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COMMONWEALTH
AL
OF MASSACHUSETTS
DOCKET NO
DY cvadS
Kharee Caswell
PLAINTIFF(S) (PRINT NAME CLEARLY)
vs
COMPLAINT
INTHE OFFICE OF THE
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CLERK OF COURTS
‘FOR THE COUNTY CF MIDDLESEX
DEFENDANT
(S) (PRINT NAME CLEARLY)
APR 14 2024
PARTIES MO E Yl QS
tof CLERK. seed
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Street city or Town
in the County of Norftk Cunty
2) Defendant(s) reside at Tnfin-ty_ Mot Campy
in the County of PH Bx b9S 3 Arantlin TA 271064, 5008
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Page 2
-_-- —_-— -
DATED: ore Lys DI14 SIGNED UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY.
Lila LOT
Signature of Plaintiff(s)
Mr. Kharee Criswell
High Street #28
Brookline, Ma 02445
(617) 331-2990
April 9th 2024
INFINITI of NORWOOD _ Belcher Fritzgerald LLP Middlesex Superior Court
866 Providence Hwy 2 Oliver Street Suite 302 200 Tradecenter Drive 2nd Floor
Norwood, MA 02062 Boston, MA 02110 Woburn, MA 01801
(781) 329-3040 % Clerk Magistrate Civil Courts
FIRST-CLASS MAIL IN PERSON
RE: Civil Action No. 93(A) Motion
Dear Mrs. CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD,
Please find my Motion (Plaintiff) for 93(A) and Memorandum of Law in support, Notice of Intent to File,
which as filed with the Court, and Affirdavit.
Dispite having recieved your response in the past, based on rules of 93(A) demands letter, I agree to have
conference with your office for the parties involved, to see if we can resolve the issues before a ruling
made by the court if you wish to settle.
Thank you.
The Plaintiff,
Kharee Criswell
Kharee Criswell
Kharee I Criswell
CC: Norfolk Superior Court
DELIVERED IN PERSON BY PLAINTIFF
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
-NORFOLKss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A) MOTION
KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff
Vv.
INFINITI NORWOOD/NFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant
PLAIN’ °S NOTICE OF MOTION 93(A) P' IT TO ERIOR COURT RUL!
NOW COMES the Plaintiif, Kharee Criswell, by and through himself (W/out Counsel), who hereby
notifies this Honorable Court that pursuant to Rule 93(A), the Plaintiff has served upon the Defendant it’s
Motion 93(A) and the Plaintiff’s intends to file said Motion with the Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
The Plaintiff,
By himself, Kharee Criswell
22 High Street #28
Brookline, Ma 02445
617-331-2990
Blacklawparalegals@ gmail.com
Date: April 9th, 2024
Certificate of Service
I, Kharee I. Criswell, hereby certify that on April 9th, 2024, I caused to be served a true & accurate copy
of the forgoing Notice of Intent upon the Defendant in person, to:
CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD, Esq.,
Belcher Fitzgerald LLP
2 Oliver Street
Boston, Ma 02110
617-368-6890
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
MIDDLESEX;ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A)
KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff
Vv.
INFINITI NORWOOD/INFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant
E 93(A)Nt IF (CE OF PLAINTIFF MOTION AND MEM: OF LAW
Pursuant to Superior Court 93(A) Motion, this hereby serves as Notice that this day Plaintiffs Motion and
Memorandum of Law in support thereof was served on the Defendants in person to the following:
Respectfully submitted,
The Plaintiff,
Kharee Criswell
By himself
Dated: April 1st, 2024
Ahad:
Kharee I.Criswell
22 High Street #28
Brookline, Ma 02445
Certificate of Service
Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 93(A), I, Kharee Criswell, hereby certify that on the Ist, day of April
2024, I served a copy of the Plaintiff's Rule 9E Notice upon the Defendants by causing a copy to be sent
to the Defendant’s office in person by the Plaintiff:
CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD, Esgq.,
Belcher Fitzgerald LLP
2 Oliver Street
Boston, Ma 02110
617-368-6890
MIDDLESEX,ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A) MOTION
KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff
V.
INFINITI NORWOOD/NFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant
MO AND A MORA NDUM OF THE PLAINTIFF’: ON IN
(GHTS TO APP! ROPRIATE IMMER‘
Under the provision of Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A, Section 9, I hereby make written
demand for relief as outlined in that statue:
Chapter 93A; Section 9 of Massachusetts General Laws B rovides remedies fo r consumers who
29 4
are dama: ed b ompan ‘air methods of compe nf: or d ptive cis 0
of any t "1. It provides a right of action to y person,
other than one involved in trade or commerce under Section 11, who has been injured by any
method, act or practice declared unlawful by Chapter 93A, Section 2 or certain other statutes2.
The court must award up to three but not less than two times the amount of actual damages if the
court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of
section two.
On or about (10-17-23), the following unfair or deceptive act occurred:
“I went into Infiniti Norwood, to have the softwear in my TCM (PCM) updated, in order that my car could
drive in it’s normal capacity. {I had a new TCM installed along with (4) output censors}. I had went into
the Infiniti dealership in Norwood with those (4) output censors present, and thus, my vehicle would
remain in 3rd gear and unable to properly perform pass 60mph without the TCM softwear being updated.
Thus, i was contacted by the mechanic at Infiniti and infomed that my computer softwear was updated,
and vehicle ready for pic up. Said mechanic also informed me that i needed a new transmission, and
offered to purchase & install a new transmission, for approximately 6k. I would have had Infiniti
Norwood, to do the entire install of the new TCM & new Censors, however, Infiniti of Norwood denied me
this service, so i choose the later. I posted a complaint of this unlawful act of refusing me service on
Carfacts & the Infiniti web site which infuriated their higher ups in the dealership. However, to my dismay
when i finally reached my vehicle i seen the check engine light was on, and upon inspection i come to
learn that i still have the same (4) codes present when i delivered the vehicle. Which meant that my TCM
could not have been updated; for the codes still being present made that rendering impossible. For the
codes being present means that my car is still stuck in 3rd gear. And therefore, the mechanic’s
intentionally lied, took my money & refused to give me service (Fraud). This is in retaliation of me
complaining against Infiniti Norwood in the past!!”
Massachusetts High Court Expands Retaliation Protection
By Gregory Keating, Carie Torrence on May 20, 2011
A new Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision expands the scope of potential retaliation claims
under the state's discrimination and retaliation statute, the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act.
In a case with a long and tortured history, Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 254 (2011), the court
concluded that an ex-employee can bring a retaliation claim against a former employer for actions taken
after the termination of the employer- employee relationship, and that instituting baseless litigation
against an ex-employee can serve as the basis for a retaliation claim. Kimberly Schive worked for Psy-Ed
Corporation from 1993 until 1996, when her position was eliminated in a corporate restructuring.
Following her termination, Schive, who is deaf, filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Psy-Ed's CEO, Joseph Valenzano, requested that another
corporate officer (the original co-founder of the company), Stanley Klein, sign an affidavit supporting
Psy-Ed's denial of Schive's allegations. Klein reluctantly signed the affidavit in June 1997. Later, Klein
apparently had a change of heart. In September 1999, Valenzano and the company learned that Klein had
signed a second affidavit in support of Schive's charge. In response, Psy-Ed refused to make additional
payments to Klein that had been promised under a separation agreement. In December 1999, the MCAD
issued a probable cause finding in favor of Schive on her discrimination claim. Two weeks later, Psy-Ed
and Valenzano filed a complaint against Klein and Schive alleging defamation, civil conspiracy and
tortious interference with contractual and business relations. In response, Schive filed a second MCAD
charge and a counterclaim alleging retaliation against Psy-Ed. In 2002, Klein filed a separate complaint
against Psy-Ed and Valenzano alleging retaliation. The court found that the retaliation claim was not
actionable because Klein had not been employed for more than two years when the alleged adverse action
took place.
Supreme Judicial Court's Decision
In parsing the myriad of claims and counterclaims between Schive, Phys-Ed, and Valenzano, the court
first addressed whether an employer's post-employment actions against a former employee could violate
lassachusetts Fair Emplo: ent Practices A‘ 51B. Reading Section
", . *
of Chapter 151B (it i ischarge, expel or othe
against a son " ing right gu: ed under hapter 15: and of the
statute (it is unlawful for “any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with such other person"
from exercising rights under Chapter 151B), the court reasoned that the statute did not require that an
employer- employee relationship exist "at the time of the wrongful conduct, or at any other time."
Accordingly, the court held that the statute's retaliation protections extended to former employees. The
court next considered whether the lawsuit filed against Schive could serve as the predicate "adverse
action" for her retaliation charge. Although the court recognized that Massachusetts citizens have state
and federal constitutional rights to seek judicial resolution of disputes, the court distinguished sham
and/or baseless lawsuits that are not constitutionally protected. The court concluded that filing baseless or
sham litigation, as opposed to "reasonably based but unsuccessful lawsuits," could thus serve as the
adverse action" sufficient to support a claim for unlawful retaliation. Courts in other jurisdictions have
reached a similar conclusion. Relying on the trial court's findings that: (1) the claims brought against
Schive were objectively baseless because Psy-Ed and Valenzano failed to present any evidence of
damages; (2) Psy-Ed and Valenzano brought the action not to vindicate the alleged defamation, but
instead to "retry" Schive's MCAD charge; and (3) there was a mere two-week gap between the MCAD's
probable cause finding and the commencement of the company's action against Schive and Klein, the
Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial court's finding that Psy-Ed and Valenzano brought the
lawsuit to retaliate against Schive for her protected activity and affirmed the award in favor of Schive on
her retaliation claims.
Lessons for Employers
Retaliation claims are in vogue nationwide. Plaintiffs' attorneys favor them because they very often boil
down to factual disputes that must go to a jury. Because an employee may prevail on a retaliation count
without a finding of discrimination, retaliation claims are particularly problematic for employers. The
Psy-Ed ruling opens the door to new types of retaliation claims against Massachusetts employers based on
alleged conduct that occurs long after the end of the employment relationship. These post-termination
retaliation claims are not limited to instituting legal action against a former employee who filed a charge
with the MCAD. Employers could also be subject to post-termination retaliation claims for providing a
negative job reference, reporting misconduct to a regulatory or licensing agency, or informing a former
employee's new or prospective employer about the former employee's protected activity. These claims
also arise in situations where a former employee applies for reemployment, often by submitting a résumé
or application online and receiving an automated response indicating that the company will retain the
application and consider the former employee for appropriate openings as they become available. If the
company then does not consider the former employee for subsequent open positions, a claim could follow.
To protect against these claims, we recommend that employers:
Develop and implement strong anti-retaliation policies.
Educate all managers and supervisors that it is illegal to blacklist or retaliate against a former employee.
Consider adopting a uniform policy that the company will not provide any information to a subsequent
employer other than the position held by an employee and his or her dates of service. At a minimum, a
consistent amount of information should be given in response to inquiries by or about former employees.
lassachusetts General aws Chapter 2 Chi 93”) stat it “Unfair dsof
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby declared unlawful”1234. This means that numerous acts and practices can serve as the basis
for a suit alleging a violation of c. 93A1. For example, according to Chapter 93A, Section 2, a
landlord is not allowed to force entry into the property without a court order.
As a result of this unfair or deceptive act or practice, I suffered injury or loss of money as follows:
“T have lost a great portion of my dignity, in humiliation and the sheer shame of not being able to
function with my vehicle in letting down my siblings/children. Also the lost of my good credit score,
insurance and vehicle, also the debt that i still owe. Going into major debt, with the bank, creditors,
friends and family”.
Therefore, I hereby demand the following relief: $250,000 US currency & Vehicle
“Infiniti Norwood, owes me financial relief for their discrimative behavior towards me. I know that the
payment for damages here, which is being sought is the minimal amount for all the infractions done to me.
When Infiniti Norwood had honest mechanics I always gave them positive reviews; however, since
“Anthony Tippett”, became the go to man, the services that i have received have been poor. I let him runa
entire diagnostics on my vehicle, he gave me a few diagnostic’s that were very expensive, and
disingenuous. (Im going to spare you of the details at this moment, only due to the fact that its minor
compared to the bigger infractions). However, I had to go to local mechanics for additional diagnostics,
for this very same reason however, i went to Anthony in confidence to my own dismay. For it was the
secretary (Caucasain Female) & Anthony Tippett who refused to give me service on recommendation of
higher up at Infiniti Norwood (Policy). The actual issue could have been alleviated if “Anthony” didnt
deny me service in the first place. Todate Anthony via Infiniti Norwood, as refused me service (3x) - and
after i put in complaints in with Infiniti Coorperate, online and with Carfacts being that Infiniti refused to
respond to my online complaints - “Anthony”, calls me personally to continue to heckle me and
misinform, in an attempt to cover up for his fellow infiniti personnel. For Infiniti Coorperate made
attempts to get the car reserviced, after i was frauded out of my money. Because i had problems with them
in the past i knew to go to a mechanic prior to having my vehicle serviced by them, out of the fear of this
type of issue; in order that i ensure fair treatment. So when i seen the same (4) codes present, i knew that
the softwear wasnt updated, and i was frauded out of my money, in retaliation of my complaining, for the
higher ups were familiar with who i am, from prior transactions. Had the mechanic informed me that
“The softwear couldnt be updated, and or that they provided new codes on the worksheet, inorder to show
that my issue was bigger then the (4) initial codes that i paid to get serviced, i could of walked away and
or choose to sell Infiniti Norwood my vehicle like they were asking after they frauded me”.
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, gives you the opportunity to make a good faith response to
this letter within thirty (30) days. Your failure to do so-could subject you to triple damages, attorney fees
and costs if i decide to institute legal action.
“Any person receiving such a demand for relief who, within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of the
demand for relief, makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any
subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning its rejection and thereby limit any
recovery to the relief tendered if the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the
injury actually suffered by the petitioner”.
General Law - Part I, Title XV, Chapter 93A, Section 9
Sincerely,
LUA.
Khare€ Criswell
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day a true copy of the above document was served upon the attorney
of record for each party by mail, postage prepaid. Dated: April 9th 2024
(Pro’se)
Consumers have the right to file a complaint if they feel as though a licensee or unlicensed individual has
violated the standards of professional conduct. In cases where it can be proven that a licensee or
unlicensed individual or business has violated an applicable statute or regulation or is not safely practicing
their trade or profession, DOL may open a complaint and conduct an investigation in coordination with
the appropriate board of registration. Grounds for complaints may include, among other things, failure to
adhere to standards of practice, fraud, fraudulent procurement of a license, misuse of client funds or
records, negligence, practice while impaired by alcohol or drugs, sexual misconduct, and unlicensed
practice.
FACTS:
HISTORY OF THE CONSUMER:
My name is Kharee Criswell, and im a victim of fraud on behalf of Infiniti Norwood. As a proud member
of Infiniti Norwood, I always brought my vehicle to be serviced by this dealership. I always had giving
that dealership positive reviews, while “Nigel Silver’? was head mechanic. When “Anthony Tippet”,
stepped into the picture, things changed for the worst. I allowed Mr Tippet to run a diagnostic test on my
car, and the diagnostic test came back with several costly issues, one of which was for a strut on the back
left wheel; and I brought my vehicle to another local mechanic who sprayed WD40 on the strut that was a
bit molded, and the strut opened back up, and was replaced for $10 dollars, while “Anthony”, had that job
costing me $800 dollars to remedy. Thus, it was at that moment I made a personal affirmation that I would
allow that dealership nor mechanic the right to run anymore diagnostic testing on my vehicle. Inside I also
felt that their diagnostic testing was a rouse toget customers to pay out unnecessary cost, in the name of
the upkeep of their vehicles, but, not necessarily interchangeable with the proper maintenance. Therefore,
from that date forward, I would only bring my vehicle to be serviced, after I got the opinion of another
mechanic, because I couldnt trust their opinions or advice. Out of the fear of being frauded, I always deal
with Infiniti Norwood, with extreme caution. So I got my personal mechanic did a diagnostic on my
vehicle, and pulled up (4) Codes, because the check engine light came on. I had (4) codes - (2)
permanent and all codes read P0720.
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Despite not desiring too, I initially reached out to Infiniti in attempts to get my car fixed. My regular
mechanic couldnt fix the issue, because he was leaving the U.S. and wouldnt be back for several months,
so I called Infiniti and tried to get my car fixed. When I called Infiniti and asked “Mr. Tippet”, could he fix
my Sensors and TCM, I was told that Infiniti recommends (Policy): “If they open the transmission, they
would want to replace it. And he went on further telling me that he wanted to run a diagnostics test on my
vehicle, in order to properly diagnose the issue, before ever trying to fix it. The problem I had with this is
that, those test I had already ran on my vehicle by a licensed mechanic. (So there was no need to) I also
didnt want my time wasted by “Mr. Tippet”, being that he had already giving me a faulty diagnosis. So I
made another attempt toget my car fixed and was told again that its their policy to replace and not open up
the transmission. So I personally called “Mr. Tippet”, and sent him a email informing if he would be
decent enough for him to replace the out PCM (TCM), and that I would have another mechanic replace
the (4) Speed Senors, and PCM. Infiniti though denying me, I got upset, and left a harsh review on their
website, letting the customers know that they are discrimitative in their practices, hustlers and adamantly
denying me a long standing, it’s customer service’s. Later, one of the managers replied to my review, and
still offered me nothing in return. However, “Mr. Tippet”, reached back out and agreed to replace the
outside PCM, and he did and I went to get the other parts serviced by another mechanic. When the
mechanic I went to could not update my PCM softwear I called back to Infiniti, in order to see if they can
update the softwear in my vehicle to which they obliged.
THE CRIME:
I brought my car in their to Infiniti Norwood to be serviced and was frauded out of my money & my
vehicle never fixed. I brought my 2015/QS0 in there to have a software update, because i recently got a
new piece’s installed into the vehicle (TCM) - and this required a software update, in order to remove the
(4) codes that were present. I was texted message from the mechanic that serviced the vehicle, him
informing me that my vehicle had been serviced/updated and to come pick it up. The same mechanic also
infomed me (Infiniti tradition) that i also needed a new transmission and that he could find me a new one,
and install a new transmission for the price of 6,500 dollars. I told him no thank you, and proceeded to pic
my vehicle up. Once i made it to my vehicle and got inside I noticed that my check engine light was still
on; so i put a code censor on the car in order to detect the issue, and the same original codes were present.
I went back into the dealership to speak with Antony Tippit to find out why the same (4) codes were
present, [after I received a message that my PCM had been updated] and he informed me that another
mechanic serviced the vehicle, and there was nothing that he could personally do. So I drove my car to the
adjacent dealership Mercury dealership, in order to drive my car up & down their lot for 25 mins in order
to get my vehicle to go into gear, so that i could drive it home. Again, this is not the first run in that I had
with Infiniti Norwoood, about my car. For several months I had to file complaints with Infiniti Cooperate,
and left reviews on their personal website, also with Infiniti Cooperate concerning the poor services at
Infiniti Norwood. For this same dealership had also refused me service in the past, due to discrimitive
practices. So I also feel that my car wasnt serived due to this same reason, thus, the latest transaction is
the result of retaliation. For the mechanic who filled the service sheet, had also said (4) codes were
present, not identifying any “New”, transmission codes that would indicate a very new issue that none of
us knew existed. No new codes meant, my car wasnt serviced at all. The ignorant lawyer leaned on this
faulty information in her response, however, not understanding that in order for their to be more pertinent
transmission issues, such as the entire transmission needed to be replaced, needed to be accompanied with
codes with the likes of “P0715 or P0500”, and P1734-00 7GR INCORRECT RATIO. None of the last
(3) codes were present, thus, my issue was simply a system update.
“RETALIATION”:
Paragraph (a) of § 36.206 provides that no private entity or public entity shall
discriminate against any individual because that individual has exercised his or her right
to oppose any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under the Act or this part.
Because i had problems with them in the past i stay on online blogs congerning my car and the latest
updates to keep the car functioning at its most optimal levels. My car only had (4) codes, so I knew that
the issue I had were only related to my valve body, and not necessarily my entire transmission. My
personal mechanic’s, also those with online content, show other mechanics step by step how to fix and
install new software. And in my case I had (4) codes - (2) permanent. The (2) Permanent were software
related codes, pertaining to the TCM being stuck in 3rd gear, as to why the car couldnt shift out of 3rd
gear without a software update (Cant drive pass 60 MPH); while the out (2) output censors pertain to the
censors surrounding the (TCM): Speed Sensors, which I had all (4) replaced. So in total I had all (4)
output censors replaced alongside the PCM outside & Inside in order to illiminate the entire issue.
‘
So once I got my car back from the dealership, and seen the check engine still light on, I knew that they
intentionally lied about fixing my car, and just out right scammed me for my money; possibly in hopes
that I would bye into their false narrative, and give them 6k and or they intentionally disregarded my
services knowing that it was me who made complaints in the past; either way they never updated my cars
software like they claimed via text or else there would exist a new code for another part of the
transmission. What sensor would cause transmission problems? A failing transmission position sensor
may no longer send the right signals to the Powertrain Control Module, or PCM (TCM). Without signals
from the position sensor, the PCM will no longer know when to shift the transmission's gears out of park
into a moving gear. When a Transmission shifts into the wrong gear, and refuses to function at all, these
codes would be P1734-00 7GR INCORRECT RATIO - Sometimes accompanied by P0715 or P0500.
My VEHICLES codes were only P0720 - What is the code P0720 on Infiniti Q50 transmission? The
P0720 is an OBD code related to the workings and overall condition of the output speed sensor circuit.
The Powertrain Control Module (PCM/TCM) in this particular circuit works by gathering a signal from
the output speed sensor to assess and input the right shift strategy to the car's transmission. What this
simply means is that, if there existed other issues with my transmission as claimed by said mechanic at
Infiniti Norwood, there assessment, would of gave additional codes to give light to the exact
non-functioning issue; in which case they would of put that code on an existing work order sheet, in order
to show why the cars software couldnt be updated due to that existing issue (code); to which they never
gave me nor presented. However, by text, they informed me that my cars softwear was updated. Thus, my
software wasnt updated, and was thereby scammed; which lead to me not being able to keep up my
payments, therefore, no longer being able to use vehicle or keep my vehicle. Infiniti’s attorney ignorantly
(CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD) that they Inifiinti had informed me that the updating of the cars PCM’s
softwear may not remedy the issue, to which i agree, if Inifiniti claimed that the system could not be
updated, because they found new codes, after clearing the old existing codes, however, there were no new
codes, and only the old existing codes present, MEANING it was a pure fabrication, that my PCM system
was updated, when the old codes were still present. This means that the mechanics department
contradicted themselves by giving me (2) different accounts stating (2) different things!
Hence, Infiniti Norwood is at fault of my vehicle destablization’s, and subsequent forfeiture. If they
would of fixed my car i would of been able to drive and keep my car; their frauding me out of my money,
put me in a inadequate position (Inferior). So they are at fault of me inquiring debt, and losing my vehicle
over their deceptive & fraudulent practices, my suffering and should not have their state license updated
being that they are intentionally committing larceny on their customers, and denying services, when they
are required by law to honor their customers. Updating my TCM’s software would of allowed me to
operate my vehicle without interference. By misinforming me & being flatout dishonest they made me
loose my vehicle and scammed me out of my finances. I pray that you dont allow them to continue to
fraud other customers and intentionally deny services to other people, like myself who are disabled and in
a protected classes ..
The law does not define any specific business actions that violate the law; rather it states
that “unfair or deceptive practices” are illegal. Although each case is judged on its own
merits, some examples of unfair or deceptive practices that might fall under Chapter
93A would be when:
e A business charges a consumer higher rates than the marked, published or advertised
price.
The refund/return policy is not clearly posted where it can be readily noticed and
understood.
A business fails to tell you relevant information regarding your product or service or
misleads you in any way.
A business does not meet its warranty agreement.
A business uses "Bait and Switch" advertising - a technique by which the seller
advertises an item for sale at a particularly good price or terms but does not really
want to sell that item. The seller discourages the purchase of the advertised item and
instead tries to convince the buyer to purchase a different item for a higher price or on
less favorable terms.
“INFINITI CORPORATE”
“After Imade several attempts to get into contact with Infiniti’s Cooperate Office, I was contacted via
email & phone by Infiniti representatives, and Nissan Investigations Department. Initially Infiniti
Coorperate made attempts to get the car reserviced, after i was frauded out of my money, and victimized.
To my dismay Anthony Tippet, called me back trying to argue with me that the (4) common codes that I
had were codes indicating a much greater issue; to which I told him that he was misinforming me, and
that I will bring them to court if he refuses to reservice the vehicle properly. He told me that he can no
longer have any conversation, once legal terms are apart of the conversation, thus, also refusing to fix my
vehicle”. (After Cooperate informed them to reservice the vehicle).
What happens if a business violates the Consumer Protection Law?
If a consumer believes a business has violated the Consumer Protection Law and engaged in
some sort of unfair or deceptive practice and after attempting to resolve the complaint with
the merchant informally, he/she may decide to take legal action. As a general matter,
consumer suing under law must demonstrate the following to prove the claim:
That the consumer sent a detailed 30-day demand letter that outlines the complaint,
the harm suffered, and the demanded relief.
That he or she is a “consumer” plaintiff - someone engaging in commerce primarily
for personal, family or household purposes;
That the defendant’s actions were “unfair” or “deceptive;” and
That these actions resulted in a “loss of money or property, real or personal” to that
consumer.
A court can award a consumer plaintiff who proves the above compensatory or actual
damages, sometimes as much as double or treble (triple) damages if the plaintiff can prove
(1) the defendant willfully and knowingly violated Chapter 93A or (2) the defendant refused
to grant relief in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that his acts violated Chapter
ARGUMENTS:
Commonwealth y. Venturcap Inv. Group V, 1784C V03091-BLS1, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 13
(Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 17, 2020) Partial summary judgment granted for the Commonwealth where
defendants’ sales practice undeniably had the capacity to mislead consumers in their decision to purchase
used motor vehicles from defendants in violation of Chapter 93A.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts moved for partial summary judgment against defendants for
unfairly and deceptively structured sales transactions with consumers that defendants allegedly knew, or
should have known, were “doomed to fail.” Defendants ran a used auto sale lot and financed all of their
car sales through their own in-house lender, for the identical sales price of approximately $12,000. The
allegedly unfair or deceptive practices included advertising that the dealership only closed deals that were
“affordable” and “designed for success” where defendants’ business records demonstrated that consumers
who were approved for loans could not or would not likely be able to afford the required monthly
payments. Based on the evidence and the undisputed material facts, the court had no difficulty concluding
that defendants violated Chapter 93A by falsely representing to consumers that it only entered into sales
transactions that were affordable and designed for customer success, when data collected from the
consumer bore little relation to the customer’s actual financial situation and could not reasonably be
expected to provide an accurate assessment of the consumers’ ability to purchase a used car.
Healy v. G/J Towing, Inc., SUCV2017-01665-BLS2, 2019 LEXIS 1225 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Dec. 18,
2019) Apparent overcharge to motor vehicle owner by towing company could “rise to the level of”
Chapter 93A, Section 9 violation.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants (who operate a towing business in Revere) charged motor vehicle owners
towed in Revere more than city ordinance and related statutes allowed, which violated Chapter 93A,
Section 9. The court addressed and denied plaintiff’s third motion for class certification, concluding it was
based on an overly broad class definition, a lack of commonality, and inadequacy of class counsel.
Although it denied class certification, the court noted that plaintiff appeared to have a meritorious Chapter
93A claim. Pursuant to defendants’ contract with the City of Revere, defendants may have overcharged
plaintiff for towing services, based on the discrepancy between what they actually charged plaintiff and
what they were allowed to charge motor vehicle owners. According to the court, based on those facts,
plaintiff “clearly has a claim against the defendants that could even rise to the level of a c. 93A violation.”
Sapir v. Dispatch Techs., 1984C V00666-BLS1, 2019 Mass. Super. LEXIS 1218 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Dec.
4, 2019) Chapter 93A claim failed as a matter of law because Chapter 93A does not apply to disputes
among shareholders of a close corporation.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants, directors of a closely held corporation, fraudulently induced him to sell
back his company shares by misrepresenting to him facts related to the company’s operations and
financial status. As to plaintiff’s claims of negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, Chapter
93A violation, and fraudulent inducement against two of the four defendants, the court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s Chapter 93A claim failed as a matter of law. Chapter 93A does
not apply to disputes arising among shareholders in a close corporation because the relationship between
such shareholders is not deemed a “commercial” one where Chapter 93A would apply.
AG v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1984-CV-02597-BLS1, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Jan. 16, 2020) Court enforces Massachusetts attorney general investigatory powers under Chapter 93A.
In this case, the court addressed a petition to compel defendant to comply with a civil investigative
demand (CID) filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General (AG). The AG issued the CID under Chapter
93A, § 6 and petitioned to enforce the CID under Chapter 93A, § 7. The CID was issued in connection
with the AG’s investigation into whether third-party applications (apps) and app developers improperly
acquired or misused the private information of defendant’s users. Defendant objected to several requests
in the CID based on privilege grounds, which prompted the AG’s filing. The court granted the AG’s
petition to compel compliance with the CID. In doing so, the court noted that a receiving person who
objects to a CID bears a “heavy burden” to show “good cause” why it should not be compelled to comply.
In this context, according to the court, “good cause” means that the receiving party must demonstrate that
the AG is “act[ing] arbitrarily or capriciously or that the information sought is plainly irrelevant.” Based
on the court’s analysis of the asserted privileges, the court compelled production of some of the
information sought by the AG, but allowed the defendant to provide a detailed privilege log concerning
specific information withheld so that the AG and the court, if appropriate, could further assess the
defendant’s privilege claims.
Massachusetts District Court/Appellate Division
Footwear Tech Inc. v. Feelgoodz LLC, 1982CV01178, 2020 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 1 (Mass. Sup.
Ct., Jan. 21, 2020) A breach of contract intended to secure unbargained for benefits (breach of contract
plus) may give rise to Chapter 93A liability.
Plaintiff, a footwear manufacturer and distributor, alleged it was the intended beneficiary of a contract
between defendants, who were also engaged in the footwear business, and that defendants breached the
contract by circumventing plaintiff and dealing directly with one another. Plaintiff brought claims for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Chapter
93A, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Defendants filed motions to dismiss
on all counts. As to Chapter 93A, the court declined to dismiss. While acknowledging the longstanding
principle that a breach of contract, standing alone, does not violate Chapter 93A, the court noted that 93A
liability may attach where “the breach [of contract is]...knowing and intended to secure unbargained for
benefits to the detriment of the other party.” The court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged defendants
engaged in conduct that went beyond a mere breach of conduct. Specifically, defendants allegedly
circumvented, froze out, and ultimately terminated their relationship with plaintiff “to further their own
pecuniary interests and that plaintiff suffered harm as a result.”
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Herbert v. Vantage Travel Service, Inc., No. 17-CV-10922-DJC, 2020 WL 1190992, at *1 (D. Mass.
March 12, 2020) Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt Chapter 93A because 93A claim did not relate
to the price, route, or service of air transportation.
Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendant alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of common law warranties, negligent
misrepresentation and a violation of Chapter 93A, § 9, related to river cruise travel packages that plaintiffs
purchased from defendant. With respect to plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim, the threshold issue the court
determined was whether the claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713,
et seq. The court held that the defendant was an “indirect air carrier” under the Deregulation Act because
it was in the business of booking flight transportation as part of its tour packages. The court held
plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim did not relate to the price, route, or service of air transportation and
therefore, the claim was not preempted by the Deregulation Act.
The court analyzed the merits of plaintiffs’ three Chapter 93A violations: (1) the defendant
misrepresented on its website that it owned and operated the MS River Voyager, which violated 940
C.MLR. §§ 15.03(2), 15.04(2)(b) & 3.16(2) and was otherwise deceptive; (2) after the MS River
Voyager was unable to continue the trip, defendant failed to offer plaintiffs their choice of
alternatives enumerated under 940 C.M.R. § 15.06; and (3) the disclaimer provision was not “clear
and conspicuous” and therefore, unfair and deceptive. The court noted that the first two bases
created a per se violation of Chapter 93A.
As to the first violation, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the alleged misrepresentation
that the MS River Voyager was not owned by the defendant caused the plaintiffs their injury as required
under G.L. c. 93A § 9. As to the second violation, the court held there was a disputed material fact as to
whether the defendant provided “all services” purchased by plaintiffs and denied the parties’ cross
motions for summary judgment. As to the third violation, the court granted the defendant summary
judgment because plaintiffs failed to show that the disclaimer provision violated Chapter 93A.
Conley y. Roseland Residential Trust, C.A. No. 18-10629-WGY, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38275 (D.
Mass. March 5, 2020) Class certification denied and summary judgment granted for defendants where
plaintiffs suffered no injury or loss.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants (a landlord and his billing contractor) wrongly charged plaintiffs (and a
class of similarly situated individuals) for gas and water utilities for nearly four years due to unlawful
sub-metering systems. Plaintiffs alleged that this system did not comply with Massachusetts regulations,
resulting in negligent misrepresentation by defendants and a violation of Chapter 93A. The court denied
class certification, as plaintiffs were not typical and did not adequately represent the class as representative
plaintiffs had no claim of actual pecuniary damages. The court also granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, as plaintiff suffered no injury from the sub-metering arrangement. Specifically, the
court determined that plaintiffs failed to expla
Preview
COMMONWEALTH AL OF MASSACHUSETTS DOCKET NO DY cvadS Kharee Caswell PLAINTIFF(S) (PRINT NAME CLEARLY) vs COMPLAINT INTHE OFFICE OF THE stafinchi: Norwad ) tea’ Motor Compery CLERK OF COURTS ‘FOR THE COUNTY CF MIDDLESEX DEFENDANT (S) (PRINT NAME CLEARLY) APR 14 2024 PARTIES MO E Yl QS tof CLERK. seed 1) Plaintif£(s) reside at Ql Proyjdence. ny Street city or Town in the County of Norftk Cunty 2) Defendant(s) reside at Tnfin-ty_ Mot Campy in the County of PH Bx b9S 3 Arantlin TA 271064, 5008 _FACTS _ 3)__f weet +o how wy Neebicle Sewitrd @ tafinrty Norwork and was Scammed ak of mY mayo Sent 1A Complaints pedv by Nistempting ty hove. iny Vehicle. - + balsa rom Lt a& eMi Cle poperly Corr ZA, oh_oneXT wool 3-40 ny velic] eng check | engine ‘gh ol Ve f v l iE was _determincal that He Same aract todos tet T brews in Shia ty bwe sorvieh, woo mat removed 5.5» may TEM SP talentwas aikyploted. therefore xX uas SCammed art o£ nj amy linaly Tl. agal al Hey joie tein my issue te pa was), 1 ifPemd the BBB od — Ath emul sehepasec ing case cto Pos consent He) letter Page 2 -_-- —_-— - DATED: ore Lys DI14 SIGNED UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY. Lila LOT Signature of Plaintiff(s) Mr. Kharee Criswell High Street #28 Brookline, Ma 02445 (617) 331-2990 April 9th 2024 INFINITI of NORWOOD _ Belcher Fritzgerald LLP Middlesex Superior Court 866 Providence Hwy 2 Oliver Street Suite 302 200 Tradecenter Drive 2nd Floor Norwood, MA 02062 Boston, MA 02110 Woburn, MA 01801 (781) 329-3040 % Clerk Magistrate Civil Courts FIRST-CLASS MAIL IN PERSON RE: Civil Action No. 93(A) Motion Dear Mrs. CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD, Please find my Motion (Plaintiff) for 93(A) and Memorandum of Law in support, Notice of Intent to File, which as filed with the Court, and Affirdavit. Dispite having recieved your response in the past, based on rules of 93(A) demands letter, I agree to have conference with your office for the parties involved, to see if we can resolve the issues before a ruling made by the court if you wish to settle. Thank you. The Plaintiff, Kharee Criswell Kharee Criswell Kharee I Criswell CC: Norfolk Superior Court DELIVERED IN PERSON BY PLAINTIFF Commonwealth of Massachusetts -NORFOLKss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A) MOTION KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff Vv. INFINITI NORWOOD/NFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant PLAIN’ °S NOTICE OF MOTION 93(A) P' IT TO ERIOR COURT RUL! NOW COMES the Plaintiif, Kharee Criswell, by and through himself (W/out Counsel), who hereby notifies this Honorable Court that pursuant to Rule 93(A), the Plaintiff has served upon the Defendant it’s Motion 93(A) and the Plaintiff’s intends to file said Motion with the Court. Respectfully Submitted, The Plaintiff, By himself, Kharee Criswell 22 High Street #28 Brookline, Ma 02445 617-331-2990 Blacklawparalegals@ gmail.com Date: April 9th, 2024 Certificate of Service I, Kharee I. Criswell, hereby certify that on April 9th, 2024, I caused to be served a true & accurate copy of the forgoing Notice of Intent upon the Defendant in person, to: CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD, Esq., Belcher Fitzgerald LLP 2 Oliver Street Boston, Ma 02110 617-368-6890 Commonwealth of Massachusetts MIDDLESEX;ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A) KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff Vv. INFINITI NORWOOD/INFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant E 93(A)Nt IF (CE OF PLAINTIFF MOTION AND MEM: OF LAW Pursuant to Superior Court 93(A) Motion, this hereby serves as Notice that this day Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law in support thereof was served on the Defendants in person to the following: Respectfully submitted, The Plaintiff, Kharee Criswell By himself Dated: April 1st, 2024 Ahad: Kharee I.Criswell 22 High Street #28 Brookline, Ma 02445 Certificate of Service Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 93(A), I, Kharee Criswell, hereby certify that on the Ist, day of April 2024, I served a copy of the Plaintiff's Rule 9E Notice upon the Defendants by causing a copy to be sent to the Defendant’s office in person by the Plaintiff: CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD, Esgq., Belcher Fitzgerald LLP 2 Oliver Street Boston, Ma 02110 617-368-6890 MIDDLESEX,ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPEARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 93(A) MOTION KHAREE CRISWELL, Plaintiff V. INFINITI NORWOOD/NFINITI MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant MO AND A MORA NDUM OF THE PLAINTIFF’: ON IN (GHTS TO APP! ROPRIATE IMMER‘ Under the provision of Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A, Section 9, I hereby make written demand for relief as outlined in that statue: Chapter 93A; Section 9 of Massachusetts General Laws B rovides remedies fo r consumers who 29 4 are dama: ed b ompan ‘air methods of compe nf: or d ptive cis 0 of any t "1. It provides a right of action to y person, other than one involved in trade or commerce under Section 11, who has been injured by any method, act or practice declared unlawful by Chapter 93A, Section 2 or certain other statutes2. The court must award up to three but not less than two times the amount of actual damages if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of section two. On or about (10-17-23), the following unfair or deceptive act occurred: “I went into Infiniti Norwood, to have the softwear in my TCM (PCM) updated, in order that my car could drive in it’s normal capacity. {I had a new TCM installed along with (4) output censors}. I had went into the Infiniti dealership in Norwood with those (4) output censors present, and thus, my vehicle would remain in 3rd gear and unable to properly perform pass 60mph without the TCM softwear being updated. Thus, i was contacted by the mechanic at Infiniti and infomed that my computer softwear was updated, and vehicle ready for pic up. Said mechanic also informed me that i needed a new transmission, and offered to purchase & install a new transmission, for approximately 6k. I would have had Infiniti Norwood, to do the entire install of the new TCM & new Censors, however, Infiniti of Norwood denied me this service, so i choose the later. I posted a complaint of this unlawful act of refusing me service on Carfacts & the Infiniti web site which infuriated their higher ups in the dealership. However, to my dismay when i finally reached my vehicle i seen the check engine light was on, and upon inspection i come to learn that i still have the same (4) codes present when i delivered the vehicle. Which meant that my TCM could not have been updated; for the codes still being present made that rendering impossible. For the codes being present means that my car is still stuck in 3rd gear. And therefore, the mechanic’s intentionally lied, took my money & refused to give me service (Fraud). This is in retaliation of me complaining against Infiniti Norwood in the past!!” Massachusetts High Court Expands Retaliation Protection By Gregory Keating, Carie Torrence on May 20, 2011 A new Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision expands the scope of potential retaliation claims under the state's discrimination and retaliation statute, the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act. In a case with a long and tortured history, Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 254 (2011), the court concluded that an ex-employee can bring a retaliation claim against a former employer for actions taken after the termination of the employer- employee relationship, and that instituting baseless litigation against an ex-employee can serve as the basis for a retaliation claim. Kimberly Schive worked for Psy-Ed Corporation from 1993 until 1996, when her position was eliminated in a corporate restructuring. Following her termination, Schive, who is deaf, filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Psy-Ed's CEO, Joseph Valenzano, requested that another corporate officer (the original co-founder of the company), Stanley Klein, sign an affidavit supporting Psy-Ed's denial of Schive's allegations. Klein reluctantly signed the affidavit in June 1997. Later, Klein apparently had a change of heart. In September 1999, Valenzano and the company learned that Klein had signed a second affidavit in support of Schive's charge. In response, Psy-Ed refused to make additional payments to Klein that had been promised under a separation agreement. In December 1999, the MCAD issued a probable cause finding in favor of Schive on her discrimination claim. Two weeks later, Psy-Ed and Valenzano filed a complaint against Klein and Schive alleging defamation, civil conspiracy and tortious interference with contractual and business relations. In response, Schive filed a second MCAD charge and a counterclaim alleging retaliation against Psy-Ed. In 2002, Klein filed a separate complaint against Psy-Ed and Valenzano alleging retaliation. The court found that the retaliation claim was not actionable because Klein had not been employed for more than two years when the alleged adverse action took place. Supreme Judicial Court's Decision In parsing the myriad of claims and counterclaims between Schive, Phys-Ed, and Valenzano, the court first addressed whether an employer's post-employment actions against a former employee could violate lassachusetts Fair Emplo: ent Practices A‘ 51B. Reading Section ", . * of Chapter 151B (it i ischarge, expel or othe against a son " ing right gu: ed under hapter 15: and of the statute (it is unlawful for “any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with such other person" from exercising rights under Chapter 151B), the court reasoned that the statute did not require that an employer- employee relationship exist "at the time of the wrongful conduct, or at any other time." Accordingly, the court held that the statute's retaliation protections extended to former employees. The court next considered whether the lawsuit filed against Schive could serve as the predicate "adverse action" for her retaliation charge. Although the court recognized that Massachusetts citizens have state and federal constitutional rights to seek judicial resolution of disputes, the court distinguished sham and/or baseless lawsuits that are not constitutionally protected. The court concluded that filing baseless or sham litigation, as opposed to "reasonably based but unsuccessful lawsuits," could thus serve as the adverse action" sufficient to support a claim for unlawful retaliation. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion. Relying on the trial court's findings that: (1) the claims brought against Schive were objectively baseless because Psy-Ed and Valenzano failed to present any evidence of damages; (2) Psy-Ed and Valenzano brought the action not to vindicate the alleged defamation, but instead to "retry" Schive's MCAD charge; and (3) there was a mere two-week gap between the MCAD's probable cause finding and the commencement of the company's action against Schive and Klein, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial court's finding that Psy-Ed and Valenzano brought the lawsuit to retaliate against Schive for her protected activity and affirmed the award in favor of Schive on her retaliation claims. Lessons for Employers Retaliation claims are in vogue nationwide. Plaintiffs' attorneys favor them because they very often boil down to factual disputes that must go to a jury. Because an employee may prevail on a retaliation count without a finding of discrimination, retaliation claims are particularly problematic for employers. The Psy-Ed ruling opens the door to new types of retaliation claims against Massachusetts employers based on alleged conduct that occurs long after the end of the employment relationship. These post-termination retaliation claims are not limited to instituting legal action against a former employee who filed a charge with the MCAD. Employers could also be subject to post-termination retaliation claims for providing a negative job reference, reporting misconduct to a regulatory or licensing agency, or informing a former employee's new or prospective employer about the former employee's protected activity. These claims also arise in situations where a former employee applies for reemployment, often by submitting a résumé or application online and receiving an automated response indicating that the company will retain the application and consider the former employee for appropriate openings as they become available. If the company then does not consider the former employee for subsequent open positions, a claim could follow. To protect against these claims, we recommend that employers: Develop and implement strong anti-retaliation policies. Educate all managers and supervisors that it is illegal to blacklist or retaliate against a former employee. Consider adopting a uniform policy that the company will not provide any information to a subsequent employer other than the position held by an employee and his or her dates of service. At a minimum, a consistent amount of information should be given in response to inquiries by or about former employees. lassachusetts General aws Chapter 2 Chi 93”) stat it “Unfair dsof competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful”1234. This means that numerous acts and practices can serve as the basis for a suit alleging a violation of c. 93A1. For example, according to Chapter 93A, Section 2, a landlord is not allowed to force entry into the property without a court order. As a result of this unfair or deceptive act or practice, I suffered injury or loss of money as follows: “T have lost a great portion of my dignity, in humiliation and the sheer shame of not being able to function with my vehicle in letting down my siblings/children. Also the lost of my good credit score, insurance and vehicle, also the debt that i still owe. Going into major debt, with the bank, creditors, friends and family”. Therefore, I hereby demand the following relief: $250,000 US currency & Vehicle “Infiniti Norwood, owes me financial relief for their discrimative behavior towards me. I know that the payment for damages here, which is being sought is the minimal amount for all the infractions done to me. When Infiniti Norwood had honest mechanics I always gave them positive reviews; however, since “Anthony Tippett”, became the go to man, the services that i have received have been poor. I let him runa entire diagnostics on my vehicle, he gave me a few diagnostic’s that were very expensive, and disingenuous. (Im going to spare you of the details at this moment, only due to the fact that its minor compared to the bigger infractions). However, I had to go to local mechanics for additional diagnostics, for this very same reason however, i went to Anthony in confidence to my own dismay. For it was the secretary (Caucasain Female) & Anthony Tippett who refused to give me service on recommendation of higher up at Infiniti Norwood (Policy). The actual issue could have been alleviated if “Anthony” didnt deny me service in the first place. Todate Anthony via Infiniti Norwood, as refused me service (3x) - and after i put in complaints in with Infiniti Coorperate, online and with Carfacts being that Infiniti refused to respond to my online complaints - “Anthony”, calls me personally to continue to heckle me and misinform, in an attempt to cover up for his fellow infiniti personnel. For Infiniti Coorperate made attempts to get the car reserviced, after i was frauded out of my money. Because i had problems with them in the past i knew to go to a mechanic prior to having my vehicle serviced by them, out of the fear of this type of issue; in order that i ensure fair treatment. So when i seen the same (4) codes present, i knew that the softwear wasnt updated, and i was frauded out of my money, in retaliation of my complaining, for the higher ups were familiar with who i am, from prior transactions. Had the mechanic informed me that “The softwear couldnt be updated, and or that they provided new codes on the worksheet, inorder to show that my issue was bigger then the (4) initial codes that i paid to get serviced, i could of walked away and or choose to sell Infiniti Norwood my vehicle like they were asking after they frauded me”. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, gives you the opportunity to make a good faith response to this letter within thirty (30) days. Your failure to do so-could subject you to triple damages, attorney fees and costs if i decide to institute legal action. “Any person receiving such a demand for relief who, within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of the demand for relief, makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning its rejection and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the petitioner”. General Law - Part I, Title XV, Chapter 93A, Section 9 Sincerely, LUA. Khare€ Criswell CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day a true copy of the above document was served upon the attorney of record for each party by mail, postage prepaid. Dated: April 9th 2024 (Pro’se) Consumers have the right to file a complaint if they feel as though a licensee or unlicensed individual has violated the standards of professional conduct. In cases where it can be proven that a licensee or unlicensed individual or business has violated an applicable statute or regulation or is not safely practicing their trade or profession, DOL may open a complaint and conduct an investigation in coordination with the appropriate board of registration. Grounds for complaints may include, among other things, failure to adhere to standards of practice, fraud, fraudulent procurement of a license, misuse of client funds or records, negligence, practice while impaired by alcohol or drugs, sexual misconduct, and unlicensed practice. FACTS: HISTORY OF THE CONSUMER: My name is Kharee Criswell, and im a victim of fraud on behalf of Infiniti Norwood. As a proud member of Infiniti Norwood, I always brought my vehicle to be serviced by this dealership. I always had giving that dealership positive reviews, while “Nigel Silver’? was head mechanic. When “Anthony Tippet”, stepped into the picture, things changed for the worst. I allowed Mr Tippet to run a diagnostic test on my car, and the diagnostic test came back with several costly issues, one of which was for a strut on the back left wheel; and I brought my vehicle to another local mechanic who sprayed WD40 on the strut that was a bit molded, and the strut opened back up, and was replaced for $10 dollars, while “Anthony”, had that job costing me $800 dollars to remedy. Thus, it was at that moment I made a personal affirmation that I would allow that dealership nor mechanic the right to run anymore diagnostic testing on my vehicle. Inside I also felt that their diagnostic testing was a rouse toget customers to pay out unnecessary cost, in the name of the upkeep of their vehicles, but, not necessarily interchangeable with the proper maintenance. Therefore, from that date forward, I would only bring my vehicle to be serviced, after I got the opinion of another mechanic, because I couldnt trust their opinions or advice. Out of the fear of being frauded, I always deal with Infiniti Norwood, with extreme caution. So I got my personal mechanic did a diagnostic on my vehicle, and pulled up (4) Codes, because the check engine light came on. I had (4) codes - (2) permanent and all codes read P0720. \SgUCPTU RIE Rie OM NORCO RU ORY UUCIMSKoR RERCLNG eae FTN ARCH UAL oaR OLOLG PLU SESS exe No INO MSO NSS aceite S OUR its suite i CeniCREU Titer Pele) syLeyue Ene Tue IUReRDySAELUKG me CURL LORD RCa® AUSULAGLES re ii GPUae aa ea TASS d CSTE CLOMDY ECS PLL EXeLE iti eGuomee SACU LLORAS TRB EN CMIECU RU ee COL CmLCC melas eenly| Perens AU ie Oa NUM ererts ti Carste Rp Key emere1e Comoe = OLOPMAAUICO CN AUIS CLELEKSCongzieD CR teCiVeN OLA) cZERH Tem ZeLtdCoM ofc oyeLaCcram Comore) EL E-Cer Oh KostT Mm nNCSCeA LE LY COMELDEL LAS Ura USca Bak COM LENA CAD AOLMLMRKS LLL SoU SHe Sexe Mee memitR mere, aia TOES Tee ae (eter Tee ae ReeeAe tei by Em io (a ron) eet aorere ott CTL uae sir SITe MOTOS ILeLA TN cMmCe)uKele (ote MUA NTE EAUSox UNCOOLe Comte) EN Wicca LereremecoltreolcolRSTPUR ROL ULSeLUToM SOUL M IRL MULE oe llemet im hatte a EPA mere Coed 1 ule rH OL CROLULT PULSES erORSURLOD aie EX ime) mY aTKosmoLmee bilereike | DTENUAMUUCMU RATES ONVESSICODUMULUECOMSUECTCL! a Kenta tei Ein JH lite a eOWe Lefertree RON Eoin (uae ES coy exer AUTELCLE COVE TTEFeaecey LStILC CODER ULLORE CET Bike ttm TEAST) re aire Tait tl oT Ute OEE ue malt ele in METER TiNe me bts mat Sat IOEeVEAUr bole CeyeRaN Kyo) LOAF nycam Uae ra) Toomer te Pee VS teat cw OY SNE inal: ELENAoM SOM UL okey ELKS ye (aUtateraCeS STANMORE Ee AAom eZee WISIN Te FRM Lenten Key PL E-Cexea HNC) oX<1e¢ NCA ESO SAYIN sa O71 UNL MKC ATESLoM CO) yefertea tee ORY SIOUM cP URCr MAT URSOU Mm MUreleCe ECHL UNey URL Ke LORS» Etezel Despite not desiring too, I initially reached out to Infiniti in attempts to get my car fixed. My regular mechanic couldnt fix the issue, because he was leaving the U.S. and wouldnt be back for several months, so I called Infiniti and tried to get my car fixed. When I called Infiniti and asked “Mr. Tippet”, could he fix my Sensors and TCM, I was told that Infiniti recommends (Policy): “If they open the transmission, they would want to replace it. And he went on further telling me that he wanted to run a diagnostics test on my vehicle, in order to properly diagnose the issue, before ever trying to fix it. The problem I had with this is that, those test I had already ran on my vehicle by a licensed mechanic. (So there was no need to) I also didnt want my time wasted by “Mr. Tippet”, being that he had already giving me a faulty diagnosis. So I made another attempt toget my car fixed and was told again that its their policy to replace and not open up the transmission. So I personally called “Mr. Tippet”, and sent him a email informing if he would be decent enough for him to replace the out PCM (TCM), and that I would have another mechanic replace the (4) Speed Senors, and PCM. Infiniti though denying me, I got upset, and left a harsh review on their website, letting the customers know that they are discrimitative in their practices, hustlers and adamantly denying me a long standing, it’s customer service’s. Later, one of the managers replied to my review, and still offered me nothing in return. However, “Mr. Tippet”, reached back out and agreed to replace the outside PCM, and he did and I went to get the other parts serviced by another mechanic. When the mechanic I went to could not update my PCM softwear I called back to Infiniti, in order to see if they can update the softwear in my vehicle to which they obliged. THE CRIME: I brought my car in their to Infiniti Norwood to be serviced and was frauded out of my money & my vehicle never fixed. I brought my 2015/QS0 in there to have a software update, because i recently got a new piece’s installed into the vehicle (TCM) - and this required a software update, in order to remove the (4) codes that were present. I was texted message from the mechanic that serviced the vehicle, him informing me that my vehicle had been serviced/updated and to come pick it up. The same mechanic also infomed me (Infiniti tradition) that i also needed a new transmission and that he could find me a new one, and install a new transmission for the price of 6,500 dollars. I told him no thank you, and proceeded to pic my vehicle up. Once i made it to my vehicle and got inside I noticed that my check engine light was still on; so i put a code censor on the car in order to detect the issue, and the same original codes were present. I went back into the dealership to speak with Antony Tippit to find out why the same (4) codes were present, [after I received a message that my PCM had been updated] and he informed me that another mechanic serviced the vehicle, and there was nothing that he could personally do. So I drove my car to the adjacent dealership Mercury dealership, in order to drive my car up & down their lot for 25 mins in order to get my vehicle to go into gear, so that i could drive it home. Again, this is not the first run in that I had with Infiniti Norwoood, about my car. For several months I had to file complaints with Infiniti Cooperate, and left reviews on their personal website, also with Infiniti Cooperate concerning the poor services at Infiniti Norwood. For this same dealership had also refused me service in the past, due to discrimitive practices. So I also feel that my car wasnt serived due to this same reason, thus, the latest transaction is the result of retaliation. For the mechanic who filled the service sheet, had also said (4) codes were present, not identifying any “New”, transmission codes that would indicate a very new issue that none of us knew existed. No new codes meant, my car wasnt serviced at all. The ignorant lawyer leaned on this faulty information in her response, however, not understanding that in order for their to be more pertinent transmission issues, such as the entire transmission needed to be replaced, needed to be accompanied with codes with the likes of “P0715 or P0500”, and P1734-00 7GR INCORRECT RATIO. None of the last (3) codes were present, thus, my issue was simply a system update. “RETALIATION”: Paragraph (a) of § 36.206 provides that no private entity or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has exercised his or her right to oppose any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part. Because i had problems with them in the past i stay on online blogs congerning my car and the latest updates to keep the car functioning at its most optimal levels. My car only had (4) codes, so I knew that the issue I had were only related to my valve body, and not necessarily my entire transmission. My personal mechanic’s, also those with online content, show other mechanics step by step how to fix and install new software. And in my case I had (4) codes - (2) permanent. The (2) Permanent were software related codes, pertaining to the TCM being stuck in 3rd gear, as to why the car couldnt shift out of 3rd gear without a software update (Cant drive pass 60 MPH); while the out (2) output censors pertain to the censors surrounding the (TCM): Speed Sensors, which I had all (4) replaced. So in total I had all (4) output censors replaced alongside the PCM outside & Inside in order to illiminate the entire issue. ‘ So once I got my car back from the dealership, and seen the check engine still light on, I knew that they intentionally lied about fixing my car, and just out right scammed me for my money; possibly in hopes that I would bye into their false narrative, and give them 6k and or they intentionally disregarded my services knowing that it was me who made complaints in the past; either way they never updated my cars software like they claimed via text or else there would exist a new code for another part of the transmission. What sensor would cause transmission problems? A failing transmission position sensor may no longer send the right signals to the Powertrain Control Module, or PCM (TCM). Without signals from the position sensor, the PCM will no longer know when to shift the transmission's gears out of park into a moving gear. When a Transmission shifts into the wrong gear, and refuses to function at all, these codes would be P1734-00 7GR INCORRECT RATIO - Sometimes accompanied by P0715 or P0500. My VEHICLES codes were only P0720 - What is the code P0720 on Infiniti Q50 transmission? The P0720 is an OBD code related to the workings and overall condition of the output speed sensor circuit. The Powertrain Control Module (PCM/TCM) in this particular circuit works by gathering a signal from the output speed sensor to assess and input the right shift strategy to the car's transmission. What this simply means is that, if there existed other issues with my transmission as claimed by said mechanic at Infiniti Norwood, there assessment, would of gave additional codes to give light to the exact non-functioning issue; in which case they would of put that code on an existing work order sheet, in order to show why the cars software couldnt be updated due to that existing issue (code); to which they never gave me nor presented. However, by text, they informed me that my cars softwear was updated. Thus, my software wasnt updated, and was thereby scammed; which lead to me not being able to keep up my payments, therefore, no longer being able to use vehicle or keep my vehicle. Infiniti’s attorney ignorantly (CHRISTINE R. FITZGERALD) that they Inifiinti had informed me that the updating of the cars PCM’s softwear may not remedy the issue, to which i agree, if Inifiniti claimed that the system could not be updated, because they found new codes, after clearing the old existing codes, however, there were no new codes, and only the old existing codes present, MEANING it was a pure fabrication, that my PCM system was updated, when the old codes were still present. This means that the mechanics department contradicted themselves by giving me (2) different accounts stating (2) different things! Hence, Infiniti Norwood is at fault of my vehicle destablization’s, and subsequent forfeiture. If they would of fixed my car i would of been able to drive and keep my car; their frauding me out of my money, put me in a inadequate position (Inferior). So they are at fault of me inquiring debt, and losing my vehicle over their deceptive & fraudulent practices, my suffering and should not have their state license updated being that they are intentionally committing larceny on their customers, and denying services, when they are required by law to honor their customers. Updating my TCM’s software would of allowed me to operate my vehicle without interference. By misinforming me & being flatout dishonest they made me loose my vehicle and scammed me out of my finances. I pray that you dont allow them to continue to fraud other customers and intentionally deny services to other people, like myself who are disabled and in a protected classes .. The law does not define any specific business actions that violate the law; rather it states that “unfair or deceptive practices” are illegal. Although each case is judged on its own merits, some examples of unfair or deceptive practices that might fall under Chapter 93A would be when: e A business charges a consumer higher rates than the marked, published or advertised price. The refund/return policy is not clearly posted where it can be readily noticed and understood. A business fails to tell you relevant information regarding your product or service or misleads you in any way. A business does not meet its warranty agreement. A business uses "Bait and Switch" advertising - a technique by which the seller advertises an item for sale at a particularly good price or terms but does not really want to sell that item. The seller discourages the purchase of the advertised item and instead tries to convince the buyer to purchase a different item for a higher price or on less favorable terms. “INFINITI CORPORATE” “After Imade several attempts to get into contact with Infiniti’s Cooperate Office, I was contacted via email & phone by Infiniti representatives, and Nissan Investigations Department. Initially Infiniti Coorperate made attempts to get the car reserviced, after i was frauded out of my money, and victimized. To my dismay Anthony Tippet, called me back trying to argue with me that the (4) common codes that I had were codes indicating a much greater issue; to which I told him that he was misinforming me, and that I will bring them to court if he refuses to reservice the vehicle properly. He told me that he can no longer have any conversation, once legal terms are apart of the conversation, thus, also refusing to fix my vehicle”. (After Cooperate informed them to reservice the vehicle). What happens if a business violates the Consumer Protection Law? If a consumer believes a business has violated the Consumer Protection Law and engaged in some sort of unfair or deceptive practice and after attempting to resolve the complaint with the merchant informally, he/she may decide to take legal action. As a general matter, consumer suing under law must demonstrate the following to prove the claim: That the consumer sent a detailed 30-day demand letter that outlines the complaint, the harm suffered, and the demanded relief. That he or she is a “consumer” plaintiff - someone engaging in commerce primarily for personal, family or household purposes; That the defendant’s actions were “unfair” or “deceptive;” and That these actions resulted in a “loss of money or property, real or personal” to that consumer. A court can award a consumer plaintiff who proves the above compensatory or actual damages, sometimes as much as double or treble (triple) damages if the plaintiff can prove (1) the defendant willfully and knowingly violated Chapter 93A or (2) the defendant refused to grant relief in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that his acts violated Chapter ARGUMENTS: Commonwealth y. Venturcap Inv. Group V, 1784C V03091-BLS1, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 13 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 17, 2020) Partial summary judgment granted for the Commonwealth where defendants’ sales practice undeniably had the capacity to mislead consumers in their decision to purchase used motor vehicles from defendants in violation of Chapter 93A. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts moved for partial summary judgment against defendants for unfairly and deceptively structured sales transactions with consumers that defendants allegedly knew, or should have known, were “doomed to fail.” Defendants ran a used auto sale lot and financed all of their car sales through their own in-house lender, for the identical sales price of approximately $12,000. The allegedly unfair or deceptive practices included advertising that the dealership only closed deals that were “affordable” and “designed for success” where defendants’ business records demonstrated that consumers who were approved for loans could not or would not likely be able to afford the required monthly payments. Based on the evidence and the undisputed material facts, the court had no difficulty concluding that defendants violated Chapter 93A by falsely representing to consumers that it only entered into sales transactions that were affordable and designed for customer success, when data collected from the consumer bore little relation to the customer’s actual financial situation and could not reasonably be expected to provide an accurate assessment of the consumers’ ability to purchase a used car. Healy v. G/J Towing, Inc., SUCV2017-01665-BLS2, 2019 LEXIS 1225 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Dec. 18, 2019) Apparent overcharge to motor vehicle owner by towing company could “rise to the level of” Chapter 93A, Section 9 violation. Plaintiff alleged that defendants (who operate a towing business in Revere) charged motor vehicle owners towed in Revere more than city ordinance and related statutes allowed, which violated Chapter 93A, Section 9. The court addressed and denied plaintiff’s third motion for class certification, concluding it was based on an overly broad class definition, a lack of commonality, and inadequacy of class counsel. Although it denied class certification, the court noted that plaintiff appeared to have a meritorious Chapter 93A claim. Pursuant to defendants’ contract with the City of Revere, defendants may have overcharged plaintiff for towing services, based on the discrepancy between what they actually charged plaintiff and what they were allowed to charge motor vehicle owners. According to the court, based on those facts, plaintiff “clearly has a claim against the defendants that could even rise to the level of a c. 93A violation.” Sapir v. Dispatch Techs., 1984C V00666-BLS1, 2019 Mass. Super. LEXIS 1218 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Dec. 4, 2019) Chapter 93A claim failed as a matter of law because Chapter 93A does not apply to disputes among shareholders of a close corporation. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, directors of a closely held corporation, fraudulently induced him to sell back his company shares by misrepresenting to him facts related to the company’s operations and financial status. As to plaintiff’s claims of negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, Chapter 93A violation, and fraudulent inducement against two of the four defendants, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s Chapter 93A claim failed as a matter of law. Chapter 93A does not apply to disputes arising among shareholders in a close corporation because the relationship between such shareholders is not deemed a “commercial” one where Chapter 93A would apply. AG v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1984-CV-02597-BLS1, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at *1 (Mass. Super. Jan. 16, 2020) Court enforces Massachusetts attorney general investigatory powers under Chapter 93A. In this case, the court addressed a petition to compel defendant to comply with a civil investigative demand (CID) filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General (AG). The AG issued the CID under Chapter 93A, § 6 and petitioned to enforce the CID under Chapter 93A, § 7. The CID was issued in connection with the AG’s investigation into whether third-party applications (apps) and app developers improperly acquired or misused the private information of defendant’s users. Defendant objected to several requests in the CID based on privilege grounds, which prompted the AG’s filing. The court granted the AG’s petition to compel compliance with the CID. In doing so, the court noted that a receiving person who objects to a CID bears a “heavy burden” to show “good cause” why it should not be compelled to comply. In this context, according to the court, “good cause” means that the receiving party must demonstrate that the AG is “act[ing] arbitrarily or capriciously or that the information sought is plainly irrelevant.” Based on the court’s analysis of the asserted privileges, the court compelled production of some of the information sought by the AG, but allowed the defendant to provide a detailed privilege log concerning specific information withheld so that the AG and the court, if appropriate, could further assess the defendant’s privilege claims. Massachusetts District Court/Appellate Division Footwear Tech Inc. v. Feelgoodz LLC, 1982CV01178, 2020 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 1 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 2020) A breach of contract intended to secure unbargained for benefits (breach of contract plus) may give rise to Chapter 93A liability. Plaintiff, a footwear manufacturer and distributor, alleged it was the intended beneficiary of a contract between defendants, who were also engaged in the footwear business, and that defendants breached the contract by circumventing plaintiff and dealing directly with one another. Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Chapter 93A, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on all counts. As to Chapter 93A, the court declined to dismiss. While acknowledging the longstanding principle that a breach of contract, standing alone, does not violate Chapter 93A, the court noted that 93A liability may attach where “the breach [of contract is]...knowing and intended to secure unbargained for benefits to the detriment of the other party.” The court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged defendants engaged in conduct that went beyond a mere breach of conduct. Specifically, defendants allegedly circumvented, froze out, and ultimately terminated their relationship with plaintiff “to further their own pecuniary interests and that plaintiff suffered harm as a result.” United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts Herbert v. Vantage Travel Service, Inc., No. 17-CV-10922-DJC, 2020 WL 1190992, at *1 (D. Mass. March 12, 2020) Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt Chapter 93A because 93A claim did not relate to the price, route, or service of air transportation. Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendant alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of common law warranties, negligent misrepresentation and a violation of Chapter 93A, § 9, related to river cruise travel packages that plaintiffs purchased from defendant. With respect to plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim, the threshold issue the court determined was whether the claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, et seq. The court held that the defendant was an “indirect air carrier” under the Deregulation Act because it was in the business of booking flight transportation as part of its tour packages. The court held plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim did not relate to the price, route, or service of air transportation and therefore, the claim was not preempted by the Deregulation Act. The court analyzed the merits of plaintiffs’ three Chapter 93A violations: (1) the defendant misrepresented on its website that it owned and operated the MS River Voyager, which violated 940 C.MLR. §§ 15.03(2), 15.04(2)(b) & 3.16(2) and was otherwise deceptive; (2) after the MS River Voyager was unable to continue the trip, defendant failed to offer plaintiffs their choice of alternatives enumerated under 940 C.M.R. § 15.06; and (3) the disclaimer provision was not “clear and conspicuous” and therefore, unfair and deceptive. The court noted that the first two bases created a per se violation of Chapter 93A. As to the first violation, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the alleged misrepresentation that the MS River Voyager was not owned by the defendant caused the plaintiffs their injury as required under G.L. c. 93A § 9. As to the second violation, the court held there was a disputed material fact as to whether the defendant provided “all services” purchased by plaintiffs and denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. As to the third violation, the court granted the defendant summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to show that the disclaimer provision violated Chapter 93A. Conley y. Roseland Residential Trust, C.A. No. 18-10629-WGY, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38275 (D. Mass. March 5, 2020) Class certification denied and summary judgment granted for defendants where plaintiffs suffered no injury or loss. Plaintiff alleged that defendants (a landlord and his billing contractor) wrongly charged plaintiffs (and a class of similarly situated individuals) for gas and water utilities for nearly four years due to unlawful sub-metering systems. Plaintiffs alleged that this system did not comply with Massachusetts regulations, resulting in negligent misrepresentation by defendants and a violation of Chapter 93A. The court denied class certification, as plaintiffs were not typical and did not adequately represent the class as representative plaintiffs had no claim of actual pecuniary damages. The court also granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as plaintiff suffered no injury from the sub-metering arrangement. Specifically, the court determined that plaintiffs failed to expla