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“Under SCR 159, which governs conflicts based on former representation, a lawyer may be disqualified from representing a client against a former client if the current representation is substantially related to the former representation. Thus, for a potentially disqualifying conflict to exist, the party seeking disqualification must establish three elements:
(Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Dist. Ct. (2007) 123 Nev. 44, 50 citing SCR 159.)
“Under SCR 160, the disqualification of a lawyer practicing in a firm is generally imputed to other lawyers in the firm.” (Id.)
“In Waid v. District Court, [the Nevada Supreme Court] recently adopted a three-part test to determine whether two representations are substantially related. A district court presented with a disqualification motion based on a former representation should:
(Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 44, 52 (Nev. 2007) quoting Waid v. District Court (2005) 121 Nev. 605.)
The Court in Waid noted that “a superficial resemblance between the matters is not sufficient; "rather, the focus is properly on the precise relationship between the present and former representation.” (Id.)
“The general rule is that only a former or current client has standing to bring a motion to disqualify counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest.” (Liapis v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State (2012) 282 P.3d 733, 737 citing Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 annot; [RPC 1.7 is identical to the model rule]; see also Great Lakes Const., Inc.,114 Cal.Rptr.3d at 307 [“Generally, before the disqualification of an attorney is proper, the complaining party must have or must have had an attorney-client relationship with that attorney.”])
“When considering whether to disqualify counsel, the district [and trial] court[s] must balance the prejudices that will inure to the parties as a result of its decision.” (McGrath v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State (2012) 381 P.3d 639 [internal citations omitted].)
“To prevail on such a motion, the moving party must establish a reasonable possibility that some specific impropriety occurred, as well as the likelihood that ‘public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interests which will be served by a lawyer's continued participation in a particular case.’” (Id.)
“Attorney ‘[d]isqualification is an extreme remedy that will not be imposed lightly. ’ Invariably, disqualifying an attorney causes delay, increases costs, and deprives parties of the counsel of their choice. ‘Courts should, therefore, disqualify counsel with considerable reluctance and only when no other practical alternative exists.’” (Millen v. Eighth Dist. Ct. (2006) 122 Nev. 1245, 1256 [internal citations omitted].)
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