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1 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon (SBN 127969) FILING FEE EXEMPT PURSUANT TO
E-mail: mkenyon@bwslaw.com GOVERNMENT CODE § § 6103
2 Kevin D. Siegel (SBN194787)
E-mail: ksiegel@bwslaw.com
3 Maxwell A. Blum (SBN 299336)
E-mail: mblum@bwslaw.com
4 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 6/8/2020
1901 Harrison Street, Suite 900
5 Oakland, CA 94612-3501
Tel: 510.273.8780 Fax: 510.839.9104
6
Attorneys for Defendant
7 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
10
11 FRANCESCA FAMBROUGH, CHRIS Case No. 17CIV05387
TAVENNER, NINA PESCHCKE-KOEDT,
12 EMILIO DIAZ, DAN SLANKER, DAWN Assigned forfor All Purposes to:
SLANKER, BRENDA SMITH, THUMPER Honorable Marie S. Weiner, Dept. 2
13 SMITH,
14 Plaintiff, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
CITY OF
CITY OF REDWOOD
REDWOOD CITY’S CITY'S
15 v. DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN
INTERVENTION (STANCIL,
16 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, CHAMBERS)
17 Defendant. Date: June 12, 2020
Time: 11:00 a.m.
18 ALISON MADDEN, WILLIAM MICHAEL Dept.: Two
FLEMING, EDWARD STANCIL, JEDRICK Judge: Hon. Marie S. Weiner
19 HUMPHRIES, ALBA LUCIA DIAZ,
JONATHAN REID, TINA REID, AND
20 JOHN CHAMBERS,
21 Plaintiff-Intervenors,
22 v.
23 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY,
24 Defendant.
25
26
27
28
B URKE , WILLIAMS
BURKE, W ILLIAMS &
& OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 1
S ORENS EN , LLP
SORENSEN, LLP
A A T LAW
LAW
T T O R N E Y S AT
ATTORNEYS
OAKLA ND
OAKLAND
CITY’S REPLY
CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
IN SUPPORT
1 Defendant City
Defendant City of
of Redwood
Redwood City City (the
(the "City")
“City”) submits
submits this
this Reply in Support of Demurrer
2 to Complaint in Intervention, with respect to two Plaintiff-Intervenors: Edward Stancil and John
3 Chambers.
4 I. INTRODUCTION
5 Stancil and Chambers elected to file their lawsuits piecemeal. First, in Frambrough [sic]
6 et al. v. City of
of Redwood City, Case No. 17CIV04680, they they unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully sought
sought aa "Court
“Court order
order
7 compelling the
compelling the City"
City” to
to award relocation benefits and assistance, including without limitation
8 Relocation Assistance
under the California Relocation Assistance Law (“CRAL”) and for unlawfully taking their
Law ("CRAL")
9 property by terminating their residential tenancies at Docktown. Now, in this lawsuit, they seek a
10 “judicial award
"judicial award ofof money"
money” in in light
light of
of the
the City's
City’s purported
purported failure to provide them adequate
failure to
11 compensation for having to vacate Docktown.
12 The City demurs because, now that judgment has been entered in the first lawsuit, their
13 claims in this action are barred by res judicata.
14 The City’s demurrer
The City's presents aa straight-forward
demurrer presents straight-forward question of law for the Court: Are
15 Stancil’s and Chambers'
Stancil's and Chambers’ causes
causes ofof action
action in
in this
this case the same,
case the same, as
as aa matter
matter of
of law, as the
law, as the causes of
causes of
16 action they asserted in Case No. 17CIV04680? If the answer is yes, then the Court must sustain
17 the City's
the City’s demurrer
demurrer without
without leave
leave to
to amend.
18 The key here is what it means, as a matter of law for res judicata purposes, for two causes
19 of action
of action to
to be
be the
the "same."
“same.” The question is not whether the theories or relief sought are identical
20 (e.g., the rule of law allegedly violated, or whether legal or equitable relief is sought). Instead,
21 the answer depends on two issues: (1) whether the claims asserted in the second case could also
22 have been asserted with those in the first; and (2) whether the claims in the second case seek to
23 vindicate the same primary right as was at issue in the first case.
24 The record here reflects the answer to both questions is yes, and that Stancil’s Stancil's and
25 Chambers’ claims here are barred.
Chambers'
26 Stancil and Chambers tacitly concede that they could have filed the claims they assert here
27 in the
in the first
first lawsuit they filed,
lawsuit they and instead
filed, and instead hide
hide behind
behind the
the Court's
Court’s recognition
recognition inin Case
28 No. 17CIV04680 that they did not do so. Their sole remaining argument is the purported
B URKE , WILLIAMS
BURKE, W ILLIAMS &
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S ORENS EN , LLP
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CITY’S REPLY
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IN SUPPORT
1 distinction in remedies in the two cases. But Supreme Court case law and multiple appellate
2 decisions make clear that is a distinction without a difference. The bottom line is that Stancil and
3 Chambers cannot repeatedly sue the City over the same dispute. They could have pleaded each of
4 their theories and requests for relief in Case No. 17CIV04680. Once judgment was entered
5 against them in that case, res judicata bars them from pursuing any cause of action against the
6 City, as a matter of law.
7 II. BACKGROUND
8 On October 12, 2017, Madden, Stancil, and Chambers (along with other petitioners) filed
9 a Petition for Writ of Mandamus against the City in Case No. 17CIV04680. Each claimed that
10 the City wrongfully terminated their residential tenancies at Docktown, failed to provide required
11 relocation assistance andand took
took their
their property
property rights.
rights. (See City's
(See City’s 11/1/2019
11/1/2019 RJNRJN ISO Opposition
ISO Opposition
12 to Petition to Intervene, Exh. 5.)
13 The Petition was heard on April 12, 2019. As the Court recounted in its Order denying
14 the Petition,
the Petition, "[alt
“[a]t oral
oral argument,
argument, Petitioners stated that the relief they seek is (1) to remain
15 residing at Docktown, or (2) obtain CRAL benefits (or inverse condemnation damages)." damages).” (City’s
(City's
16 11/1/2019 RJN ISO Opposition to Petition to Intervene, Exh. 6, Statement of Decision, p. 4.)
17 On July 2, 2019, the Court ruled against Petitioners. (Id. at Judgment, pp. 1-2.) On
18 August 1, 2019, the Court entered Judgment for the City. (Ibid.) Madden, Stancil, and Chambers
19 were subsequently granted leave to intervene in this lawsuit, and did so.
20 On February 7, 2020, the City filed its Demurrer against Madden, Stancil, and Chambers
21 with respect to their Complaint-in-Intervention. Stancil and Chambers filed their Opposition on
22 March 20, 2020. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the hearing was continued and ultimately
23 rescheduled from April 3, 2020 to June 12, 2020. The City now offers this reply to Stancil and
24 Chambers’ Opposition.'
Chambers' Opposition.1
25
1
1 On March 17, 2020, Madden substituted in as her own counsel. She subsequently filed
26 her own Opposition, but reported to the Court and parties by email that she was encountering
obstacles associated with the Covid-19 pandemic that interfered, inter alia, with her ability to
27 perform legal research at a law library. The Court then vacated the hearinghearing on
on the
the City's
City’s
Demurrer to
Demurrer to Madden's
Madden’s Complaint-in-Intervention.
Complaint-in-Intervention. (See Case Management Order # 15.)
28 Accordingly, this
Accordingly, this Reply
Reply responds
responds only
only to
to Stancil’s and Chambers'
Stancil's and Chambers’ Opposition
Opposition brief.
brief.
B URKE , WILLIAMS
BURKE, W ILLIAMS &
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SORENSEN, LLP
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IN SUPPORT
1 III. DISCUSSION
2 Stancil and Chambers acknowledge that res judicata judicata applies
applies where
where "(1)
“(1) the decision in the
3 prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action
4 as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them
5 were parties
were parties to
to the
the prior
prior proceeding."
proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82,
(Zevnik
6 emphasis added.) And there is no dispute that the first and third elements are satisfied here. The
7 only disagreement is over the second element, whether the causes of action in Case
8 No. 17CIV04680 and this matter are the same, as a matter of law. “Cause of
"Cause of Action"
Action” has
has aa
9 specific meaning when applying the doctrine of res judicata:
10 [T]he “cause of action"
1-Tlhe phrase "cause action” is often used indiscriminately to mean counts
which state [according
(according to different legal theories] the same cause of action....
11 But for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata, “cause
iudicata. the phrase "cause
of action"
action” has a more precise meaning: The cause of action is the right to
12 obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy
sought or the legal theory ... … advanced. [citation.]
rcitation.1 Causes of action are
13 considered the same if based on the same primary right. [citation.]
(citation.] The
primary
Primary right issimply the plaintiff's
plaintiffs right to be free from the particular
14 injury suffered.
iniury [citation.]
(citation.] Thus, under the primary rights theory.theory, the
determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the
15 same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally
involve the same primary right. [citation.]
16
(Hi-Desert Medical Center v. Douglas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 733, citing Mycogen Corp. v.
17
Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Ca1.4thCal.4th 888, 904, Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Ca1.4th Cal.4th
18
788, 798, and Citizens for for Open Government v. City of of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 325,
19
italics in original; bold added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, the
20
Court should evaluate whether the causes of action are the same by considering two issues:
21
(1) whether the claims asserted in the second case could have been asserted with those in the first;
22
and (2) whether the claims in the second case seek to vindicate the same primary right as was at
23
issue in the first case. (See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Ca1.4th Cal.4th 888, 904, see also,
24
e.g., Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at 82, and Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301,
25
309-10.) Ifthe answer
If the answer toto both
both questions
questions isis yes,
yes, the
the Court
Court must
must sustain
sustain the
the City's
City’s Demurrer.
Demurrer.
26
Stancil and Chambers advance two arguments on this issue in their Opposition. First, they
27
contend that certain statements made by this Court when it resolved Case No. 17C1V04680 17CIV04680 mean
28
B URKE , WILLIAMS
BURKE, W ILLIAMS &
& OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 4
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A A T LAW
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CITY’S REPLY
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IN SUPPORT
1 that res judicata does not apply. Second, they contend that res judicata does not apply because
2 they sought different relief in Case No. 17CIV04680. Each contention is wrong. The Court
3 should grant
should grant the
the City's
City’s Demurrer, without leave to amend, because the claims here could have
4 been presented in the first action, and Stancil and Chambers seek to vindicate the same primary
5 right: the right to assistance under the CRAL.
6 A. The Court’s
The Court's Statements in Case No. 17CIV04680 Are Not Relevant; the Res Judicata
Analysis Depends on Whether Plaintiffs Could Have Brought Their Claims in the
7 Prior Case, as They Concede, Not the Scope of Relief Previously Sought.
8 The first question is whether Stancil and Chambers could have brought their claims in this
9 case in Case No. 17CIV04680 along with their other claims in that case. “bars the
Res judicata "bars
10 litigation not only of issues that were actually litigated in the prior proceeding but also issues that
11 could have been litigated in that proceeding."
proceeding.” (Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at 82.) This includes
12 abandoned claims. (Gates, 178 Cal.App.3d at 309-10.) Stancil and Chambers could have done
13 so, and their Opposition identifies no obstacles standing in the way, tacitly conceding the point.
14 Opposition claims
Instead, the Opposition claims that
that the
the City
City ignored the Court's
ignored the Court’s statement
statement inin its decision in
15 Case No. 17CIV04680 that that it
it was
was not
not "ADJUDICATING
“ADJUDICATING OR OR MAKING A DETERMINATION
16 THAT PETITIONERS, THE DOCKTOWN TENANTS ARE OR ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
17 THE BENEFITS UNDER CRAL." CRAL.” (Opp. at 2:12.) Not so. The City appropriately
18 Court’s statement
acknowledged the Court's statement in footnote 5 of its MPA. While worth noting, this statement
19 ultimately has no bearing on the analysis here. As discussed, the question is whether Stancil and
20 Chambers could have brought their claims in Case No. 17CIV04680, not whether they did. The
21 Court’s observation that they could have, but did not, present those theories or seek those
Court's
22 remedies cannot save Stancil and Chambers from the dispositive legal effect of res judicata.
23 Indeed, Stancil and Chambers do not offer any legal authority to suggest that a court may
24 relieve a party of the legal consequences of the the party's
party’s pursuit
pursuit of
of piecemeal
piecemeal litigation. The
25 plaintiffs chose this strategy, and now that judgment has been entered against them in Case
26 No. 17CIV04680, they are stuck with the consequences.
27 PG&E v. Shasta Dam Area Public Utility Dist. makes clear that the linchpin is what the
28 plaintiff chose to litigate in the first case, not what the court said. ((1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 752,
B URKE , WILLIAMS
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1 756 ["The
756 [“The law would indeed be lame if [PG&E], after making the allegations that it made in the
2 prior actions, by withdrawing some of the issues raised by said allegations voluntarily, and even
3 with the permission of the court, but over the objection of [the utility district], could thereafter in
4 a new action litigate said issues"].)
issues”].)
5 The bottom line is the Court must apply the applicable res judicata test and consider
6 whether Stancil and Chambers could have asserted in Case No. 17CIV04680 the claims they now
7 seek to litigate in this case. There was no legal obstacle preventing them from asserting their
8 current claims in the prior case, which is dispositive.
9 B. Stancil and Chambers Seek to Vindicate the Same Primary Right.
10 The second issue is whether Stancil and Chambers seek to vindicate the same primary
11 right in this case that they did in Case No. 17CIV04680. They do.
12 “[t]he most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible:
To reiterate, "[t]he the
13 violation of
violation of aa single
single primary
primary right
right gives
gives rise
rise to
to but
but aa single
single cause
cause ofof action."
action.” (Mycogen, 28
(Mycogen,
14 quotation marks
Cal.4th at 904, citation and internal quotation
Ca1.4th marks omitted.)
omitted.) “The plaintiffs
"The plaintiff's primary
primary right
right is the
is the
15 right to be free from a particular injury, regardless of the legal theory on which liability for the
16 injury is
injury is based."
based.” (Federation of
(Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations v. City of of Los Angeles
17 (“Federation II")
("Federation (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202, emphasis added, citing Mycogen, 28
II”) (2005)
18 Cal.4th at 904; see also Bay
Ca1.4th Bay Cities Paving &
Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v.
Grading, Inc. Lawyers’ Mutual
v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins.
Ins. Co.
Co. (1993) 5
19 Cal.4th 854, 857.)
Ca1.4th “The primary
"The primary right
right must
must also
also be
be distinguished
distinguished from the remedy sought: The
20 violation of one primary right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the
21 injured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of
22 action, one not being determinative of of the
the other."
other.” (Mycogen, 28 Ca1.4th
Cal.4th at 904, emphasis in
23 original, internal quotes omitted; see also Franceschi v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
24 247, 257.)
25 Accordingly, "the
Accordingly, “the doctrine
doctrine ofof res
res judicata
judicata goes
goes beyond
beyond the
the four
four corners of the
corners of the operative
operative
26 pleading in the prior action: if the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the
27 subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is
28 conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged. The
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1 reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate
2 them in consecutive actions."
actions.” (Ibid., citing Warga
(Ibid., Warga v. Cooper (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 371, 377-
3 78.)
4 Stancil and Chambers contend they can again dispute, in this second lawsuit, whether the
5 City is obligated to compensate them for terminating their tenancies. They cannot. In Case
6 No. 17CIV04680, they sought to vindicate this right by arguing that a writ of mandate should
7 have issued to command the City to provide compensation, including without limitation under the
8 CRAL. That legal theory did not pan out, and now they are seeking a judicial award of
9 compensation, directly under the CRAL, as well as just compensation for inverse condemnation.
10 But the harm is the same: they contend the City has not provided them compensation to which
11 they allege they are entitled. Where the harm at issue is the same in two suits, the same primary
12 right is implicated. (Federation II, 126 Cal.App.4th at 12022.)12022.)
13 Stancil and Chambers contend they should nevertheless be permitted to proceed with the
14 instant action because the remedies they seek are different. But their Opposition ignores the
15 Supreme Court’s ruling in Mycogen, quoted above, that comparing the remedies sought in two
Supreme Court's
16 lawsuits is the wrong way to assess whether they both seek to vindicate the same primary right.
17 Mycogen explains why. The Supreme Court held that res judicata prevented a party who
18 had sought declaratory relief and specific performance on a contract from subsequently filing a
19 suit for damages for breach of the same contract. There was a distinction in remedies in that case:
20 “In both Mycogen I and Mycogen II, MPS alleged a breach of the same contract, differing only in
"In
21
2
2 Stancil and Chambers attempt to distinguish Federation II II on the ground that the first
22 and second
and second cases in that
cases in that matter
matter both
both involved
involved the
the same
same primary
primary right: “the right
right: "the to ensure
right to the
ensure the
city’s compliance
city's compliance withwith CEQA's
CEQA’s substantive and procedural requirements in connection with the
23 General Plan Framework and the certified EIR,” and that
EIR," and that both
both cases
cases sought
sought aa court
court order
order
compelling the city to comply with CEQA. (Opp. at 2-3, citing Federation II, 126 Cal.App.4th at
24 1180.) This misses the point.
25 While both cases involved CEQA, the petitioners were trying to use different legal
theories to
theories to vindicate
vindicate the
the same
same right.
right. In the second
In the second case,
case, petitioners
petitioners challenged
challenged thethe city’s findings
city's findings
26 on waste water, solid waste, open space, and utilities, but had not done so in the first case.
(Federation II, at p. 559.) Federation II II held that this attempt to litigate a new theory for relief
27 was barred by res judicata because it was a new means to the same end. That both cases involved
CEQA or sought an order compelling compliance rather than damages has no bearing on this
28 point.
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1 the requested remedy.”
remedy." (Mycogen, 28 Ca1.4th
Cal.4th at 905.) But ultimately it did not matter for the
2 Court’s analysis,
Court's analysis, the
the second
second claim was barred by res judicata because both cases sought to
3 vindicate the same primary right. (Id. at 904.)
4 The same focus on the primary right at issue, rather than remedies, bars a plaintiff from
5 first petitioning for a writ of mandate, and, after judgment is entered, pursuing monetary relief.
6 (Hi-Desert, 239 Cal.App.4th at 733.) Hi-Desert further explains why.
7 Various hospitals sought to recoup financial reimbursement from the Department of
8 Health Care
Health Care Services (“Department”).
Services ("Department"). The Department
The Department had had limited the amount
limited the amount of of Medicaid
Medicaid
9 reimbursements it paid to the hospitals based on Senate Bill 1103. (Id. at 902.) The hospitals
10 pursued a multi-litigation strategy. In a case called Mission I, the hospitals petitioned for a writ of
11 mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, arguing that Senate Bill 1103 was
12 invalid, and that the caps it imposed should not be applied. (Id. at 721.) They were successful,
13 but they had only requested declaratory and injunctive relief, not monetary damages for the
14 Department’s failure
Preview
1 Michelle Marchetta Kenyon (SBN 127969) FILING FEE EXEMPT PURSUANT TO E-mail: mkenyon@bwslaw.com GOVERNMENT CODE § § 6103 2 Kevin D. Siegel (SBN194787) E-mail: ksiegel@bwslaw.com 3 Maxwell A. Blum (SBN 299336) E-mail: mblum@bwslaw.com 4 BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 6/8/2020 1901 Harrison Street, Suite 900 5 Oakland, CA 94612-3501 Tel: 510.273.8780 Fax: 510.839.9104 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 10 11 FRANCESCA FAMBROUGH, CHRIS Case No. 17CIV05387 TAVENNER, NINA PESCHCKE-KOEDT, 12 EMILIO DIAZ, DAN SLANKER, DAWN Assigned forfor All Purposes to: SLANKER, BRENDA SMITH, THUMPER Honorable Marie S. Weiner, Dept. 2 13 SMITH, 14 Plaintiff, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CITY OF REDWOOD REDWOOD CITY’S CITY'S 15 v. DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION (STANCIL, 16 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, CHAMBERS) 17 Defendant. Date: June 12, 2020 Time: 11:00 a.m. 18 ALISON MADDEN, WILLIAM MICHAEL Dept.: Two FLEMING, EDWARD STANCIL, JEDRICK Judge: Hon. Marie S. Weiner 19 HUMPHRIES, ALBA LUCIA DIAZ, JONATHAN REID, TINA REID, AND 20 JOHN CHAMBERS, 21 Plaintiff-Intervenors, 22 v. 23 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, 24 Defendant. 25 26 27 28 B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 1 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 Defendant City Defendant City of of Redwood Redwood City City (the (the "City") “City”) submits submits this this Reply in Support of Demurrer 2 to Complaint in Intervention, with respect to two Plaintiff-Intervenors: Edward Stancil and John 3 Chambers. 4 I. INTRODUCTION 5 Stancil and Chambers elected to file their lawsuits piecemeal. First, in Frambrough [sic] 6 et al. v. City of of Redwood City, Case No. 17CIV04680, they they unsuccessfully unsuccessfully sought sought aa "Court “Court order order 7 compelling the compelling the City" City” to to award relocation benefits and assistance, including without limitation 8 Relocation Assistance under the California Relocation Assistance Law (“CRAL”) and for unlawfully taking their Law ("CRAL") 9 property by terminating their residential tenancies at Docktown. Now, in this lawsuit, they seek a 10 “judicial award "judicial award ofof money" money” in in light light of of the the City's City’s purported purported failure to provide them adequate failure to 11 compensation for having to vacate Docktown. 12 The City demurs because, now that judgment has been entered in the first lawsuit, their 13 claims in this action are barred by res judicata. 14 The City’s demurrer The City's presents aa straight-forward demurrer presents straight-forward question of law for the Court: Are 15 Stancil’s and Chambers' Stancil's and Chambers’ causes causes ofof action action in in this this case the same, case the same, as as aa matter matter of of law, as the law, as the causes of causes of 16 action they asserted in Case No. 17CIV04680? If the answer is yes, then the Court must sustain 17 the City's the City’s demurrer demurrer without without leave leave to to amend. 18 The key here is what it means, as a matter of law for res judicata purposes, for two causes 19 of action of action to to be be the the "same." “same.” The question is not whether the theories or relief sought are identical 20 (e.g., the rule of law allegedly violated, or whether legal or equitable relief is sought). Instead, 21 the answer depends on two issues: (1) whether the claims asserted in the second case could also 22 have been asserted with those in the first; and (2) whether the claims in the second case seek to 23 vindicate the same primary right as was at issue in the first case. 24 The record here reflects the answer to both questions is yes, and that Stancil’s Stancil's and 25 Chambers’ claims here are barred. Chambers' 26 Stancil and Chambers tacitly concede that they could have filed the claims they assert here 27 in the in the first first lawsuit they filed, lawsuit they and instead filed, and instead hide hide behind behind the the Court's Court’s recognition recognition inin Case 28 No. 17CIV04680 that they did not do so. Their sole remaining argument is the purported B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 2 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 distinction in remedies in the two cases. But Supreme Court case law and multiple appellate 2 decisions make clear that is a distinction without a difference. The bottom line is that Stancil and 3 Chambers cannot repeatedly sue the City over the same dispute. They could have pleaded each of 4 their theories and requests for relief in Case No. 17CIV04680. Once judgment was entered 5 against them in that case, res judicata bars them from pursuing any cause of action against the 6 City, as a matter of law. 7 II. BACKGROUND 8 On October 12, 2017, Madden, Stancil, and Chambers (along with other petitioners) filed 9 a Petition for Writ of Mandamus against the City in Case No. 17CIV04680. Each claimed that 10 the City wrongfully terminated their residential tenancies at Docktown, failed to provide required 11 relocation assistance andand took took their their property property rights. rights. (See City's (See City’s 11/1/2019 11/1/2019 RJNRJN ISO Opposition ISO Opposition 12 to Petition to Intervene, Exh. 5.) 13 The Petition was heard on April 12, 2019. As the Court recounted in its Order denying 14 the Petition, the Petition, "[alt “[a]t oral oral argument, argument, Petitioners stated that the relief they seek is (1) to remain 15 residing at Docktown, or (2) obtain CRAL benefits (or inverse condemnation damages)." damages).” (City’s (City's 16 11/1/2019 RJN ISO Opposition to Petition to Intervene, Exh. 6, Statement of Decision, p. 4.) 17 On July 2, 2019, the Court ruled against Petitioners. (Id. at Judgment, pp. 1-2.) On 18 August 1, 2019, the Court entered Judgment for the City. (Ibid.) Madden, Stancil, and Chambers 19 were subsequently granted leave to intervene in this lawsuit, and did so. 20 On February 7, 2020, the City filed its Demurrer against Madden, Stancil, and Chambers 21 with respect to their Complaint-in-Intervention. Stancil and Chambers filed their Opposition on 22 March 20, 2020. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the hearing was continued and ultimately 23 rescheduled from April 3, 2020 to June 12, 2020. The City now offers this reply to Stancil and 24 Chambers’ Opposition.' Chambers' Opposition.1 25 1 1 On March 17, 2020, Madden substituted in as her own counsel. She subsequently filed 26 her own Opposition, but reported to the Court and parties by email that she was encountering obstacles associated with the Covid-19 pandemic that interfered, inter alia, with her ability to 27 perform legal research at a law library. The Court then vacated the hearinghearing on on the the City's City’s Demurrer to Demurrer to Madden's Madden’s Complaint-in-Intervention. Complaint-in-Intervention. (See Case Management Order # 15.) 28 Accordingly, this Accordingly, this Reply Reply responds responds only only to to Stancil’s and Chambers' Stancil's and Chambers’ Opposition Opposition brief. brief. B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 3 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Stancil and Chambers acknowledge that res judicata judicata applies applies where where "(1) “(1) the decision in the 3 prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action 4 as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them 5 were parties were parties to to the the prior prior proceeding." proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82, (Zevnik 6 emphasis added.) And there is no dispute that the first and third elements are satisfied here. The 7 only disagreement is over the second element, whether the causes of action in Case 8 No. 17CIV04680 and this matter are the same, as a matter of law. “Cause of "Cause of Action" Action” has has aa 9 specific meaning when applying the doctrine of res judicata: 10 [T]he “cause of action" 1-Tlhe phrase "cause action” is often used indiscriminately to mean counts which state [according (according to different legal theories] the same cause of action.... 11 But for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata, “cause iudicata. the phrase "cause of action" action” has a more precise meaning: The cause of action is the right to 12 obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory ... … advanced. [citation.] rcitation.1 Causes of action are 13 considered the same if based on the same primary right. [citation.] (citation.] The primary Primary right issimply the plaintiff's plaintiffs right to be free from the particular 14 injury suffered. iniury [citation.] (citation.] Thus, under the primary rights theory.theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the 15 same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right. [citation.] 16 (Hi-Desert Medical Center v. Douglas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 733, citing Mycogen Corp. v. 17 Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Ca1.4thCal.4th 888, 904, Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Ca1.4th Cal.4th 18 788, 798, and Citizens for for Open Government v. City of of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 325, 19 italics in original; bold added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, the 20 Court should evaluate whether the causes of action are the same by considering two issues: 21 (1) whether the claims asserted in the second case could have been asserted with those in the first; 22 and (2) whether the claims in the second case seek to vindicate the same primary right as was at 23 issue in the first case. (See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Ca1.4th Cal.4th 888, 904, see also, 24 e.g., Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at 82, and Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 25 309-10.) Ifthe answer If the answer toto both both questions questions isis yes, yes, the the Court Court must must sustain sustain the the City's City’s Demurrer. Demurrer. 26 Stancil and Chambers advance two arguments on this issue in their Opposition. First, they 27 contend that certain statements made by this Court when it resolved Case No. 17C1V04680 17CIV04680 mean 28 B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 4 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 that res judicata does not apply. Second, they contend that res judicata does not apply because 2 they sought different relief in Case No. 17CIV04680. Each contention is wrong. The Court 3 should grant should grant the the City's City’s Demurrer, without leave to amend, because the claims here could have 4 been presented in the first action, and Stancil and Chambers seek to vindicate the same primary 5 right: the right to assistance under the CRAL. 6 A. The Court’s The Court's Statements in Case No. 17CIV04680 Are Not Relevant; the Res Judicata Analysis Depends on Whether Plaintiffs Could Have Brought Their Claims in the 7 Prior Case, as They Concede, Not the Scope of Relief Previously Sought. 8 The first question is whether Stancil and Chambers could have brought their claims in this 9 case in Case No. 17CIV04680 along with their other claims in that case. “bars the Res judicata "bars 10 litigation not only of issues that were actually litigated in the prior proceeding but also issues that 11 could have been litigated in that proceeding." proceeding.” (Zevnik, 159 Cal.App.4th at 82.) This includes 12 abandoned claims. (Gates, 178 Cal.App.3d at 309-10.) Stancil and Chambers could have done 13 so, and their Opposition identifies no obstacles standing in the way, tacitly conceding the point. 14 Opposition claims Instead, the Opposition claims that that the the City City ignored the Court's ignored the Court’s statement statement inin its decision in 15 Case No. 17CIV04680 that that it it was was not not "ADJUDICATING “ADJUDICATING OR OR MAKING A DETERMINATION 16 THAT PETITIONERS, THE DOCKTOWN TENANTS ARE OR ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 17 THE BENEFITS UNDER CRAL." CRAL.” (Opp. at 2:12.) Not so. The City appropriately 18 Court’s statement acknowledged the Court's statement in footnote 5 of its MPA. While worth noting, this statement 19 ultimately has no bearing on the analysis here. As discussed, the question is whether Stancil and 20 Chambers could have brought their claims in Case No. 17CIV04680, not whether they did. The 21 Court’s observation that they could have, but did not, present those theories or seek those Court's 22 remedies cannot save Stancil and Chambers from the dispositive legal effect of res judicata. 23 Indeed, Stancil and Chambers do not offer any legal authority to suggest that a court may 24 relieve a party of the legal consequences of the the party's party’s pursuit pursuit of of piecemeal piecemeal litigation. The 25 plaintiffs chose this strategy, and now that judgment has been entered against them in Case 26 No. 17CIV04680, they are stuck with the consequences. 27 PG&E v. Shasta Dam Area Public Utility Dist. makes clear that the linchpin is what the 28 plaintiff chose to litigate in the first case, not what the court said. ((1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 752, B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 5 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 756 ["The 756 [“The law would indeed be lame if [PG&E], after making the allegations that it made in the 2 prior actions, by withdrawing some of the issues raised by said allegations voluntarily, and even 3 with the permission of the court, but over the objection of [the utility district], could thereafter in 4 a new action litigate said issues"].) issues”].) 5 The bottom line is the Court must apply the applicable res judicata test and consider 6 whether Stancil and Chambers could have asserted in Case No. 17CIV04680 the claims they now 7 seek to litigate in this case. There was no legal obstacle preventing them from asserting their 8 current claims in the prior case, which is dispositive. 9 B. Stancil and Chambers Seek to Vindicate the Same Primary Right. 10 The second issue is whether Stancil and Chambers seek to vindicate the same primary 11 right in this case that they did in Case No. 17CIV04680. They do. 12 “[t]he most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: To reiterate, "[t]he the 13 violation of violation of aa single single primary primary right right gives gives rise rise to to but but aa single single cause cause ofof action." action.” (Mycogen, 28 (Mycogen, 14 quotation marks Cal.4th at 904, citation and internal quotation Ca1.4th marks omitted.) omitted.) “The plaintiffs "The plaintiff's primary primary right right is the is the 15 right to be free from a particular injury, regardless of the legal theory on which liability for the 16 injury is injury is based." based.” (Federation of (Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations v. City of of Los Angeles 17 (“Federation II") ("Federation (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202, emphasis added, citing Mycogen, 28 II”) (2005) 18 Cal.4th at 904; see also Bay Ca1.4th Bay Cities Paving & Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Grading, Inc. Lawyers’ Mutual v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Ins. Co. Co. (1993) 5 19 Cal.4th 854, 857.) Ca1.4th “The primary "The primary right right must must also also be be distinguished distinguished from the remedy sought: The 20 violation of one primary right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the 21 injured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of 22 action, one not being determinative of of the the other." other.” (Mycogen, 28 Ca1.4th Cal.4th at 904, emphasis in 23 original, internal quotes omitted; see also Franceschi v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 24 247, 257.) 25 Accordingly, "the Accordingly, “the doctrine doctrine ofof res res judicata judicata goes goes beyond beyond the the four four corners of the corners of the operative operative 26 pleading in the prior action: if the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the 27 subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is 28 conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged. The B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 6 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate 2 them in consecutive actions." actions.” (Ibid., citing Warga (Ibid., Warga v. Cooper (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 371, 377- 3 78.) 4 Stancil and Chambers contend they can again dispute, in this second lawsuit, whether the 5 City is obligated to compensate them for terminating their tenancies. They cannot. In Case 6 No. 17CIV04680, they sought to vindicate this right by arguing that a writ of mandate should 7 have issued to command the City to provide compensation, including without limitation under the 8 CRAL. That legal theory did not pan out, and now they are seeking a judicial award of 9 compensation, directly under the CRAL, as well as just compensation for inverse condemnation. 10 But the harm is the same: they contend the City has not provided them compensation to which 11 they allege they are entitled. Where the harm at issue is the same in two suits, the same primary 12 right is implicated. (Federation II, 126 Cal.App.4th at 12022.)12022.) 13 Stancil and Chambers contend they should nevertheless be permitted to proceed with the 14 instant action because the remedies they seek are different. But their Opposition ignores the 15 Supreme Court’s ruling in Mycogen, quoted above, that comparing the remedies sought in two Supreme Court's 16 lawsuits is the wrong way to assess whether they both seek to vindicate the same primary right. 17 Mycogen explains why. The Supreme Court held that res judicata prevented a party who 18 had sought declaratory relief and specific performance on a contract from subsequently filing a 19 suit for damages for breach of the same contract. There was a distinction in remedies in that case: 20 “In both Mycogen I and Mycogen II, MPS alleged a breach of the same contract, differing only in "In 21 2 2 Stancil and Chambers attempt to distinguish Federation II II on the ground that the first 22 and second and second cases in that cases in that matter matter both both involved involved the the same same primary primary right: “the right right: "the to ensure right to the ensure the city’s compliance city's compliance withwith CEQA's CEQA’s substantive and procedural requirements in connection with the 23 General Plan Framework and the certified EIR,” and that EIR," and that both both cases cases sought sought aa court court order order compelling the city to comply with CEQA. (Opp. at 2-3, citing Federation II, 126 Cal.App.4th at 24 1180.) This misses the point. 25 While both cases involved CEQA, the petitioners were trying to use different legal theories to theories to vindicate vindicate the the same same right. right. In the second In the second case, case, petitioners petitioners challenged challenged thethe city’s findings city's findings 26 on waste water, solid waste, open space, and utilities, but had not done so in the first case. (Federation II, at p. 559.) Federation II II held that this attempt to litigate a new theory for relief 27 was barred by res judicata because it was a new means to the same end. That both cases involved CEQA or sought an order compelling compliance rather than damages has no bearing on this 28 point. B URKE , WILLIAMS BURKE, W ILLIAMS & & OAK #4825-9136-4285 v4 7 S ORENS EN , LLP SORENSEN, LLP A A T LAW LAW T T O R N E Y S AT ATTORNEYS OAKLA ND OAKLAND CITY’S REPLY CITY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 1 the requested remedy.” remedy." (Mycogen, 28 Ca1.4th Cal.4th at 905.) But ultimately it did not matter for the 2 Court’s analysis, Court's analysis, the the second second claim was barred by res judicata because both cases sought to 3 vindicate the same primary right. (Id. at 904.) 4 The same focus on the primary right at issue, rather than remedies, bars a plaintiff from 5 first petitioning for a writ of mandate, and, after judgment is entered, pursuing monetary relief. 6 (Hi-Desert, 239 Cal.App.4th at 733.) Hi-Desert further explains why. 7 Various hospitals sought to recoup financial reimbursement from the Department of 8 Health Care Health Care Services (“Department”). Services ("Department"). The Department The Department had had limited the amount limited the amount of of Medicaid Medicaid 9 reimbursements it paid to the hospitals based on Senate Bill 1103. (Id. at 902.) The hospitals 10 pursued a multi-litigation strategy. In a case called Mission I, the hospitals petitioned for a writ of 11 mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, arguing that Senate Bill 1103 was 12 invalid, and that the caps it imposed should not be applied. (Id. at 721.) They were successful, 13 but they had only requested declaratory and injunctive relief, not monetary damages for the 14 Department’s failure