“The general rule applied in various jurisdictions of this country recognizes the inherent authority of a trial court to dismiss litigation for failure to prosecute.” (See Westbrook v. Wallace (1984) 478 A.2d 687, 689.)
“Rule 41(b) stems from the inherent authority of the trial courts to to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." (See Warren v. Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLC, BCD-CV-11-28, at *1 (Me. Super. Mar. 26, 2013); Westbrook v. Wallace (1984) 478 A.2d 687, 689; Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 626, 629-30.)
“Thus, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(1), a trial court may dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute a case, encompassing a broad range of circumstances from instances where no action has been taken in a case for two years or when a plaintiffs attorney fails to appear at trial.” (See id.)
“Similarly, Rule 41(b)(2) authorizes a trial judge, on motion by a defendant, to dismiss any claim against the defendant for failure to prosecute or failure ... to comply with the [civil] rules or any order of court. Nevertheless, the Law Court has cautioned that [switch power should be exercised only with full appreciation and consideration of the plight of the plaintiff' and the values underlying our system of justice which favors resolution on the merits." (See id.)
"A court should exercise its inherent power to dismiss only when the party bringing the action has failed to fulfill its duty to the court." (See id; State v. Bozvring (1985) 490 A.2d 667, 669.)
Rule 41 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure govern a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.
“The court, on its own motion, after notice to the parties, and in the absence of a showing of good cause to the contrary, shall dismiss an action for want of prosecution at any time more than two years after the last docket entry showing any action taken therein by the plaintiff other than a motion for continuance.” (See Me. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(1).)
“For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute for 2 years or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.” (See Me. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2).)
“In general, courts have the discretion to dismiss cases for lack of prosecution.” (See Presnell v. Peoples Heritage Bank (1993) 619 A.2d 1205, 1206.)
“The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an `inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” (See State v. Bowring (1985) 490 A.2d 667, 669; Presnell v. Peoples Heritage Bank (1993) 619 A.2d 1205, 1206.)
“In each case, we will review a judge's dismissal of an action based on lack of diligent prosecution for an abuse of discretion.” (See State v. Bowring (1985) 490 A.2d 667, 669.)
“Such abuse may occur when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.” (See West Point-Pepperell v. State Tax Assess (1997) 691 A.2d 1211, 1213; Coon v. Grenier (1989) 867 F.2d 73, 78.)
“Although we recognize the constitutional implications of dismissal and give greater scrutiny to the decision to dismiss than we would give to a lesser sanction, we will not lightly overrule the trial court's decision." (See id; Orlandella v. O'Brien (1994) 637 A.2d 105, 106.)
It is well settled that “among the many types of delay which have been held to justify the exercise of the authority to dismiss are counsel's failure to appear on the trial date and appearance without being prepared to proceed.” (See Westbrook v. Wallace (1984) 478 A.2d 687, 689; Joseph v. Norton Co. (1959) 273 F.2d 65.)
It is also well settled that “when a plaintiff has failed to prosecute an action for more than two years, M.R. Civ. P. 41(b) mandates that the court dismiss the action absent a showing by the delinquent plaintiff of ‘good cause’ to the contrary. The term ‘good cause’ is a highly relative concept which lacks fixed and definite meaning, and the application of it requires the court to evaluate the circumstances of each individual case and then to make its determination by exercising a sound discretion." (See Raymond v. Lyden (1999) 728 A.2d 124, 126; West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor (1997) ME 58, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1211, 1213; Emerson v. A.E. Hotels, Inc. (1979) 403 A.2d 1192, 1193 n. 2.)
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