Motion for Sanctions in PETRELLO, JOSEPH v. BEMER, BRUCE J. Et Al| Trellis.Law

On March 16, 2021 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Joseph Petrello, and Bemer Petroleum Corp., Bruce J. Bemer, for T90 - Torts - All other in the District Court of New Haven County.

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DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV21-6067153-S SUPERIOR COURT

JOSEPH PETRELLO J.D. OF WATERBURY

vs. AT WATERBURY

BRUCE BEMER, ET. AL. APRIL 8, 2024

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PLAINTIFF’S
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Cot The Plaintiff, Joseph Petrello, hereby respectfully offers his surreply to Defendant
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i MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed February 27, 2024 (Entry No. 230.00). The
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Plaintiff has established through the factual record developed in discovery that genuine issues
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I COUNT FOUR

The Plaintiff has laid out its argument in sufficient detail for why there is an issue of fact

as to the Plaintiffs age that should go to the jury and thus will not restate it here. The defendant

Bemer Petroleum Corp. hereinafter, “the corporate defendant ta”
's” reply provides no analysis, and

attempts to make no distinction, between the language of Plaintiffs Count four and the claim

that the defendant negligently failed to take adequate precautions to prevent sexual abuse by a

Boy Scout leader in Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 323 Conn. 303 (2016) that our Supreme

Court held that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d permitted in Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp.,

323 Conn. 303, 147 A.3d 104 (2016). The issue in Boy Scouts of America Corp. was whether

the extended statute of limitations in § 52-577d applied to claims of negligence against third
parties arising out of an underlying act of intentional sexual misconduct, namely, the troop

leader's sexual abuse of the minor plaintiff. /d., 331. The defendant in Boy Scouts of America

Corp. contended that the negligence claim was time barred because § 52-577d "applies only to

intentional torts, i.e., to claims against the perpetrator of a sexual assault on a minor, while §

52-584 continues to apply to claims against parties whose negligent conduct is alleged to have
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Qs caused injury to the plaintiff when he was a minor." (Emphasis in original.) /d., 331. The
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of negligence against the company. The Supreme Court further articulated its position on § 52-
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defendant readily admits “would appear to fall within Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d, provided that

Petrello was actually under the age of 18.” (Entry No 230.00, p. 3). Defendant cites to Doe v.

Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 323 Conn. 303 (2016), and acknowledges that the “Supreme Court

held that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d was permitted to apply to the plaintiff's claims against the

defendant institution as the institution’s own conduct was a cause of the complained of injury,

which fell within the auspices of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d. (Entry No 230.00, p. 3).

Subparagraphs a. through u. of paragraph 16 of count four of the amended complaint lay out in

specific detail the institutional negligence of the defendant corporation arising out of an

underlying act of intentional sexual misconduct by Bruce Bemer. Bemer Petroleum Corp.

allowed an individual who frequently attempted to flirt with, made inappropriate sexual remarks

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to, groped and provided with intoxicating substances to teenage boys to recruit, hire and abuse

those teenage boys including the Plaintiff on the business premises as part of an

interview/hiring process. If the teenage boys allowed defendant Bemer to conduct sex acts on

them, then Bemer Petroleum Corp. would hire them afterwards and the abuse would continue

essentially as part of the terms of employment. Therefore, on close examination of the specific
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13 conclude that whether the Plaintiffs claim of negligence against the corporate defendant arise
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Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count
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judgment contends that there are no issues of disputed fact and summary judgment should be

granted because in order to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of an employee, the

latter must be acting within the scope of their employment and in furtherance of the employer's

business. Bemer Petroleum Corp. argues that the sexual abuse, assault and exploitation of a

minor teenager is, by its very nature, far outside the scope of defendant Bruce Bemer's

employment, and it is impossible that the inappropriate activities were in the furtherance of

Bemer Petroleum Corp.’s business. The Plaintiffs arguments establish that a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether the corporate defendants are vicariously liable for defendant

Bemer’s actions as alleged in counts five, six, and seven. In the fifth, sixth and seventh counts

of the amended Complaint (Docket No.107.00), the Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bruce
Bemer’s acts of sexual abuse, assault and exploitation occurred while he was the president of

and acting as an employee, servant or agent of the corporate defendant. Defendant Bruce

Bemer’s acts of sexual abuse, assault and exploitation occurred on the business premises of

210 Commerce St., Glastonbury, CT, while he was recruiting and hiring minor Plaintiff, all of

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which are in the scope of his employment, and for which the defendant, Bemer Petroleum
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200,

207, 579 A.2d 69 (1990). "In such cases it is, and must usually remain, a question depending

upon the degree of deviation and all the attendant circumstances. In cases where the deviation

is slight and not unusual, the court may, and often will, as matter of law, determine that the

servant was still executing his master's business. So too, where the deviation is very marked

and unusual, the court in like manner may determine that the servant was not on the master's

business at all, but on his own." Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 161, 28 A. 29 (1893). Thus,

"there are occasional cases where a servant's digression from duty is so clear-cut that the

disposition of the case becomes a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) A-G
Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, inc. supra, 216 Conn. 207. Connecticut is a fact pleading

state, and here the plaintiff's amended complaint provides the facts.

"[I]n order to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of his employee, the

employee must be acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the

employer's business . . . But it must be the affairs of the principal, and not solely the affairs of
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the agent, which are being furthered in order for the doctrine to apply .. . Weils v. Walker Bank
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395 & Trust Co., 590 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah 1979) (if employee's actions are not authorized by his
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nox law to adopt a per se rule against vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assault. Some
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45 conduct, motives that may extend beyond the obvious motive of self-gratification." Kilduff v.
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Cosential, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. CIV. 3:02CV651 (PCD), 2003 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 24975 (D. Conn. February 25, 2003). To grant the corporate defendant's motion now

would be inappropriate and to deny the Plaintiff his right to have his claims which are supported

both by the law and the factual record developed to date determined by a jury of his peers

would be similarly be a miscarriage of justice.

The present case is analogous to Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 700 A.2d 1377

(1997). In Mullen, the plaintiff sued a religious order whose priest engaged in sexual relations

with the plaintiff during counseling sessions. The priest had weekly duties at a local parish but

was also a psychologist with a private practice, the proceeds of which were contributed to the

religious order in full in accordance with his vow of poverty. He also served as the staff
psychologist for the religious order, providing counseling during religious retreats. The priest

began counseling the plaintiff. He sexually exploited her during his church-sanctioned pastoral-

psychological counseling sessions, as well as while he staffed church retreats. In reversing the

granting of summary judgment for the religious order, the Appetlate Court held that a trier of fact

could reasonably determine that the "sexual relationship with the plaintiff was a misguided
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transference-counter transference phenomenon. In addition, the court noted that the order “did

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a2 A.2d 1217, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 914, 665 A.2d 608 (1995), and Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 154
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Conn. 544, 227 A.2d 251 (1967). In Glucksman v. Walters, supra, 142-43, a part-time Young

Men's Christian Association (YMCA) employee responded to a foul in a YMCA basketball game

by severely assaulting the man who had fouled him. The Appellate Court concluded that a jury

could have reasonably characterized this assault as "a misguided effort" at maintaining order

on the YMCA basketball court and, accordingly, we reversed a directed verdict holding the

YMCA not vicariously liable for the assault on the basis of respondeat superior. /d., 145-48.

In Pelletier v. Bilbiles, supra, 154 Conn. 544, an employee of a confectionery store,

charged with keeping order in the store, assaulted a customer who had thrown a wrapper on

the floor. Our Supreme Court held that "the beating of an unruly customer . . . is an extremely

forceful, although misguided, method of discouraging patrons of the [store] . . . from causing
disturbances on the premises in the future. The fact that the specific method a servant employs

to accomplish his master's orders is not authorized does not relieve the master from liability. . .

Also, the fact that the battery . .. may have been motivated by personal animosity . . . does not

exonerate the defendant. .. . A master does not escape liability merely because his servant

loses his temper while he is conducting the master's business." (Citations omitted.) /d., 548.
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28 Bemer’s recruitment and control over the underage boys that it needed for summer help. It also
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benefited monetarily from the inexpensive labor. Thus, a trier of fact could reasonably find that

Bemer’s recruiting, interviewing and hiring of the plaintiff that was the backdrop for Bruce

Bemer sexual assault and exploitation of the Plaintiff was well within the scope of his

employment for corporate defendants and was in furtherance of the corporate defendants’

business.

Bruce Bemer’s sexual exploitation of the plaintiff occurred during the corporate

defendant sanctioned interviewing for summer yard workers sessions and while he recruited

employees to do the hardest, most-dangerous and lowest paying jobs for the business. Thus, a

trier of fact could reasonably determine that, as awful as it may sound, Bemer's sexual

relationship with the plaintiff was a misguided attempt at recruiting the Plaintiff, or even an
unauthorized, unethical, tortious method of employee recruiting, but not an abandonment of the

corporate defendant's business. Furthermore, a trier of fact could reasonably find that the

sexual relations between Bemer and the plaintiff directly grew out of, and were the immediate

and proximate results of, the corporate defendant’s sanctioned recruiting and interviewing

sessions. Here, as in Glucksman and Pelletier, the trier of fact could reasonably have found
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defendant's business. "The fact that the specific method a servant employs to accomplish his

master's orders is not authorized does not relieve the master from liability." Pelletier v. Bilbiles,

supra, 154 Conn. 544, 548.

First, the Plaintiff was recruited, interviewed and hired to work for the defendant

corporation exclusively by defendant Bemer.’ David Detuccio, the company’s vice president

acknowledged that Mr. Bemer would frequently behave inappropriately with the minors who

were yard workers? and they were exclusively recruited, interviewed and hired by Bruce

' See Deposition Testimony of Bruce Bemer, attached hereto as “Exhibit A” pages 18, 19, 24, 25, and 42.
? See Deposition Testimony of David DeTuccio, attached hereto as “Exhibit B* pages 96 through 100.
Bemer.° These facts were verified by Daniel Greene, another long-term employee.* Christine

Beebe, long-time employee of Bemer Petroleum, in her deposition referred to a stuffed ape as

Bemer Petroleum’s human resources department meaning that the corporation had no

functioning oversight over Bemer Petroleum.5 She also verified that the yard workers were

underage, that they were recruited and hired by Bruce Bemer.® Bruce Bemer conducted the
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3165 Bemer abused the Plaintiff on multiple occasions.’ Mark Malone, another !ong-time employee
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employees would have to do that hard work, and that specifically the company benefitted from
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attempts to hire young people and simultaneously sexually abused or groom them for future

abuse was in the bailiwick of the defendant corporation. The individual who groomed and

brought the Plaintiff to Bruce Bemer for sexual exploitation, Jason McCormick, was also an

employee at the time that the abuse of the Plaintiff occurred.1°

3 See Deposition Testimony of David DeTuccio, attached hereto as “Exhibit B” pages 19 through 21.
4 See Deposition Testimony of Daniel Greene, attached hereto as “Exhibit C* pages 85 through 90.
* See Deposition Testimony of Christine Beebe, attached hereto as “Exhibit D” pages 50 through 52.
° See Deposition Testimony Excerpt of Christine Beebe, attached hereto as “Exhibit D™ pages 17
? See Deposition Testimony Excerpt of David DeTuccio, attached hereto as “Exhibit B” pages 24, In. 18-24.
* See Deposition Testimony Excerpt of Mark Malone Pt. I, attached hereto as “Exhibit E” pages 85 through 89.
° See attached Exhibit F, photo produced by Bemer petroleum Corp. in response to Plaintiffs request for production.
© See Deposition Testimony Excerpt of David DeTuccio, attached hereto as “Exhibit B™ pages 23 through 25.

10
Each and every Bemer Petroleum employee that has been deposed in this matter and

other cases brought by former employees of Bemer Petroleum have acknowledged that none

of the minor boys including the Plaintiff had to fill out a job application, undergo an interview

and all were hired specifically by Bruce Bemer which was separate and apart from the process

that was utilized by the company to hire for positions that were not “yard boys”. None of the
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exploitation and abuse of the Plaintiff. The Defendants have also failed to show the non-
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ao THE PLAINTIFF,
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No JOSEPH PETRELLO

BY !s/443073
Samuel C. Martin, Esq.
Monique S. Foley, Esq.
Kevin C. Ferry, Esq.
His Attorney
Law Office of Kevin C. Ferry, LLC
77 Lexington Street
New Britain, CT 06052
Tel No. (860) 827-0880
Fax. No. (860) 827-9942
Juris No: 429851

CERTIFICATION
| hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing will be mailed or delivered electronically on

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April 8, 2024, to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record and to all parties who have
not appeared and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and
self-represented parties receiving electronic delivery, as follows:

ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Bruce Bemer
Ryan P. Barry, Esq.
Barry, Barall Taylor & Levesque
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202 West Center Street, 1st Floor
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30 (f) 860-645-7900
sa (e) blevesque@ct-attorneys.com
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(e) rbarry@ct-attorneys.com
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ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT:
SN Bemer Petroleum Corporation
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850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
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Bridgeport CT, 06601
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By /s/443073
Bo
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13
EXHIBITA

14
On

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY

AT WATERBURY

JOSEPH PETRELLO NO. UWY-CV21-6067153-S

BRUCE BEMER, ET AL August 16, 2023

10
VIDECTAPED DEPOSITION OF BRUCE BEMER
11

22 CHRISTINA LOMBINO, RPR, CSR
Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 00193
23 ALLAN REPORTING SERVICE
P.O. Box 914
24 Canton, Connecticut 06019
(860) 693-8557
25 FAX (860) 693-1065

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
_aneenwen

Fifth.

How about Coke Zero?

Excuse me?

How about Coke Zero?

Fifth.

MR. BARRY: Objection.

Q Do you allege that my client only worked for you

and you never sexually assaulted him?

A Fifth.

10 MR. BARRY: Objection.

11 Q Did you specifically tell Jason McCormick to go

12 out and look for homeless young boys so they can be

13 brought to you for your sexual pleasure?

14 A Fifth.

15 Q Do you admit my client was ever an employee of

16 Bemer Petroleum?

17 A Fifth.

18 Q Who hired my client to work at Bemer Petroleum?

1S Bifth..

20 How many people work at Bemer Petroleum?

21 MR. BARRY: Objection. Under advice of

22 counsel I advise you to plead the Fifth.

23 A Fifth.

24 Q At the time my client began working at Bemer

28 Petroleum how many people worked there?

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
1g,

MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

A (No Response)

Q Are people at Bemer Petroleum aware of your

sexual assault of minors, sig?

MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

BAFEn .

How many of them are aware of it?

MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

A Fifth.

10 Q Are your employees financially dependent on you

11 and thus have a hard time coming forward about what you

12 have done?

1 MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

14 A Fifth.

is Q Sir, do you know how many of your victims are

16 homeless at this time?

LT A Fifth.

18 Q Do you know how many of your victims are dead at

19 this time, sir?

20 A Fifth.

21 Q Do you know how many of your victims have

22 psychiatric issues at this time?

23 A PLtth.

24 Q Do you know how many of your victims are

25 incarcerated at this time?

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
24

as they come up and then I will object or not

MR. MARTIN: Okay.

Q Did any other officers of Bemer Petroleum

conspire with you to create access to my client?

MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

Fifth.

Do you know who Dave Detuccio is?

Fifth.

You sued him, why did you sue hin, sir?

10 A Fifth.

11 Q Do you believe that Dave Detuccio would have

12 information that would be relevant to this case?

13 A Fifth...

14 Q What about Dave Detuccio's wife?

15. A Fifth.

16 Q Does she work for you as well?

17 A Fifth.

18 Q Were you taking medication at the time of the

19) incidents alleged in my client's complaint, mental health

20 condition or emotional illness?

21 MR. BARRY: Objection.

22 A The Fifth.

23 Q Sir, did you ever use intimidation to pressure

24 my client to engage in sexual acts with you?

25 A Fi £h..

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
re

Q Did you store alcohol at the office at 210

Commerce Street, in Glastonbury, Connecticut at the time

of the incidents alleged by my client?

A Fifth.

Q Did my client reside in your home?

Fifth.

How long did he reside there for?

Fifth.

Why did you want my client to live with you?

10 A FLEth..

11 Q Is it true that you sexually assaulted my client

12 every single night that he lived with you?

1g A Fifth.

14 Q Why did you do that, sir?

15 A Fifth.

16 Q Did you know that my client would not be

17 supervised by any adult with authority or any adult to

18 enforce the safety and well-being of the child at the

19 time that you were sexually assaulting him?

20 A Fifth.

21 Q Six, is it true that you performed fellatio on

22 my client multiple times?

2g A Fifth.

24 Q Did you do this in your office, sir?

25 A Fifth.

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
42

child, my client in particular, would have serious

emotional and physical trauma?

A Fifth.

2 My client's complaint states that you took

Mr. Petrello into your office at Bemer Petroleum on

approximately thirty times of a period of at least two

years, engage in sexual conduct with him including

serving my client drugs and alcohol and luring him with

money, do you refute that?

10 A Fifth.

tl Is that number too high or too low?

12 Fifth.

13 Do you not know the answer?

14 MR. BARRY: Objection, plead the Fifth.

15 Fifth.

16 Is it too many to count, sir?

L? A Fifth.

18 Q Did you intend to inflict emotional distress on

19 my client when you were sexually assaulting him?

20 A Fifth.

21 Q Are you aware that my client has suffered and

22 continues to suffer injuries of a serious nature

23 including but not limited to physical injuries, emotional

24 distress, Shocks terror, recurrent intrusive

25 recollections of the abuse, anger, anxiety, post

ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
EXHIBIT B

15
STATE OF CONNECTICUT

DN: KHD CV 21 6139561 S$ SUPERIOR COURT

JOSEPH PETRELLO JD OF HARTFORD

Vv. AT HARTFORD

BRUCE BEMER, ET AL DECEMBER 21, 2021

13 DEPOSITION OF: DAVID D. DETUCCIO, JR.
{taken via Zoom videoconference)
14

‘ALLAN REPORTING SERVICES (860) 693-8557
ig

into -- giving sales a try.

So we did hire a dispatcher, you know, and

at that point, I maintained my responsibilities as

operations manager. I had a dispatcher now underneath

of me, and I went out on the road and started selling

for the company.

Q That was in the "90s you said?

A Yes, mid-90s. If I had to reflect back,

somewhere in the mid-90s.

10 Q Okay. So now you've been there, you know,

11 approximately for ten years. So take me through those

12 ten years. Did you have any point in time during those

13 ten years where you started to realize that there was a

14 lot of young boys around Bruce a lot and that he may

15 have an interest in youngsters?

16 A Yeah. Over time, yes. Occasionally, there

17 would be, you know, a new face driving around in a car

18 with him. You know, Bruce was a night owl so if he

13 ame in, and as time went by, Bruce's time frame

20 starting in the day would shift more towards the nine

21 or ten o'clock realm.

22 And, you know, occasionally, yeah, there

23 was, you know, 16 to, you know, 16- to 18-year-olds

24 that were coming around and, you know, or being hired

25 as yard workers.
20

They would fall under Bruce's hiring realm

He did the hiring, and -- but, you know, from my

perspective, I was more on the side of overseeing the

drivers and dispatching and the yard worker, I mean,

our dock worker.

You know, so it was =~ I was kind of

overseeing that side of things where Bruce would come

in, get in a vault truck, and go make deliveries. And

yeah, there were many a time that there would be a new

10 face viding in the truck with him and off they went.

il Q So, again, still, like, in the mid-1990s,

12 you said that he did the hiring. Did he do all the

13 hiring for the company or just specific areas?

14 A More for the yard staff, for the yard staff.

15 You know, drivers I would interview. The gentleman

16 that was at that time acting vice president, he would

17 bring folks in that he and I would meet and talk with.

18 Q Who was that person?

19 A His name is Michael Morrissey. At that

20 time, he was vice president of the company.

21 Q- How long was he there?

22 A He started out as sales for the company back

23 in the day when I was still at JD Power equipment, and

24 he remained on until 2006 when he and Bruce had a

25 little bit of a falling out and he parted company.
21

Q Okay. So when did he start there, do you

know? Before you is I think what you said.

A He was there before me. If I had to guess,

he was probably there in the late "70s, early "80s.

Q So after that amount of time they have a

falling out. What was that over?

A Iodon't know all the particulars. Some of

it I believe was the fact that Mr. Morrissey kind of

had his own agenda is what Bruce would allude to at

10 times with the propane gas association and in the

li propane industry.

12 And he was devoting a lot of his time, you

13 know, while at Bemer's to building his name in the

14 propane industry instead of focusing on the company.

i5 Q Okay. So back to hiring. You said that

16 once you became operations manager then got into sales,

17 that you would actually do interviewing for drivers?

18 A Correct, I would interview drivers.

19 Q Then how would the decision to hire be made?

20 Would you go report how the interview went to Bruce and

21 if you liked them and Bruce didn't have any objection,

22 they would get hired?

23 A Pretty much. Occasionally, he would want to

24 meet one. Here or there he would want to meet one, but

25 at that point, he was pretty comfortable with my
22

abilities to interview and hire driver staff.

Q. How about other than drivers; any other

positions in the company that the interviewing was left

to you?

A No. More so Mike Morrissey because at that

point, he was more the administrative person overseeing

the accounting department. He and the office manager

would typically hire the interoffice staffing. And

then, again, Bruce would oversee taking care of hiring

10 for yard staff.

aL Q The yard st

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Barbara N. Bellis Track Judge’s New Case

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Motion-Secondary: PETRELLO, JOSEPH v. BEMER, BRUCE J. Et Al

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