Complaint,Petition: HOULE, III, LOUIS v. OUELLETTE, MASON Et Al

On April 18, 2024 a Complaint,Petition was filed involving a dispute between Louis Houle Iii, and Mason Ouellette, Metropolis Of Connecticut, Llc, for M90 - Misc - All other in the District Court of Middlesex County.

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RETURN DATE: MAY 21, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT

LOUIS HOULE III J.D. OF MIDDLESEX

v. AT MIDDLETOWN

METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC, and
MASON OUELLETTE APRIL 17, 2024
VERIFIED PETITION FOR BILL OF DISCOVERY

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-156a, et seq., the Petitioner, Louis Houle

II, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby petitions this Court to grant its instant Petition

for Bill of Discovery and allow it to. serve interrogatories, requests for production, and/or

subpoenas for testimony against Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC, and Mason Ouellette. For the

reasons set forth below, sufficient probable cause exists for this Court to permit Petitioner to seek

the requested discovery in order to prevent a failure of justice.

I PARTIES

Petitioner Louis Houle III is a Connecticut resident whose current address is 438 Savage

Hill Road, Berlin, CT.

Respondent Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC (“MoCT”), is a Connecticut limited liability

company with a registered business address of 582 Pinewood Dr., Longmeadow, MA. At all times

pertinent to this Petition, MoCT owned, operated, and did business as “Mardi Gras II,” an adult

entertainment club and bar located at 37 North Road, East Windsor, CT.

Mason Ouellette is a Connecticut resident whose current address is 88 Beverly Heights,

Middletown, CT.

Il. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about February 19, 2024, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Petitioner was operating a

motor vehicle in the vicinity of the Route 9 South Exit 31 on-ramp near Mill Street in Berlin,
Connecticut, at which time and place his vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by Mason

Ouellette. See Affidavit of Louis Houle III, April 17, 2024, Exhibit “A,” §] 3-5. Ouellette was

found by the responding Berlin Police Department officer to have been at fault for the accident.

See Houle Ill Aff., Ex. A, 9; see also Connecticut Uniform Police Crash Report, Ofc. Noah Vinci,

Feb. 23, 2024, Exhibit “D.” Ouellette was arrested for, among other things, operating his motor

vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a. See Houle III

Aff., Ex. A, 8; R. Ofc. Vinci, Ex. D, p. 9. Petitioner has sustained personal injuries as a result of

the accident and intends to seek compensation against potentially liable parties. See Houle III Aff.,

Ex. A, 79.

Upon information and belief, Ouellette consumed alcoholic beverages at Mardi Gras II at

some yet-indeterminable time prior to 8:15 p.m. on February 19, 2024. See Houle III Aff., Ex. A,

{ 8. Petitioner represents that, at the scene of the accident, Ouellette informed the responding

Berlin Police Department officer that he had been drinking alcoho! at a “strip club in East

Windsor.” Id. Investigation by undersigned counsel has confirmed that the only such

establishment in East Windsor at the time of the subject collision was Mardi Gras II. Upon

information and belief, Ouellette was visibly and obviously intoxicated at the time he was served

alcoholic beverages at Mardi Gras II by MoCT’s employees, agents, and/or servants.

On or prior to the date of filing of this Petition, Petitioner, through undersigned counsel,

has served MoCT, through its registered principal and registered agent of service, with Notice of

Intent to Sue pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-102, et seq., the “Connecticut Dram Shop Act.”

Il. DISCOVERY SOUGHT

Petitioner seeks pre-suit discovery from MoCT and Ouellette as outlined below:
a. As to MoCT:

(1) Production of receipts, credit card transactions, or other such proof of service

by its agents, employees, and/or servants of alcohol beverages to Ouellette on

February 19, 2024;

(2) Surveillance video or any other such evidence depicting Ouellette’s presence

within Mardi Gras II on February 19, 2024;

(3) Responses to Interrogatories as set forth in the attached Proposed

Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”;

(4) Deposition testimony from a designated representative of MoCT regarding

knowledge of service of alcoholic beverages to Ouelette on February 19, 2024.

b. As to Ouellette:

qd) Responses to Interrogatories as set forth in the attached Proposed

Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”;

(2) Production of receipts, credit card transactions, or other such evidence

regarding the establishment(s), private residence(s), or other identifiable locations

where he was served and/or had consumed alcoholic beverages, drugs, narcotics,

or any other intoxicating substances, on February 19, 2024; and

(3) Production of photographs, videos, social media posts, text messages, or other

such physical and/or electronically-stored information regarding Ouellette’s

whereabouts on February 19, 2024, prior to approximately 8:15 p.m.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court should allow Petitioner to obtain this limited

discovery, which is necessary and material to his potential claims against Respondents and others,

and the granting of which would prevent a failure of justice.
Iv. ARGUMENT

a. Legal Standard for Bill of Discovery

The bill of discovery is an independent action in equity for discovery, and is designed to

obtain evidence for use in another potential action notwithstanding other statutes and court rules

regarding discovery. Benvenuto v. Brookman, 348 Conn. 609, 613, n. 1 (2024), citing Berger v.

Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 5-6 (1994). A bill of discovery is an independent action in equity for

discovery, and is designed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which

discovery is sought.” (Internal citation omitted). Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co.,

251. Conn. 673, 681 (2002).
Connecticut General Statutes § 52-156a provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a)(1) A person who desired to perpetuate testimony regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in the Superior Court may file a
verified petition in the superior court for the judicial district of the
residence of any expected adverse party. The petition shall be
entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show: (A) That the
petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in the
superior court but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be
brought, (B) the subject matter of the expected action and the
petitioner’s interest therein, (C) the facts which the petitioner desires
to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons for desiring
to perpetuate it, (D) the names or a description of the persons the
petitioner expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far
as known, and (E) the names and addresses of the persons to be
examined and the substance of the testimony which the petitioner
expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing to
take the depositions of the persons to be examined named in the
petition, for purposes of perpetuating their testimony.

C.G.S. § 52-156a(a)(1), et seg.

Section 52-156 effectively “codifies the ancient bill in equity to perpetuate testimony.”

Sanderson v. Stever Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 (1985). “Because a bill of

discovery is favored in equity, it should be granted unless there is some well founded objection
against the exercise of the court’s discretion.” Journal Publishing, supra, 261 Conn. 680. The

Connecticut Supreme Court in Johnson Publishing provided the relevant standard of review a

superior court must apply upon filing of a bill of discovery:

To sustain the bill, the petitioner must demonstrate that what he
seeks to discover is material and necessary for proof of, or is needed
to aid in proof of or in defense of, another action already brought or
about to be brought. Although the petitioner must also show that he
has no other adequate means of enforcing discovery of the desired
material, the availability of other remedies for obtaining information
does not require the denial of the equitable relief sought. This is
because a remedy is adequate only if it is one which is specific and
adapted to securing the relief sought conveniently, effectively and
completely. The remedy is designed to give facility to proof.

Discovery is confined to facts material to the plaintiff’s cause of
action and does not afford an open invitation to delve into the
defendant’s affairs. A plaintiff must be able to demonstrate good
faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both
material and necessary to his action. A plaintiff should describe with
such details as may be reasonably available the material he seeks
and should not be allowed to indulge in a hope that a thorough
ransacking of any information and material which the defendant
may possess would turn up evidence helpful to his case. What is
reasonably necessary and what the terms of the judgment require
call for the exercise of the trial court's discretion.

The plaintiff who brings a bill of discovery must demonstrate by
detailed facts that there is probable cause to bring a potential cause
of action. Probable cause is the knowledge of facts sufficient to
justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has reasonable grounds
for presenting an action. Its existence or nonexistence is determined
by the court on the facts found. Moreover, the plaintiff who seeks
discovery in equity must demonstrate more than a mere suspicion;
he must also show that there is some describable sense of wrong.
Whether particular facts constitute probable cause is a question of
law.

(Internal citations omitted.) /d., 680-82.

Courts readily and frequently grant bills of discovery. See, e.g., Garfinkle v. Jewish Family

Servs. of Greater New Haven, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-
18-6087420-S, 2019 WL 1938591 (Apr. 8, 2019, Young, J.) (denying respondent’s motion to strike

petition for bill of discovery and holding that petitioner had “met burden of sufficiently alleging a

legal and factual claim of probable cause); see also Lewis v. Charter Oak, FCU, Superior Court,

judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6139314-S, 2021 WL 5277570 (Oct. 20, 2021,

Budzik, J.) (denying motion to dismiss petition because petitioner sought discovery limited in

nature and scope and finding that the “equities of [the] matter plainly weigh[ed] in favor of

[petitioner] due to information sought being “relatively easily obtained . . . in order to remedy

ongoing .... harm.”); Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 67 Conn. L. Rptr. 327 (Oct. 27, 2018, Moukawsher,

J.) (granting bill of discovery where floor manufacturer claimed former chemist misappropriated

trade secret with new employer); 399 Farmington Ave., LLC v. Bristol Gastroenterology Assoc.,

PC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6137507-S, 2021 WL 2929805-

S (June 17, 2021, Sheridan, J.) (granting petition for written discovery but limiting discovery “to

the minimum necessary to obtain” requested financial information “needed to substantiate the

petitioner’s claims.”).

On the other hand, Petitions are typically denied only under the rare circumstance where the

petitioner has failed to provide any factual detail to support potential causes of action against the

respondent, the requested discovery is too speculative in nature, or is otherwise barred by other

legal considerations not relevant to the instant Petition. See, e.g., Browne v. Meredith Corp.,

Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-20-6047109-S, 2022 WL

1049217 (Mar. 3, 2022, Kavanewsky, J.) (granting respondents’ motion to strike entirety of petition

for bill of discovery because petitioner offered only “rank suspicion” in support of potential claims);

see also Manzo-Ill v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 63 Conn. L. Rptr. 765 (Jan. 12, 2017, Povodator,

J.) (granting motion to strike petitions directed at numerous respondents because petitioner’s
“shotgun approach” in seeking discovery from seven different third parties and lack of factual

specificity failed to demonstrate probable cause as to each individual respondent)'; Reynolds v.

Ecker, 58 Conn. L. Rptr. 702 (Aug. 5, 2014, Wilson, J.) (denying petition in medical malpractice

action where petitioner merely “suspected” malpractice and failed to demonstrate probable cause);

b. Petitioner Has Probable Cause to Bring Causes of Action Against Respondents

The “probable cause” standard of proof applicable to bills of discovery is much lower than

the standard required to prove liability in a civil action. See Berger, supra, 230 Conn. at 8; see also

Ledgebrook Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Lusk Corp., 172 Conn. 577, 584 (1977). Under

Connecticut law, probable cause is defined as:

[A] bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the
law for the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary
caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in
entertaining it . . . . Probable cause is a flexible common sense
standard. It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely
true than false . . . In its determination of probable cause, the trial
court is vested with broad discretion ....

(Citations omitted.) TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 286 Conn. 132, 137 (2008).

The Berger Court emphasized that: “[t]here is a distinction between a would-be plaintiff

having to demonstrate the need for the information to determine whether a particular cause of

action is worthy of being pursued and a plaintiff having to prove definitively that he has a cause

of action and that he will probably prevail ultimately at the trial on the merits.” Berger, supra, 230

Conn. at 9. In petitioning the court for a bill of discovery, “the plaintiff need not . . . state each

claim with technical precision; he need only set forth facts that fairly indicate that he has some

potential cause of action.” Pottetti v. Clifford, 146 Conn. 252, 259 (1959).

' Judge Povodator later allowed the petitioner’s substitute bill of discovery because it “contain[ed] more detailed and
definitive allegations” than the prior version that had been stricken. Manzo-Ill v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 65 Conn.
L. Rptr. 109 (Aug. 28, 2018, Povodator, J.).
Here, Petitioner has probable cause that demonstrates the necessity and materiality of the

discovery sought. As described above, this matter concerns a motor vehicle collision in which

Petitioner sustained personal injuries due to the intoxication of the tortfeasor, Ouellette. Petitioner,

by way of Affidavit, has verified and declared in good faith that, at or around the time of the subject

collision, the responding police officer indicated that Ouellette had been “drinking at a strip club

in East Windsor.” See Houle III Aff., Ex. A, 18. Investigation by undersigned counsel has revealed

that MoCT is the owner and operator of a gentlemen’s club and bar that does business as Mardi

Gras II, which was the only such establishment in East Windsor at the time of the subject accident.

Unlike other cases in which courts have limited or outright rejected petitions for a bill of

discovery, the instant Petition is not founded upon mere speculation or conjecture. See, Manzo-Ill

v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., supra, 63 Conn. L. Rptr. 765; Jackson v. Yale New Haven Hospital,

Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-09-4038104-S, 2009 WL 4069276

(Oct. 26, 2009, Jones, J.) (granting motion to strike for failure of bill of discovery to be supported

by detailed facts evidencing probable cause to pursue claims).

Rather, the Petition is based primarily on the first-hand observations and knowledge of

Petitioner himself, see generally Houle III Aff., Ex. A, and concerns a motor vehicle accident for

which a police report was produced by the responding police officer. See generally R. Ofc. Vinci,

Ex. D. Therefore, Petitioner has a well-founded belief, based on both personal observation and

verifiable accounts of uninterested third parties, that he has viable causes of action against

Respondents, which include, but are not limited to:

As to Ouellette:
(1) Negligence;
(2) Common law recklessness; and
(3) Statutory recklessness (C.G.S. § 14-222)
As to MoCT:
(1) Violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-102, et seg.; and
(2) Reckless service of alcohol.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that he has demonstrated probable

cause to pursue these and other potential claims against Respondents.

c. The Discovery Sought is Material and Necessary to Petitioner’s Causes of Action

A petitioner seeking a bill of discovery “must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as

probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary to his action... A

plaintiff should describe with such detail as may be reasonably available the material he seeks.”

Berger, supra, 230 Conn. at 5-7. Potentially discoverable information is material and necessary if

“they pertained to the question [Petitioner] needs to answer: which of the many potential cause of

action against [the defendants] was most worthy of pursuit.” Jd. at 10.

In this case, Petitioner seeks to propound discovery requests, consisting of limited

interrogatories, documents, and potential deposition testimony, that he needs in order to conduct a

fulsome investigation into the merits of the potential causes of action identified above. The

discovery sought is narrowly tailored to the day of the subject motor vehicle accident and is limited

in scope to information that directly concerns the inquiries relevant to Petitioner’s claims, namely,

where Ouellette had consumed alcohol prior to the subject collision, and whether MoCT served

him alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated. These are the essential facts necessary for Petitioner

to determine what, if any, causes of action may be viable against Respondents or others.

Petitioner is acting in good faith in petitioning for a bill of discovery. As set forth below,

there are several factors beyond Petitioner’s control that necessitate the instant petition at this

juncture. Therefore, filing a petition for bill of discovery in this case is the “only method, short of

filing suit clumsily or wastefully, that would afford [Petitioner] access” to the requested discovery.

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Pottetti, supra, 146 Conn. at 258. Petitioner has no other purpose for filing the instant Petition

than to obtain information necessary to assess the viability of causes of action against Respondents

and other potentially liable parties whose identity is undiscoverable to Petitioner, in as timely a

manner as possible and to avoid the clear prejudice that would result absent the requested relief.

d. Petitioner Has No Other Adequate Means of Enforcing Discovery of the Desired Material

Presently, Petitioner and MoCT are the only other parties known to Petitioner who possess

the requested information and documents that are reasonably calculated to reveal whether

Petitioner has viable causes of action against Respondents and other potentially liable parties.

Moreover, there exist several extraneous factors beyond Petitioner’s control that significantly limit,

if not entirely neutralize, Petitioner’s ability to pursue the requested discovery in any manner other

than the instant Bill of Discovery. As a result, Petitioner has no other means of obtaining the

subject evidence and should be permitted to pursue the pre-suit discovery requested herein.

i. Ouellette is currently facing criminal prosecution relating to the subject motor
vehicle accident.
As of the date of the filing of this Petition, Ouellette is currently being prosecuted for

criminal offenses stemming from his involvement in the motor vehicle collision at issue. See

Pending Case Detail, Exhibit E. Given this pending criminal action, concerns regarding the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article first, § 9 of the Connecticut Constitution

are implicated.

The Fifth Amendment establishes that “[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. The Connecticut Constitution similarly

states that no person “shall be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Conn. Const., art. I, §

9. Consistent with these foundational principles of democracy, the United States Supreme Court

has held that the privilege “against self-incrimination not only protects the individual against being

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involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him

not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or

informal, where answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley,

414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).

To this end, the interplay between the right against self-incrimination and testimony

provided in a civil context is well-recognized under Connecticut law. Connecticut General Statutes

§ 52-199 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]Jn any hearing or trial, a party interrogated shall not be

obliged to answer a question or produce a document the answering or producing of which would

tend to incriminate him . . .” C.G.S. § 52-199(a).

In accordance with these constitutional and statutory protections, courts are understandably

cautious to compel production of testimony or documents where disclosure may create a real risk

of criminal prosecution. For example, in Murphy v. Nykaza, the Court sustained the defendant’s

objection to the plaintiff's motion to compel answers to deposition questions where the defendant

asserted his right against self-incrimination. 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 289 (May 12, 1995, Levin, J.). In

denying plaintiffs motion to compel the defendant’s testimony, the Court found that the applicable

statute of limitations for potential criminal prosecution relating to the defendant’s alleged

malfeasance had yet to expire, and, therefore, that the defendant was entitled to assert his Fifth

Amendment rights. /d. at *2-3.

Given Ouellette’s pending criminal prosecution, it is more likely than not that Ouellette

would object to providing any deposition testimony on grounds that any such evidence may be

used against him during the criminal proceedings. This consideration is relevant to the instant

Petition, insofar as the narrowly tailored discovery sought from Ouellette requests only

information that will not lead to any implication of his Fifth Amendment rights. See Burritt

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Interfinancial Bancorpration v. Brooke Pointe Assocs., 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 151 (Aug. 6, 1992, Blue,

J.) (holding that article first, § 8 of Connecticut Constitution protected defendants in civil action

“against the compulsory disclosure of incriminatory books and papers.”). In other words,

Ouellette’s identification of places where he consumed alcohol on February 19, 2024, other than

Mardi Gras II, along with production of any media or documentary information evidencing

consumption of alcohol, would not tend to expose him to any further prosecution for crimes, since

he is already being prosecuted for those exact offenses. See Grannis v. Branden, 5 Day 260, 262

(Conn. 1812).

Ouellette’s pending criminal action and his right against self-incrimination tip the scales of

equity heavily in favor of granting the instant Petition. The only other potential remedy available

to Petitioner to obtain the requested information from Ouellette would be by way of

commencement of a civil action. Given the aforementioned considerations, it would be both

premature and “clumsy” to commence a civil action against Ouellette at this juncture. See Pottetti,

supra, 146 Conn. at 258.

The requested discovery from Ouellette is both necessary and material to assessing the

merit of claims against MoCT, other purveyors who may have served Ouellette with alcohol on

the day in question, and any otherwise unidentifiable individuals against whom Petitioner may

assert claims under a theory of social host liability. See Dziadik v. Fretts, Superior Court, judicial

district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-17-6036161-S, 2023 WL 2889174 (Apr. 3, 2023, Roraback,

J.) (providing detailed discussion of cause of action against social host for provision of alcohol).

Because Ouellette is the only person who knows his whereabouts on the day of the subject

collision, and because commencing an action would be premature and likely implicate Ouellette’s

right against self-incrimination, the Court should grant the instant Petition.

12
ii. The Dram Shop Notice period necessitates the requested discovery be pursued
and permitted by the Court with immediacy.
As set forth above, Petitioner intends to pursue claims against MoCT arising from its

service of alcohol to Ouellette when he was visibly and obviously intoxicated, pursuant to the

Dram Shop Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-102, et seg. While these potential claims against MoCT

are founded upon a good faith belief and information obtained by Petitioner from the officer who

responded to the subject accident, there remains a distinct possibility that other establishments

and/or individuals served Ouellette with alcohol on February 19, 2024.?

Relevant to the instant Petition, the Dram Shop Act requires that any “aggrieved person...

shall give written notice to such seller [of alcohol] of such person’s . . . intention to bring an action

under this section. Such notice shall be given (1) within one hundred twenty days of the occurrence

of such injury to person or property . . . .” C.G.S. § 30-102.

In order to prevail on a Dram Shop claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the sale of the alcoholic

liquor; (2) that the sale was to an intoxicated person; and (3) that the intoxicated person caused

injury to another’s person or property as a result of his or her intoxication. Hayes v. Caspers. Ltd.,

90 Conn.App. 781, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 915 (2005).

The statutory notice period for any potential claims against other purveyors of alcohol for

violating the Dram Shop Act will expire one-hundred twenty days from the date of the subject

incident, on June 18, 2024. While Petitioner would certainly have viable causes of action against

any such purveyors for reckless service of alcohol, among others, causes of action sounding in

recklessness require a higher burden of proof and there is no analogous notice period. See Coble

v. Maloney, 34 Conn.App. 655, 661 (1997) (plaintiff must demonstrate defendants acted in manner

? As stated above, on or prior to the date of the filing of this Petition, undersigned counsel has put MoCT’s registered
principal and registered agent of service on notice of his intent to pursue claims under the Dram Shop Act, C.G.S. §
30-120b.

13
that tended to take on aspect of “highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure

from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.”); see also McGeever

v. Mulready, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-6012741-S, 2013

WL 3970249 at *2 (July 18, 2013, Roche, J.) (“To recover on a Dram Shop claim, a plaintiff must

establish perceivable signs of intoxication, whereas to recover on a reckless service of alcohol

claim a plaintiff must prove that the intoxication was patently obvious.”).

These concerns further underscore the urgency, necessity and materiality of the discovery

sought and the lack of any other viable method for obtaining the requested information. In

weighing the equities at this stage, as this Court must, it is clear that the imminent expiration of

Dram Shop’s statutory notice period, the lower burden of proof compared to other viable causes

of action that may be available to Petitioner against other purveyors, and Ouellette’s pending

criminal prosecution provide sufficient basis for this Court to grant the instant petition. Should

Petitioner’s Bill of Discovery be denied, it would unquestionably result in prejudice to Petitioner’s

ability to conduct the investigation necessary to not only identify other potentially liable parties,

but also to potentially rule out causes of action against either Respondent. Unlike the “mere fishing

expeditions” denied by other courts, Petitioner’s requested discovery is as narrowly tailored as

possible to elicit the information relevant to his claims, and no further.

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant its

Petition and allow the limited discovery set forth in the attached exhibits to proceed against the

Respondents.

14
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
PETITIONER,
Wie HOULEB=
IIL

By
Michael w¢ehbager (437858)
GOLDMAN, GRUDER & Woops, LLP
200 Connecticut Avenue
Norwalk, CT 06854
(203) 899-8900 (Office)
mstenger@goldmangruderwoods.com
Firm Juris No.: 411134

1S
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above, and a Notice of Petitioner’s intent to make

application to the court for the order set forth in this Petition, was or will immediately be served

upon Respondents pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-156a(2) at the addresses set forth below.

Petitioner will file a Return of Service upon receipt from the marshal(s) tasked with service

pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57.

Mason Ouellette
88 Beverly Heights
Middletown, CT 06457

Helen Santaniello
Principal
Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC
37 North Road
East Windsor, CT 06088

Helen Santaniello
Principal
Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC
582 Pinewood Drive
Longmeadow, MA 01106

Tammy Winstanley
Registered Agent of Service
Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC
29 Drummer Lane
Redding, CT 06896

By
Michael W. enger (437858)
GOLDMAN, GRUDER & Woops, LLP
200 Connecticut Avenue
Norwalk, CT 06854
(203) 899-8900 (Office)
mstenger@goldmangruderwoods.com
Firm Juris No.: 411134

16
RETURN DATE: MAY 21, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT

LOUIS HOULE III J.D. OF MIDDLESEX

Vv. AT MIDDLETOWN

METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC, and
MASON OUELLETTE » 2024

PROPOSED ORDER

The foregoing Verified Petition for Bill of Discovery, having been considered by the Court,

is hereby: GRANTED / DENIED

And it is further ordered that:

Petitioner Louis Houle III IS / IS NOT entitled to seek the limited discovery from

Respondents as described in the Petition and as set forth in Exhibit B and Exhibit C.

Responses to Interrogatories and the requested documentation are to be provided to

Petitioner no later than

Respondents’ failure to comply with this Order may result in the imposition of sanctions

pursuant to Practice Book § 13-14, et seq.

Dated this day of , 2024, at Middletown, Connecticut.

Judge of the Superior Court
EXHIBIT A

Affidavit of Louis Houle III, Petitioner
RETURN DATE: MAY 21, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT

LOUIS HOULE III J.D. OF MIDDLESEX

Vv. AT MIDDLETOWN

METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC, and
MASON OUELLETTE APRIL 17, 2024

AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS HOULE III

I, LOUIS HOULE II, hereby depose and state as follows:

I am over the age of eighteen and I understand and appreciate the obligations entailed with
making a sworn statement such as this affidavit.

I am the Petitioner in the above-captioned matter. The statements I make herein are based
on my own first-hand experiences and observations of the facts set forth below as I
presently recall them, and are true and accurate to the best of my recollection.

On February 19, 2024, shortly prior to 8:15 p.m., I was operating a black 2017 Ram 1500
southbound on Mill Street in Berlin, Connecticut.

At approximately 8:15 p.m., while I was operating my vehicle on Mill Street, I began
driving behind a Black Chevrolet truck, which was driving slowly along the right side of
the right of two lanes of travel, near the shoulder.

As I attempted to pass the truck, my vehicle was suddenly and without warning struck on
its rear right quadrant by the truck. Based on the positioning of the vehicles and the nature
of the collision, I believe the other driver was attempting to make a U-turn.

Following discussions with the responding Berlin Police Department Officer, I learned that
the driver of the other vehicle was Mason Ouellette.

I also learned from the responding officer that Ouellette had been “drinking at a strip club
in East Windsor” and that he had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.

I sustained personal injuries as a result of the accident, and I intend to seek compensation
against potentially liable parties.

**End of Affidavit**
**Signature Page to Follow**
VERIFICATION

I, Louis Houle III, hereby verify that the statements made in this Affidavit are true
and

accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made under the penalty of perjury.

Signed: Ske
Louis Houle III
Date:_4 //7/ Y

he
Sworn and subscribed to me this|"/_ day of April, 2024

AY A
PAULA A BERGERON
Notary Public
Connecticut
My iene Expires Jan 31, 2026

‘Notary. Public / Commissioner of the Superior Court
My commission expires:
vi
QA 71, 20%-
Gees
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EXHIBIT B
Proposed Interrogatories as to
Metropolis of Connecticut, LLC
RETURN DATE: MAY 21, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT

LOUIS HOULE III J.D. OF MIDDLESEX

V. AT MIDDLETOWN

METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC, and
MASON OUELLETTE APRIL 17, 2024

PETITIONER’S INTERROGATORIES AS TO
METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC

Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-156a, ef seq., and Connecticut Practice Book § 13-6, the

Petitioner, Louis Houle III, hereby propounds the following Interrogatories upon Metropolis of

Connecticut, LLC:

1 Provide the times (opening time and closing time) that Mardi Gras I] was open for business
on February 19, 2024.

ANSWER:

2 Provide the names and last known addresses of any agent, servant, or employee who
worked at Mardi Gras II and served alcoholic beverages to patrons on February 19, 2024.

ANSWER:

State whether Mardi Gras II was outfitted with video surveillance cameras of the exterior
or interior of the premises on February 19, 2024. If so, please identify:

a. How many such surveillance cameras were in operation on February 19, 2024;
Which area(s) of the premises each camera captures (i.e., front door,.bar, etc.);
Your normal/routine video surveillance retention policies; and
Whether video surveillance from February 19, 2024, is still available for
preservation and production.
ANSWER:
4. Identify the method(s) that Mardi Gras II accepted on February 19, 2024, for payment of
goods and services that it provides to its patrons (i.e., cash, credit card, etc.).

ANSWER:

State whether Mardi Gras II maintains copies of bills/checks rendered for provision of
goods and services, credit card transactions, receipts, or any other such equivalent
document or electronic system in which sales are registered/recorded. If so, please identify:
a. The typical business practice of Mardi Gras II pertaining to maintaining and/or
preserving any such records (i.e., how long are such records kept);
Any individual with managerial, administrative, or other such responsibilities who
would be authorized to collect payment for good and services rendered at Mardi
Gras II and who would have access to Mardi Gras II’s daily sales information;

Whether any receipts, bills, or other such records of transactions concerning sales
of goods and/or services at Mardi Gras II for February 19, 2024.
ANSWER:

State whether Mardi Gras II is in possession of any information that would demonstrate
that Mason Ouellette was a patron of Mardi Gras II on February 19, 2024. If so, please
provide:
a. The nature of such information (i.e., surveillance video, eyewitness observation,
etc.); and

b. The name(s) and address(es) of any individual(s) with knowledge of Ouellette’s
presence at Mardi Gras II on February 19, 2024.
ANSWER:
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
PETITIONER,
LOUIS OE

Michael tenger (437858)
GOLDMAN, GRUDER & Woops, LLP
200 Connecticut Avenue
Norwalk, CT 06854
(203) 899-8900 (Office)
mstenger@goldmangruderwoods.com
Firm Juris No.: 411134
VERIFICATION

L , authorized representative of Metropolis of

Connecticut, LLC, hereby verify that the responses to the foregoing Interrogatories are true and

accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are provided under the penalty of perjury.

Signed:
Print Name:
Date:

Sworn and subscribed to me this day of , 2024

Notary Public / Commissioner of the Superior Court
My commission expires:
EXHIBIT C

Proposed Interrogatories as to
Mason Ouellette
RETURN DATE: MAY 21, 2024 SUPERIOR COURT

LOUIS HOULE Tl J.D. OF MIDDLESEX

Vv. AT MIDDLETOWN

METROPOLIS OF CONNECTICUT, LLC, and
MASON OUELLETTE APRIL 17, 2024

PETITIONER’S INTERROGATORIES AS TO
MASON QUELLETTE

Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-156a, ef seg., and Connecticut Practice Book § 13-6, the

Petitioner, Louis Houle III, hereby propounds the following Interrogatories upon Mason Ouellette:

1 Provide the names and last known addresses of any individuals in whose presence you
recall consuming alcoholic beverages on February 19, 2024.

ANSWER:

2 State the address of any locations or premises where you consumed alcohol on February
19, 2024.

ANSWER:

3 Describe the quantity and nature of the alcoholic beverages you consumed on February 19,
2024 (i.e., 1 pint of beer, 2 glasses of wine, etc.).

ANSWER:
4 State the time of day you first consumed an alcoholic beverage on February 19, 2024.

ANSWER:

5 To the best of your recollection, describe any and all intoxicating substances you consumed
other than alcohol on February 19, 2024.

ANSWER:

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
PETITIONER,
LOUIS HOULE III

By
Michael W. nger (437858)
GOLDMAN, GRUDER & Woops, LLP
200 Connecticut Avenue
Norwalk, CT 06854
(203) 899-8900 (Office)
mstenger@goldmangruderwoods.com
Firm Juris No.: 411134
VERIFICATION
I, MASON OUELLETTE, hereby verify that the responses to the foregoing Interrogatories

are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are provided under the penalty

of perjury.

Signed:
Print Name:
Date:

Sworn and subscribed to me this day of , 2024

Notary Public / Commissioner of the Superior Court
My commission expires:
EXHIBIT D

Police Report
Officer Noah Vinci
Berlin Police Department
February 23, 2024
_Feb 28 2024 2:24PM UHG 8608285873 p-2

“Page 1 of 9 4

CONNECTICUT UNIFORM POLICE CRASH REPORT
Number of Motor Vehicles: Case Number: [2400002730
Automobiles, Motorayctes, etc. Form PR-1 REV October 2018
Number of Non-Motorists: Crash Summary (Front) DOT Identifier:
For DOT use only i Tr saa
Pedestrians, Bicyelists, etc.
rOrtveS) 5 BPW Drea 00 Label
OF 6 iD Ole BLO).
Date of Crash (Y¥YYYMMDD) ‘Time (0000-2359) * Tawn Name ‘Town # Crash Severity
20240219 | 20:15 ] Berlin [ 007 | | ©Fatal © InjuryE Pbo
Latitude Crash occurred on (street name or route #) at its intersection with (street name or route #)
41.619929816 [Mout sr | at[RT 9 S EXIT 31 RAMP
Ifnotat intersection: distance NSE, W name of nearest intersecting rod, town line or mile marker
Longitude O Feet
of |Route 9 S On Ramp
~72.731984204 @ Tenths of Mil

aor ea rere (Gi TNE OAR
O) wim OO MELO)
SAFFIeWAY OWNERSHIP LOCATION OF FIRST HARMFUL EVENT | FIRST HARMFUL EVENT. MANNER OF IMPACT

Cy
01. Public Road o1 ‘On Roadway Non-Collision: (Applies tor miulti-vehiele crashes)
2. Private Road
88. jot Applicable
TRAFIICWAY CLASS
02 . Shoulder
03 . Median
04, Roadside
0s. Gore
Co J
1. Overturn’Ro! ver
02. Fire / Explosion
0. Immersi 3, Full or Partsal
pe]
(01. Frontto Rear
102. Front to Front
103, Angle
01. Trafiiows On Road 94, Jackkaife 04. Sideswipe, Same Direction
02. Tratiicw: OL
jot on Read Separator 05, Cargo/Equipznent Loss ar Shift 05. Sideswipe, Opposite Direction
03. Non-Tnafi 07. _ In Parking Lane or Zone 06, Fell/Jumped froma Vebicte 06, Rear to Side
(04. ParkingLot 08 Off-Roadway Locaticn Unknown 07, Thrown or Falling Object 07. Rear t

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April 18, 2024

Case Filing Date

April 18, 2024

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Complaint,Petition: HOULE, III, LOUIS v. OUELLETTE, MASON Et Al

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