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D.N. UWY-CV20-6057584-S SUPERIOR COURT
LINDA SENIOR J.D. OF WATERBURY
v. AT WATERBURY
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC.,
TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND
CORPORATION, INC. AND TRINITY
HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND PROVIDER
NETWORK ORGANIZATION, INC. APRIL 25, 2024
OBJECTION MOTION FOR ORDER OF
COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
The defendants hereby object to the plaintiff’s motion for order of compliance seeking to
take yet another fact witness deposition; this time, a designated person pursuant to Connecticut
Practice Book Section 13-27(h), who is/are competent and qualified to testify to the identity of
the nurse assigned to Plaintiff on November 23, 2018. This deposition is not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. And is one more in a litany of discovery abuses.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
By way of background, this case sounds in negligence against the defendants. According
to the allegations of the operative complaint, the plaintiff, Linda Senior, underwent a total right
hip replacement at Saint Mary’s Hospital on November 20, 2018. Second Amended Complaint,
Docket Entry No. 122.00, ¶ 8. On November 23, 2018, the plaintiff was transferred by radiology
technologists from a hospital bed to a gurney/stretcher in the radiology department in the hospital
and. Id., ¶¶ 10-12, 18. There is no evidence or suggestion that a nurse was present during this
attempted transfer or a claim that a nurse should have been present for the attempted transfer.
The plaintiff claims as a result of the attempted transfer, she had to undergo additional surgeries,
including abductor tendon repair/reconstruction and other additional medical treatment, such as
physical therapy and ongoing pain management. Id. ¶ 23. The plaintiff has not disclosed a
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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nursing expert. This case has absolutely nothing to do with the nursing care provided to the
plaintiff during her admission.
To date, the defendants have produced 11 current and former employees of Saint Mary’s
Hospital for depositions in this case, many of which have sat for hours of testimony regardless of
whether they witnessed the event or had any involvement in the care at issue. One of the
individuals produced for a deposition was Deborah Cook, RN. On October 11, 2023, Nurse Cook
was questioned from 10:05 a.m. until 4:46 p.m. with minimal breaks. On April 12, 2024, the
plaintiff noticed the deposition at issue and filed a motion for order of compliance seeking to
learn the identity of the nurse “assigned” to the plaintiff. The classification of which nurse or
nurses that were “assigned” to Ms. Senior has absolutely no bearing on the liability issues in this
case. In reviewing the docket, the court can easily surmise that the sole purpose of this motion
and attempted deposition is to form the basis of an allegation that defendants are in violation of
an order. The court should not countenance this abusive discovery tactic.
The defendants submit that the only potentially sanctionable conduct here is the
plaintiff’s bad faith motion for order of compliance seeking, inter alia, default for failing to agree
to one unilaterally noticed deposition to take place within 10 days of the notice. The instant
motion is yet another abuse of the discovery process in this case and an utter waste of judicial
resources.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard for a Motion for a Protective Order.
The Court possesses the inherent power to control discovery. Millbrook Owners Ass’n,
Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 12-14 (2001). Connecticut’s rules of discovery do have
boundaries and limitations. LaMar v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 31 Conn. Supp. 335, 335-36 (1974).
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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“[T]he use of protective orders is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.” Id.; see also
Lougee v. Grinnell, 216 Conn. 483, 491 (1990), reviewed on other grounds, State v. Salmon, 250
Conn. 147 (1999). A party may seek a protective order from the court for the purpose of ensuring
fairness and justice so that discovery may not be pursued in bad faith or so as to oppress or
annoy the individual who is made subject to the inquiry. LaMar v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra,
citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Specifically, Practice Book § 13-5 provides
in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to
protect from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not
be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery
may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery….
“The party seeking to bar a deposition must make a threshold showing that there is good
cause that the protective order issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schramm v. Stelly,
Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 00 0081681 (June 25, 2001,
Cremins, J.) [30 Conn. L. Rptr. 41, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1718]. Whether or not good cause
exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co.,
Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. CV88-352383-S, 1992
WL 32568, at *2 (Feb. 11, 1992) (Schaller, J.). Good cause has been defined as a sound basis or
legitimate need to take judicial action. Pavlo v. Slattery, Superior Court, judicial district of
Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV030083541S, at *9 (Feb. 20, 2004, Bear, J.) (2004 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 372).
“[A] protective order should be issued where there are interests to be protected and where
the likelihood of relevant evidence being discovered is minimal.” Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Purdue
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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Frederick Co., Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No.
X08CV020191697, at *3 (Oct. 19, 2005, Taggart, J.) (2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2820).
Discovery in a civil action is limited to “papers, books, documents and electronically stored
information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not
privileged….” (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 13-2.
The plaintiff claims that two MRI technologists were negligent in their transfer of the
patient from a bed to a stretcher/gurney in the radiology department. The plaintiff has disclosed a
radiology technologist to opine on the standard of care. There is no claim involving the nursing
care in this case. The identity of the nurse or nurses who was “assigned” to Linda Senior on a
particular day has no bearing on this case whatsoever, which involves the attempted transfer of a
patient from a hospital bed to an MRI table by a radiology technologist in the radiology
department. There is no dispute that a nurse was not involved in the attempted transfer, and there
is no allegation that a nurse should have been involved in the transfer. Thus, this deposition is
not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is not relevant to any claim or
defense in the pending action. The court should deny Plaintiff’s unfounded motion for
compliance and issue a protective order around production of another hospital witness, the
request for which is untimely and improper.
DEFENDANTS,
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC. TRINITY
HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND CORPORATION,
INC. and TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW
ENGLAND PROVIDER NETWORK
ORGANIZATION, INC.
BY: /s/ Joseph M. Walsh
Sally O. Hagerty, Esq. (Juris 426191)
Joseph M. Walsh, Esq. (Juris No. 433050)
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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DANAHERLAGNESE, PC
Their Attorneys
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the above was mailed and/or electronically delivered on this
April 25, 2024 to all counsel and pro se parties of record and that written consent for electronic
delivery was received from all counsel and pro se parties of record who were electronically served.
Kimberly Andrade, Esq.
Hirsch Andrade LLP
1000 Lafayette Boulevard
Bridgeport, CT 06604
Attorney for Plaintiff
/s/ Joseph M. Walsh
Joseph M. Walsh, Esq.
D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666
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D.N. UWY-CV20-6057584-S SUPERIOR COURT LINDA SENIOR J.D. OF WATERBURY v. AT WATERBURY SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND CORPORATION, INC. AND TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND PROVIDER NETWORK ORGANIZATION, INC. APRIL 25, 2024 OBJECTION MOTION FOR ORDER OF COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER The defendants hereby object to the plaintiff’s motion for order of compliance seeking to take yet another fact witness deposition; this time, a designated person pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Section 13-27(h), who is/are competent and qualified to testify to the identity of the nurse assigned to Plaintiff on November 23, 2018. This deposition is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. And is one more in a litany of discovery abuses. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND By way of background, this case sounds in negligence against the defendants. According to the allegations of the operative complaint, the plaintiff, Linda Senior, underwent a total right hip replacement at Saint Mary’s Hospital on November 20, 2018. Second Amended Complaint, Docket Entry No. 122.00, ¶ 8. On November 23, 2018, the plaintiff was transferred by radiology technologists from a hospital bed to a gurney/stretcher in the radiology department in the hospital and. Id., ¶¶ 10-12, 18. There is no evidence or suggestion that a nurse was present during this attempted transfer or a claim that a nurse should have been present for the attempted transfer. The plaintiff claims as a result of the attempted transfer, she had to undergo additional surgeries, including abductor tendon repair/reconstruction and other additional medical treatment, such as physical therapy and ongoing pain management. Id. ¶ 23. The plaintiff has not disclosed a D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 1 nursing expert. This case has absolutely nothing to do with the nursing care provided to the plaintiff during her admission. To date, the defendants have produced 11 current and former employees of Saint Mary’s Hospital for depositions in this case, many of which have sat for hours of testimony regardless of whether they witnessed the event or had any involvement in the care at issue. One of the individuals produced for a deposition was Deborah Cook, RN. On October 11, 2023, Nurse Cook was questioned from 10:05 a.m. until 4:46 p.m. with minimal breaks. On April 12, 2024, the plaintiff noticed the deposition at issue and filed a motion for order of compliance seeking to learn the identity of the nurse “assigned” to the plaintiff. The classification of which nurse or nurses that were “assigned” to Ms. Senior has absolutely no bearing on the liability issues in this case. In reviewing the docket, the court can easily surmise that the sole purpose of this motion and attempted deposition is to form the basis of an allegation that defendants are in violation of an order. The court should not countenance this abusive discovery tactic. The defendants submit that the only potentially sanctionable conduct here is the plaintiff’s bad faith motion for order of compliance seeking, inter alia, default for failing to agree to one unilaterally noticed deposition to take place within 10 days of the notice. The instant motion is yet another abuse of the discovery process in this case and an utter waste of judicial resources. II. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Standard for a Motion for a Protective Order. The Court possesses the inherent power to control discovery. Millbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 12-14 (2001). Connecticut’s rules of discovery do have boundaries and limitations. LaMar v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 31 Conn. Supp. 335, 335-36 (1974). D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 2 “[T]he use of protective orders is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.” Id.; see also Lougee v. Grinnell, 216 Conn. 483, 491 (1990), reviewed on other grounds, State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 (1999). A party may seek a protective order from the court for the purpose of ensuring fairness and justice so that discovery may not be pursued in bad faith or so as to oppress or annoy the individual who is made subject to the inquiry. LaMar v. St. Mary’s Hospital, supra, citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Specifically, Practice Book § 13-5 provides in relevant part: Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery…. “The party seeking to bar a deposition must make a threshold showing that there is good cause that the protective order issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schramm v. Stelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 00 0081681 (June 25, 2001, Cremins, J.) [30 Conn. L. Rptr. 41, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1718]. Whether or not good cause exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. CV88-352383-S, 1992 WL 32568, at *2 (Feb. 11, 1992) (Schaller, J.). Good cause has been defined as a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action. Pavlo v. Slattery, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV030083541S, at *9 (Feb. 20, 2004, Bear, J.) (2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 372). “[A] protective order should be issued where there are interests to be protected and where the likelihood of relevant evidence being discovered is minimal.” Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Purdue D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 3 Frederick Co., Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. X08CV020191697, at *3 (Oct. 19, 2005, Taggart, J.) (2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2820). Discovery in a civil action is limited to “papers, books, documents and electronically stored information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action, which are not privileged….” (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 13-2. The plaintiff claims that two MRI technologists were negligent in their transfer of the patient from a bed to a stretcher/gurney in the radiology department. The plaintiff has disclosed a radiology technologist to opine on the standard of care. There is no claim involving the nursing care in this case. The identity of the nurse or nurses who was “assigned” to Linda Senior on a particular day has no bearing on this case whatsoever, which involves the attempted transfer of a patient from a hospital bed to an MRI table by a radiology technologist in the radiology department. There is no dispute that a nurse was not involved in the attempted transfer, and there is no allegation that a nurse should have been involved in the transfer. Thus, this deposition is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is not relevant to any claim or defense in the pending action. The court should deny Plaintiff’s unfounded motion for compliance and issue a protective order around production of another hospital witness, the request for which is untimely and improper. DEFENDANTS, SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC. TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND CORPORATION, INC. and TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND PROVIDER NETWORK ORGANIZATION, INC. BY: /s/ Joseph M. Walsh Sally O. Hagerty, Esq. (Juris 426191) Joseph M. Walsh, Esq. (Juris No. 433050) D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 4 DANAHERLAGNESE, PC Their Attorneys D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 5 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the above was mailed and/or electronically delivered on this April 25, 2024 to all counsel and pro se parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and pro se parties of record who were electronically served. Kimberly Andrade, Esq. Hirsch Andrade LLP 1000 Lafayette Boulevard Bridgeport, CT 06604 Attorney for Plaintiff /s/ Joseph M. Walsh Joseph M. Walsh, Esq. D A N A H E R L A G N E S E , PC • 274 R I V E R S I D E A V E N U E , 1 S T F LO O R , W E S T P O R T , CT 06880 • (860) 247-3666 6