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IN THE STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
BYRON PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
OTD LOGISTICS INCORPORATED,
) CIVIL ACTION
SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE
) FILE NO.: 22A00477
COMPANY LTD., formerly HOUSTON )
SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, )
TERENCE GADSON, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN )
DOE 2, AND JOHN DOE 3,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company Ltd., by and through undersigned
counsel, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c), hereby moves the Court to quash the Notice of
Deposition served upon it in this action by Plaintiff Byron Perkins and for a protective order
precluding its deposition in this case on the grounds that the requested discovery from Skyward is
inappropriate and may not be had. Specifically, Skyward is not an appropriate party with
knowledge of the topics designated in Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, as it is the parent company
of the insurer which did issue the insurance policy at issue to Defendant OTD Logistics,
Incorporated, non-party Houston Specialty Insurance Company (Skyward is contemporaneously
moving to substitute Houston Specialty in its place as a defendant in this action). Second, at any
rate, discovery as to the designated topics, which concern the application and interpretation of that
insurance policy is inappropriate in the context of this liability action. As a result, Plaintiff is not
entitled to depose Skyward and Skyward respectfully requests that the court quash the Notice of
STATE COURT OF
DEKALB COUNTY, GA.
- 5/19/2023 2:14 PM
PD,41907593.1 E-FILED
BY: Mundy B Jackson
Deposition and issue a protective order preventing its deposition (or a deposition of its subsidiary,
Houston Specialty) in this matter. Pursuant to Rule 6.4(B) of the Uniform Rules of the Superior
Courts of the State of Georgia, counsel for Skyward and Plaintiff have met and conferred regarding
the above issues and have been unable to resolve their differences short of motion practice.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company, Ltd. respectfully
request that the Court quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition and issue a protective order
precluding its deposition in this case.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May 2023.
/s/ Christy M. Maple
Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807
Robert D, Whitney, GA Bar #790047
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
4141 Parklake Ave., Suite 530
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
Telephone: 919 789 5300
Facsimile: 919 789 5301
Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance
Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty
Insurance Company
STATE COURT OF
DEKALB COUNTY, GA.
5/19/2023 2:14 PM
E-FILED
BY: Mundy Jackson
PD.41907593.1
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF SKYWARD’S MOTION TO QUASH AND
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
1. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks to depose and obtain documents from Defendant Skyward Specialty
Insurance Company, Ltd. regarding various topics generally concerning the interpretation and
application of an insurance policy it issued to Defendant OTD Logistics Incorporated and its
investigation of claims conducted in connection with the automobile accident at issue in this case.
While an insurer is appropriately made a party to a liability lawsuit in these circumstances, due to
OTD’s status as a motor carrier, the discovery Plaintiff seeks is not permitted by the rules of
discovery. First, Skyward did not issue the insurance policy at issue and therefore lacks the
requisite knowledge of the topics set forth in Plaintiff's notice of deposition. Counsel for Skyward
has repeatedly raised this issue with counsel for Plaintiff, who to date has not consented to
Skyward’s substitution out of the case to be replaced by the entity that actually issued the policy
at issue, Skyward’s subsidiary, Houston Specialty Insurance Company. Moreover, even if
Skyward were the appropriate party with knowledge of the topics so designated, discovery as to
such topics is inappropriate in a direct action, where the insurer’s presence functions effectively
as a payor only, As this matter is pending in State Court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any
declaratory relief action as would be needed to properly bring forth any issues of interpretation of
the policy at issue, which at any rate have not been asserted in this action. Therefore, Skyward
respectfully requests that the Court quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition, partially
quash Plaintiffs document requests, and enter a protective order barring its deposition in this case.
I. FACTS
This matter arises out of a March 25, 2020 automobile collision between a truck owned by
Defendant OTD Logistics Incorporated and a private passenger vehicle in which Plaintiff Byron
PD,41907593.1
Perkins was a passenger: See generally Complaint. Based on OTD’s status as’ federally-licensed
motor carrier, Plaintiff joined Skyward as a direct defendant to this action pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
40-1-112. Complaint, {{ 5, 38-39. Plaintiff's only cause of action asserted against Skyward is such
a direct action in contract, and Plaintiff does not seek any interpretation of the provisions of the
Policy, Jd. at {J 38-39.
Skyward’s subsidiary, non-party Houston Specialty Insurance Company, issued policy
number RT-HSIC-CA-0000102-00 to OTD, effective October M4, 2019 to October 14, 2020 (the
“Policy”). A true copy of the Policy’s declaration pages indicating its issuance by Houston
Specialty is attached to this motion as Exhibit 1 (because the Policy provides coverage for
numerous, specifically-identified vehicles, the Policy’s declarations are 251 pages in length, and
Skyward attaches only the first three pages as an exhibit to this motion; due to its commercial
sensitivity and irrelevance to this motion or action, premium information has been redacted),
Skyward has met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiff repeatedly seeking Plaintiffs consent to
substitute Houston Specialty into this action in place of Skyward, but Plaintiff has not agreed.
On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed and served a Second Amended Notice of Deposition of
Skyward, which is the operative notice at issue. See Exhibit 2, The Notice generally seeks the
testimony of a corporate designee of Skyward pursuant to 0.C.G.A. 9-11-30(b)(6) with regard to
various topics concerning the terms, interpretation, and claims investigation in connection with the
automobile collision forming the basis for the lawsuit. See id. at pp. 3-4. The Notice also seeks
production of various documents, including its claim file. Jd. at p. 4.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
For good cause shown, the court “may make any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
PD,41907593.1
including... (1) That the discovery not be had” and “(4) That certain matters not be inquired into
or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters[.]” O.C.G.A. § 9-1 1-26(c)(1), (4). “The
trial court has wide discretion in the entering of orders preventing the taking of depositions” under
O.C.G.A. 9-11-26(c). General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 815, 874 S.E.2d 52, 59
(2022) (internal quotations and altcrations omitted) (quoting Hampton Island Founders, LLC v.
Liberty Capital, LLC, 283 Ga. 289, 296 (4), 658 S.E.2d 619 (2008)). While the court's discretion
is broad, any discovery limitations should be crafted such that “such limitations do not have the
effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of Ga., 185 Ga.
App. 532, 533, 384 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (intemal quotation omitted) (quoting Mead Corp v.
Masterack, 243 Ga. 213, 215, 253 S.E.2d 167 (1979).
IV. ARGUMENT
Here, the Court should quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition, partially quash
Plaintiff's requests for document production, and enter a protective order because Skyward would
be subject to undue burden and expense through this deposition. First, because Skyward did not
issue the insurance policy at issue, it is not the appropriate party to testify as to the topics identified
in the Notice. Second, even if Skyward were the appropriate party (or if the Notice were directed
at Houston Specialty, which did issue the insurance policy at issue), the topics upon which Plaintiff
seeks discovery are not appropriately before the Court in this matter. As a result, Skyward
respectfully requests that the Court quash the Notice of Deposition and enter an order protecting
Skyward and Houston Specialty from deposition in this matter.
a. The Notice is Propounded to an Inappropriate Party
First, Skyward is plainly the incorrect party to testify as to those topics designated in the
Notice because it is not the entity that issued the insurance policy at issue. Rather, as shown on the
PDAl 907593.1
Policy itself, the entity that issued the Policy is Houston Specialty Insurance Company.' See
Exhibit 1. “A holding or parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated
separately from the subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of the corporate
entity.” Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations omitted); see
also, e.g., Gebran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-16-07616 BRO (MRWx), 2016 WL
7471292, at *3-4 (C.D, Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (noting that a parent company “erroneously sued” by
the plaintiff was not a real party in interest in the lawsuit and that its subsidiary, which actually
employed the plaintiff alleging employment violations, was the proper party to the lawsuit). Courts
have found that corporate parents “control” their subsidiaries sufficiently to be the appropriate
respondents to written discovery seeking production of documents. See e.g., In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litigation, 233 F.R.D. 542, 544 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that a corporate parent had the
obligation to produce documents in its subsidiaries’ possession where the corporate parent
controlled the subsidiary). Here, however, Plaintiff seeks a deposition of a corporate witness
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 30(b)(6), which seeks testimony on behalf of the corporation itself rather
than documents that it is able to control. O,C.G.A. § 30(b)(6) (“The organization shall designate
one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who will consent to testify on
its behalf...”) (emphasis added). This situation therefore does not constitute a circumstance
“justifying disregard of the corporate entity,” where the action is on a contract for which Skyward
cannot be legally liable and does not directly employ personnel with any knowledge of the topics
identified. Dumas v. ACCC Ins. Co., 349 Fed. App’x 489, 491-92 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
insurer’s obligation to the insured arises “out of the relationship between the insurer and the
“Skyward has concurrently moved to substitute the correct entity that issued the Policy to OTD, Houston Specialty,
in its place as a party to this action.
PD.41907593.1
insured created by the contract or policy of insurance”).
Accordingly, as an entity that did not issue the Policy pursuant to which Plaintiff has
asserted a direct action in this case, Skyward is not the proper party with knowledge of the
designated topics in Plaintiff's Notice. Skyward accordingly requests that the Court quash the
Notice and issue a protective order precluding its deposition in this matter.
b. The Topics Identified in the Notice are Not Properly Before the Court in this
Action
Even if the Notice properly targets Skyward (or if the Court interprets it as seeking the
testimony of Houston Specialty representatives), the Notice is nonetheless inappropriate in the
context of a direct action, where Skyward has been added as a party defendant effectively as an
indemnitor of any judgment entered against OTD and, potentially, Gadson. None of Plaintiff's
causes of action seeks interpretation of the Policy, and the State Court would lack jurisdiction over
such a declaratory relief action if Plaintiff had attempted to bring one. Moreover,
Skyward/Houston Specialty’s interpretation of the Policy and claims adjustment practices are
irrelevant to the liability issues asserted against OTD and its alleged driver, Gadson. Thus, the
Notice seeks discovery of information that is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, and the Court should accordingly quash the Notice and issue an order protecting
Skyward and Houston Specialty from being deposed in this matter on the identified topics.
First, adding an insurer to a direct action does not open the insurer to discovery as to the
interpretation of its policy or as to its claims adjustment processes. The Georgia Supreme Court
has explained that under the direct action statute, “the insurance carrier is not, in reality, a separate
party for purposes of liability, but, rather, is equivalent to a provider of a substitute surety bond,
creating automatic liability in favor of a third party who may have a claim for damages for the
negligence of the motor common carrier.” Andrews v. Yellow Freight Sys., 262 Ga. 476, 476, 421
PD.41907593.1
S.E.2d 712, 713 (1992) (emphasis in original) (citing Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 205 Ga.
App. 164, 421 S.E.2d 329 (1992)). The plaintiff has no separate claim for damages against the
motor carrier’s insurer — as noted in Andrews, the carrier’s liability is “automatic.” Id. “The
provision allowing joinder of the insurer is not intended, in any respect, to enhance the value of a
third party’s claim for damages. Thus, the mere presence of the insurer as a party defendant should
have no effect on the issues of liability or injuries, and should not affect the amount of the verdict.”
Jd, Because Skyward’s presence in the lawsuit has no effect on liability or damages, any
information concerning the terms of its Policy is irrelevant. Pursuant to the statute, there is no
separate cause of action against the carrier created in favor of the claimant.
Moreover, even if such an action were permitted, Plaintiff has not asserted any claim
seeking interpretation of the Policy. The elements of a direct action pursuant to 0.C.G.A. § 40-1-
112 are “(1) the subject carrier must be a ‘motor carrier’ as defined by the direct action statutes;
(2) the plaintiff must have sustained an actionable injury; and (3) the insurer must be an ‘insurance
carrier.” McGill v. Am. Trucking & Transp., Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.3d 1261, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
(citations omitted). By the terms of his complaint, Plaintiff seeks recovery under the direct action
statute and does not, for example, seek a declaration interpreting the Policy. Nor could Plaintiff do
so, as the State Court in which he has brought this action lacks jurisdiction to hear such matters
under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a) (“In cases of actual controversy, the respective
superior courts of this state and the Georgia State-wide Business Court shall have power, upon
petition or other appropriate pleading, to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested
party petition for such declaration...”). Thus, no claim seeking interpretation of the Policy has
even been asserted and such an action would be inappropriate in this venue.
Finally, even if such an action had been asserted, none of the topics upon which Plaintiff
PD.41907593.1
seeks Skyward’s testimony would be relevant to such an action. Interpretation and construction of
contracts, including insurance policies, is a matter of law for the court to determine. Landmark
Am. Ins. Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 612 (1), 705 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2011). “[W]here the
language of a contract is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation,
no construction is necessary or even permissible by the trial court.” Ainsworth v. Perrault, 254 Ga.
App. 470, 476 (4), 563 S.E.2d 135, 140-41 (2002). Where no construction of the contract is
required, “the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms.” Envision Printing,
LLC v. Evans, 336 Ga. App. 635, 638 (1), 786 S.E.2d 250, 252 (2016) (quoting General Steel v.
Delta Bidg. Sys., 297 Ga. App. 136, 138 (1), 676 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2009)). Plain insurance policy
terms “must be given full effect even though they are beneficial to the insurer and detrimental to
the insured.” Woodmen v. World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Etheridge, 223 Ga, 231, 154 S,E.2d 369, 372
(1967), “A word or phrase [in an insurance policy] is ambiguous only when it is of uncertain
meaning, and may be fairly understood in more ways than one so that it involves a choice between
two or more constructions of the contract.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bauman, 313 Ga. App.
771, 773-74, 723 §.B.2d 1, 3 (2012). Where a policy is subject to multiple reasonable
interpretations, “it is construed in the light most favorable to the insured and against the insurer.”
Giddens v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 445 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted),
Thus, even interpreting Plaintiff's direct action claim as one secking an interpretation of
the Policy, all of the topics upon which he seeks to depose Skyward concern information that is
inadmissible and irrelevant in the context of such an action. Because interpretation of the Policy
in such an action is a matter of law for the court’s determination, Skyward’s testimony about the
application and interpretation of the Policy is irrelevant. Khan, 307 Ga. App. at 612 (1), 705 S.E.2d
PD.41907593.1
at 710; see also, e.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, 321 F.R.D. 107,
119 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that discovery requests seeking extrinsic information concerning an
insurance policy there at issue were “wholly irrelevant to a straightforward coverage determination
{and] that might only bear marginal relevance even in a bad faith action”); Diamond State Ins. Co.
v. His House, Inc., No. 10-20039-COV, 2011 WL 146837, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011) (denying
insured’s request to depose insurer’s corporate witness in a declaratory relief action regarding
interpretation of the insurance policy at issue because if the policy was found to be unambiguous,
the court would interpret it as a matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence, and if it was
ambiguous, it would be interpreted strictly against the insurer); Notice, Exhibit 1, at p. 3
(Designated Matters 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6). If the policy is unambiguous, the’ Court must enforce it as.
written, while if it is ambiguous, the policy is construed in the light most favorable to the insured.
Giddens, 445 F.3d at 1297; Diamond State, 2011 WL 146837, at *4. Under either scenario,
Skyward’s interpretation of the Policy terms is irrelevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.
Moreover, extrinsic evidence may not be used “to create an ambiguity in an otherwise
unambiguous contract.” Watson v. Union Camp Corp., 861 F.Supp. 1086, 1089 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
Thus, there is no basis upon which Plaintiff might seek such testimony even if he had brought the
issue of policy interpretation before the Court.
Further, the additional topics identified in Plaintiff's Notice, which generally concern
Skyward’s alleged claims-handling and investigative activities in response to the collision at issue,
other claims resolved arising out of the collision, and non-liability claims under the Policy,
likewise seek information not relevant to the issues in this matter. Westfield, 321 F.R.D. at 119;
10
PD.41907593.1
Notice, at pp. 3-4 (Designated Matters 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). The basis
for and investigation of the claims is not at issue in an action merely seeking coverage under an
insurance policy (as opposed to an action for bad faith, where such issues may be relevant) and
particularly here, where the litigation seeks to establish OTD’s and Gadson’s liability for the
collision at issue. Westfield, 321 F.R.D. at 114; Notice, at pp. 3-4 (Designated Matters 8, 9, 11, 12,
and 13; Document Requests 1, 4). Skyward’s/Houston Specialty’s handling of other liability
claims and first party property claims plainly bear no relevance to whether OTD and its alleged
driver, Defendant Gadson, are liable to Plaintiff or to the damages he sustained. Notice, at pp. 3-4
(Designated Matters 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13). Plaintiff has not propounded any previous discovery
requests upon Skyward that would merit its testimony on such topics, Notice, at p. 4 (Designated
Matter 16). Skyward and Houston Specialty have raised defenses that coincide with the defenses
raised by its insured, OTD, in recognition of the “automatic” liability conferred upon an insurer
under 0.C.G.A. § 40-1-112. Andrews, 262 Ga. at 476, 421 S.E.2d at 713; see generally, Skyward’s
Answer. Houston Specialty has not denied that it issued the Policy at issue or that the other
elements of a direct action claim asserted by Plaintiff are otherwise unmet (other than those
liability defenses interposed by OTD). Thus, the topics asserted in Plaintiff's Notice seek wholly
irrelevant information such that no deposition of a Skyward (or Houston Specialty) representative
is merited,
Skyward accordingly requests that the Court quash the Notice of its deposition and enter a
protective order barring its deposition, as well as the deposition of its subsidiary, Houston
2 Skyward concedes that Houston Specialty must produce a certified copy of its Policy and copies of statements issued.
and photographs and diagrams in its possession pertaining to the subject collision as such information is relevant to
the issues as asserted in this matter. Notice, at p. 4 (Document Requests 2, 4, and 5).
il
PD.41907593.1
Specialty, in this matter.
V. CONCLUSION
Skyward respectfully requests that the Court quash Plaintiffs Notice of its deposition,
quash in part the document requests served concurrently, and enter a protective order barring its
deposition in this matter. Skyward is not the appropriate party with personnel to testify as to the
topics identified by Plaintiff. Moreover, even if it were that party, the deposition topics and many
of the document requests seek information irrelevant to this liability action.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May 2023.
/s/ Christy M. Maple
Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807
Robert D. Whitney, GA Bar #790047
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
4141 Parklake Ave., Suite 530
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
Telephone: 919 789 5300
Facsimile: 919 789 5301
Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance
Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty
Insurance Company
STATE COURT OF
DEKALB COUNTY, GA
5/19/2023 2:14 PM
E-FILED
BY: Mundy Jackson
12
PD.41907593.1
IN THE STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
BYRON PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
OTD LOGISTICS INCORPORATED, CIVIL ACTION
SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE FILE NO.: 22A00477
COMPANY LTD., FORMERLY HOUSTON
SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
TERENCE GADSON, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN
DOE 2, AND JOHN DOE 3,
Defendant.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 19th day of May, 2023, a copy of Defendant Skyward Specialty
Insurance Company, Ltd.’s Motion to Quash and for Protective Order was served via the electronic
filing system for Dekalb County State Court upon all parties to this action via their attorneys of
record.
/s/ Christy M. Mapl
Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807
Robert D. Whitney, GA Bar #790047
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
4141 Parklake Ave.; Suite 530
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
Telephone: 919 789 5300
Facsimile: 919 789 5301
Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance
Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty
Insurance Company ‘
13
PD.41907593.1
s
EXHIBIT 1
POLICY NUMBER: RT-HSIC-CA-0000102-00 COMMERCIAL AUTO
CADS 03 10 13
BUSINESS AUTO DECLARATIONS
ITEM ONE
Company Name: Houston Specialty Insurance Company
|Producer Name: RSI Insurance Brokers, Inc,
|Named Insured: OTD Logistics Incorporated
Mailing Address: 10100 Airway Road
San Diego, CA 92154
Policy Period
From: 10/14/2019
To: 40/14/2020 At 12:01 AM Standard Time at your mailing address shown above
Previous Policy Number:
Form Of Business:
X | Corporation
Partnership EB Limited Liability Company
Other:
[J tnaiviuai
In return for the payment of the premium, and subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree with you to provide
the insurance as stated in this policy.
Premium shown is payable at Inception: $ 0.00
Audit Period (If Applicable): [X } Annually Cf] Semiannually LJ Quarterly C Monthly
Endorsements Attached To This Policy:
IL 00 17 — Common Policy Conditions ¢ IL 01 46 in Washington)
IL 00 21 — Broad Form Nuclear Exclusion (Not applicable in New York) ( [L.01 98 in Washington)
Countersignature Of Authorized Representative
Name: Kirby Hill
[Titles Executive Vice President
Signature: Wes?
Date: 10/11/2019
Note
Officers' facsimile signatures may be inserted here, on the policy cover or elsewhere at the company’s option.
1797
CA DS 03 10 13 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 Page 1 of 257
ITEM TWO
Schedule Of Coverages And Covered Autos
This policy provides only those coverages where a charge Is shown in the premium column below. Each of these
caverages will apply only to those “autos” shown as covered "autos". "Autos" are shown as covered “autos”
fora particular coverage by the entry of one or more of the symbols from the Covered Autos Section of
the Business Auto Coverage Form next to the name of the coverage.
Covered
Coverages Autos Limit Premium
Covered Autos 2,8,9 $ 1,000,000 sa
Liability
Personal Injury Separately Stated In Each Personal iS
Protection Injury Protection Endorsement Minus
(Or Equivalent $ Deductible
No-Fault Coverage)
Added Personal Separately Stated In Each Added
Injury Protection Personal Injury Protection
(Or Equivalent Added Endorsement.
No-Fault Coverage)
Property Protection Separately Stated In The Property
Insurance Protection Insurance Endorsement
(Michigan Only) Minus
$ Deductible.
For Each Accident.
Auto Medical $ Each Insured
Payments
Medical Expense And Separately Stated In The Medical
Income Loss Benefits Expense And Income Loss Benefits
(Virginia Only) Endorsement
Uninsured Motorist I$ 30,000 sz
|Underinsured i$
Motorists
(When Not Included
In Uninsured
Motorists Coverage)
1798
Page 2 of 251 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 CA DS 03 10 13
ITEM TWO
Schedule Of Coverages And Covered Autos (Cont'd)
Covered
Coverages Autos Limit Premium
Physical [Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repair,
Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus
Comprehensive
Coverage
$ Deductible
For Each Covered Auto, But No
Deductible Applies To Loss Caused By
Fire Or Lightning.
See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed
Autos.
Physical Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repair,
Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus
Specified
Cause OF
$ Deductible
Loss For Each Covered Auto For Loss Caused
Coverage By Mischief Or Vandalism
See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed
‘Autos,
Physical Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repatr,
Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus
Collision s Deductible
Coverage
For Each Covered Auto.
See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed
Autos.
Physical $ For Each
Damage Towing Disablement Of A Private Passenger Auto.
[And Labor
s
Premium For Endorsements|$
Estimated Total Premium *|$
"This Policy May Be Subject To Final Audit,
1799
CA DS 03 10 13 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 Page 3 of 251
Preview
IN THE STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA BYRON PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. OTD LOGISTICS INCORPORATED, ) CIVIL ACTION SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE ) FILE NO.: 22A00477 COMPANY LTD., formerly HOUSTON ) SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) TERENCE GADSON, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN ) DOE 2, AND JOHN DOE 3, Defendants. DEFENDANT SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company Ltd., by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c), hereby moves the Court to quash the Notice of Deposition served upon it in this action by Plaintiff Byron Perkins and for a protective order precluding its deposition in this case on the grounds that the requested discovery from Skyward is inappropriate and may not be had. Specifically, Skyward is not an appropriate party with knowledge of the topics designated in Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, as it is the parent company of the insurer which did issue the insurance policy at issue to Defendant OTD Logistics, Incorporated, non-party Houston Specialty Insurance Company (Skyward is contemporaneously moving to substitute Houston Specialty in its place as a defendant in this action). Second, at any rate, discovery as to the designated topics, which concern the application and interpretation of that insurance policy is inappropriate in the context of this liability action. As a result, Plaintiff is not entitled to depose Skyward and Skyward respectfully requests that the court quash the Notice of STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY, GA. - 5/19/2023 2:14 PM PD,41907593.1 E-FILED BY: Mundy B Jackson Deposition and issue a protective order preventing its deposition (or a deposition of its subsidiary, Houston Specialty) in this matter. Pursuant to Rule 6.4(B) of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts of the State of Georgia, counsel for Skyward and Plaintiff have met and conferred regarding the above issues and have been unable to resolve their differences short of motion practice. WHEREFORE, Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company, Ltd. respectfully request that the Court quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition and issue a protective order precluding its deposition in this case. Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May 2023. /s/ Christy M. Maple Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807 Robert D, Whitney, GA Bar #790047 PHELPS DUNBAR LLP 4141 Parklake Ave., Suite 530 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Telephone: 919 789 5300 Facsimile: 919 789 5301 Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty Insurance Company STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY, GA. 5/19/2023 2:14 PM E-FILED BY: Mundy Jackson PD.41907593.1 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF SKYWARD’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 1. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff seeks to depose and obtain documents from Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company, Ltd. regarding various topics generally concerning the interpretation and application of an insurance policy it issued to Defendant OTD Logistics Incorporated and its investigation of claims conducted in connection with the automobile accident at issue in this case. While an insurer is appropriately made a party to a liability lawsuit in these circumstances, due to OTD’s status as a motor carrier, the discovery Plaintiff seeks is not permitted by the rules of discovery. First, Skyward did not issue the insurance policy at issue and therefore lacks the requisite knowledge of the topics set forth in Plaintiff's notice of deposition. Counsel for Skyward has repeatedly raised this issue with counsel for Plaintiff, who to date has not consented to Skyward’s substitution out of the case to be replaced by the entity that actually issued the policy at issue, Skyward’s subsidiary, Houston Specialty Insurance Company. Moreover, even if Skyward were the appropriate party with knowledge of the topics so designated, discovery as to such topics is inappropriate in a direct action, where the insurer’s presence functions effectively as a payor only, As this matter is pending in State Court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any declaratory relief action as would be needed to properly bring forth any issues of interpretation of the policy at issue, which at any rate have not been asserted in this action. Therefore, Skyward respectfully requests that the Court quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition, partially quash Plaintiffs document requests, and enter a protective order barring its deposition in this case. I. FACTS This matter arises out of a March 25, 2020 automobile collision between a truck owned by Defendant OTD Logistics Incorporated and a private passenger vehicle in which Plaintiff Byron PD,41907593.1 Perkins was a passenger: See generally Complaint. Based on OTD’s status as’ federally-licensed motor carrier, Plaintiff joined Skyward as a direct defendant to this action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112. Complaint, {{ 5, 38-39. Plaintiff's only cause of action asserted against Skyward is such a direct action in contract, and Plaintiff does not seek any interpretation of the provisions of the Policy, Jd. at {J 38-39. Skyward’s subsidiary, non-party Houston Specialty Insurance Company, issued policy number RT-HSIC-CA-0000102-00 to OTD, effective October M4, 2019 to October 14, 2020 (the “Policy”). A true copy of the Policy’s declaration pages indicating its issuance by Houston Specialty is attached to this motion as Exhibit 1 (because the Policy provides coverage for numerous, specifically-identified vehicles, the Policy’s declarations are 251 pages in length, and Skyward attaches only the first three pages as an exhibit to this motion; due to its commercial sensitivity and irrelevance to this motion or action, premium information has been redacted), Skyward has met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiff repeatedly seeking Plaintiffs consent to substitute Houston Specialty into this action in place of Skyward, but Plaintiff has not agreed. On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed and served a Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Skyward, which is the operative notice at issue. See Exhibit 2, The Notice generally seeks the testimony of a corporate designee of Skyward pursuant to 0.C.G.A. 9-11-30(b)(6) with regard to various topics concerning the terms, interpretation, and claims investigation in connection with the automobile collision forming the basis for the lawsuit. See id. at pp. 3-4. The Notice also seeks production of various documents, including its claim file. Jd. at p. 4. Il. LEGAL STANDARD For good cause shown, the court “may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, PD,41907593.1 including... (1) That the discovery not be had” and “(4) That certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters[.]” O.C.G.A. § 9-1 1-26(c)(1), (4). “The trial court has wide discretion in the entering of orders preventing the taking of depositions” under O.C.G.A. 9-11-26(c). General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 815, 874 S.E.2d 52, 59 (2022) (internal quotations and altcrations omitted) (quoting Hampton Island Founders, LLC v. Liberty Capital, LLC, 283 Ga. 289, 296 (4), 658 S.E.2d 619 (2008)). While the court's discretion is broad, any discovery limitations should be crafted such that “such limitations do not have the effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533, 384 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (intemal quotation omitted) (quoting Mead Corp v. Masterack, 243 Ga. 213, 215, 253 S.E.2d 167 (1979). IV. ARGUMENT Here, the Court should quash Plaintiff's Notice of Skyward’s deposition, partially quash Plaintiff's requests for document production, and enter a protective order because Skyward would be subject to undue burden and expense through this deposition. First, because Skyward did not issue the insurance policy at issue, it is not the appropriate party to testify as to the topics identified in the Notice. Second, even if Skyward were the appropriate party (or if the Notice were directed at Houston Specialty, which did issue the insurance policy at issue), the topics upon which Plaintiff seeks discovery are not appropriately before the Court in this matter. As a result, Skyward respectfully requests that the Court quash the Notice of Deposition and enter an order protecting Skyward and Houston Specialty from deposition in this matter. a. The Notice is Propounded to an Inappropriate Party First, Skyward is plainly the incorrect party to testify as to those topics designated in the Notice because it is not the entity that issued the insurance policy at issue. Rather, as shown on the PDAl 907593.1 Policy itself, the entity that issued the Policy is Houston Specialty Insurance Company.' See Exhibit 1. “A holding or parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated separately from the subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of the corporate entity.” Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004) (alterations omitted); see also, e.g., Gebran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-16-07616 BRO (MRWx), 2016 WL 7471292, at *3-4 (C.D, Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (noting that a parent company “erroneously sued” by the plaintiff was not a real party in interest in the lawsuit and that its subsidiary, which actually employed the plaintiff alleging employment violations, was the proper party to the lawsuit). Courts have found that corporate parents “control” their subsidiaries sufficiently to be the appropriate respondents to written discovery seeking production of documents. See e.g., In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation, 233 F.R.D. 542, 544 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that a corporate parent had the obligation to produce documents in its subsidiaries’ possession where the corporate parent controlled the subsidiary). Here, however, Plaintiff seeks a deposition of a corporate witness pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 30(b)(6), which seeks testimony on behalf of the corporation itself rather than documents that it is able to control. O,C.G.A. § 30(b)(6) (“The organization shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who will consent to testify on its behalf...”) (emphasis added). This situation therefore does not constitute a circumstance “justifying disregard of the corporate entity,” where the action is on a contract for which Skyward cannot be legally liable and does not directly employ personnel with any knowledge of the topics identified. Dumas v. ACCC Ins. Co., 349 Fed. App’x 489, 491-92 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the insurer’s obligation to the insured arises “out of the relationship between the insurer and the “Skyward has concurrently moved to substitute the correct entity that issued the Policy to OTD, Houston Specialty, in its place as a party to this action. PD.41907593.1 insured created by the contract or policy of insurance”). Accordingly, as an entity that did not issue the Policy pursuant to which Plaintiff has asserted a direct action in this case, Skyward is not the proper party with knowledge of the designated topics in Plaintiff's Notice. Skyward accordingly requests that the Court quash the Notice and issue a protective order precluding its deposition in this matter. b. The Topics Identified in the Notice are Not Properly Before the Court in this Action Even if the Notice properly targets Skyward (or if the Court interprets it as seeking the testimony of Houston Specialty representatives), the Notice is nonetheless inappropriate in the context of a direct action, where Skyward has been added as a party defendant effectively as an indemnitor of any judgment entered against OTD and, potentially, Gadson. None of Plaintiff's causes of action seeks interpretation of the Policy, and the State Court would lack jurisdiction over such a declaratory relief action if Plaintiff had attempted to bring one. Moreover, Skyward/Houston Specialty’s interpretation of the Policy and claims adjustment practices are irrelevant to the liability issues asserted against OTD and its alleged driver, Gadson. Thus, the Notice seeks discovery of information that is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, and the Court should accordingly quash the Notice and issue an order protecting Skyward and Houston Specialty from being deposed in this matter on the identified topics. First, adding an insurer to a direct action does not open the insurer to discovery as to the interpretation of its policy or as to its claims adjustment processes. The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that under the direct action statute, “the insurance carrier is not, in reality, a separate party for purposes of liability, but, rather, is equivalent to a provider of a substitute surety bond, creating automatic liability in favor of a third party who may have a claim for damages for the negligence of the motor common carrier.” Andrews v. Yellow Freight Sys., 262 Ga. 476, 476, 421 PD.41907593.1 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1992) (emphasis in original) (citing Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 205 Ga. App. 164, 421 S.E.2d 329 (1992)). The plaintiff has no separate claim for damages against the motor carrier’s insurer — as noted in Andrews, the carrier’s liability is “automatic.” Id. “The provision allowing joinder of the insurer is not intended, in any respect, to enhance the value of a third party’s claim for damages. Thus, the mere presence of the insurer as a party defendant should have no effect on the issues of liability or injuries, and should not affect the amount of the verdict.” Jd, Because Skyward’s presence in the lawsuit has no effect on liability or damages, any information concerning the terms of its Policy is irrelevant. Pursuant to the statute, there is no separate cause of action against the carrier created in favor of the claimant. Moreover, even if such an action were permitted, Plaintiff has not asserted any claim seeking interpretation of the Policy. The elements of a direct action pursuant to 0.C.G.A. § 40-1- 112 are “(1) the subject carrier must be a ‘motor carrier’ as defined by the direct action statutes; (2) the plaintiff must have sustained an actionable injury; and (3) the insurer must be an ‘insurance carrier.” McGill v. Am. Trucking & Transp., Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.3d 1261, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (citations omitted). By the terms of his complaint, Plaintiff seeks recovery under the direct action statute and does not, for example, seek a declaration interpreting the Policy. Nor could Plaintiff do so, as the State Court in which he has brought this action lacks jurisdiction to hear such matters under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a) (“In cases of actual controversy, the respective superior courts of this state and the Georgia State-wide Business Court shall have power, upon petition or other appropriate pleading, to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petition for such declaration...”). Thus, no claim seeking interpretation of the Policy has even been asserted and such an action would be inappropriate in this venue. Finally, even if such an action had been asserted, none of the topics upon which Plaintiff PD.41907593.1 seeks Skyward’s testimony would be relevant to such an action. Interpretation and construction of contracts, including insurance policies, is a matter of law for the court to determine. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 612 (1), 705 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2011). “[W]here the language of a contract is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is necessary or even permissible by the trial court.” Ainsworth v. Perrault, 254 Ga. App. 470, 476 (4), 563 S.E.2d 135, 140-41 (2002). Where no construction of the contract is required, “the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms.” Envision Printing, LLC v. Evans, 336 Ga. App. 635, 638 (1), 786 S.E.2d 250, 252 (2016) (quoting General Steel v. Delta Bidg. Sys., 297 Ga. App. 136, 138 (1), 676 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2009)). Plain insurance policy terms “must be given full effect even though they are beneficial to the insurer and detrimental to the insured.” Woodmen v. World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Etheridge, 223 Ga, 231, 154 S,E.2d 369, 372 (1967), “A word or phrase [in an insurance policy] is ambiguous only when it is of uncertain meaning, and may be fairly understood in more ways than one so that it involves a choice between two or more constructions of the contract.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bauman, 313 Ga. App. 771, 773-74, 723 §.B.2d 1, 3 (2012). Where a policy is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, “it is construed in the light most favorable to the insured and against the insurer.” Giddens v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 445 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), Thus, even interpreting Plaintiff's direct action claim as one secking an interpretation of the Policy, all of the topics upon which he seeks to depose Skyward concern information that is inadmissible and irrelevant in the context of such an action. Because interpretation of the Policy in such an action is a matter of law for the court’s determination, Skyward’s testimony about the application and interpretation of the Policy is irrelevant. Khan, 307 Ga. App. at 612 (1), 705 S.E.2d PD.41907593.1 at 710; see also, e.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, 321 F.R.D. 107, 119 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that discovery requests seeking extrinsic information concerning an insurance policy there at issue were “wholly irrelevant to a straightforward coverage determination {and] that might only bear marginal relevance even in a bad faith action”); Diamond State Ins. Co. v. His House, Inc., No. 10-20039-COV, 2011 WL 146837, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011) (denying insured’s request to depose insurer’s corporate witness in a declaratory relief action regarding interpretation of the insurance policy at issue because if the policy was found to be unambiguous, the court would interpret it as a matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence, and if it was ambiguous, it would be interpreted strictly against the insurer); Notice, Exhibit 1, at p. 3 (Designated Matters 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6). If the policy is unambiguous, the’ Court must enforce it as. written, while if it is ambiguous, the policy is construed in the light most favorable to the insured. Giddens, 445 F.3d at 1297; Diamond State, 2011 WL 146837, at *4. Under either scenario, Skyward’s interpretation of the Policy terms is irrelevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Moreover, extrinsic evidence may not be used “to create an ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous contract.” Watson v. Union Camp Corp., 861 F.Supp. 1086, 1089 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Thus, there is no basis upon which Plaintiff might seek such testimony even if he had brought the issue of policy interpretation before the Court. Further, the additional topics identified in Plaintiff's Notice, which generally concern Skyward’s alleged claims-handling and investigative activities in response to the collision at issue, other claims resolved arising out of the collision, and non-liability claims under the Policy, likewise seek information not relevant to the issues in this matter. Westfield, 321 F.R.D. at 119; 10 PD.41907593.1 Notice, at pp. 3-4 (Designated Matters 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). The basis for and investigation of the claims is not at issue in an action merely seeking coverage under an insurance policy (as opposed to an action for bad faith, where such issues may be relevant) and particularly here, where the litigation seeks to establish OTD’s and Gadson’s liability for the collision at issue. Westfield, 321 F.R.D. at 114; Notice, at pp. 3-4 (Designated Matters 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13; Document Requests 1, 4). Skyward’s/Houston Specialty’s handling of other liability claims and first party property claims plainly bear no relevance to whether OTD and its alleged driver, Defendant Gadson, are liable to Plaintiff or to the damages he sustained. Notice, at pp. 3-4 (Designated Matters 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13). Plaintiff has not propounded any previous discovery requests upon Skyward that would merit its testimony on such topics, Notice, at p. 4 (Designated Matter 16). Skyward and Houston Specialty have raised defenses that coincide with the defenses raised by its insured, OTD, in recognition of the “automatic” liability conferred upon an insurer under 0.C.G.A. § 40-1-112. Andrews, 262 Ga. at 476, 421 S.E.2d at 713; see generally, Skyward’s Answer. Houston Specialty has not denied that it issued the Policy at issue or that the other elements of a direct action claim asserted by Plaintiff are otherwise unmet (other than those liability defenses interposed by OTD). Thus, the topics asserted in Plaintiff's Notice seek wholly irrelevant information such that no deposition of a Skyward (or Houston Specialty) representative is merited, Skyward accordingly requests that the Court quash the Notice of its deposition and enter a protective order barring its deposition, as well as the deposition of its subsidiary, Houston 2 Skyward concedes that Houston Specialty must produce a certified copy of its Policy and copies of statements issued. and photographs and diagrams in its possession pertaining to the subject collision as such information is relevant to the issues as asserted in this matter. Notice, at p. 4 (Document Requests 2, 4, and 5). il PD.41907593.1 Specialty, in this matter. V. CONCLUSION Skyward respectfully requests that the Court quash Plaintiffs Notice of its deposition, quash in part the document requests served concurrently, and enter a protective order barring its deposition in this matter. Skyward is not the appropriate party with personnel to testify as to the topics identified by Plaintiff. Moreover, even if it were that party, the deposition topics and many of the document requests seek information irrelevant to this liability action. Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May 2023. /s/ Christy M. Maple Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807 Robert D. Whitney, GA Bar #790047 PHELPS DUNBAR LLP 4141 Parklake Ave., Suite 530 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Telephone: 919 789 5300 Facsimile: 919 789 5301 Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty Insurance Company STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY, GA 5/19/2023 2:14 PM E-FILED BY: Mundy Jackson 12 PD.41907593.1 IN THE STATE COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA BYRON PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. OTD LOGISTICS INCORPORATED, CIVIL ACTION SKYWARD SPECIALTY INSURANCE FILE NO.: 22A00477 COMPANY LTD., FORMERLY HOUSTON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, TERENCE GADSON, JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, AND JOHN DOE 3, Defendant. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 19th day of May, 2023, a copy of Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company, Ltd.’s Motion to Quash and for Protective Order was served via the electronic filing system for Dekalb County State Court upon all parties to this action via their attorneys of record. /s/ Christy M. Mapl Christy M. Maple, GA Bar #240807 Robert D. Whitney, GA Bar #790047 PHELPS DUNBAR LLP 4141 Parklake Ave.; Suite 530 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Telephone: 919 789 5300 Facsimile: 919 789 5301 Attorneys for Defendant Skyward Specialty Insurance Company Ltd. and Non-Party Houston Specialty Insurance Company ‘ 13 PD.41907593.1 s EXHIBIT 1 POLICY NUMBER: RT-HSIC-CA-0000102-00 COMMERCIAL AUTO CADS 03 10 13 BUSINESS AUTO DECLARATIONS ITEM ONE Company Name: Houston Specialty Insurance Company |Producer Name: RSI Insurance Brokers, Inc, |Named Insured: OTD Logistics Incorporated Mailing Address: 10100 Airway Road San Diego, CA 92154 Policy Period From: 10/14/2019 To: 40/14/2020 At 12:01 AM Standard Time at your mailing address shown above Previous Policy Number: Form Of Business: X | Corporation Partnership EB Limited Liability Company Other: [J tnaiviuai In return for the payment of the premium, and subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree with you to provide the insurance as stated in this policy. Premium shown is payable at Inception: $ 0.00 Audit Period (If Applicable): [X } Annually Cf] Semiannually LJ Quarterly C Monthly Endorsements Attached To This Policy: IL 00 17 — Common Policy Conditions ¢ IL 01 46 in Washington) IL 00 21 — Broad Form Nuclear Exclusion (Not applicable in New York) ( [L.01 98 in Washington) Countersignature Of Authorized Representative Name: Kirby Hill [Titles Executive Vice President Signature: Wes? Date: 10/11/2019 Note Officers' facsimile signatures may be inserted here, on the policy cover or elsewhere at the company’s option. 1797 CA DS 03 10 13 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 Page 1 of 257 ITEM TWO Schedule Of Coverages And Covered Autos This policy provides only those coverages where a charge Is shown in the premium column below. Each of these caverages will apply only to those “autos” shown as covered "autos". "Autos" are shown as covered “autos” fora particular coverage by the entry of one or more of the symbols from the Covered Autos Section of the Business Auto Coverage Form next to the name of the coverage. Covered Coverages Autos Limit Premium Covered Autos 2,8,9 $ 1,000,000 sa Liability Personal Injury Separately Stated In Each Personal iS Protection Injury Protection Endorsement Minus (Or Equivalent $ Deductible No-Fault Coverage) Added Personal Separately Stated In Each Added Injury Protection Personal Injury Protection (Or Equivalent Added Endorsement. No-Fault Coverage) Property Protection Separately Stated In The Property Insurance Protection Insurance Endorsement (Michigan Only) Minus $ Deductible. For Each Accident. Auto Medical $ Each Insured Payments Medical Expense And Separately Stated In The Medical Income Loss Benefits Expense And Income Loss Benefits (Virginia Only) Endorsement Uninsured Motorist I$ 30,000 sz |Underinsured i$ Motorists (When Not Included In Uninsured Motorists Coverage) 1798 Page 2 of 251 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 CA DS 03 10 13 ITEM TWO Schedule Of Coverages And Covered Autos (Cont'd) Covered Coverages Autos Limit Premium Physical [Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repair, Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus Comprehensive Coverage $ Deductible For Each Covered Auto, But No Deductible Applies To Loss Caused By Fire Or Lightning. See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed Autos. Physical Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repair, Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus Specified Cause OF $ Deductible Loss For Each Covered Auto For Loss Caused Coverage By Mischief Or Vandalism See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed ‘Autos, Physical Actual Cash Value Or Cost Of Repatr, Damage Whichever Is Less, Minus Collision s Deductible Coverage For Each Covered Auto. See Item Four for Hired or Borrowed Autos. Physical $ For Each Damage Towing Disablement Of A Private Passenger Auto. [And Labor s Premium For Endorsements|$ Estimated Total Premium *|$ "This Policy May Be Subject To Final Audit, 1799 CA DS 03 10 13 © Insurance Services Office, Inc., 2011 Page 3 of 251