (citing Bd. of
Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 423
(1999)). “In ruling on such a section 2-615 motion, only those facts apparent from the face of
the pleadings, matters of which the court can take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the
record may be considered.” K. Miller Constr. Co. v. McGinnis, 238 I11.2d 284, 291 (2010).

This Court must therefore determine whether the allegations in the complaint state a
cause of action upon which relief may be granted when viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Jarvis, 201 Ill. 2d at 86 (citing Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1991)).
Furthermore, the complaint must be considered as a whole. Cain v. American Nat’l Bank and
Trust Co. of Chicago, 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 578 (1st Dist. 1975) (citing Courtney v. Bd. of
Education, 6 Ill. App. 3d 424 (1st Dist. 1972)). A complaint should not be dismissed under
section 2-615 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it is apparent
that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings entitling plaintiffs to recovery. Khan v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, 4 47. In order to effectively state a cause of action, the
plaintiff must allege the essential elements of the claim. Gonzales v. American Express Credit
Corp., et al., 315 Ill. App. 3d 199, 206 (1st Dist. 2000) (citing Gallagher Corp v. Russ, 309 Ill.
App. 3d 192, 199 (st Dist. 1999)).
Moreover, Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (lst)
120891, § 22. Conclusions of fact are insufficient to state a cause of action regardless of whether
they generally inform the defendant of the nature of the claim against him. Jd. Even the general
policy favoring the liberal construction of pleadings will not satisfy the requirement that a
complaint set forth facts necessary for recovery under the theory asserted. Alpha School Bus Co.
v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App.3d 722, 735 (1st Dist. 2009).

Analysis

Gohari has not pleaded reasonable reliance

To state a claim for common law fraud a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false statement of
material fact; (2) the party making the statement knew or believed it to be untrue; (3) the party to

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whom the statement was made had a right to rely on the statement; (4) the party to whom the
statement was made did rely on the statement; (5) the statement was made for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person to whom the statement was
made led to that person’s injury. Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill.2d 513, 529
(1996). Common law fraud demands a higher standard when it comes to pleading, i.e. “(t]he
facts which constitute an alleged fraud must be pleaded with sufficient specificity, particularity
and certainty to apprise the opposing party of what he is called upon to answer.” Green v.
Rogers, 234 Illl.2d 478, 494 (2009), quoting Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. A, C &
S, Inc., 131 Il.2d 428, 457 (1989).

McDonald’s contends that Gohari has pleaded herself out of court by pleading that she
knew before she paid for her food items that the prices on the electronic menu board were not
correct in that the listed prices were less than the charged prices. McDonald’s argues that Gohari
did not rely on the listed prices because the cashier informed her that the prices were erroneous
before Gohari paid for her food items.

Reasonable reliance is an essential element of a claim for common law fraud. Mince v.
George, 395 Ill. App.3d 399 (1st Dist. 2009). “A person may not enter into a transaction with
her eyes closed to available information and then charge that she has been deceived by another.
If the party’s reliance is unreasonable in light of the information open to her, the loss is
considered her own responsibility.” Jd. at 402 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

In this case, Gohari has pleaded that she was not deceived because she has pleaded that
she was aware that the price she was being charged was higher than the listed price before she
paid for her meal. When she inquired, the cashier told her that the listed prices were incorrect.
Instead of merely walking away at that point, Gohari placed a second order. When the price for
that meal was announced by the cashier, Gohari once again determined that the price was
incorrect. The cashier repeated the statement that the listed prices were incorrect, and refused to
alter the price at Gohari’s request. Once again, instead of merely walking away, Gohari placed a
third order for which she paid despite being given all the information that she needed, i.e. that the
listed prices were incorrect and that they were higher than what was actually charged. Under the
circumstances that Gohari herself pleaded, her reliance was unreasonable.

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Though Gohari points out that she was at O’Hare and could not leave the airport because
she needed to catch a connecting flight, this fact does not compel a different result. It is common
knowledge that O’Hare has a multitude of places to eat, including many fast-food restaurants and
places to purchase snacks and sandwiches such as Starbucks, and therefore Gohari was not
forced to buy a meal at McDonald’s. Gohari impliedly concedes that O’Hare has other eating
establishments because she pleads that she did not want to eat elsewhere. Merely because she
waited 20 minutes in line at McDonald’s does not mean that every restaurant and other

establishment that serves food had a lengthy wait time. In any event, the fact that Gohari may
have been inconvenienced by having to go elsewhere to eat has nothing to do with whether she
was deceived or whether she reasonably relied on the prices posted on the electronic listing
board.

Gohari also argues that the rudeness of the cashier when telling her that she was holding
up the line makes her reliance reasonable. The cashier’s rudeness did not make Gohari’s reliance
reasonable, however, because the cashier was providing Gohari with all the information she
needed about pricing. The fact that the cashier conveyed the information in a rude manner has
nothing to do with Gohari’s alleged reliance, as Gohari admits that the information that the
cashier conveyed was correct, i.e. the prices on the menu board mis-stated the actual prices.
Finally, though Gohari argues that the cashier did not tell her which menu items were mis-priced,
the information available to Gohari was that the listed prices were wrong, and her first two
orders were mis-priced. Gohari herself pleaded that the cashier repeatedly told her that the prices
listed on the electronic board were wrong. (Compl. §] 25, 26). Gohari independently
corroborated that the listed prices were wrong on her first two orders. She therefore did not, and
could not have given the information provided to her, reasonably rely on the incorrect
information on the electronic menu board.

Gohari has pleaded a proper ICFA claim

The ICFA prohibits

[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely
upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or
the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the

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‘Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act’, in the conduct of any trade or
commerce. ..

815 ILCS 505/2 (internal citations omitted).

Section 2 of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides in relevant part:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
his or her business, vocation, or occupation, the person:

(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised.

815 ILCS 510/2(a)(9).
ICFA provides a private cause of action only where a plaintiff can show that he suffered
damage as a result of unlawful conduct proscribed by the statute. Smith v. Prime Cable of
Chicago, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 859 (1st Dist. 1995). In order to adequately plead a cause of
action under the CFA in a private cause of action, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deceptive act or
practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; (3)
that the deception occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce; and (4) actual
damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately caused by the deception. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201
Ill. 2d 134, 149 (2002); 815 ILCS 505/10a (a). Although a violation of the ICFA may occur in
the absence of damages, a private cause of action does not arise absent a showing of both a
violation and resultant damage. Tarin v. Pellonari, 253 Ill. App. 3d 542, 554 (1st Dist. 1993).

Unlike ‘common law fraud, reliance by the consumer is not an element. “Although the
defendant’s intent that its deception be relied on is an element, no actual reliance is required to
state a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.” Chandler v. Am. Gen. Fin., 329 Ill.
App.3d 729, 741 (1st Dist. 2002). However, in order to recover, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s consumer fraud proximately caused her injurics. Jd. “The required allegation of
causation is minimal, because that determination is best left to the trier of fact.” Jd. citing
Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 504 (1996).

Gohari has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for a violation of the ICFA. She has
pleaded facts that McDonald’s, in the course of trade or commerce, advertised goods at a

particular price with the intent not to sell them at that price. 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(9). Gohari has
pleaded sufficient facts to show actual damage proximately caused by the deception—she paid

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for items at a price higher than advertised. As her pleading requirement is minimal on this issue,
she has met the pleading requirement.

Gohari cannot be a class representative for any alleged acts that occurred at Terminal 1,
Concourse B
To the extent that any of the allegations rest on the activities of Gohari’s lawyer’s
investigator’s actions at the McDonald’s franchise located at O'Hare, Terminal 1, Concourse B,

those allegations are dismissed and neither Gohari nor the putative class may seek damages or
any other recovery based on those actions. The only named plaintiff is Gohari herself and she is

named as the class representative. An adequate class representative must: (1) be a member of
the class; (2) not seek relief that is potentially antagonistic to non-representative members of the
class; and (3) have the desire and ability to prosecute the claim vigorously on behalf of herself
and the other class members, which requires a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding
of the litigation. Byer Clinic & Chiropractic, Ltd. v. Kapraun, 2016 IL App (ist) 142733, 4 9).
In order to be a member of the class, the named plaintiff must be able to maintain an individual
cause of action against the defendant. Ramirez v. Smart Corp., 371 Ill. App.3d 797, 810 3d
Dist. 2007).

Gohari cannot personally prosecute any claims based on actions taken by another. She
did not suffer any injury in connection with the alleged events at Concourse B nor did she suffer
any damages in connection with those alleged events. No one allegedly attempted to defraud
Gohari at the McDonald’s franchise at Concourse B nor did anyone commit any unfair or
deceptive act against her at Concourse B. She has not even alleged that she was at O’Hare in
June, 2016, much less that she placed an order at the McDonald’s in Concourse B and was
defrauded and deceived by the pricing. As no one made any false statements to Gohari that she
relied on, she can never prove common law fraud in connection with the alleged events in
Concourse B. Cramer, 174 Ill.2d at 529. As Gohari is not a person who has suffered damages
due to a violation of the ICFA, she can never prove a claim under the ICFA in connection with
the alleged events in Concourse B. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a). Thus, as Gohari is not a member of
any class for any events that allegedly occurred at Concourse B, those alleged events are not
properly in this complaint.

Gohari argued at oral argument that the events are properly pleaded because her attorneys
were conducting due diligence when they sent their investigator to the McDonald’s franchise

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located at O’Hare, Terminal 1, Concourse B so that their obligations under Supreme Court Rule
137 could be met. Il. S. Ct. R. 137, However, though compliance with Rule 137 is mandatory,
due diligence conducted in connection with that Rule does not form the basis for bringing a
separate cause of action or seeking additional damages. Essentially, Gohari is using her Rule
137 due diligence in an attempt to increase the number of class members (i.e. buyers of
McDonald’s food items at the McDonald’s franchise located in Concourse B of Terminal | on
July 19, 2016), and increase the amount of potential damages owed by McDonald’s by
expanding the length of the class period of time from events that allegedly occurred on May 28,
2016 to events that allegedly occurred between May 28, 2016 through June 19, 2016, inclusive’.
This is improper. She is not a member of any class related to the McDonald’s franchise at
Concourse B because she was not present when the alleged events occurred, suffered no injuries,
suffered no damages, and therefore she cannot bring a cause of action related to anything that
occurred at that franchise.

The complaint must be amended to redact any reference to actions taken by Gohari’s
lawyer’s investigator, and Gohari and the putative class may not seek any recovery, whether
money damages, injunction, or any other remedy, for any alleged event that occurred at the
McDonald’s franchise, O’Hare, Terminal 1, Concourse B, as that alleged event is not a cause of

action in this case.

Whether the activities of Gohari’s lawyer’s investigator are admissible in evidence at a
trial is a question for another day. Nothing in this Order should be construed as a possible ruling
on the issue of the possible admissibility of such evidence as this Order deals only with whether
Gohari can bring a cause of action in connection with events with which she had no connection.

* Plaintiff's Response Brief makes Plaintiff's intent clear. Plaintiff argues “McDonald’s was still overcharging
customers not only at the same location, but others as well.” (Resp. p. 3). Plaintiff also argues, “Indeed,
McDonald’s does not dispute the Complaint’s major claim that it overcharged menu items, for at least — nearly —a
month or more, at multiple O’Hare restaurants.” (/d.).

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McDonald’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. Count I is dismissed with
prejudice. Count II stands. The Complaint must be amended to redact any reference to the
events of June 19, 2016 in accordance with this Order. Plaintiff is granted twenty-eight days
from the date of this Order to aménd. Defendants are granted twenty-eight days thereafter to
answer or otherwise plead.

This case is set for status on January 31, 2017 at 10:00 a.m.

DATE: November 30, 2016

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EXHIBIT H
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, TNO Dow
COUNTY DEPARTMENT—CHANCERY DIVISION

FARAH GOHARI, as the Named Class
Representative Plaintiff, and all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v. 16 CH 8261
Hon. Kathleen M. Pantle
McDONALD’S CORPORATION; McDONALD’
FRANCHISE AT O’HARE AIRPORT,
TERMINAL 1, CONCOURSE C; and
McDONALD’S FRANCHISE AT O?HARE
AIRPORT, TERMINAL 1, CONCOURSE B,
Defendants.

ORDER

Defendant McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s Corp.”) moves this Court to. Dismiss
Count IM of Plaintiff's Farah Gohari (“Gohari”) First Amended Class Action Complaint,
reconsider denial of its Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiffs original Complaint, and to
strike any allegations concerning the activities of Gohari’s lawyer’s investigator. In Count III,
Gohari pleads a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
18 U.

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Horan, Cecilia A. Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

October 21, 2022

Case Filing Date

June 20, 2016

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Exhibit,Appendix: FARAH GOHARI et al vs MCDONALD?S CORPORATION et al

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