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Filing # 196200886 E-Filed 04/15/2024 01:56:54 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. 50-2022-CA-006587
LARRY KLAYMAN
Plaintiff,
v.
PGA TOUR, INC.
and
JOSEPH WILLIAM MONAHAN IV
Defendants.
NONPARTY TIGER WOODS’S FURTHER OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION
Non-party Tiger Woods respectfully opposes Plaintiff Larry Klayman’s “emergency”
motion to compel the production of additional documents, on top of the hundreds of documents
that Mr. Woods has already produced in response to Plaintiff’s subpoenas.
On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint in this case, Dkt. 345,
following the Court’s order disqualifying him from serving as a class representative or class
counsel due to his personal and financial interests and role as a necessary witness. That filing was
made two weeks after the deadline of March 25. Compare Dkt. 345 with Mar. 11, 2024 Transcript
(“Tr.”) at 15:4-5 (“Mr. Klayman will amend or file a new complaint in the next two weeks.”).
Two days later, Defendants requested an extension to respond to the Fourth Amended
Complaint, stating that they intended to move to dismiss in light of “a significant jurisdictional
issue relating to plaintiff’s individual claims.” Dkt. 346 ¶ 8. That same day, Plaintiff renewed his
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FILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, JOSEPH ABRUZZO, CLERK, 04/15/2024 01:56:54 PM
so-called emergency motion to compel against Mr. Woods and scheduled a UMC hearing for April
17 without giving undersigned counsel the courtesy of even asking about their availability, let
alone conferring on the propriety of addressing the motion now. Dkt. 347.
The Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion to compel or, at the very least, adjourn the April
17 UMC hearing until after resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
As an initial matter, it is premature to seek (further) discovery from Mr. Woods before the
Court and parties have sorted out whether Plaintiff has stated a case. See Tr. at 15:3-23 (rejecting
Plaintiff’s attempt to argue his emergency motion against Mr. Woods because “the first thing I
want to see is the complaint”). As the Court previously recognized, Plaintiff’s desire for more
documents is not an “emergency.” Tr. at 15:9-12 (“I’ve got little old ladies getting kicked out [of]
their house. I’ve got people who are dying of cancer. I’ve got things that are emergencies. [This]
doesn’t meet the administrative order’s definition of an emergency.”).
It appears that Defendants may raise a challenge to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
which of course calls into question whether Plaintiff’s subpoena is enforceable. See, e.g., Sucart
v. Off. of Comm’r, 129 So. 3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that a court’s
“[p]ower to issue subpoenas . . . cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction” and looking to
subject matter jurisdiction as a basis to quash subpoena) (quoting U.S. Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 at 76 (1988)); cf. Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v.
Leondakos, 602 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1992) (observing that where jurisdiction is contested “a
plaintiff should be able to conduct limited discovery on the jurisdictional question” that “should
not be broad, onerous or expansive, nor should it address the merits of the case”) (emphasis added).
Here, if the Court were to dismiss the action, Plaintiff already has received far more than
he is entitled from Mr. Woods. Indeed, as we previously explained, Dkt. 321, Mr. Woods has
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produced hundreds of documents through 2022 and, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, is not
required to continuously update his collection and production through the present. In short, there
is no basis to require Mr. Woods to undergo additional burden and expense when it appears
Defendants will raise a fundamental challenge to Plaintiff’s ability to require compliance in the
first place. And Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain about whatever relatively brief delay that
might entail: far from litigating this case like an “emergency,” Plaintiff ignored the Court’s
deadline to file the Fourth Amended Complaint despite claiming that the changes to the complaint
are effectively immaterial.
In the event that the Court does proceed to hear Plaintiff’s “emergency” motion, the motion
should be denied for the reasons stated in Mr. Woods’s previous opposition. Mr. Woods has fully
complied with his obligations, and nothing requires him to update his collection and production to
the present. Finally, the Court should award Mr. Woods his costs for responding to Plaintiff’s
motion, including the costs incurred in preparing the instant filing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Woods respectfully requests that the Court adjourn the April
17 hearing until after a determination has been made on Defendants’ anticipated motion to dismiss,
or otherwise deny Plaintiff’s motion, and award Mr. Woods costs.
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Dated: April 15, 2024 /s/ David Oscar Markus
Miami, Florida David Oscar Markus
Florida Bar No. 119318
MARKUS/MOSS PLLC
40 N.W. Third Street
Penthouse One
Miami, Florida 33128
Tele.: (305) 379-6667
dmarkus@markuslaw.com
Sean Hecker*
Michael Ferrara*
Brandon Trice*
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP
350 Fifth Avenue, 63rd Floor
New York, New York 10118
Tele.: (212) 763-0883
shecker@kaplanhecker.com
mferrara@kaplanhecker.com
btrice@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Nonparty Tiger Woods
*Admitted pro hac vice
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 15, 2024, I electronically filed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing with the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, which will send an electronic notice of filing
and service copy of the foregoing to all registered users authorized to receive service of filings in
the above case.
/s/ David Oscar Markus
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