Motion-Secondary: FBS Properties, Inc., Bosco Investments, LLC VS. GeoSouthern Energy Corporation,GEP Haynesville LLC

On September 23, 2019 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Bosco Investments, Llc, Fbs Properties, Inc., and Geosouthern Energy Corporation, Gep Haynesville Llc, for Contract-Other >$200,000 in the District Court of Montgomery County.

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12/5/2019 9:10 AM
21-01-00430 Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 38990976
Montgomery County 284th Judicial District Court By: Bonnie Lugo
Filed: 12/5/2019 9:10 AM
Received and E-Filed for Record
1/14/2021 10:09 AM
CAUSE NO. 2019-69106 Melisa Miller, District Clerk
Montgomery County, Texas
Deputy Clerk, Kayla Adams
FBS PROPERTIES, INC., and § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BOSCO INVESTMENTS, LLC §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. §
§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
GEOSOUTHERN ENERGY §
CORPORATION, and GEP §
HAYNESVILLE, LLC, §
§
Defendants. § 281st JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO CONTINUE VENUE AND SLAPP HEARINGS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE CHRISTINE WEEMS:

Defendants GeoSouthern Energy Corporation and GEP Haynesville, LLC

(“Defendants”) file this Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery and to

Continue December 13 and 17 Hearing and would respectfully show unto the Court as

follows:

I.
SUMMARY
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1. Plaintiffs’ request for discovery and a continuance should be denied. Plaintiffs’

request for venue related discovery is premised on the wrong legal standard. Plaintiffs

cite cases that only allow for extremely limited discovery in exceptional cases where

transfers are sought to prevent unfair trials. Defendants did not seek a transfer under Tex.

R. Civ. P. 257, the prevention of unfair trials rule; therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to
venue related discovery under Rule 257, the wrong legal standard.

2. Additionally, Plaintiffs have been unable to articulate the need for specific venue

related discovery. Plaintiffs pled two bases for venue: (i) the forum selection clause in the

NDA, and (ii) acts or omissions occurring in Harris County. Plaintiffs’ motion is simply a

license to fish for “venue related evidence,” which is an absurd concept. In getting to fix

venue as the plaintiff, the plaintiff better have a basis for choosing that venue at the time

it files suit. Fishing for evidence to fix venue is not a recognized concept.

3. Under the rules, Plaintiffs had to respond to the forum selection clause basis by

November 13, 2019, which is 30 days before the venue hearing. Further, any request for

discovery or a continuance also had to be sought 30 days prior to the hearing. In

Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the rules’ requirements, Plaintiffs waived any right to

discovery.

4. In wrapping up the venue related discovery with the TCPA, Plaintiffs concede

they have no basis for discovery under either venue or TCPA grounds. This Court should

not take the bait and combine the issues. To the contrary, this Court should—as is

required under decided precedent—endeavor to rule on the venue motion before taking
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up the TCPA motion to dismiss1. If the Court chooses to proceed with the discovery

issues, Plaintiffs have, nonetheless, failed to establish good cause under the TCPA for

discovery.

5. Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed his availability for the venue hearing back

1
Given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s trial during the week of the TCPA dismissal hearing, Defendants will re-schedule
the TCPA hearing. This will ensure the Court addresses the venue issues without conflating them with TCPA
discovery.

2
in October before the hearing was even scheduled. Having agreed to move forward with

the hearing back in October, this Court should not now re-schedule the venue hearing.

6. The motion for limited discovery and a continuance of the hearing should be

denied.

II.
RESPONSE

A. Plaintiffs Cite to Incorrect Legal Standards and Fail to Provide Any
Legitimate Basis on Which to Obtain Venue-Related Discovery.

2. Plaintiffs first claim that courts “regularly permit venue-related discovery,” and

that the Court should therefore continue the venue hearing in this case so that Plaintiffs

may conduct such discovery. Plaintiffs argue that they need this venue-related discovery

because, despite their express allegations that all of the relevant actions occurred in

Montgomery County, Texas they need to fish for evidence that a trailing act may have

occurred in Harris County. This Court should easily reject Plaintiffs’ arguments.

(i) The cases on which Plaintiffs rely for seeking venue-related discovery
concern a motion to transfer venue under Rule 257—which permits venue
transfers to avoid unfair trials due to prejudice—which has a special and
explicit rule that allows discovery with regard to such motions.

3. First, the two cases cited by Plaintiffs—City of La Grange v. McBee and Beard v.
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Gonzalez—each concern a motion to transfer venue under Tex. R. Civ. P. 257, a unique

venue rule that allows civil litigants to seek a change of venue when special

circumstances exist that would preclude the litigant from receiving a “fair and impartial

trial.” See Rule 257. Pursuant to Rule 258, the court “shall” permit “reasonable

discovery” in support of, or in response to, a motion to transfer venue under Rule 257.

3
See Rule 257.

4. Accordingly, City of La Grange and Beard are inapposite because they deal with

discovery in the context of a Rule 257 motion to transfer venue. See City of La Grange

v. McBee, 923 S.W.2d 89, 90-91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied)

(“McBee had moved to transfer the case pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 257(a) . . .

[therefore,] [t]he City was entitled to engage in reasonable discovery to investigate the

issue [of prejudice that may preclude a fair and impartial trial] and develop evidence

opposing transfer. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 258.”); Beard v. Gonzalez, 924 S.W.2d 763, 764

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (“Vogt filed his motion to change venue, alleging

that Beard is the husband of a well-known local politician” and that he would be

“deprive[d] . . . of a fair and impartial trial,” and thus, trial court abused discretion in

refusing allow Beard to conduct “reasonable discovery” pursuant to Rule 258).2

5. In this case, Defendants filed a motion to transfer venue pursuant to Rules 86 and

87 and established that Harris County was not a county of proper venue because none of

the alleged acts or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred there, and because

the venue-selection clause in the parties’ contract was unenforceable because it does not
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comply with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §15.020.

6. Importantly, neither Rule 86 nor Rule 87 contains any language that gives a

plaintiff the right to conduct venue-related discovery to support its response to a motion

to transfer venue, or any language that would allow the plaintiff the right to continue a

2
Although the Beard opinion did not specifically state that the motion was brought under Tex. R. Civ. P. 257, the
articulated basis for the motion—deprivation of fair trial due to prejudice—clearly indicates that the motion
was, in fact, brought (at least in part) under Rule 257.

4
hearing on a venue motion for lack of discovery. Indeed, the fact that the Texas

Legislature incorporated detailed proof and evidence provisions into Rule 87 without also

discussing a party’s entitlement to venue-related discovery is telling: no such discovery

is permitted. Likewise, the fact that the Texas Legislature specifically included a right to

discovery in Rule 258—but not Rule 87—further confirms that no such discovery is

allowed.

7. The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth

Court of Appeals, 929 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1996) further forecloses Plaintiffs’

argument. In that case, Firestone filed a motion to transfer venue under Rule 87, and the

plaintiffs sought a continuance of a venue hearing to conduct discovery, which the trial

court denied. Id. at 441. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals granted mandamus and

overturned that ruling, concluding—under Rule 258 and the Texas Supreme Court’s prior

opinion in Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1990)—that the

plaintiffs were entitled to “reasonable discovery” to support their response to Firestone’s

motion to transfer venue. The Texas Supreme Court, in turn, issued a writ of mandamus

overturning the court of appeals. It noted that, “Firestone brought its venue motion under
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Rule 87, not rule 257,” and that, therefore, “Union Carbide [and its discussion of Rule

258’s discovery requirements] is inapposite.” Id.

8. Finally, the mere fact that Rule 88 states that “[d]iscovery shall not be abated or

otherwise affected by a pendency of a motion to transfer venue” does not, as Plaintiffs

contend, mean that litigants are entitled to venue-specific discovery. Instead, the purpose

of Rule 88 is merely to “enable the parties to proceed with preparation for trial on the

5
merits, promptly and unhampered, so that the [motion to transfer venue] will not delay

final disposition of the suit.” Newman Oil Co. v. Alkek, 585 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1979, no writ).

(ii) Plaintiffs have been unable to articulate any specific need for venue related
discovery.

9. In addition to not being entitled to venue-related discovery, Plaintiffs have failed

to show any legitimate need for discovery. Defendants’ motion to transfer venue

establishes that the parties’ NDA’s venue-selection clause is not enforceable because it

does not comply with Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code §15.020. Whether or not a contract

evidences a “major transaction” such that it satisfies §15.020 is a pure question of law

that the court decides from looking at the face of the contract. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code §15.020(a) (contract must set forth “consideration with an aggregated stated

value equal to or greater than $1 million” in order to qualify as major transaction).

Clearly, this Court—in determining whether or not the NDA “states” aggregate

consideration of $1 million or more—does not need any additional evidence or discovery.

10. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ request to fish for evidence to perhaps show that “a

substantial part of its claims occurred in Harris County” is not a sufficient basis to
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postpone the venue hearing in the hope Plaintiffs may hook into some threadbare piece of

evidence. In Plaintiffs’ lengthy and detailed original petition, they fail to mention even a

single act that occurred in Harris County. Instead, they claim that all of the relevant

activity occurred either at: (i) Defendants’ headquarters in Montgomery County, Texas;

or (ii) Louisiana. In fact, in their response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum

6
non conveniens, Plaintiffs railed on the fact that all of the “decisions” and sole “meeting”

leading to this lawsuit occurred at “Defendants’ headquarters” in Montgomery

County, Texas. (See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

Forum Non Conveniens,, p. 15). Plaintiffs’ argument that it should be allowed to fish for

evidence to contradict its own previously forum-related allegations—on which this Court

relied in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss—flies in the face of reason.

11. Aside from failing to plead any Harris County substantial acts or omissions in

their petition, Plaintiffs still cannot point to a suspected fact—let alone an actual fact—

that might support venue in Harris County. For example, the mere fact that Plaintiff FBS

is “headquartered” in Harris County does not, in any way, give rise to venue in Harris

County. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §15.002(a) (setting out that plaintiff’s

residence generally is immaterial for venue purposes). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ conclusory

allegation that it “appears” that some of Defendants’ employees “live” in Harris County

has no bearing on the venue analysis. Id. (There is no provision that allows venue to be

premised on the county of residence of a party’s employees). To the contrary, in

response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs belabored the fact that all of
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Defendants’ employees work in Montgomery County, Texas, and therefore any alleged

tortious conduct occurred in Montgomery County, Texas:

The Geosouthern employees responsible for these actions, including but not
limited to Wilkerson and Molleston, work in the Texas headquarters [in
Montgomery County].

....

The GEP Haynesville employees primarily responsible for these actions,

7
including but not limited to Dahman, Bentz, and Marr, all work at GEP
Haynesville’s Texas headquarters in [Montgomery County].

(See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens,

p. 15). Even in its Motion for Continuance, Plaintiffs again hammer the fact that all the

relevant “decisions” that Defendants made “were made at Defendants’ headquarters in

Texas.” (See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Continuance, p6). It is undisputed that “Defendants’

headquarters” are in Montgomery County, Texas.

12. Without doubt, Rule 87 clearly permits Plaintiffs to file whatever affidavits they

want to respond to Defendants’ motion to transfer venue. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’

assertion, they are free to “challenge [Defendants’ venue-related assertio[n]” even

without discovery.

13. Thus, Plaintiffs’ adamant allegation—or, more appropriately—adamant

concession—that all of the major activity occurred in Defendants’ headquarters in

Montgomery County, Texas wholly undercuts Plaintiffs’ conclusory calls for venue-

related discovery.

(iii) Conversely, the discovery Plaintiffs seek has nothing to do with “venue
evidence,” assuming that would even be a permissible inquiry.
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14. When asked to articulate what venue related discovery Plaintiffs’ sought,

Plaintiffs’ counsel was unable to respond: “And what is the discovery you are seeking for

venue? Please list that out separately.” (See Mahendru Email; Ex. A). Bypassing that

request, Plaintiffs’ counsel simply filed the motion, but in masking the specific venue

related discovery under the “good cause” requirement under the TCPA, Plaintiffs

concede they have no venue related discovery to seek.

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15. None of these three requests for documents has any venue component:

(See Plaintiffs’ Appendix to Motion, p. 14). The first request conveniently leaves out

seeking any decisions made in Harris County, assuming arguendo that a decision made in

Harris County would even form the basis of venue in Harris County. The second category

of documents all deal with communications between Defendants and Louisiana parties.

Even if those communications emanated from a server located in Harris County, which is

just a hypothetical example, that would not be discoverable and certainly an email

launched from Harris County would not give rise to venue in Harris County. Lest we

forget, Plaintiffs already have these documents since they were so selective in attaching

those emails from the Louisiana litigation to their petition and their forum non conveniens

response.
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16. And finally, the third request is as overbroad and catchall as it could possibly be.

If Defendants’ representatives were internally communicating about the “Wilson Lease,”

how on earth could that have any bearing on venue? Neither the physical location of the

individual nor the substance of the communication would establish venue. But what is

Plaintiff alleging about Defendants’ conduct: that Defendants’ tortiously interfered with

an alleged lease FBS had with Wilson Minerals. By definition, that tortious interference

9
could only have occurred in Louisiana not anywhere in Texas. Further, the alleged breach

of contract with respect to the NDA could only have occurred in Montgomery County.

That is, any alleged act of disseminating confidential information could only have

occurred in Montgomery County or in Louisiana. Harris County simply does not come

into the picture. Defendants already provided affidavits to this Court that GEP

Haynesville transmitted Malcolm Murchison’s email from April 2016—months before

the execution of the NDA in August 2016—to Jeff Clark, the landman in Louisiana. (See

Douglas Dahmann Declaration attached as Exhibit A to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss);

(See Jeff Clark Declaration attached as Exhibit G to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss).

(iv) There is no plausible basis for seeking depositions in a venue hearing.

17. Plaintiffs have been unable to show this Court any cases under Rules 86 and 87

where a court granted deposition discovery to fix the plaintiff’s choice of venue. In taking

Plaintiffs’ invitation, therefore, this Court will be an outlier.

18. More importantly, that Plaintiffs proclaim they need a deposition to establish the

propriety of venue shows that Plaintiffs are just grasping. It would be an absurd

proposition for a plaintiff to file a claim in a venue with no facts or foundation and hope
CertifiedDocumentNumber:88386728-Page10of16

to make venue stick only after discovery. That would upend the entire construct of due

order of pleadings, giving plaintiff first choice to fix venue, and the need to have venue

hearings addressed at the earliest time possible:

Texas venue law is established. The plaintiff has the first choice to fix
venue in a proper county; this the plaintiff does by filing the suit in the
county of his choice. If a defendant, through a venue transfer motion,
objects to the plaintiff's venue choice, the plaintiff must prove that venue is
proper in the county of suit. Where there are multiple plaintiffs joined in a

10
single suit, each plaintiff, independently of the others, must establish proper
venue. With some exceptions not relevant here, “[a]ny person who is
unable to establish proper venue may not join or maintain venue for the suit
as a plaintiff.” If the plaintiff fails to establish proper venue, the trial court
must transfer venue to the county specified in the defendant's motion to
transfer, provided that the defendant has requested transfer to another
county of proper venue. On this point, the defendant has the burden to
provide prima facie proof.

In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999).

19. Therefore, Plaintiffs have no legal basis to obtain discovery to fix venue.

B. Plaintiffs Should Have Filed A Continuance of the Venue Hearing By Their
Required Response Date—30 Days Before the Hearing.

20. Pursuant to Rule 87, “any response or opposing affidavits [to a motion to transfer

venue] shall be filed at least 30 days prior to the hearing of the motion to transfer.” Tex.

R. Civ. P. 87(1). Defendants filed their motion to transfer venue on October 28, 2019.

That same day, they filed a notice of hearing setting the motion for oral hearing on

December 13, 2019. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ response was due on or before November

13, 2019.

21. At a minimum, FBS was required to file a response to contest the argument that

the forum selection clause was enforceable under §15.020. In failing to do so, it waived
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any argument that it needs a continuance.

22. And it should not be lost on this Court that each Plaintiff must independently

establish venue. “Where there are multiple plaintiffs joined in a single suit, each plaintiff,

independently of the others, must establish proper venue.” In re Masonite Corp., 997

S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999). Bosco cannot benefit from the forum selection clause in

any manner; therefore, it had to independently establish Harris County as a proper venue.

11
Given the forum non conveniens response, FBS is the only party that ever met with

Defendants, and that meeting took place in Montgomery County as FBS admitted: “As

President of FBS, I attended a meeting with representatives of Geosouthern Energy

Corporation and GEP Haynesville, LLC at their headquarters in Texas on August 17,

2016.” (See Fred Schneiderman Affidavit attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Response to

Forum Non Conveniens Motion). In fact, Plaintiffs have failed to articulate any basis for

Bosco to file suit in Texas much less Harris County.

23. Despite knowing of their apparent “need” for discovery since the filing of

Defendants’ motion to transfer venue, Plaintiffs neither sought discovery nor filed any

response to Defendants’ motion to transfer. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to continue

the venue hearing is untimely.

C. Until this Court Resolves the Venue Motion, It Should Not Bother Addressing
Defendants’ Pending Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the TCPA. Regardless,
Plaintiffs Have Not Articulated “Good Cause” For Obtaining Discovery.

24. Plaintiffs also claim that they need discovery to respond to Defendants’ TCPA

motion to dismiss. Again, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request.

25. First, as a matter of procedural efficiency, this Court should first adjudicate
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Defendants’ pending motion to transfer venue. There is no reason to decide issues

relating to Defendants’ pending TCPA motion if the Court is going to transfer venue

anyway.

26. Second, Plaintiffs have not articulated “good cause” for obtaining discovery to

response to Defendants’ motion. This Court can, from the face of Plaintiffs’ pleadings,

determine that Louisiana law applies to Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim. After all,

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Plaintiffs—one of whom is a Louisiana company—pleaded that Defendants “tortiously

interfered” with Plaintiffs’ Louisiana-based mineral interests by soliciting a Louisiana-

based oil and gas company, Wilson Minerals, to sue Plaintiffs in Louisiana state district

court for a declaration that, under Louisiana law, Plaintiffs’ mineral interests had been

terminated due to lack of production. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants tortiously

interfered with Plaintiffs’ Louisiana-based mineral interests by executing a “top-lease” of

that same Louisiana-based mineral interest and recording that lease in the Louisiana real

property records. As a matter of law, and even assuming that Defendants did make

“decisions” in Texas, Louisiana no doubt has the most “significant” relationship to

Plaintiffs’ tort claims such that they would be governed by Louisiana law. Therefore,

Plaintiffs do not need discovery to respond to Defendants’ choice-of-law analysis.

27. As shown in Defendants’ TCPA motion, Louisiana—for all intents and

purposes—does not recognize a tortious interference claim. Therefore, no amount of

discovery could save Plaintiffs.

28. Additionally, while Plaintiffs claim that they only seek a few narrow categories

of documents, that is not the case—Plaintiffs have worded each request so broadly that
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they would literally envelop every document even potentially relevant to Plaintiffs’

claims. For example, they seek “[a]ll communications internal to Geosouthern Energy

Corporation and/or GEP Haynesville, L.L.C. . . . concerning the NDA, the Wilson Lease,

the GEP Lease, FBS, or Bosco.” Likewise, Plaintiffs seek “all documents and

communications exchanged between Defendants and Wilson Minerals or Clark Energy

concerning the Wilson Lease, GEP Lease, FBS, or Bosco.” But as Plaintiffs themselves

13
pointed out, Defendants have not sought dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim

for breach of the NDA, so it is unclear what “good cause” Plaintiffs have for seeking any

of Defendants’ communications or documents that relate to the NDA.

29. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown “good cause” for their need for

discovery. This Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion.

D. Plaintiffs Are Putting Words into this Court’s Mouth.

30. Plaintiffs, at one point in their motion, claim that the Court—in denying

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens—has already determined that

Texas law, and not Louisiana law, applies to Plaintiffs’ tort claims. Not so.

31. The potential application of a foreign state’s law is only one of many factors in

the forum non conveniens analysis, and this Court likely based its decision to deny that

motion on the basis that both Defendants are headquartered in Texas—not because it

believed that Texas law governed Plaintiffs’ tort claims.

32. Additionally, the standard for obtaining dismissal under forum non conveniens is

vastly different than the standard for applying of another state’s law. In seeking forum

non conveniens dismissal, a party no doubt bears a heavy and difficult burden. On the
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other hand, in determining which state’s law should apply to a tort claim, the court

balances which state has the most significant relationship to the claims. In this case, that

state is no doubt Louisiana.

33. Discovery, therefore, should be denied until after this court address the venue

transfer.

14
E. Back on October 28th, Plaintiffs’ Counsel Confirmed His Availability for
December 13.

34. Prior to even filing the motion to transfer venue, Plaintiffs’ counsel reached out

to alert Defendants’ counsel of a conflict with the then scheduled November 14th forum

non conveniens hearing date. In his phone call, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the

forum non conveniens and venue matters both be addressed on December 13th, the date

of the venue hearing. In his subsequent email, he also confirmed his availability on

December 13th. (See Stewart Email; Ex. B). (“If we can’t do it by the 25th, we are also

both available on December 13 and can probably find some other dates in December as

well if needed.”).

III.
CONCLUSION

35. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully requests that the Court deny

Plaintiffs’ motion for continuance and their motion for discovery.
CertifiedDocumentNumber:88386728-Page15of16

15
Dated: December 5, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

MAHENDRU, P.C.

By:
Ashish Mahendru
State Bar No. 00796980
Darren A. Braun
State Bar No. 24082267
639 Heights Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77007
Telephone: 713-571-1519
Facsimile: 713-651-0776
amahendru@thelitigationgroup.com
dbraun@thelitigationgroup.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been
provided to all counsel of record in accordance with the applicable Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this 5th day of December, 2019.

Jarod R. Stewart jstewart@skv.com
Craig Smyser csmyser@skv.com
SMYSER KAPLAN & VESELKA, LLP
717 Texas Avenue, Ste. 2800
Houston, Texas 77002
CertifiedDocumentNumber:88386728-Page16of16

Ashish Mahendru

16
I, Marilyn Burgess, District Clerk of Harris
County, Texas certify that this is a true and
correct copy of the original record filed and or
recorded in my office, electronically or hard
copy, as it appears on this date.
Witness my official hand and seal of office
this January 7, 2021

Certified Document Number: 88386728 Total Pages: 16

Marilyn Burgess, DISTRICT CLERK
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated
documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal
please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com
From: Stewart, Jarod
To: Ashish Mahendru
Cc: Darren Braun; Smyser, Craig; Kreitz, Austin; Danielle Butler
Subject: Re: FBS v. Geosouthern
Date: Tuesday, November 26, 2019 5:58:19 PM

Ashish,

Since you can’t talk this week, please read our motion and call me next week if your
clients decide to agree to some or all of the requested relief.

This e-mail is confidential and/or privileged. If the reader is not the intended
On Nov
recipient, 26, 2019, at
any review, 2:24 PM, Ashish
dissemination Mahendru
or copying of any part of this e-mail is
wrote:
prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by e-mail
or at 713-221-2300 and then permanently delete this e-mail.
Jarod,

I can’t talk this week. I see you have already scheduled your hearing
without conferring about dates. I have two hearings on December 6th,
but why stop at just two?

What is your good cause for seeking discovery?

And what is the discovery you are seeking for venue? Please list that out
separately.
Certified Document Number: 88386729 - Page 1 of 4

Ashish Mahendru
Mahendru, P.C.
639 Heights Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77007
Office:(713) 571-1519
Fax: (713) 651-0776
www.thelitigationgroup.com

On Nov 26, 2019, at 12:57 PM, Stewart, Jarod
wrote:

EXHIBIT A
Ashish,

We will be asking for the following discovery, for both the venue
and TCPA motions:

Requests for Production of Documents

1. All documents concerning Defendants’ decisions made and
activities conducted in Texas relating to the NDA, Wilson
Lease, GEP Lease, FBS, and Bosco.

2. All documents and communications exchanged between
Defendants and Wilson Minerals or Clark Energy concerning
the Wilson Lease, GEP Lease, FBS, or Bosco.

3. All communications internal to Geosouthern Energy
Corporation and/or GEP Haynesville LLC, including but not
limited to communications by and between Margaret
Molleston, Douglass Dahmann, John Bentz, and Morgan Marr,
concerning the Wilson Lease, the GEP Lease, FBS, or Bosco.

Topics for Deposition of GEP Haynesville Corporate
Representative

1. Knowledge of individuals who made decisions and took
actions on behalf of Defendants regarding the Wilson Lease,
the GEP Lease, FBS, and Bosco, including where the
individuals work and what decisions they made and actions
they took and where they were located during such decisions

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December 05, 2019

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September 23, 2019

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Motion-Secondary: FBS Properties, Inc., Bosco Investments, LLC VS. GeoSouthern Energy Corporation,GEP Haynesville LLC

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