Preview
DOCKET NO.: HHD-CV20-6126692-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
DANIEL DASILVA and : J.D. OF HARTFORD
CRISTIANE DASILVA, :
: AT HARTFORD
v. :
:
BERTRAM H. COUSINS and :
BOZZUTOS, INC. : MAY 1, 2024
MOTION IN LIMINE
The defendants hereby respectfully request that the court grant their motion precluding
any evidence regarding any alleged claim of a violation of General Statutes §14-240a. That
statute, like General Statutes §14-240, prohibits following “another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the
condition of the roadway or highway and weather conditions.” It also requires, however, that
such following too closely be done “with the intent to harass or intimidate the operator of the
preceding motor vehicle.” Id.
As a threshold matter, plaintiff has not properly pled a claim pursuant to the statute.
Plaintiff has simply pled a violation of General Statutes §14-240, which is NOT a triggering
statute for §14-295. In alleging the requisite elements for a violation of §14-240, the plaintiff is
not thereby entitled to make a claim pursuant to §14-295. In order to make a claim pursuant to
§14-295, the plaintiff needs to plead and prove that the defendant not only followed the
plaintiffs’ vehicle to closely, but did so “with the intent to harass or intimidate” the plaintiffs.
Not only have they not done this, they cannot based upon the undisputed evidence.
There is a video of the collision which is a dash cam video taken from within the
defendants’ vehicle. Undersigned attempted to upload the video but was unable to do so since it
is not a PDF document. Counsel, however, will be able to provide the court a copy of the video.
In any event, there is no dispute that the video shows the defendant Cousins proceeding down the
highway for approximately 10 seconds prior to the collision. There is no vehicle in front of the
defendants’ vehicle until he comes upon traffic which has stopped (or perhaps slowed
significantly) and he is unable to stop in time prior to rear ending the plaintiffs’ vehicle.
These undisputed facts would not even allow for a claim pursuant to §14-240, let alone
§14-240a. In Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401 (1995) our Supreme Court explained the
requirements prior to submitting any claim alleging a violation of to §14-240 to a jury. In that
case, as in the instant matter, the plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped and was rear-ended by the
defendant’s vehicle. The claim was essentially that a rear end accident in and of itself entitles
one to a jury charge on §14-240. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this notion and noted
that the statute specifically requires that one vehicle follow another and that “the term ‘follow’
implies movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower.” Id, 406. Thus, the court concluded
that §14-240 is only “applicable to situations in which one motor vehicle is traveling behind
another in the same lane of traffic, and there is evidence that the operator of the rear vehicle
failed to maintain a reasonably safe distance between the vehicles, and that failure had a causal
connection to a resulting collision.” (Emphasis in original; internal punctuation omitted.) Id.
The video of the collision in question demonstrates an accident which occurred precisely
in the same manner as in Wrinn v. State, supra, wherein the Supreme Court concluded that it
would be error to submit a jury charge on §14-240. No rational person viewing the video could
conclude that it shows the “movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower” or one vehicle
“traveling behind another in the same lane of traffic.” Wrinn, supra. Given the extra proof
required for a claim pursuant to §14-240a (which has not been alleged), if the facts are
insufficient to support a charge pursuant to §14-240 than a fortiori it would be error to submit a
claim pursuant to §14-240a. Given the undisputed facts regarding how the collision occurred,
the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of §14-240a.
WHEREFORE, the defendants respectfully request that the court grant their motion.
The Defendants
BERTRAM COUSINS and
BOZZUTOS, INC.
/s/ 405434
Keith S. McCabe, Esq.
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin
Granite Square, 700 State Street, 3rd Fl, Suite 303
New Haven, CT 06511
Phone: (203) 714-4568
Fax: (203) 714-4561
Email: ksmccabe@mdwcg.com
File No.: 40962.00121
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, and/or or
delivered electronically, via facsimile or non-electronically on May 1, 2024 to all counsel and
self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received
from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were electronically served upon the
following as follows:
To: Lawyer A. Twillie II, Esq.
L.A. LAW, LLC
650 Farmington Avenue
Hartford, CT 06105
(844) 438-5252
Email: HELP@LALAWCT.COM
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Pro Se
Daniel DaSilva
5580 NW 61st Street
Apt. 619
Coconut Creek, FL 33073
And
Pro Se
Cristiane DaSilva
5580 NW 61st Street
Apt. 619
Coconut Creek, FL 33073
/s/ 405434
Keith S. McCabe, Esq.
Preview
DOCKET NO.: HHD-CV20-6126692-S : SUPERIOR COURT : DANIEL DASILVA and : J.D. OF HARTFORD CRISTIANE DASILVA, : : AT HARTFORD v. : : BERTRAM H. COUSINS and : BOZZUTOS, INC. : MAY 1, 2024 MOTION IN LIMINE The defendants hereby respectfully request that the court grant their motion precluding any evidence regarding any alleged claim of a violation of General Statutes §14-240a. That statute, like General Statutes §14-240, prohibits following “another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the roadway or highway and weather conditions.” It also requires, however, that such following too closely be done “with the intent to harass or intimidate the operator of the preceding motor vehicle.” Id. As a threshold matter, plaintiff has not properly pled a claim pursuant to the statute. Plaintiff has simply pled a violation of General Statutes §14-240, which is NOT a triggering statute for §14-295. In alleging the requisite elements for a violation of §14-240, the plaintiff is not thereby entitled to make a claim pursuant to §14-295. In order to make a claim pursuant to §14-295, the plaintiff needs to plead and prove that the defendant not only followed the plaintiffs’ vehicle to closely, but did so “with the intent to harass or intimidate” the plaintiffs. Not only have they not done this, they cannot based upon the undisputed evidence. There is a video of the collision which is a dash cam video taken from within the defendants’ vehicle. Undersigned attempted to upload the video but was unable to do so since it is not a PDF document. Counsel, however, will be able to provide the court a copy of the video. In any event, there is no dispute that the video shows the defendant Cousins proceeding down the highway for approximately 10 seconds prior to the collision. There is no vehicle in front of the defendants’ vehicle until he comes upon traffic which has stopped (or perhaps slowed significantly) and he is unable to stop in time prior to rear ending the plaintiffs’ vehicle. These undisputed facts would not even allow for a claim pursuant to §14-240, let alone §14-240a. In Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401 (1995) our Supreme Court explained the requirements prior to submitting any claim alleging a violation of to §14-240 to a jury. In that case, as in the instant matter, the plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped and was rear-ended by the defendant’s vehicle. The claim was essentially that a rear end accident in and of itself entitles one to a jury charge on §14-240. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this notion and noted that the statute specifically requires that one vehicle follow another and that “the term ‘follow’ implies movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower.” Id, 406. Thus, the court concluded that §14-240 is only “applicable to situations in which one motor vehicle is traveling behind another in the same lane of traffic, and there is evidence that the operator of the rear vehicle failed to maintain a reasonably safe distance between the vehicles, and that failure had a causal connection to a resulting collision.” (Emphasis in original; internal punctuation omitted.) Id. The video of the collision in question demonstrates an accident which occurred precisely in the same manner as in Wrinn v. State, supra, wherein the Supreme Court concluded that it would be error to submit a jury charge on §14-240. No rational person viewing the video could conclude that it shows the “movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower” or one vehicle “traveling behind another in the same lane of traffic.” Wrinn, supra. Given the extra proof required for a claim pursuant to §14-240a (which has not been alleged), if the facts are insufficient to support a charge pursuant to §14-240 than a fortiori it would be error to submit a claim pursuant to §14-240a. Given the undisputed facts regarding how the collision occurred, the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of §14-240a. WHEREFORE, the defendants respectfully request that the court grant their motion. The Defendants BERTRAM COUSINS and BOZZUTOS, INC. /s/ 405434 Keith S. McCabe, Esq. Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin Granite Square, 700 State Street, 3rd Fl, Suite 303 New Haven, CT 06511 Phone: (203) 714-4568 Fax: (203) 714-4561 Email: ksmccabe@mdwcg.com File No.: 40962.00121 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, and/or or delivered electronically, via facsimile or non-electronically on May 1, 2024 to all counsel and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were electronically served upon the following as follows: To: Lawyer A. Twillie II, Esq. L.A. LAW, LLC 650 Farmington Avenue Hartford, CT 06105 (844) 438-5252 Email: HELP@LALAWCT.COM Attorney for Plaintiffs Pro Se Daniel DaSilva 5580 NW 61st Street Apt. 619 Coconut Creek, FL 33073 And Pro Se Cristiane DaSilva 5580 NW 61st Street Apt. 619 Coconut Creek, FL 33073 /s/ 405434 Keith S. McCabe, Esq.