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DOCKET NO.:AAN-CV-15-6018160-S : SUPERIOR COURT
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS : J.D. OF ANSONIA/MILFORD
TRUSTEE
V. : AT MILFORD
MICHAEL P. HEALEY, ET AL : MARCH 19, 2024
MOTION TO QUASH
Defendant, Michael P. Healey, moves to quash the subpoena attached based on
the following.
1. The Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition and issued a Subpoena
attached to this motion as Exhibit A. The Plaintiff seeks a lengthy number of very old
documents from this accounting firm which may or may not have handled accounting
matters for Healey many years ago. The Subpoena is improper for a number of
reasons.
2. It is dated March 15, 2024 and was served at a date thereafter, and
provides less than a week’s notice for a deposition in violation of law.
3. The Subpoena is excessively over broad, intrusive, not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and improperly seeks
confidential information regarding non-parties, including Mr. Healey's wife and of his
former business for no legitimate reason.
4. It seeks “any and all client files" from Mr. Healey, Mrs. Healey, Healey
Ford of Ansonia (a company which has not operated for 8 years) and many other
categories of documents in an egregious shotgun fashion, which is totally unjustified in
this lawsuit. No justifiable explanation exists for seeking Mrs. Healey’s personal tax
records; she is not obligated to the Plaintiff at all and was never an owner of Healey
Ford of Ansonia.
5. It seeks records which pre-date the date of the alleged loan in this case,
which was 2007, again for no legitimate reason.
6. It seeks to circumvent proceedings now pending before this court
regarding any disclosure of Healey's tax returns by attempting to obtain them from an
accountant. This demonstrates a disregard for pending court proceedings with an end
run around an adverse ruling regarding these tax returns.
But overall, the Subpoena is unduly intrusive, greatly burdensome and
harassing. The appropriate remedy is to quash the Subpoena. Pertinent decisions are
also attached here to relative to this point.
THE DEFENDANT,
MICHAEL P. HEALEY
BY: /s/ 101986
James M. Nugent
Harlow, Adams & Friedman
One New Haven Avenue, Suite 100
Milford, CT 06460
Tele No.: (203) 878-0661
Juris No. 102083
Jmn@quidproquo.com
-2-
ORDER
The foregoing Motion having been presented to the court, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED: GRANTED / DENIED
Dated:___________ BY THE COURT,
_______________________________
Judge/Assistant Clerk
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid and/or
sent electronically this date to all counsel and pro se parties of record:
McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC
50 Weston Street
Hartford, CT 06120
ctlitigation@mccalla.com
Geoffrey.Milne@mccalla.com
Pelligrino Law Firm
475 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
srb@pellegrinolawfirm.com
/s/ 101986
James M. Nugent
-3-
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of Connecticut,
Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford.
EAGLE VALLEY ECO FUEL, INC.
v.
FABULOUS FLOORS, INC.
HHDCV156103950 March 6, 2019 (Sheridan, J.)
*1 A motion to quash may be granted when a subpoena is "unreasonable and oppressive," or "if it
seeks the production of materials not subject to production" within the scope permitted by
Practice Book §§ 13-2 through 13-5. Practice Book § 13-28(c) and (e). Whether to grant a
motion to quash is discretionary. Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, 116 Conn.App. 663,
670, 672, 975 A.2d 1282, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 930, 980 A.2d 916 (2009). The trial court has
discretion to limit discovery in civil actions where the disclosure sought is outside the scope
permitted by Practice Book § 13-2, including when it would not be of assistance in the
prosecution or defense of the action, when it is immaterial or privileged, where it is not within
the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power, or when the requesting party is in an equal
or better position to obtain the information on its own). See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190
Conn. 48, 58-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).
Thus, the test in determining whether the court should grant the witness' motion to quash, is
whether the subpoena is "unreasonable and oppressive." The court must also determine whether
the information sought is outside the scope of § 13-2.
This motion seeks to quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the plaintiffs to Michael
Richey and to Cynthia Richey for purposes of trial. The plaintiffs contend that the subpoenas are
"overreaching" because the documents sought relate to Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc., Verna Mae
Group, LLC and Brickenmore East, LLC, entities which are not parties to this lawsuit. That
argument is unavailing. Regardless of whether those entities are parties to the lawsuit, if the
requested documents would be of assistance in the defense of the action, are not immaterial or
privileged, and are within the knowledge, possession or power of the plaintiffs, they must be
produced.
The parties were heard at oral argument on March 5, 2019. Having heard the arguments and
scrutinized Schedule A to the subpoenas, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
demonstrated either that the subpoena in toto is unreasonable and oppressive, nor that it compels
the production of materials not subject to discovery under Practice Book § 13-2, such that it
should be quashed in its entirety.
During oral argument, the plaintiffs highlighted several document requests they deemed
immaterial or irrelevant. Those items will be discussed in particular below.
Request No. 4: The settlement agreement entered into between Michael Richey and/or Cynthia
Richey and/or Eagle Valley Eco Fuels and your first party insurance carrier-Underwriters of
Lloyds of London with regard to any claims asserted against Underwriters of Lloyds and/or its
attorneys
and Request No. 8: Copy of any confidentiality agreement regarding a June 21, 2016 settlement
with certain underwriters of Lloyd's of London entered into by you.
The plaintiffs assert that the agreement with Underwriters of Lloyds of London is subject to a
confidentiality provision prohibiting disclosure-even in response to a court order. If that is indeed
the case, the plaintiffs should produce the specific language of the confidentiality provision and
identify the legal counsel that negotiated and/or drafted the confidentiality provision on behalf of
Underwriters of Lloyds of London, so that defendant's counsel can verify the confidentiality
agreement or seek a waiver of the provision.
*2 Request No. 11: Copies of all personal property filings with the Town of Ellington and/or
East Windsor, Connecticut for personal property owned by you in your individual capacity or
filed on behalf of Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc. Brickenmore East, LLC and/or Verna Mae Group,
LLC in 2012 and 2013.
The plaintiffs contend that this disclosure will force them to reveal "trade secrets" in the
descriptions and listing of serial numbers for machinery and equipment used by the entities
named. The obvious flaw in this argument is that if the personal property information was filed
with the Town of Ellington and/or Town of East Windsor, those would be public documents, not
"trade secrets" by any definition. Nonetheless, the defendants have agreed that equipment serial
numbers can be redacted on any information provided to them.
Request No. 14: Any bank records to substantiate an inheritance of $ 3M from Michael Richey's
grandmother.
The plaintiffs claim that this information is not relevant to the case. "In ruling on discovery
matters, including motions to quash deposition notices and subpoenas, the court is obligated to
take a reasoned and logical approach to the relevant contest between the parties. See, e.g.,
Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 7-8, 826 A.2d 1088 (2003)." Clarke v. Rieger,
2007 WL 155198 (January 9, 2007, Rubinow, J.). Applying this approach to the present case, and
having heard the plaintiff's explanation of the nature of the $ 3 Million "inheritance," the court
concludes that the documentation, if it exists, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
evidence that would be admissible at trial and would be of assistance in the defense of this
matter. If the documents exist, and if they are and are within the knowledge, possession or power
of the plaintiffs, they must be produced in compliance with the subpoena.
Request No. 18: Copies of all attorney fees billed to you by the following firms: a. Halloran &
Sage; b. Romano & Associates; c. Walter Bass; d. Donald Weisman; e. Brennan Maki.
To the extent that itemized bills contain information protected by the attorney client privilege or
work product doctrine, the itemized entries may be omitted or redacted from the materials
produced.
In conclusion, the motion to quash is denied, and to the extent not specifically excluded above,
any responsive documents within the knowledge, possession or power of the plaintiffs must be
produced in compliance with the subpoena.
Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc. v. Fabulous Floors, Inc., 2019 WL 1568719, at *1-2 (Conn.Super.,
2019)
.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of Connecticut, 2018 WL 7107306
Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven.
Erik KUSELIUS
v.
Holly NIEDERKOHR CV175039209S Dec. 26, 2018. ( Wilson, J.)
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
*1 On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel the defendant's deposition, which
was noticed for February 16, 2018. As part of the plaintiff's deposition notice, and pursuant to
Practice Book § 13-28(c), the plaintiff served the defendant with a subpoena duces tecum,
commanding the defendant to bring certain documents contained in "Schedule A" which was
attached to the subpoena. On February 2, 2018, the defendant moved to quash the subpoena on
three grounds. First, the defendant argued that the discovery process should have been put on
hold until the court ruled on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which was
pending at the time of the motion to quash. Second, the subpoena failed to comply with Practice
Book § 13-27(a), which requires notice be given to all parties to the action or each party's
attorney and that said notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition. Finally, the
defendant claimed that the subpoena sought irrelevant, overly broad and unduly burdensome
information which could not possibly lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Def. Mot.
To Quash (# 130). The defendant also claimed that the intent of the deposition notice was to
harass the defendant and not to seek relevant information that would be beneficial to the
plaintiff's case. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's noticing of the deposition and attendant
document requests were vexatious and intended to harass and embarrass the defendant. Based on
the foregoing, the defendant requested the court to grant the motion to quash.
Since the filing of the plaintiff's motion to compel and the defendant's motion to quash, the court
ruled on the motion to dismiss (# 106.30) denying the motion as to counts one through ten, and
granting it as to count eleven which contained allegations of slander and libel. Subsequent to the
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, and in response to the defendant's motion for
reargument/reconsideration (# 148) of the court's ruling on the defendant's motion for protective
order (# 115.10) regarding discovery requests from the plaintiff, the court conducted an
exhaustive review of the plaintiff's amended complaint, interrogatories, request for production
and request for admissions, and issued a twenty-nine-page ruling on said motion for protective
order on October 9, 2018 (# 115.40). The court's ruling on October 9, 2018, dealt with many of
the items set forth in plaintiff's Schedule A and Amended Schedule A attached to the plaintiff's
subpoena which are now the subject of the present motion to quash. The court heard oral
argument on the defendant's motion to quash (# 130) at short calendar on December 17, 2017.
II
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 13-2 provides in relevant part that "[i]n any civil action ... where the judicial
authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party
may obtain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter discovery of information or
disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books, documents and electronically stored
information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not
privileged, whether the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, and which are within the knowledge,
possession or power of the party or person to whom the discovery is addressed. Discovery shall
be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the
action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater
facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure. It shall not be ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ..."
*2 "Our rules of discovery are meant to serve the ends of justice by `facilitating an intensive
search for the truth through accuracy and fairness, provid[ing] procedural mechanisms designed
to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' (Citations omitted.) Picketts v. Int'l Playtex, Inc.,
215 Conn. 490, 508, 576 A.2d 518 (1990).
Practice Book § 13-5 states in relevant part: "Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is
sought and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the
discovery may be had only on specific terms and conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of
discovery be limited to certain matters ..." Under Practice Book § 13-5 the party seeking the
protective order is required to show good cause. The courts have defined good cause as "a sound
basis or legitimate need to take judicial action." Welch v. Welch, supra, 48 Conn.Sup. 19, 828
A.2d 707 [34 Conn. L. Rptr. 171] (2003). "Good cause must be based upon a particular and
specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Id.
at 20. "Whether or not `good cause' exists for entry of a protective order must depend on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case." Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., Superior Court,
judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-88352383-S (February 11,
1992, Schaller, J.) [6 Conn. L. Rptr. 3]. "To determine whether good cause exists, courts balance
`the need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is
compelled.' " In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F.Sup.2d 385, 413-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) ).
Practice Book § 13-28(c) states, in relevant part: "A subpoena issued for the taking of a
deposition may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and
copying of designated books, papers, documents or tangible things which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Sections 13-2 through 13-5." Practice
Book § 13-28(e) states in relevant part: "The court in which the cause is pending ... may, upon
motion made promptly and, in any event, at or before the time for compliance specified in a
subpoena authorized by subsection (b) of this section, (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is
unreasonable and oppressive or if it seeks the production of materials not subject to production
under the provisions of subsection (c) of this section ..."
"A motion to quash may be granted when a subpoena is `unreasonable and oppressive,' or `if it
seeks the production of materials not subject to production' within the scope permitted by
Practice Book §§ 13-2 through 13-5. Practice Book § 13-28(c) and (e). Whether to grant a
motion to quash is discretionary. Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, 116 Conn.App. 663,
670, 672, 975 A.2d 1282, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 939, 980 A.2d 916 (2009). `Any request for
information that does not directly relate to legitimate issues that may arise in the course of the
criminal prosecution ought to be denied.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Erickson,
297 Conn. 164, 177, 997 A.2d 480 (2010). The court should be even more cautious in civil cases
where a person's liberty is not at stake. See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48,
58-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983) (trial court has discretion to limit discovery in civil actions where
the disclosure sought is outside the scope permitted by Practice Book § 13-2, including when it
would not be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action, when it is immaterial or
privileged, when it is not within the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power, or when
the requesting party is in an equal or better position to obtain the information on its own) ...
*3 "Of course, when a plaintiff asserts a claim the defendant is permitted to conduct reasonable
discovery regarding that claim ... See Irizarry v. M.L. Moskowitz & Co., Inc., Superior Court,
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-08-5007501-S (January 12,
2012), citing Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn.App. 276, 283, 835 A.2d 62 (2003), cert. denied, 267
Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). McClellan v. William W. Backus Hospital, Superior Court,
judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. KNLCV-13-6016702-S (June 13,
2014, Cole-Chu, J.) [58 Conn. L. Rptr. 295]. Likewise, as this court previously noted,
`[d]iscovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in ... the
prosecution ... of the action ...' Practice Book § 13-2." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Talbot
v. Quinnipiac University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No.
CV-146048886-S (November 28, 2014, Wilson, J.) [59 Conn. L. Rptr. 380].
Much of the information contained in plaintiff's Schedule A and Amended Schedule A, is
covered by this court's October 9, 2018 ruling (# 115.40) on defendant's motion for protective
order (# 115). The court during oral argument on the present motion to quash cautioned both
plaintiff's and defendant's counsel that counsel should be mindful of the court's previous ruling
regarding these discovery matters and that counsel shall comply with said ruling and order. The
court considers repeated requests, without good cause, by the plaintiff for information the court
previously ruled protected pursuant to its order, or an objection by the defendant to information
which the court ruled discoverable, as evidence of noncompliance with the court's order.
Accordingly, the court cautions that such conduct by counsel on both sides will result in
sanctions. In other words, should the court again be faced with having to rule on discovery
already covered by its October 9, 2018 ruling and order, counsel will be subject to sanctions.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Having reviewed plaintiff's Amended Schedule A attached to his subpoena, and defendant's
motion to quash, and having heard the parties' arguments the court rules as follows regarding
same:
1. a, c, and d. GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to amend its request to comply with this
court's October 9, 2018 ruling. See, Kuselius v. Niederkohr, Superior Court, judicial district of
New Haven, Docket No. CV-175039209-S (October 9, 2018, Wilson, J.).
e and f are GRANTED until further order of the court.
g. GRANTED pursuant to the court's October 9, 2018 ruling on requests for production # 29 and
Kuselius v. Niederkohr, 2018 WL 7107306, at *1-4 (Conn.Super., 2018)
Bonk v. Iaropoli, 1998 WL 457960, at *1-2 (Conn.Super.,1998)
EXHIBIT A
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DOCKET NO.:AAN-CV-15-6018160-S : SUPERIOR COURT US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS : J.D. OF ANSONIA/MILFORD TRUSTEE V. : AT MILFORD MICHAEL P. HEALEY, ET AL : MARCH 19, 2024 MOTION TO QUASH Defendant, Michael P. Healey, moves to quash the subpoena attached based on the following. 1. The Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition and issued a Subpoena attached to this motion as Exhibit A. The Plaintiff seeks a lengthy number of very old documents from this accounting firm which may or may not have handled accounting matters for Healey many years ago. The Subpoena is improper for a number of reasons. 2. It is dated March 15, 2024 and was served at a date thereafter, and provides less than a week’s notice for a deposition in violation of law. 3. The Subpoena is excessively over broad, intrusive, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and improperly seeks confidential information regarding non-parties, including Mr. Healey's wife and of his former business for no legitimate reason. 4. It seeks “any and all client files" from Mr. Healey, Mrs. Healey, Healey Ford of Ansonia (a company which has not operated for 8 years) and many other categories of documents in an egregious shotgun fashion, which is totally unjustified in this lawsuit. No justifiable explanation exists for seeking Mrs. Healey’s personal tax records; she is not obligated to the Plaintiff at all and was never an owner of Healey Ford of Ansonia. 5. It seeks records which pre-date the date of the alleged loan in this case, which was 2007, again for no legitimate reason. 6. It seeks to circumvent proceedings now pending before this court regarding any disclosure of Healey's tax returns by attempting to obtain them from an accountant. This demonstrates a disregard for pending court proceedings with an end run around an adverse ruling regarding these tax returns. But overall, the Subpoena is unduly intrusive, greatly burdensome and harassing. The appropriate remedy is to quash the Subpoena. Pertinent decisions are also attached here to relative to this point. THE DEFENDANT, MICHAEL P. HEALEY BY: /s/ 101986 James M. Nugent Harlow, Adams & Friedman One New Haven Avenue, Suite 100 Milford, CT 06460 Tele No.: (203) 878-0661 Juris No. 102083 Jmn@quidproquo.com -2- ORDER The foregoing Motion having been presented to the court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: GRANTED / DENIED Dated:___________ BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Judge/Assistant Clerk CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid and/or sent electronically this date to all counsel and pro se parties of record: McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC 50 Weston Street Hartford, CT 06120 ctlitigation@mccalla.com Geoffrey.Milne@mccalla.com Pelligrino Law Firm 475 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511 srb@pellegrinolawfirm.com /s/ 101986 James M. Nugent -3- UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford. EAGLE VALLEY ECO FUEL, INC. v. FABULOUS FLOORS, INC. HHDCV156103950 March 6, 2019 (Sheridan, J.) *1 A motion to quash may be granted when a subpoena is "unreasonable and oppressive," or "if it seeks the production of materials not subject to production" within the scope permitted by Practice Book §§ 13-2 through 13-5. Practice Book § 13-28(c) and (e). Whether to grant a motion to quash is discretionary. Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, 116 Conn.App. 663, 670, 672, 975 A.2d 1282, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 930, 980 A.2d 916 (2009). The trial court has discretion to limit discovery in civil actions where the disclosure sought is outside the scope permitted by Practice Book § 13-2, including when it would not be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action, when it is immaterial or privileged, where it is not within the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power, or when the requesting party is in an equal or better position to obtain the information on its own). See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 58-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983). Thus, the test in determining whether the court should grant the witness' motion to quash, is whether the subpoena is "unreasonable and oppressive." The court must also determine whether the information sought is outside the scope of § 13-2. This motion seeks to quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the plaintiffs to Michael Richey and to Cynthia Richey for purposes of trial. The plaintiffs contend that the subpoenas are "overreaching" because the documents sought relate to Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc., Verna Mae Group, LLC and Brickenmore East, LLC, entities which are not parties to this lawsuit. That argument is unavailing. Regardless of whether those entities are parties to the lawsuit, if the requested documents would be of assistance in the defense of the action, are not immaterial or privileged, and are within the knowledge, possession or power of the plaintiffs, they must be produced. The parties were heard at oral argument on March 5, 2019. Having heard the arguments and scrutinized Schedule A to the subpoenas, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated either that the subpoena in toto is unreasonable and oppressive, nor that it compels the production of materials not subject to discovery under Practice Book § 13-2, such that it should be quashed in its entirety. During oral argument, the plaintiffs highlighted several document requests they deemed immaterial or irrelevant. Those items will be discussed in particular below. Request No. 4: The settlement agreement entered into between Michael Richey and/or Cynthia Richey and/or Eagle Valley Eco Fuels and your first party insurance carrier-Underwriters of Lloyds of London with regard to any claims asserted against Underwriters of Lloyds and/or its attorneys and Request No. 8: Copy of any confidentiality agreement regarding a June 21, 2016 settlement with certain underwriters of Lloyd's of London entered into by you. The plaintiffs assert that the agreement with Underwriters of Lloyds of London is subject to a confidentiality provision prohibiting disclosure-even in response to a court order. If that is indeed the case, the plaintiffs should produce the specific language of the confidentiality provision and identify the legal counsel that negotiated and/or drafted the confidentiality provision on behalf of Underwriters of Lloyds of London, so that defendant's counsel can verify the confidentiality agreement or seek a waiver of the provision. *2 Request No. 11: Copies of all personal property filings with the Town of Ellington and/or East Windsor, Connecticut for personal property owned by you in your individual capacity or filed on behalf of Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc. Brickenmore East, LLC and/or Verna Mae Group, LLC in 2012 and 2013. The plaintiffs contend that this disclosure will force them to reveal "trade secrets" in the descriptions and listing of serial numbers for machinery and equipment used by the entities named. The obvious flaw in this argument is that if the personal property information was filed with the Town of Ellington and/or Town of East Windsor, those would be public documents, not "trade secrets" by any definition. Nonetheless, the defendants have agreed that equipment serial numbers can be redacted on any information provided to them. Request No. 14: Any bank records to substantiate an inheritance of $ 3M from Michael Richey's grandmother. The plaintiffs claim that this information is not relevant to the case. "In ruling on discovery matters, including motions to quash deposition notices and subpoenas, the court is obligated to take a reasoned and logical approach to the relevant contest between the parties. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg., Inc., 265 Conn. 1, 7-8, 826 A.2d 1088 (2003)." Clarke v. Rieger, 2007 WL 155198 (January 9, 2007, Rubinow, J.). Applying this approach to the present case, and having heard the plaintiff's explanation of the nature of the $ 3 Million "inheritance," the court concludes that the documentation, if it exists, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence that would be admissible at trial and would be of assistance in the defense of this matter. If the documents exist, and if they are and are within the knowledge, possession or power of the plaintiffs, they must be produced in compliance with the subpoena. Request No. 18: Copies of all attorney fees billed to you by the following firms: a. Halloran & Sage; b. Romano & Associates; c. Walter Bass; d. Donald Weisman; e. Brennan Maki. To the extent that itemized bills contain information protected by the attorney client privilege or work product doctrine, the itemized entries may be omitted or redacted from the materials produced. In conclusion, the motion to quash is denied, and to the extent not specifically excluded above, any responsive documents within the knowledge, possession or power of the plaintiffs must be produced in compliance with the subpoena. Eagle Valley Eco Fuel, Inc. v. Fabulous Floors, Inc., 2019 WL 1568719, at *1-2 (Conn.Super., 2019) . UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. Superior Court of Connecticut, 2018 WL 7107306 Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven. Erik KUSELIUS v. Holly NIEDERKOHR CV175039209S Dec. 26, 2018. ( Wilson, J.) STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY *1 On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel the defendant's deposition, which was noticed for February 16, 2018. As part of the plaintiff's deposition notice, and pursuant to Practice Book § 13-28(c), the plaintiff served the defendant with a subpoena duces tecum, commanding the defendant to bring certain documents contained in "Schedule A" which was attached to the subpoena. On February 2, 2018, the defendant moved to quash the subpoena on three grounds. First, the defendant argued that the discovery process should have been put on hold until the court ruled on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which was pending at the time of the motion to quash. Second, the subpoena failed to comply with Practice Book § 13-27(a), which requires notice be given to all parties to the action or each party's attorney and that said notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition. Finally, the defendant claimed that the subpoena sought irrelevant, overly broad and unduly burdensome information which could not possibly lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Def. Mot. To Quash (# 130). The defendant also claimed that the intent of the deposition notice was to harass the defendant and not to seek relevant information that would be beneficial to the plaintiff's case. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's noticing of the deposition and attendant document requests were vexatious and intended to harass and embarrass the defendant. Based on the foregoing, the defendant requested the court to grant the motion to quash. Since the filing of the plaintiff's motion to compel and the defendant's motion to quash, the court ruled on the motion to dismiss (# 106.30) denying the motion as to counts one through ten, and granting it as to count eleven which contained allegations of slander and libel. Subsequent to the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, and in response to the defendant's motion for reargument/reconsideration (# 148) of the court's ruling on the defendant's motion for protective order (# 115.10) regarding discovery requests from the plaintiff, the court conducted an exhaustive review of the plaintiff's amended complaint, interrogatories, request for production and request for admissions, and issued a twenty-nine-page ruling on said motion for protective order on October 9, 2018 (# 115.40). The court's ruling on October 9, 2018, dealt with many of the items set forth in plaintiff's Schedule A and Amended Schedule A attached to the plaintiff's subpoena which are now the subject of the present motion to quash. The court heard oral argument on the defendant's motion to quash (# 130) at short calendar on December 17, 2017. II DISCUSSION Practice Book § 13-2 provides in relevant part that "[i]n any civil action ... where the judicial authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party may obtain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books, documents and electronically stored information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not privileged, whether the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, and which are within the knowledge, possession or power of the party or person to whom the discovery is addressed. Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure. It shall not be ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ..." *2 "Our rules of discovery are meant to serve the ends of justice by `facilitating an intensive search for the truth through accuracy and fairness, provid[ing] procedural mechanisms designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' (Citations omitted.) Picketts v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 508, 576 A.2d 518 (1990). Practice Book § 13-5 states in relevant part: "Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specific terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters ..." Under Practice Book § 13-5 the party seeking the protective order is required to show good cause. The courts have defined good cause as "a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action." Welch v. Welch, supra, 48 Conn.Sup. 19, 828 A.2d 707 [34 Conn. L. Rptr. 171] (2003). "Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Id. at 20. "Whether or not `good cause' exists for entry of a protective order must depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case." Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-88352383-S (February 11, 1992, Schaller, J.) [6 Conn. L. Rptr. 3]. "To determine whether good cause exists, courts balance `the need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled.' " In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F.Sup.2d 385, 413-16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) ). Practice Book § 13-28(c) states, in relevant part: "A subpoena issued for the taking of a deposition may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents or tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Sections 13-2 through 13-5." Practice Book § 13-28(e) states in relevant part: "The court in which the cause is pending ... may, upon motion made promptly and, in any event, at or before the time for compliance specified in a subpoena authorized by subsection (b) of this section, (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or if it seeks the production of materials not subject to production under the provisions of subsection (c) of this section ..." "A motion to quash may be granted when a subpoena is `unreasonable and oppressive,' or `if it seeks the production of materials not subject to production' within the scope permitted by Practice Book §§ 13-2 through 13-5. Practice Book § 13-28(c) and (e). Whether to grant a motion to quash is discretionary. Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, 116 Conn.App. 663, 670, 672, 975 A.2d 1282, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 939, 980 A.2d 916 (2009). `Any request for information that does not directly relate to legitimate issues that may arise in the course of the criminal prosecution ought to be denied.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Erickson, 297 Conn. 164, 177, 997 A.2d 480 (2010). The court should be even more cautious in civil cases where a person's liberty is not at stake. See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 58-60, 459 A.2d 503 (1983) (trial court has discretion to limit discovery in civil actions where the disclosure sought is outside the scope permitted by Practice Book § 13-2, including when it would not be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action, when it is immaterial or privileged, when it is not within the disclosing party's knowledge, possession or power, or when the requesting party is in an equal or better position to obtain the information on its own) ... *3 "Of course, when a plaintiff asserts a claim the defendant is permitted to conduct reasonable discovery regarding that claim ... See Irizarry v. M.L. Moskowitz & Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-08-5007501-S (January 12, 2012), citing Ramos v. Ramos, 80 Conn.App. 276, 283, 835 A.2d 62 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). McClellan v. William W. Backus Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. KNLCV-13-6016702-S (June 13, 2014, Cole-Chu, J.) [58 Conn. L. Rptr. 295]. Likewise, as this court previously noted, `[d]iscovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in ... the prosecution ... of the action ...' Practice Book § 13-2." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Talbot v. Quinnipiac University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-146048886-S (November 28, 2014, Wilson, J.) [59 Conn. L. Rptr. 380]. Much of the information contained in plaintiff's Schedule A and Amended Schedule A, is covered by this court's October 9, 2018 ruling (# 115.40) on defendant's motion for protective order (# 115). The court during oral argument on the present motion to quash cautioned both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel that counsel should be mindful of the court's previous ruling regarding these discovery matters and that counsel shall comply with said ruling and order. The court considers repeated requests, without good cause, by the plaintiff for information the court previously ruled protected pursuant to its order, or an objection by the defendant to information which the court ruled discoverable, as evidence of noncompliance with the court's order. Accordingly, the court cautions that such conduct by counsel on both sides will result in sanctions. In other words, should the court again be faced with having to rule on discovery already covered by its October 9, 2018 ruling and order, counsel will be subject to sanctions. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Having reviewed plaintiff's Amended Schedule A attached to his subpoena, and defendant's motion to quash, and having heard the parties' arguments the court rules as follows regarding same: 1. a, c, and d. GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to amend its request to comply with this court's October 9, 2018 ruling. See, Kuselius v. Niederkohr, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-175039209-S (October 9, 2018, Wilson, J.). e and f are GRANTED until further order of the court. g. GRANTED pursuant to the court's October 9, 2018 ruling on requests for production # 29 and Kuselius v. Niederkohr, 2018 WL 7107306, at *1-4 (Conn.Super., 2018) Bonk v. Iaropoli, 1998 WL 457960, at *1-2 (Conn.Super.,1998) EXHIBIT A