Preview
Docket No.: FST-CV-22-6059354-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
ISAAC CASTRO : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
: STAMFORD/NORWALK
v. :
: at STAMFORD
KEOGH, BURKHART & VETTER, et al. :
______________________________________ : April 29, 2023
DEFENDANTS CRONE & CASSONE’S AND JOHN A. CASSONE’S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO
REQUEST TO REVISE SUBSTITUTE COMPLAINT
The defendants, Crone & Cassone and John A. Cassone (collectively referred to herein as
“Cassone”) hereby file their Reply to the plaintiff’s Objection (Entry No. 140.00) to Cassone’s
Request to Revise (Entry No. 139.00) the Substitute Complaint (Entry No 133.00). Cassone notes
that among other deficiencies, the plaintiff, Isaac Castro (“Castro”), impermissibly deleted from
his Objection all of the “Reasons for Requested Revision” sections of Cassone’s Request to
Revise.1 This stratagem at least creates the possibility that the Court might be misled into
believing that Cassone did not proffer reasons for the various requested revisions. Those sections
have been restored herein, along with Cassone’s substantive replies to the objections asserted by
Castro.
The defendants also advise the Court that as detailed herein, they have withdrawn Requests
5-9, leaving Requests 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 for adjudication.
1
Practice Book § 10-36 required Cassone to set forth the reasons supporting each of the
requests to revise and to “provide sufficient space in which the party to whom the request is
directed can insert an objection and the reasons therefor.” Cassone served Castro’s counsel with a
Word version of the Request to Revise on December 6, 2023 in order to allow him the ability to
insert his objections. Rather than do this, Castro’s counsel summarily deleted all of the “Reasons
for Requested Revision” before inserting his objections. The Practice Book allows counsel to
insert his objections; it does not permit him to alter the Requests to Revise by deleting opposing
counsel’s reasons supporting the revisions.
1
1. First Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 18, which reads:
18. Paragraph 32 of the Contract provides terms that “All notices under this
Agreement shall be in writing and shall be delivered by email, facsimile
transmission, certified mail, or by overnight courier, addressed to the attorney for
the respective party. Notice signed by the respective attorneys shall be deemed
sufficient within the meaning of this paragraph without the signature of the parties
themselves. Electronic signatures of parties and of the attorneys for the parties on
this Agreement notices, or amendments to this Agreement shall be deemed to have
the full force and effect of an original signature.” Hereinafter, this provision of
the Contract shall be referred to as “Notice.”
Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph to refer to
paragraph 32 of the Contract as the “Notice provision” instead of simply as “Notice.”
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
are able to defend against those claims.
Paragraph 32 of the Contract does not define any specific type of “notice;” rather, it simply
provides the requirements for all of the notices contemplated by the Contract. These include
notice of termination, notice of the inability to obtain a mortgage, notice of demand for return of
the down payment, notice of default, and the like. As shown in other requests to revise that follow,
by proclaiming that “Notice” means the requirements governing notices as detailed in paragraph
32, and not any particular kind of notice, it is impossible for the defendants to understand the
various allegations in plaintiff’s Substitute Complaint that allege that the defendants failed to give
(or inadequately gave) “Notice,” because nowhere in the Substitute Complaint does plaintiff
identify the specific type of notice that was allegedly not given or insufficiently given. That
2
difficulty is easily obviated by plaintiff referring to paragraph 32 as the “Notice provision” and, as
requested below, specifically identifying the notice(s) that it claims defendants failed to give or
gave inadequately.
3
Reply to Objection: Castro’s objection is without merit. The contract at issue
provides for numerous different types of notice. Castro contends that the defendants either
failed to give one or more of these notices, inadequately gave one or more of these notices, or
both. The haphazard manner in which Castro sets forth his allegations, however, renders it
impossible to know (a) upon which notice or notices Castro’s claims are premised or (b)
whether Castro contends that any one or more of those notices was either not given at all or
given inadequately/improperly. It cannot seriously be argued that the defendants are not
entitled to know the specific allegations being asserted against them. Further, Castro’s
persistent refusal, over many months, to provide the required specificity combined with his
absurd arguments (suggesting he could have referred to inadequate/unprovided notices as
“Hot Fudge Sundae”) strongly suggests that he himself has no idea what it is he is claiming in
this case. Regardless, there is no sound basis for the Court to not require that specific
references to the notice provision of the contract (i.e., ¶ 32 of the contract) be alleged as the
“notice provision” and, where Castro contends a specific type of notice (termination, failure
to obtain mortgage, claimed default by the seller, etc.) was either not given or given
improperly, to specifically identify the notice(s).
2. Second Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 29-30, which read:
29. The Contract provides in part, under paragraph 5, that “BUYER agrees to make
prompt application for such a loan and to pursue said application with diligence. If having
done so, the BUYER is unable to obtain written commitment for such Loan on or before July
8, 2022, and if BUYER so notifies SELLER or SELLER’S attorney, as provided in
paragraph 32, at or before 6:00 p.m. on said date, then SELLER shall have the option to
extend the mortgage contingency date or terminate this Agreement, which shall then be null
and void, and the BUYER shall be entitled to the immediate return buy SELLER of all
sums paid by the BUYER on account of this Agreement except for the sum of Four
Hundred Fifty ($450.00) Dollars towards the cost of preparation of this Agreement.”
4
30. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant SELLER exercised any rights provided under the
Contract’s paragraph 5 provisions before or after July 8, 2022.
Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete these paragraphs as
irrelevant and immaterial to any of the causes of action asserted in the Substitute Complaint.
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” In
addition, Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious,
scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.”
Put simply, if neither party exercised any of the rights set out in paragraph 5 of the
Contract, there is no reason to even refer to paragraph 5 in the Substitute Complaint. Including
these paragraphs does not advance any of the causes of action alleged and can only serve to
confuse the issues. They ought to be omitted.
5
Reply to Objection: Castro’s argument succinctly proves Cassone’s point. After
alleging in ¶29 what he believes he, as the “BUYER,” would be entitled to if the Seller
exercised rights granted under ¶ 32 of the subject contract, Castro alleges in ¶ 30 that the
Seller did not exercise those rights. That is precisely why these allegations are irrelevant and
should be omitted.
3. Third Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 32, which reads:
32. The Contract provided in part, under paragraph 19, that “The SELLER agrees to
deliver, simultaneously with the closing of title, exclusive possession of the Premises…”
Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete this paragraph as irrelevant
and immaterial to any of the causes of action asserted in the Substitute Complaint.
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” In
addition, Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious,
scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.”
As even a cursory reading of the Substitute Complaint makes clear, there was no closing of
the transaction contemplated by the Contract. As a result, there is no need for an allegation that
the Seller (who is no longer a party to this litigation) agreed to deliver possession of the Premises
at the closing. While the undisputed fact that no closing occurred might be relevant to the claims
that plaintiff asserts against Cassone, the fact that the Seller agreed to convey possession as part of
the closing is not. The paragraph ought to be omitted.
6
Objection to Request:
Reply to Objection: Castro’s objection conflates his claimed right to specific
performance of the subject contract from the Seller with the damages theoretically
recoverable from Cassone. Cassone was never the owner of the subject property; there are
no circumstances pursuant to which this case could possible end with an order or award that
compelled him to specifically perform the real estate sale described in the contract. Further,
Castro has settled his claims against the Seller and withdrawn this lawsuit as to the Seller
7
(Entry No. 134.00), thereby removing from this case any possibility of an order of specific
performance.2 Finally, to the extent that Castro continues to mistakenly believe that
somehow such an order is still a viable remedy here, he may wish to remember that specific
performance would require that he pay to the Seller the sum of $462,500.00.
4. Fourth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 59 and 60, which read:
59. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY3 failed to exercise a
standard of care to communicate timely, diligently, and/or effectively on behalf of Plaintiff.
60. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in
their exercise of care owed to the Plaintiff in their representation for the purchase of the
Property.”
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise these paragraphs such
that the defendants are informed of the specific ways in which they allegedly deviated from the
requisite standard of care.
Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
are able to defend against those claims.
2
Castro’s reliance on the possibility of an order of specific performance also ignores his
own pleading, which alleges that the subject property was sold to a third party on September 12,
2022 (Substitute Complaint, ¶ 25).
3
The Substitute Complaint defines “BUYER’S ATTORNEY” as John A. Cassone.
Substitute Complaint, ¶ 7. “C&C” refers to defendant Crone & Cassone. Substitute Complaint, ¶ 6.
8
“Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is
to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until
the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River
Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203
Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise
his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn.
144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff).
Plaintiffs most frequently allege professional negligence by asserting that a defendant
“failed to meet the applicable standard of care in one or more of the following ways” and then
listing subparagraphs that provide the court and counsel with the specific acts or omissions upon
which plaintiff intends to rely to prove the defendant’s malpractice. Where a plaintiff does not
follow that generally accepted practice, as here, it creates difficulty in determining exactly what
claims of professional negligence are being advanced. These two paragraphs do not provide any
assistance to that endeavor.4 In paragraph 59, for example, the defendants are left to guess what
communications they failed make timely, as opposed to diligently, as opposed to effectively.
Defendant’s conundrum is this: for what unmade/untimely/inadequately conveyed
communications are defendants being sued? What facts support the plaintiff’s contention(s) that
the communication(s) were lacking, late or ineffective?
Paragraph 60 is similarly vague and uncertain of meaning. How were the defendants
“negligent in their exercise of care owed to the Plaintiff in their representation?” Connecticut is a
fact pleading state. The defendants are entitled to know the facts upon which plaintiff relies so that
4
As shown in the Fifth Request to Revise, below, plaintiff cannot persuasively argue that
the paragraphs that follow paragraphs 59 and 60 provide the required specificity regarding their
negligence claims.
9
they can mount an appropriate defense. Further, the vagueness of these two paragraphs not only
prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to
introduce at trial virtually unlimited evidence or arguments. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of
the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132
Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). The plaintiff should revise these two paragraphs so that the
defendants are fully and fairly apprised of the claims being asserted against them.
Objection to Request:
10
Reply to Objection: This objection is both incomprehensible and incorrect.
Respectfully, Cassone no idea what “[a] conclusion statement that the conduct of the plaintiff
is not necessary when the conduct of the Defendant is described in detail throughout the
complaint” means.
5. Fifth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 61-62, which read:
61. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide
Notice as necessary under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could
materially impact Plaintiff or Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the
Contract.
62. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide
Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when
they failed to make necessary communications under Paragraph 20 of the Contract.5
63. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide
Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when
they failed to make respond [sic] to Defendant KBV’s correspondences or send any email
from July 15, 2022 to August 5, 202. That, in the alternative, the Defendant C&C and/or
Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in the provision of Notice as necessary
under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could materially impact Plaintiff or
Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the Contract.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise these paragraphs to allege
specifically what notice(s) the defendants failed to give.
Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
5
The Substitute Complaint defines “Defendant KBV” as the law firm Keogh, Burkhart &
Vetter. Substitute Complaint, ¶ 3.
11
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
can defend against those claims.
“Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is
to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until
the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River
Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203
Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise
his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn.
144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff).
As noted earlier, plaintiff’s decision to define the word “Notice” in the Substitute
Complaint to mean the requirements for notices given pursuant to the Contract leads to a situation
where all of these paragraphs are essentially meaningless. Indeed, the defendants cannot even
begin to guess at what they mean. The Substitute Complaint refers to several different types of
notice. See, Substitute Complaint ¶ 28 (which mentions both “Notice to the Escrow Agent . . .
demanding payment of the Deposit” and “Notice of an objection to the proposed payment”); ¶ 29
(notice of failure to obtain a mortgage by the mortgage contingency date); ¶ 31 (“Notice of
Contract”); ¶¶ 34-35 (Notice of termination). To which of these does paragraph 61, which alleges
the failure to give “Notice as necessary under the Contract,” refer?
Because the plaintiff does not identify the “Notice” that he claims Cassone failed to
provide, it is impossible for Cassone to formulate a cogent response to the Substitute Complaint.
Further, the vagueness of the allegation as currently existing not only prejudices Cassone in
responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial
evidence or arguments about a variety of notices. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of
New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349,
12
44 A.2d 64 (1945). As a result, the plaintiff should specifically identify the notice(s) that he
claims Cassone was required to provide and which Cassone allegedly failed to provide.
Paragraph 62 is similarly deficient. Plaintiff there alleges that defendants “failed to provide
Notice . . . when they failed to make necessary communications under Paragraph 20 of the
Contract.” Plaintiff’s only other reference paragraph 20 of the Contract occurs in paragraph 33 of
the Substitute Complaint. That paragraph makes it abundantly clear that paragraph 20 of the
Contract does not mention any required “notice” or “communication.”6 If plaintiff intends to seek
monetary damages from the defendants for not providing a notice or making “necessary
communications” under paragraph 20 of the Contract, which mentions neither, he ought to be
required to allege what that notice/communication requirement is so that the defendants know why
it is the plaintiff is suing them.
Objection to Request to Revise:
Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request.
6. Sixth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 63, which reads:
63. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide
Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when
they failed to make respond [sic] to Defendant KBV’s correspondences or send any email
from July 15, 2022 to August 5, 202. That, in the alternative, the Defendant C&C and/or
Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in the provision of Notice as necessary
6
Paragraph 20 of the Contract pertains to “Liability for Delayed Closing.”
13
under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could materially impact Plaintiff or
Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the Contract.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph such that
the defendants are informed of the “correspondences” from “Defendant KBV” to which they failed
to respond. In addition, Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise the second sentence of paragraph
63, which is a variation on the theme first articulated in paragraph 61, by alleging specifically what
notice(s) defendants gave negligently and how such notice(s) were defective.
Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
are able to defend against those claims.
“Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is
to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until
the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River
Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203
Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise
his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn.
144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff).
Here, plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to respond to unidentified
“correspondences” from Keogh, Burkhart & Vetter. It is impossible for defendants to defend
against that allegation unless the plaintiff identifies the correspondences to which he refers.
14
The “alternative” portion of paragraph 63 is substantially the same as paragraph 61, but
now the plaintiff claims negligent provision of unidentified “Notice.” At risk of repetition,
because the plaintiff does not identify the “Notice” that he claims Cassone provided negligently, it
is impossible for Cassone to formulate a cogent response to the Substitute Complaint. In addition,
Cassone is entitled to know the way(s) in which plaintiff contends Cassone was negligent in
providing the notice(s) mentioned in this paragraph. Finally, the vagueness of the allegation as
currently existing not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also
could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial evidence or arguments about a variety of notices. See
Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302
(1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). As a result, the plaintiff should
specifically identify the notice(s) that he claims Cassone was required to provide and which
Cassone allegedly provided negligently.
Objection to Requests:
Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request.
7. Seventh Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 65, which reads:
65. That, as a result of Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY’s
nonfeasance, negligence, or failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care, the
Plaintiff sustained significant losses including the security deposit, the ability to demand
specific performance under the Contract, and the additional consequential and related
damages as a result of those losses.
15
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph to delete
the claim that the plaintiff’s damages include the loss of the security deposit.
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any
unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.”
On information and belief, the plaintiff’s security deposit has been fully refunded. As a
result, the plaintiff should remove this claimed loss from the list of damages it seeks to recover
against Cassone.
Objection to Request:
16
Reply to Objection: Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s intemperate and incorrect
suggestions that the defendants’ actions are “vexatious” and “consistent with their false
reporting on the status of discovery,” the defendants will withdraw this request and will
simply deny the allegation related to the security deposit at the appropriate time.
8. Eighth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 66, which reads:
66. That the failure by Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY to
communicate timely with Defendant SELLER, Defendant KBV and/or Defendant ESCROW
AGENT and the continued failure to provide all documentation relating to the legal
representation (including all communications made pursuant to the representation) upon
request to the Plaintiff by Defendant C&C and or [sic] Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEYS
ATTORNEY and otherwise acting without the requisite duty of care requisite to the license
to practice law with in [sic] the state of Connecticut has resulted in unnecessary legal
expenses and costs borne by the Plaintiff.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph in the
following ways: (a) by specifically identifying to what the alleged “failure . . . to communicate
timely” with the Seller, Seller’s attorney, and/or the Escrow Agent refers; (b) by specifically
identifying the “documentation relating to the legal representation” that plaintiff claims Cassone
has “continued” to failed to provide; (c) by specifically alleging the ways in which plaintiff
contends Cassone has “otherwise act[ed] without the requisite duty of care requisite to the license
to practice law” in Connecticut; and (d) identifying the “unnecessary legal expenses and costs” that
plaintiff contends are recoverable against Cassone.
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
17
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
can defend against those claims.
“Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is
to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until
the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River
Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203
Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise
his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn.
144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff).
There are numerous insufficiencies with respect to the allegations in paragraph 65 that
deprive the defendants of the ability to understand exactly why it is that the plaintiff is suing them.
Those insufficiencies are as follows:
(a) The lack of detail provided in this paragraph (and the Substitute Complaint as a whole)
regarding the “communication” that plaintiff contends the defendants did not have with the
Seller or Seller’s attorney (who was also the Escrow Agent) prevents the defendants from
understanding exactly why the plaintiff is suing them. Plaintiff’s failure to allege specific
facts regarding the oft-repeated but never specified claims of lack of communication,
failure to communicate, lack of “Notice” (whatever that means), insufficiency of “Notice,”
etc. is referenced in Requests to Revise 2, 4, 5, and 6. This case has been pending for more
than a year. The defendants have requested on more than one occasion that the plaintiff
provide facts supporting his conclusory claims of lack of communication or “Notice” (or
the insufficient nature of the unidentified communications or notices). Plaintiff’s steadfast
refusal to include these facts in the Substitute Complaint make it impossible for the
defendants to respond to the Substitute Complaint or to adequately defend themselves. As
noted earlier, Connecticut is a fact pleading state. The defendants are entitled to know the
facts upon which plaintiff relies so that they can mount an appropriate defense. Further, the
vagueness of these allegations not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute
Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial virtually unlimited
evidence or arguments. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242
Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d
64 (1945). The plaintiff should revise this paragraph so that the defendants are fully and
fairly apprised of the claims being asserted against them as they relate to alleged lack of
communication with the Seller or the Seller’s Attorney/Escrow Agent.
18
(b) The lack of detail provided in this paragraph regarding the “documentation relating to
the legal representation” that plaintiff claims Cassone has “continued” to failed to provide
plaintiff also makes it impossible for the defendants to adequately defend themselves, for
all of the reasons noted in subparagraph (a), above. Moreover, a fair reading of paragraphs
67-73 of the Substitute Complaint is that Cassone in fact did provide the “documentation”
that Castro requested within three weeks of it having been requested prior to suit, other
than the claim that a single email was not provided.7 That email is described in paragraph
72, which notably contains details about the date, time and contents of the allegedly
unproduced email. According to plaintiff, the omission of this single email (which plaintiff
asserts, without evidence, was intentional) led him to leave Cassone out of the first lawsuit
that he filed (¶ 73). The Court can take judicial notice that the first lawsuit was filed on
October 28, 2022.8 This lawsuit was initiated on December 20, 2022, less than two months
later. It appears, then, that the plaintiff obtained the allegedly missing email that prompted
him to include Cassone as a defendant within a few weeks.
Ignoring for now the triviality of the plaintiff’s complaints about these allegedly
unprovided documents prior to the initiation of suit, the defendants are entitled to know
whether this is the full constellation of allegedly unprovided documents about which
plaintiff here complains. If so, then he should revise the Substitute Complaint to indicate
that. If not, then he should revise the Substitute Complaint to identify all of the
“documentation” that he claims the defendants have failed to provide to him and the basis
upon which he asserts the defendants had a duty to provide it.
(c) The broad and all-encompassing allegation that Cassone has “otherwise act[ed] without
the requisite duty of care” is too vague to satisfy Connecticut’s fact pleading requirements.
As noted several times herein, defendants are entitled to be fully and fairly apprised of the
claims being asserted against them. If Castro believes that Cassone has “otherwise”
deviated from the standard of care, our rules of procedure requires that he specifically
identify all of the ways in which he claims Cassone did so.
(d) Finally, the defendants request that Castro identify the “unnecessary legal expenses and
costs” that he believes are recoverable from Cassone. To the extent that this refers to the
expenses and costs of this litigation, they are not recoverable in a legal malpractice claim
because Connecticut follows the so-called “American rule” that requires parties to bear
their own legal fees and expenses. If Castro is referring to legal expenses and costs
unrelated to this litigation, he should identify what they are.
7
Castro also alleges that Cassone did not initially provide a copy of the executed Contract,
which “prompted Plaintiff to ask” for it. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff
filed the executed Contract as an Exhibit on the electronic docket for this case on January 12,
2023, so the inclusion of a paragraph in the Substitute Complaint that complains about the non-
production of a document that was clearly either produced to plaintiff or already in his possession
is befuddling.
8
Isaac Castro v. Keogh, Burkhart & Vetter, et al., docket number FST-CV-22-6058757-S.
19
Objection to Request:
Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request.
9. Ninth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 74, which reads:
74. That Plaintiff suffered further economic loss due to further failure to timely provide all
documents in Plaintiff’s file with Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph by
specifically alleging the facts upon which he bases the claim that defendants “further” failed to
provide “all documents” and the “further economic loss” which plaintiff claims resulted.
Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
can defend against those claims.
“Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is
to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until
the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River
20
Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203
Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise
his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn.
144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff).
This paragraph, without more, is meaningless. Plaintiff has alleged – inadequately, as
described above – that the defendants failed to provide unspecified “documentation.” Here,
plaintiff doubles down, asserting that there was a “further failure to timely provide all documents,”
without bothering to allege any facts in support of that claim. What additional failure(s) were
there? When did it/they occur? What, specifically, was not provided? What “further economic
loss” did this cause? At risk of redundancy, the plaintiff is required to set forth his claims in a
manner that ensures that the defendants are fully and fairly apprised of the facts upon which the
plaintiff bases his claims. This paragraph falls far short of that requirement, and is so vague that it
will allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial virtually unlimited evidence or arguments. See Grimes
v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997);
Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945).
Objection to Request:
21
Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request.
10. Tenth Requested Revision
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 84, which reads:
84. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 36
and 81 through 97 of this Complaint inclusively, with the same force and effect as if more
fully set forth herein….
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff either delete this paragraph or
revise it such that it makes sense.
Reasons for Requested Revision: This paragraph is the introduction to the first of
plaintiff’s two identical CUTPA counts. This count is asserted against the law firm of Crone and
Cassone; the following identical count is against Attorney John Cassone. Because they are
identical (and therefore redundant), this request to revise, and all that follow, are equally applicable
to both counts.9
Put simply, as phrased this paragraph is incomprehensible. Cassone here purports to
incorporate by reference paragraphs that do not exist. He is attempting to incorporate by reference
paragraphs that have not yet been asserted (i.e., ¶¶ 85-97), and he follows that incorporation by alleging
those very paragraphs. Read literally, the first 13 paragraphs of this count are being alleged two times,
consecutively. The plaintiff should either delete this paragraph in its entirety or revise it to accurately
allege which of the preceding paragraphs of the Substitute Complaint he intends to incorporate by
reference.
9
For the sake of brevity, Cassone will not repeat this and all following requests for
revisions a second time in connection with the second CUTPA claim, and asks that the Court treat
this and all of the following requests as applicable to each of the CUTPA counts.
22
Objection to Request:
Reply to Objection: This objection is without merit. The plaintiff seems to suggest
that even though the objection is correct – the re-incorporation paragraph refers to
paragraphs in the Substitute Complaint that don’t even exist – no revision is necessary
because the defendants should somehow simply know what the plaintiff means. The plaintiff
is the master of his complaint; where he files one that contains nonsensical references to
paragraphs that do not exist, it is not asking too much to have him correct it in order to
avoid future confusion for the litigants, the Court, and eventually the jury.
11. Eleventh Requested Revision10
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 86, which reads:
86. That Defendant C&C’s alleged fraud, negligence, malfeasance, nonfeasance and/or
actions as alleged above are unfair.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete the reference to “fraud”
from this paragraph, as there are no claims of fraud asserted in the Substitute Complaint.
10
This Request to Revise also applies to paragraph 114 of the Substitute Complaint. The
same revision should be made to that paragraph, as well.
23
Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....”
Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement
of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that
defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they
are able to defend against those claims.
The essential elements of an action for fraud or intentional misrepresentation are that “(1) a
false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by
the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party
did so act upon that false representation to his injury.” Barbara Weisman, Trustee v. Kaspar, 233
Conn. 531, 539, 661 A.2d 530 (1995). Here, Castro claims that he alleged fraud in prior
paragraphs (“as alleged above”). He did not. Further, fraud must be specifically averred. To
whom did defendants made a fraudulent misrepresentation? When? What, specifically, did they
say that was knowingly false? “[B]ecause specific acts must be pleaded, the mere allegation that a
fraud has been perpetrated is insufficient.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn. App. 719, 730, 916 A.2d 834 (2007).
In short, there is no fraud mentioned or alleged in the preceding 85 paragraphs, so the
reference to “fraud . . . as alleged above” in paragraph 86 is improper, and it should be omitted
from paragraph 86.
24
Objection to Request:
Reply to Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-38 has no application here.
Paragraph 86 was part of a count that was stricken by the Court (Entry 125.03). It is of no
moment whether the defendants did not first seek a revision to a count that the Court
deemed fatally defective. The plaintiff has, as is his right, attempted to resurrect the stricken
CUTPA claim by filing a Substitute Complaint. The defendants are, as a matter of right,
allowed to treat this as a new count (because it is) and to avail themselves of the opportunity
to seek revisions in accordance with Practice Book § 10-35.
12. Twelfth Requested Revision11
Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 91 through 102, which read as follows:
91. That Defendant C&C’s signed a contract for legal services wherein Plaintiff hired
Defendant C&C to perform services in exchange for monetary consideration and
payment upon certain contingencies.
92. That Defendant C&C offered the contract as part of enticing the Plaintiff to do business
with the Defendant.
93. That Defendant C&C refused to provide the contract to the Plaintiff after engaging the
Plaintiff to retain his services.
11
This Request to Revise also applies to paragraphs 119-130 of the Substitute Complaint.
The same revisions should be made to those paragraphs, as well.
25
94. That Defendant C&C refused to provide the contract in order to mislead the Plaintiff
regarding the Plaintiff’s rights and recourses and to mislead the Plaintiff regarding the
Defendant C&C’s obligations and duties under the contract.
95. That Defendant’s conduct is misleading and harmful to consumers who expect to be
able to rely upon the terms of the contract.
96. That failure to provide a contract for services is a materially misleading act Defendant
C&C has committed on consumers.
97. That Defendant C&C fails to maintain contracts and other documents essential to
conducting its business.
98. That by failing to maintain documents, Defendant C&C is guilty of malfeasance,
negligence, or nonfeasance to the detriment of consumers in Connecticut.
99. That failure to maintain records of transactions and service contracts between a
business and its clients offends public policy.
100. In the alternative, Defendant C&C misrepresented to the Plaintiff that there was a
contract assuring the Plaintiff of certain services when in fact no contract existed.
101. In the alternative, Plaintiff, as a consumer is directly harmed by the misrepresentation
of the Defendant C&C as to the existence of a contract.
102. In the alternative, Defendant C&C misrepresented to the Plaintiff that he did not need
a contract and that Defendant C&C would take care of the closing of the Property and that
Defendant C&C represented that a contract would not be needed because Defendant C&C
was incentivized to do work and receive compensation from the closing of the Property.
Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete these paragraphs, which
represent nothing more than a misguided attempt to contrive a set of allegations in an attempt to
create a claim for CUTPA liability where none exists. If the Court does not order these paragraphs
deleted, Cassone requests that they be revised in the following ways:
• Paragraph 93: Plaintiff should state when and how the defendants allegedly refused to
provide him with a contract that he claims defendants signed. Under what circumstances
would defendants sign a contract that was not presented/given to plaintiff? Further,
plaintiff should allege both when he requested a copy of the contract and when defendants
refused to provide it. As plaintiff is well aware, neither party has been able to locate a
written engagement agreement. It appears none exists. Plaintiff himself recognizes this by
virtue of the allegations in paragraphs 100 through 102, which are premised on the non-
existence of the very contract that plaintiff claims the defendants have refused to provide.
26
• Paragraphs 96-97: Plaintiff should allege facts to support his unsupported, conclusory
allegation that the defendants fail (presumably as part of their practice) “to maintain
contracts and other documents essential to conducting its business.” Put simply, this is an
utterly fictitious assertion, but if plaintiff intends to allege it, he must provide some factual
support for it, rather than a conclusory (and false allegation). To what other matters does
plaintiff refer? What “other documents” and other “contracts” does he contend defendants
fail to maintain?
• Paragraph 99: Similarly, the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants’ “failure to maintain
records of transactions and service contracts” is both fictitious and vague. Plaintiff should
alleged specifically the “records of transactions and service contracts” that he claims these
defendants fail maintain.
Reasons
Preview
Docket No.: FST-CV-22-6059354-S : SUPERIOR COURT : ISAAC CASTRO : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF : STAMFORD/NORWALK v. : : at STAMFORD KEOGH, BURKHART & VETTER, et al. : ______________________________________ : April 29, 2023 DEFENDANTS CRONE & CASSONE’S AND JOHN A. CASSONE’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO REQUEST TO REVISE SUBSTITUTE COMPLAINT The defendants, Crone & Cassone and John A. Cassone (collectively referred to herein as “Cassone”) hereby file their Reply to the plaintiff’s Objection (Entry No. 140.00) to Cassone’s Request to Revise (Entry No. 139.00) the Substitute Complaint (Entry No 133.00). Cassone notes that among other deficiencies, the plaintiff, Isaac Castro (“Castro”), impermissibly deleted from his Objection all of the “Reasons for Requested Revision” sections of Cassone’s Request to Revise.1 This stratagem at least creates the possibility that the Court might be misled into believing that Cassone did not proffer reasons for the various requested revisions. Those sections have been restored herein, along with Cassone’s substantive replies to the objections asserted by Castro. The defendants also advise the Court that as detailed herein, they have withdrawn Requests 5-9, leaving Requests 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 for adjudication. 1 Practice Book § 10-36 required Cassone to set forth the reasons supporting each of the requests to revise and to “provide sufficient space in which the party to whom the request is directed can insert an objection and the reasons therefor.” Cassone served Castro’s counsel with a Word version of the Request to Revise on December 6, 2023 in order to allow him the ability to insert his objections. Rather than do this, Castro’s counsel summarily deleted all of the “Reasons for Requested Revision” before inserting his objections. The Practice Book allows counsel to insert his objections; it does not permit him to alter the Requests to Revise by deleting opposing counsel’s reasons supporting the revisions. 1 1. First Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 18, which reads: 18. Paragraph 32 of the Contract provides terms that “All notices under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be delivered by email, facsimile transmission, certified mail, or by overnight courier, addressed to the attorney for the respective party. Notice signed by the respective attorneys shall be deemed sufficient within the meaning of this paragraph without the signature of the parties themselves. Electronic signatures of parties and of the attorneys for the parties on this Agreement notices, or amendments to this Agreement shall be deemed to have the full force and effect of an original signature.” Hereinafter, this provision of the Contract shall be referred to as “Notice.” Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph to refer to paragraph 32 of the Contract as the “Notice provision” instead of simply as “Notice.” Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they are able to defend against those claims. Paragraph 32 of the Contract does not define any specific type of “notice;” rather, it simply provides the requirements for all of the notices contemplated by the Contract. These include notice of termination, notice of the inability to obtain a mortgage, notice of demand for return of the down payment, notice of default, and the like. As shown in other requests to revise that follow, by proclaiming that “Notice” means the requirements governing notices as detailed in paragraph 32, and not any particular kind of notice, it is impossible for the defendants to understand the various allegations in plaintiff’s Substitute Complaint that allege that the defendants failed to give (or inadequately gave) “Notice,” because nowhere in the Substitute Complaint does plaintiff identify the specific type of notice that was allegedly not given or insufficiently given. That 2 difficulty is easily obviated by plaintiff referring to paragraph 32 as the “Notice provision” and, as requested below, specifically identifying the notice(s) that it claims defendants failed to give or gave inadequately. 3 Reply to Objection: Castro’s objection is without merit. The contract at issue provides for numerous different types of notice. Castro contends that the defendants either failed to give one or more of these notices, inadequately gave one or more of these notices, or both. The haphazard manner in which Castro sets forth his allegations, however, renders it impossible to know (a) upon which notice or notices Castro’s claims are premised or (b) whether Castro contends that any one or more of those notices was either not given at all or given inadequately/improperly. It cannot seriously be argued that the defendants are not entitled to know the specific allegations being asserted against them. Further, Castro’s persistent refusal, over many months, to provide the required specificity combined with his absurd arguments (suggesting he could have referred to inadequate/unprovided notices as “Hot Fudge Sundae”) strongly suggests that he himself has no idea what it is he is claiming in this case. Regardless, there is no sound basis for the Court to not require that specific references to the notice provision of the contract (i.e., ¶ 32 of the contract) be alleged as the “notice provision” and, where Castro contends a specific type of notice (termination, failure to obtain mortgage, claimed default by the seller, etc.) was either not given or given improperly, to specifically identify the notice(s). 2. Second Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 29-30, which read: 29. The Contract provides in part, under paragraph 5, that “BUYER agrees to make prompt application for such a loan and to pursue said application with diligence. If having done so, the BUYER is unable to obtain written commitment for such Loan on or before July 8, 2022, and if BUYER so notifies SELLER or SELLER’S attorney, as provided in paragraph 32, at or before 6:00 p.m. on said date, then SELLER shall have the option to extend the mortgage contingency date or terminate this Agreement, which shall then be null and void, and the BUYER shall be entitled to the immediate return buy SELLER of all sums paid by the BUYER on account of this Agreement except for the sum of Four Hundred Fifty ($450.00) Dollars towards the cost of preparation of this Agreement.” 4 30. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant SELLER exercised any rights provided under the Contract’s paragraph 5 provisions before or after July 8, 2022. Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete these paragraphs as irrelevant and immaterial to any of the causes of action asserted in the Substitute Complaint. Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” In addition, Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.” Put simply, if neither party exercised any of the rights set out in paragraph 5 of the Contract, there is no reason to even refer to paragraph 5 in the Substitute Complaint. Including these paragraphs does not advance any of the causes of action alleged and can only serve to confuse the issues. They ought to be omitted. 5 Reply to Objection: Castro’s argument succinctly proves Cassone’s point. After alleging in ¶29 what he believes he, as the “BUYER,” would be entitled to if the Seller exercised rights granted under ¶ 32 of the subject contract, Castro alleges in ¶ 30 that the Seller did not exercise those rights. That is precisely why these allegations are irrelevant and should be omitted. 3. Third Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 32, which reads: 32. The Contract provided in part, under paragraph 19, that “The SELLER agrees to deliver, simultaneously with the closing of title, exclusive possession of the Premises…” Requested Revision: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete this paragraph as irrelevant and immaterial to any of the causes of action asserted in the Substitute Complaint. Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” In addition, Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.” As even a cursory reading of the Substitute Complaint makes clear, there was no closing of the transaction contemplated by the Contract. As a result, there is no need for an allegation that the Seller (who is no longer a party to this litigation) agreed to deliver possession of the Premises at the closing. While the undisputed fact that no closing occurred might be relevant to the claims that plaintiff asserts against Cassone, the fact that the Seller agreed to convey possession as part of the closing is not. The paragraph ought to be omitted. 6 Objection to Request: Reply to Objection: Castro’s objection conflates his claimed right to specific performance of the subject contract from the Seller with the damages theoretically recoverable from Cassone. Cassone was never the owner of the subject property; there are no circumstances pursuant to which this case could possible end with an order or award that compelled him to specifically perform the real estate sale described in the contract. Further, Castro has settled his claims against the Seller and withdrawn this lawsuit as to the Seller 7 (Entry No. 134.00), thereby removing from this case any possibility of an order of specific performance.2 Finally, to the extent that Castro continues to mistakenly believe that somehow such an order is still a viable remedy here, he may wish to remember that specific performance would require that he pay to the Seller the sum of $462,500.00. 4. Fourth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 59 and 60, which read: 59. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY3 failed to exercise a standard of care to communicate timely, diligently, and/or effectively on behalf of Plaintiff. 60. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in their exercise of care owed to the Plaintiff in their representation for the purchase of the Property.” Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise these paragraphs such that the defendants are informed of the specific ways in which they allegedly deviated from the requisite standard of care. Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they are able to defend against those claims. 2 Castro’s reliance on the possibility of an order of specific performance also ignores his own pleading, which alleges that the subject property was sold to a third party on September 12, 2022 (Substitute Complaint, ¶ 25). 3 The Substitute Complaint defines “BUYER’S ATTORNEY” as John A. Cassone. Substitute Complaint, ¶ 7. “C&C” refers to defendant Crone & Cassone. Substitute Complaint, ¶ 6. 8 “Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff). Plaintiffs most frequently allege professional negligence by asserting that a defendant “failed to meet the applicable standard of care in one or more of the following ways” and then listing subparagraphs that provide the court and counsel with the specific acts or omissions upon which plaintiff intends to rely to prove the defendant’s malpractice. Where a plaintiff does not follow that generally accepted practice, as here, it creates difficulty in determining exactly what claims of professional negligence are being advanced. These two paragraphs do not provide any assistance to that endeavor.4 In paragraph 59, for example, the defendants are left to guess what communications they failed make timely, as opposed to diligently, as opposed to effectively. Defendant’s conundrum is this: for what unmade/untimely/inadequately conveyed communications are defendants being sued? What facts support the plaintiff’s contention(s) that the communication(s) were lacking, late or ineffective? Paragraph 60 is similarly vague and uncertain of meaning. How were the defendants “negligent in their exercise of care owed to the Plaintiff in their representation?” Connecticut is a fact pleading state. The defendants are entitled to know the facts upon which plaintiff relies so that 4 As shown in the Fifth Request to Revise, below, plaintiff cannot persuasively argue that the paragraphs that follow paragraphs 59 and 60 provide the required specificity regarding their negligence claims. 9 they can mount an appropriate defense. Further, the vagueness of these two paragraphs not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial virtually unlimited evidence or arguments. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). The plaintiff should revise these two paragraphs so that the defendants are fully and fairly apprised of the claims being asserted against them. Objection to Request: 10 Reply to Objection: This objection is both incomprehensible and incorrect. Respectfully, Cassone no idea what “[a] conclusion statement that the conduct of the plaintiff is not necessary when the conduct of the Defendant is described in detail throughout the complaint” means. 5. Fifth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 61-62, which read: 61. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide Notice as necessary under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could materially impact Plaintiff or Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the Contract. 62. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when they failed to make necessary communications under Paragraph 20 of the Contract.5 63. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when they failed to make respond [sic] to Defendant KBV’s correspondences or send any email from July 15, 2022 to August 5, 202. That, in the alternative, the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in the provision of Notice as necessary under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could materially impact Plaintiff or Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the Contract. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise these paragraphs to allege specifically what notice(s) the defendants failed to give. Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that 5 The Substitute Complaint defines “Defendant KBV” as the law firm Keogh, Burkhart & Vetter. Substitute Complaint, ¶ 3. 11 defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they can defend against those claims. “Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff). As noted earlier, plaintiff’s decision to define the word “Notice” in the Substitute Complaint to mean the requirements for notices given pursuant to the Contract leads to a situation where all of these paragraphs are essentially meaningless. Indeed, the defendants cannot even begin to guess at what they mean. The Substitute Complaint refers to several different types of notice. See, Substitute Complaint ¶ 28 (which mentions both “Notice to the Escrow Agent . . . demanding payment of the Deposit” and “Notice of an objection to the proposed payment”); ¶ 29 (notice of failure to obtain a mortgage by the mortgage contingency date); ¶ 31 (“Notice of Contract”); ¶¶ 34-35 (Notice of termination). To which of these does paragraph 61, which alleges the failure to give “Notice as necessary under the Contract,” refer? Because the plaintiff does not identify the “Notice” that he claims Cassone failed to provide, it is impossible for Cassone to formulate a cogent response to the Substitute Complaint. Further, the vagueness of the allegation as currently existing not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial evidence or arguments about a variety of notices. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 12 44 A.2d 64 (1945). As a result, the plaintiff should specifically identify the notice(s) that he claims Cassone was required to provide and which Cassone allegedly failed to provide. Paragraph 62 is similarly deficient. Plaintiff there alleges that defendants “failed to provide Notice . . . when they failed to make necessary communications under Paragraph 20 of the Contract.” Plaintiff’s only other reference paragraph 20 of the Contract occurs in paragraph 33 of the Substitute Complaint. That paragraph makes it abundantly clear that paragraph 20 of the Contract does not mention any required “notice” or “communication.”6 If plaintiff intends to seek monetary damages from the defendants for not providing a notice or making “necessary communications” under paragraph 20 of the Contract, which mentions neither, he ought to be required to allege what that notice/communication requirement is so that the defendants know why it is the plaintiff is suing them. Objection to Request to Revise: Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request. 6. Sixth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 63, which reads: 63. That the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY failed to provide Notice to Defendant KBV, Defendant SELLER, and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT when they failed to make respond [sic] to Defendant KBV’s correspondences or send any email from July 15, 2022 to August 5, 202. That, in the alternative, the Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY was negligent in the provision of Notice as necessary 6 Paragraph 20 of the Contract pertains to “Liability for Delayed Closing.” 13 under the Contract when failure to provide such Notice could materially impact Plaintiff or Defendant SELLER’S obligations and rights under the Contract. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph such that the defendants are informed of the “correspondences” from “Defendant KBV” to which they failed to respond. In addition, Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise the second sentence of paragraph 63, which is a variation on the theme first articulated in paragraph 61, by alleging specifically what notice(s) defendants gave negligently and how such notice(s) were defective. Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they are able to defend against those claims. “Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff). Here, plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to respond to unidentified “correspondences” from Keogh, Burkhart & Vetter. It is impossible for defendants to defend against that allegation unless the plaintiff identifies the correspondences to which he refers. 14 The “alternative” portion of paragraph 63 is substantially the same as paragraph 61, but now the plaintiff claims negligent provision of unidentified “Notice.” At risk of repetition, because the plaintiff does not identify the “Notice” that he claims Cassone provided negligently, it is impossible for Cassone to formulate a cogent response to the Substitute Complaint. In addition, Cassone is entitled to know the way(s) in which plaintiff contends Cassone was negligent in providing the notice(s) mentioned in this paragraph. Finally, the vagueness of the allegation as currently existing not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial evidence or arguments about a variety of notices. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). As a result, the plaintiff should specifically identify the notice(s) that he claims Cassone was required to provide and which Cassone allegedly provided negligently. Objection to Requests: Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request. 7. Seventh Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 65, which reads: 65. That, as a result of Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY’s nonfeasance, negligence, or failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care, the Plaintiff sustained significant losses including the security deposit, the ability to demand specific performance under the Contract, and the additional consequential and related damages as a result of those losses. 15 Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph to delete the claim that the plaintiff’s damages include the loss of the security deposit. Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-35 provides for “the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations.” On information and belief, the plaintiff’s security deposit has been fully refunded. As a result, the plaintiff should remove this claimed loss from the list of damages it seeks to recover against Cassone. Objection to Request: 16 Reply to Objection: Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s intemperate and incorrect suggestions that the defendants’ actions are “vexatious” and “consistent with their false reporting on the status of discovery,” the defendants will withdraw this request and will simply deny the allegation related to the security deposit at the appropriate time. 8. Eighth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 66, which reads: 66. That the failure by Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY to communicate timely with Defendant SELLER, Defendant KBV and/or Defendant ESCROW AGENT and the continued failure to provide all documentation relating to the legal representation (including all communications made pursuant to the representation) upon request to the Plaintiff by Defendant C&C and or [sic] Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEYS ATTORNEY and otherwise acting without the requisite duty of care requisite to the license to practice law with in [sic] the state of Connecticut has resulted in unnecessary legal expenses and costs borne by the Plaintiff. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph in the following ways: (a) by specifically identifying to what the alleged “failure . . . to communicate timely” with the Seller, Seller’s attorney, and/or the Escrow Agent refers; (b) by specifically identifying the “documentation relating to the legal representation” that plaintiff claims Cassone has “continued” to failed to provide; (c) by specifically alleging the ways in which plaintiff contends Cassone has “otherwise act[ed] without the requisite duty of care requisite to the license to practice law” in Connecticut; and (d) identifying the “unnecessary legal expenses and costs” that plaintiff contends are recoverable against Cassone. Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that 17 defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they can defend against those claims. “Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff). There are numerous insufficiencies with respect to the allegations in paragraph 65 that deprive the defendants of the ability to understand exactly why it is that the plaintiff is suing them. Those insufficiencies are as follows: (a) The lack of detail provided in this paragraph (and the Substitute Complaint as a whole) regarding the “communication” that plaintiff contends the defendants did not have with the Seller or Seller’s attorney (who was also the Escrow Agent) prevents the defendants from understanding exactly why the plaintiff is suing them. Plaintiff’s failure to allege specific facts regarding the oft-repeated but never specified claims of lack of communication, failure to communicate, lack of “Notice” (whatever that means), insufficiency of “Notice,” etc. is referenced in Requests to Revise 2, 4, 5, and 6. This case has been pending for more than a year. The defendants have requested on more than one occasion that the plaintiff provide facts supporting his conclusory claims of lack of communication or “Notice” (or the insufficient nature of the unidentified communications or notices). Plaintiff’s steadfast refusal to include these facts in the Substitute Complaint make it impossible for the defendants to respond to the Substitute Complaint or to adequately defend themselves. As noted earlier, Connecticut is a fact pleading state. The defendants are entitled to know the facts upon which plaintiff relies so that they can mount an appropriate defense. Further, the vagueness of these allegations not only prejudices Cassone in responding to the Substitute Complaint, but also could allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial virtually unlimited evidence or arguments. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). The plaintiff should revise this paragraph so that the defendants are fully and fairly apprised of the claims being asserted against them as they relate to alleged lack of communication with the Seller or the Seller’s Attorney/Escrow Agent. 18 (b) The lack of detail provided in this paragraph regarding the “documentation relating to the legal representation” that plaintiff claims Cassone has “continued” to failed to provide plaintiff also makes it impossible for the defendants to adequately defend themselves, for all of the reasons noted in subparagraph (a), above. Moreover, a fair reading of paragraphs 67-73 of the Substitute Complaint is that Cassone in fact did provide the “documentation” that Castro requested within three weeks of it having been requested prior to suit, other than the claim that a single email was not provided.7 That email is described in paragraph 72, which notably contains details about the date, time and contents of the allegedly unproduced email. According to plaintiff, the omission of this single email (which plaintiff asserts, without evidence, was intentional) led him to leave Cassone out of the first lawsuit that he filed (¶ 73). The Court can take judicial notice that the first lawsuit was filed on October 28, 2022.8 This lawsuit was initiated on December 20, 2022, less than two months later. It appears, then, that the plaintiff obtained the allegedly missing email that prompted him to include Cassone as a defendant within a few weeks. Ignoring for now the triviality of the plaintiff’s complaints about these allegedly unprovided documents prior to the initiation of suit, the defendants are entitled to know whether this is the full constellation of allegedly unprovided documents about which plaintiff here complains. If so, then he should revise the Substitute Complaint to indicate that. If not, then he should revise the Substitute Complaint to identify all of the “documentation” that he claims the defendants have failed to provide to him and the basis upon which he asserts the defendants had a duty to provide it. (c) The broad and all-encompassing allegation that Cassone has “otherwise act[ed] without the requisite duty of care” is too vague to satisfy Connecticut’s fact pleading requirements. As noted several times herein, defendants are entitled to be fully and fairly apprised of the claims being asserted against them. If Castro believes that Cassone has “otherwise” deviated from the standard of care, our rules of procedure requires that he specifically identify all of the ways in which he claims Cassone did so. (d) Finally, the defendants request that Castro identify the “unnecessary legal expenses and costs” that he believes are recoverable from Cassone. To the extent that this refers to the expenses and costs of this litigation, they are not recoverable in a legal malpractice claim because Connecticut follows the so-called “American rule” that requires parties to bear their own legal fees and expenses. If Castro is referring to legal expenses and costs unrelated to this litigation, he should identify what they are. 7 Castro also alleges that Cassone did not initially provide a copy of the executed Contract, which “prompted Plaintiff to ask” for it. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff filed the executed Contract as an Exhibit on the electronic docket for this case on January 12, 2023, so the inclusion of a paragraph in the Substitute Complaint that complains about the non- production of a document that was clearly either produced to plaintiff or already in his possession is befuddling. 8 Isaac Castro v. Keogh, Burkhart & Vetter, et al., docket number FST-CV-22-6058757-S. 19 Objection to Request: Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request. 9. Ninth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 74, which reads: 74. That Plaintiff suffered further economic loss due to further failure to timely provide all documents in Plaintiff’s file with Defendant C&C and/or Defendant BUYER’S ATTORNEY. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff revise this paragraph by specifically alleging the facts upon which he bases the claim that defendants “further” failed to provide “all documents” and the “further economic loss” which plaintiff claims resulted. Reasons for Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they can defend against those claims. “Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial process. The purpose of the pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, not to conceal basic issues until the trial is underway.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River 20 Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 782 (1998). In Farrell v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 203 Conn. 554 (1987), our Supreme Court explained that the pleader is required to sufficiently apprise his opponent of the specific claim being made him. See also Fussenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 148 (1985) (a complaint must fully disclose the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff). This paragraph, without more, is meaningless. Plaintiff has alleged – inadequately, as described above – that the defendants failed to provide unspecified “documentation.” Here, plaintiff doubles down, asserting that there was a “further failure to timely provide all documents,” without bothering to allege any facts in support of that claim. What additional failure(s) were there? When did it/they occur? What, specifically, was not provided? What “further economic loss” did this cause? At risk of redundancy, the plaintiff is required to set forth his claims in a manner that ensures that the defendants are fully and fairly apprised of the facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claims. This paragraph falls far short of that requirement, and is so vague that it will allow the plaintiff to introduce at trial virtually unlimited evidence or arguments. See Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, 242 Conn. 236, 251 n.11, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); Mocarski v. Palmer, 132 Conn. 349, 44 A.2d 64 (1945). Objection to Request: 21 Reply to Objection: The defendants withdraw this request. 10. Tenth Requested Revision Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 84, which reads: 84. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 36 and 81 through 97 of this Complaint inclusively, with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein…. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff either delete this paragraph or revise it such that it makes sense. Reasons for Requested Revision: This paragraph is the introduction to the first of plaintiff’s two identical CUTPA counts. This count is asserted against the law firm of Crone and Cassone; the following identical count is against Attorney John Cassone. Because they are identical (and therefore redundant), this request to revise, and all that follow, are equally applicable to both counts.9 Put simply, as phrased this paragraph is incomprehensible. Cassone here purports to incorporate by reference paragraphs that do not exist. He is attempting to incorporate by reference paragraphs that have not yet been asserted (i.e., ¶¶ 85-97), and he follows that incorporation by alleging those very paragraphs. Read literally, the first 13 paragraphs of this count are being alleged two times, consecutively. The plaintiff should either delete this paragraph in its entirety or revise it to accurately allege which of the preceding paragraphs of the Substitute Complaint he intends to incorporate by reference. 9 For the sake of brevity, Cassone will not repeat this and all following requests for revisions a second time in connection with the second CUTPA claim, and asks that the Court treat this and all of the following requests as applicable to each of the CUTPA counts. 22 Objection to Request: Reply to Objection: This objection is without merit. The plaintiff seems to suggest that even though the objection is correct – the re-incorporation paragraph refers to paragraphs in the Substitute Complaint that don’t even exist – no revision is necessary because the defendants should somehow simply know what the plaintiff means. The plaintiff is the master of his complaint; where he files one that contains nonsensical references to paragraphs that do not exist, it is not asking too much to have him correct it in order to avoid future confusion for the litigants, the Court, and eventually the jury. 11. Eleventh Requested Revision10 Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraph 86, which reads: 86. That Defendant C&C’s alleged fraud, negligence, malfeasance, nonfeasance and/or actions as alleged above are unfair. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete the reference to “fraud” from this paragraph, as there are no claims of fraud asserted in the Substitute Complaint. 10 This Request to Revise also applies to paragraph 114 of the Substitute Complaint. The same revision should be made to that paragraph, as well. 23 Reasons for Requested Revisions: Practice Book § 10-1 provides that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies....” Further, a party may use a request to revise “to obtain . . . a more complete or particular statement of the allegations of an adverse party’s pleadings.” Practice Book § 10-35. This ensures that defendants are adequately and fairly apprised of the claims being made against them so that they are able to defend against those claims. The essential elements of an action for fraud or intentional misrepresentation are that “(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.” Barbara Weisman, Trustee v. Kaspar, 233 Conn. 531, 539, 661 A.2d 530 (1995). Here, Castro claims that he alleged fraud in prior paragraphs (“as alleged above”). He did not. Further, fraud must be specifically averred. To whom did defendants made a fraudulent misrepresentation? When? What, specifically, did they say that was knowingly false? “[B]ecause specific acts must be pleaded, the mere allegation that a fraud has been perpetrated is insufficient.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn. App. 719, 730, 916 A.2d 834 (2007). In short, there is no fraud mentioned or alleged in the preceding 85 paragraphs, so the reference to “fraud . . . as alleged above” in paragraph 86 is improper, and it should be omitted from paragraph 86. 24 Objection to Request: Reply to Requested Revision: Practice Book § 10-38 has no application here. Paragraph 86 was part of a count that was stricken by the Court (Entry 125.03). It is of no moment whether the defendants did not first seek a revision to a count that the Court deemed fatally defective. The plaintiff has, as is his right, attempted to resurrect the stricken CUTPA claim by filing a Substitute Complaint. The defendants are, as a matter of right, allowed to treat this as a new count (because it is) and to avail themselves of the opportunity to seek revisions in accordance with Practice Book § 10-35. 12. Twelfth Requested Revision11 Portion of Complaint to be Revised: Paragraphs 91 through 102, which read as follows: 91. That Defendant C&C’s signed a contract for legal services wherein Plaintiff hired Defendant C&C to perform services in exchange for monetary consideration and payment upon certain contingencies. 92. That Defendant C&C offered the contract as part of enticing the Plaintiff to do business with the Defendant. 93. That Defendant C&C refused to provide the contract to the Plaintiff after engaging the Plaintiff to retain his services. 11 This Request to Revise also applies to paragraphs 119-130 of the Substitute Complaint. The same revisions should be made to those paragraphs, as well. 25 94. That Defendant C&C refused to provide the contract in order to mislead the Plaintiff regarding the Plaintiff’s rights and recourses and to mislead the Plaintiff regarding the Defendant C&C’s obligations and duties under the contract. 95. That Defendant’s conduct is misleading and harmful to consumers who expect to be able to rely upon the terms of the contract. 96. That failure to provide a contract for services is a materially misleading act Defendant C&C has committed on consumers. 97. That Defendant C&C fails to maintain contracts and other documents essential to conducting its business. 98. That by failing to maintain documents, Defendant C&C is guilty of malfeasance, negligence, or nonfeasance to the detriment of consumers in Connecticut. 99. That failure to maintain records of transactions and service contracts between a business and its clients offends public policy. 100. In the alternative, Defendant C&C misrepresented to the Plaintiff that there was a contract assuring the Plaintiff of certain services when in fact no contract existed. 101. In the alternative, Plaintiff, as a consumer is directly harmed by the misrepresentation of the Defendant C&C as to the existence of a contract. 102. In the alternative, Defendant C&C misrepresented to the Plaintiff that he did not need a contract and that Defendant C&C would take care of the closing of the Property and that Defendant C&C represented that a contract would not be needed because Defendant C&C was incentivized to do work and receive compensation from the closing of the Property. Requested Revisions: Cassone requests that the plaintiff delete these paragraphs, which represent nothing more than a misguided attempt to contrive a set of allegations in an attempt to create a claim for CUTPA liability where none exists. If the Court does not order these paragraphs deleted, Cassone requests that they be revised in the following ways: • Paragraph 93: Plaintiff should state when and how the defendants allegedly refused to provide him with a contract that he claims defendants signed. Under what circumstances would defendants sign a contract that was not presented/given to plaintiff? Further, plaintiff should allege both when he requested a copy of the contract and when defendants refused to provide it. As plaintiff is well aware, neither party has been able to locate a written engagement agreement. It appears none exists. Plaintiff himself recognizes this by virtue of the allegations in paragraphs 100 through 102, which are premised on the non- existence of the very contract that plaintiff claims the defendants have refused to provide. 26 • Paragraphs 96-97: Plaintiff should allege facts to support his unsupported, conclusory allegation that the defendants fail (presumably as part of their practice) “to maintain contracts and other documents essential to conducting its business.” Put simply, this is an utterly fictitious assertion, but if plaintiff intends to allege it, he must provide some factual support for it, rather than a conclusory (and false allegation). To what other matters does plaintiff refer? What “other documents” and other “contracts” does he contend defendants fail to maintain? • Paragraph 99: Similarly, the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants’ “failure to maintain records of transactions and service contracts” is both fictitious and vague. Plaintiff should alleged specifically the “records of transactions and service contracts” that he claims these defendants fail maintain. Reasons