Preview
.92422
1 ERIC J. BENGTSON—BAR NO. 254167 4/16/2024
MORGAN W. HANSEN—BAR NO. 257846
2 DAVIS, BENGTSON & YOUNG, APLC
1960 The Alameda, Suite 210
3 San Jose, CA 95126
Phone: 669.245.4200
4 Fax: 408.985.1814 No Filing Fee for a Public Entity
Email: eric@dby-law.com or its Employees (Gov’t Code §6103)
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Attorneys for Defendant
6 REDWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
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10 A.A., by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Case No. 24-CIV-01556
F.K., (Assigned for All Purposes to the
11 Hon. V. Raymond Swope, Dept. 23)
Plaintiff,
12 DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT
vs. OF DEFENDANT REDWOOD CITY
13 SCHOOL DISTRICT’S DEMURRER TO
REDWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; COMPLAINT
14 and DOES 1-50, inclusive 14
Date: October 7, 2024
15 Defendants. Time: 2:00 p.m.
Dept.: 23
16 Judge: Hon. V. Raymond Swope
17 Complaint Filed: 3/11/24
18 Trial Date: tbd
19 I, Morgan W. Hansen, do hereby declare that:
20 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice in all of the courts in the State of
21 California and I am an attorney at the law firm Davis Bengtson & Young APLC, attorneys of record
22 for Defendant REDWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity school district (hereinafter
23 “District”).
24 2. In accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41, I met and conferred
25 with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the filing of this demurrer.
26 3. True and correct copies of the emails exchanged between the parties are attached hereto
27 as Exhibit A.
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Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendant Redwood City School District’s Demurrer to Complaint
.92422
1 4. On or about April 4. 2024, I spoke with Plaintiff’s Counsel telephonically. Although I
2 found the conversation to be cordial, the parties are at an impasse and require judicial intervention at
3 this time.
4 I do hereby declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the
5 foregoing is true and correct, and that this Declaration was executed on April 16, 2024, at San Jose,
6 California.
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9 ______________________________
MORGAN W. HANSEN
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Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendant Redwood City School District’s Demurrer to Complaint
EXHIBIT “A”
From: Morgan Hansen
To: Hani Ganji; Julie Heaton
Cc: rk@kermanillp.com; ma@kermanillp.com
Subject: RE: AA v. Redwood City School District
Date: Thursday, April 4, 2024 10:09:29 AM
Hani,
I have called you twice this morning. I left you a voicemail. You may try calling me back on Monday
early afternoon.
Morgan
From: Hani Ganji
Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2024 9:18 AM
To: Julie Heaton
Cc: rk@kermanillp.com; ma@kermanillp.com; Morgan Hansen
Subject: Re: AA v. Redwood City School District
My number below is fine.
Hani Ganji
KERMANI LLP
San Francisco | Los Angeles | Atlanta
t 415.690.8234 | hg@kermanillp.com | www.kermanillp.com
--
This e-mail message and any attachments may contain information that is
PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient of this
message, you may not use, disseminate, forward, copy, or print this e-mail; doing so
may violate the addressee's rights. If you have received this email in error, please
notify the sender immediately by replying to this message and destroy all copies of
this message and any attachments. Thank you.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 3:48 PM Julie Heaton wrote:
Tomorrow at 10:00 will work for us. Morgan Hansen will be giving you a call; please let me know
the number where you can be reached.
_____________________________________
Julie Heaton, Legal Assistant to Eric Bengtson
Davis, Bengtson & Young APLC
1960 The Alameda, Suite 210
San Jose, CA 95126
669 245-4200 Office
408 261-4273 Direct
408 985-1814 Fax
Email: jheaton@dby-law.com
From: Hani Ganji
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 2:38 PM
To: Julie Heaton
Cc: rk@kermanillp.com; ma@kermanillp.com
Subject: Re: AA v. Redwood City School District
Hello - thanks for your email. We disagree with your position. Happy to discuss further
telephonically. I'm available tomorrow at 10am.
Best,
Hani Ganji
KERMANI LLP
San Francisco | Los Angeles | Atlanta
t 415.690.8234 | hg@kermanillp.com | www.kermanillp.com
--
This e-mail message and any attachments may contain information that is
PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient of this
message, you may not use, disseminate, forward, copy, or print this e-mail; doing
so may violate the addressee's rights. If you have received this email in error,
please notify the sender immediately by replying to this message and destroy all
copies of this message and any attachments. Thank you.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:39 PM Julie Heaton wrote:
Dear Counsel:
Served with this email is a meet-and-confer letter from Eric Bengtson. Once you have
reviewed it and are ready to discuss, please let me know and I’ll schedule a phone call.
In addition, would you please provide me with the proof of service on summons showing
when the District was served with the complaint?
Thanks,
Julie Heaton
_____________________________________
Julie Heaton, Legal Assistant to Eric Bengtson
Davis, Bengtson & Young APLC
1960 The Alameda, Suite 210
San Jose, CA 95126
669 245-4200 Office
408 261-4273 Direct
408 985-1814 Fax
Email: jheaton@dby-law.com
April 3, 2024
By Email Only
Ramin Kermani-Nejad, Esq.
Mohamad Ahmad, Esq.
Hani Ganji, Esq.
KERMANI LLP
2719 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 250
Santa Monica, CA 90403
rk@kermanillp.com
ma@kermanillp.com
hg@kermanillp.com
Re: A.A. v. Redwood City School District
San Mateo County Superior Court Case No. 24-CIV-01556
Our File No.: 12618.92422
Dear Counsel:
Our firm has been retained by Defendant Redwood City School District (“District”), a
public entity public school district, named in the civil lawsuit filed by your client, A.A.
(“Plaintiff”), through his Guardian ad Litem, F.K., in the San Mateo County Superior Court
matter, referenced above.
Meet & Confer
Pursuant Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41(a), please allow this letter to function as our
meet and confer effort regarding the potential deficiencies of the Complaint. Once you have had
a chance to review this correspondence, please feel free to give me a call so we can discuss
further via telephone.
Demurrer
A. Allegations in Complaint
As you are aware, through his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that on or about November
28, 2023, he was sent to Hoover Elementary’s “Chill Room” by his teacher. (Complaint, ¶10).
He contends that another minor student, Student X, came into the “Chill Room” while Plaintiff
was there unsupervised. (Id., ¶12). Plaintiff then contends that Student X chased him, tackled
him, removed his pants, and sexually assaulted him. (Id., ¶13).
The Complaint asserts two separate causes of action in total:
1. Violation of Mandatory Statutory Duties
2. Negligent Supervision, Training, Retention & Entrustment
B. First Cause of Action: Violation of Mandatory Statutory Duties
As a public entity, the District can only be liable for duties specifically created by statute.
Common law tort liability is precluded against public entities. (Miklosy v. Regents of University
of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876.) As the Legislative Committee Comments to Government
Code § 815 explain, “the practical effect of this section is to eliminate any common law
governmental liability for damages arising out of torts.” (Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 778, 792, as modified (June 1, 1998); Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore
(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 49, 63.) Further “[t]here is no common law governmental tort liability in
California; and except as provided by statute, there is no liability on the part of a public entity for
any act or omission of itself, a public employee, or any other person.” (Green Valley Landowners
Association v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 441-442.)
In other words, public entities can only be held liable if a statute declares them to be
liable. (Gov. Code § 815(a); Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.)
The statute must impose a mandatory duty. Gov. Code § 815.6 clarifies:
“Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is
designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity
is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge
the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence
to discharge the duty.” (Cal. Gov Code Section 815.6.)
In support of Plaintiff’s first cause of action for “Violation of Mandatory Statutory
Duties”, Plaintiff contends that the District had a duty to provide him a safe place to attend
school and that the District owed Plaintiff a” duty of care to provide safe care and supervision.”
(Complaint, ¶21). The Complaint then suggests that the District breached mandatory statutory
duties found under Education Code Sections 44807 and 44808 and California Code of
Regulations, Title 5, Section 5552. (Id.)
First, to the extent that this cause of action is alleging that the District breached a duty of
care to the Plaintiff, this is a negligence-based cause of action and does not amount to a violation
of a mandatory statutory duty.
Second, Education Code Sections 44807 states, in pertinent part, that “every teacher in
the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from
school, on the playgrounds, or during recess.” The alleged incident did not take place on the way
to or from school nor did it occur on the playground or doing recess. Notwithstanding this, by its
terms, Education Code section 44807 requires only "teacher[s]" to hold pupils to a strict account
for their conduct; it does not purport to impose a mandatory duty more broadly on any public
entity. Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 939. There is no cause of action
for a breach of this statute.
Similarly, Education Code Section 44808 provides that no school district shall be
responsible for the safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when the pupil is not on
school property unless the district has undertaken to provide transportation for the pupil to and
from the school premises, has undertaken a school sponsored activity off the premises of such
school, or has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or has failed to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances. The statute is often cited to cloak public school districts
with immunity for off-campus injuries. First, the incident in question occurred on campus – not
off campus. Second, it is not immediately apparent what relevance the statute has in this matter.
Notwithstanding this, we are unaware of any basis for an affirmative cause of action under this
statute.
Finally, California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Section 5552 governs playground
supervision. Specifically, it mandates that the principal provides supervision of pupils on school
grounds during recess where playground supervision is not otherwise available. Again, the
Complaint says nothing of recess or playground supervision.
Consequently, we plan on filing a demurrer to the First Cause of Action and will request
that the Court sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.
C. Second Cause of Action: Negligent Supervision, Training, Retention &
Entrustment
All liability against public entities must be based on statute. (See Gov. Code § 815; Lopez
v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, fn. 2.) A duty to “train” is indisputably
a duty created solely through common law by the Court’s ruling in Juarez v. Boy Scouts of
America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal. App.4th 377. The District is immune from this or any common law
duty. (Green Valley Landowners Association v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425,
442.)
Further, the Juarez opinion imposed a duty on the Boy Scouts of America (and that entity
only) to educate, train and warn Scouts about the dangers of childhood sexual abuse. The Juarez
court emphasized that “the reach of [its] opinion is only intended to extend as far as the records
before [it] today.” (Juarez, supra, at p. 409) (emphasis added.) The Juarez holding is narrow; in
fact, no subsequent California cases have expanded its decision beyond the Boy Scouts of
America.
With respect to “negligent entrustment,” the Plaintiff fails to identify any statutory basis
for the District’s liability for this common law cause of action. As noted above, Section 815, sub.
(a) and 815.6 require an authorizing statute or enactment before a governmental entity such as a
public school district can be liable in tort.
We plan on filing a demurrer to the Second Cause of Action unless you can amend it
sufficiently to address these issues.
D. Proposed Amendment
If you were to eliminate these two causes of action and replace them with a single
negligence cause of action under Gov. Code 815.2, we would most likely forego the demurrer
and file an answer to the amended complaint.
Teleconference to Discuss Further
Thank you for taking the time to review this correspondence.
As noted above, we are required by statute to meet and confer via telephone prior to the
filing of a demurrer. Once you have had a chance to review this letter, please feel free to give me
a call or email me to schedule a time for us to discuss further.
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation.
Very truly yours,
DAVIS BENGTSON & YOUNG, APLC
Eric. J. Bengtson, Esq.
EJB/MWH/jh
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1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 I, the undersigned, say:
3 I am a citizen of the United States. My business address is 1960 The Alameda, Suite 210,
San Jose, CA 95126. I am employed with Davis Bengtson & Young, APLC in the County of Santa
4 Clara, where this service occurs. I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within matter.
On the date set forth below, I served the attached document(s) described as follows:
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DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT REDWOOD CITY
6 SCHOOL DISTRICT’S DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
7 on the following person(s) in this action by providing a true copy thereof, to the following:
8 Attorneys for Plaintiff
Ramin Kermani-Nejad
9 Mohamad Ahmad
Hani Ganji
10 Kermani LLP
2719 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 250
11 Santa Monica, CA 90403
424-253-4254
12 rk@kermanillp.com
ma@kermanillp.com
13 hg@kermanillp.com
14 [ ] (BY MAIL) I am familiar with my firm’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for
mailing with the United States Postal Service, to wit, that correspondence will be deposited with the United
15 States Postal Service this same day in the ordinary course of business. Following ordinary business practices,
I sealed said envelope and placed it for collection and mailing on April 16, 2024.
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[ ] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight
17 delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) listed above. I placed the envelope or
package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight
18 delivery carrier.
19 [XX] (BY EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s)
at the electronic service address(es) listed above.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
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is true and correct and that this Declaration was executed on April 16, 2024.
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Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendant Redwood City School District’s Demurrer to Complaint