Motion to Strike in Rhode Island

Background

“Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” (See Drysdale v. So. County Hospital H.C.S., 01-0373 (2005), No. WC 01-0373, at *1 (R.I. Super. Jan. 5, 2005).)

“This motion is the proper procedural device to challenge evidence.” (See Steinberg v. Obstetrics-Gynecological Infertility Group, 260 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495 (D.C. Conn. 2003)” Dulgarian v. ZBR, No. 01-4749, at *1 (R.I. Super. Oct. 7, 2005).)

“Motions to strike a defense under Rule 12(f) are generally not favored.” (See Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards (1982) 677 F.2d 1045, 1057.) “However, in the instance when only a legal determination must be made based upon uncontroverted facts, a motion to strike may be useful.” (See id.)

However, “the practice of striking out unnecessary and frivolous pleas has been repeatedly recognized and approved by this court, and we are fully in accord with such practice as tending to simplify the proceedings.” (See Ciunci v. Troiano (1964) 99 R.I. 45, 48.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“A motion to strike should be precise, stating specifically the portions of the affidavit to which objection is being made, and the grounds therefor.” (See Perma Research Dev. Co. v. Singer Co. (1969) 410 F.2d 572, 579; Anjoorian v. Arnold Kilberg Co., No. PC 97-1013, at *1 (R.I. Super. Nov. 27, 2006).)

“Although the granting of a motion to strike is within the discretion of the court, the court should grant the motion only where the defenses are insufficient as a matter of law, immaterial because they bear no essential relationship to the claims asserted, or are impertinent in that they do not pertain to the issues in question.” (See Driscoll v. United Health Plans of New England Inc., 94-195 (1995), C.A. No. 94-195, at *1 (R.I. Super. Feb. 6, 1995).)

“The traditional disfavor of a motion to strike, however, must be balanced against the motion's intended use as the primary procedure for objecting to an insufficient defense.” (See id.)

“Although the standard for determining the legal sufficiency of a defense is narrow, the court should grant the motion to strike where the insufficiency is clearly apparent." (See Middletown Plaza Assoc. v. Dora Dale of Middletown (1985) 621 F. Supp. 1163, 1164; Driscoll v. United Health Plans of New England Inc., 94-195 (1995), C.A. No. 94-195, at *1 (R.I. Super. Feb. 6, 1995).)

“A motion to strike must be made contemporaneously with the admission of the evidence and it is inappropriate when the testimony to which it is directed went in without objection, but otherwise in cases where the evidence, though apparently proper when admitted, is shown at a later stage to be objectionable.” (See Cooper v. Housing Authority of Newport (1969) 105 R.I. 126, 127.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“Federal circuit courts hold that the standard of review of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is abuse of discretion.” (See, e.g., Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Lichty Bros. Construction, Inc. (2012) 488 Fed.Appx. 430, 434 n. 2 [We review a district court's decision to strike any defenses that are insufficient as a matter of law for abuse of discretion]; Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co. (2010) 618 F.3d 970, 974 [noting that Rule 12(f) motions are reviewed for ‘abuse of discretion.] “Therefore, we will review this motion to strike under the abuse of discretion standard.” (See Long v. Dell, Inc. (2014) 93 A.3d 988, 1005.)

“When a court considers a motion to strike, matters outside the pleadings are not to be considered, and well pleaded facts are accepted as true.” (See First Financial Sav. Bank v. American Bankers Ins. (1991) 783 F. Supp. 963, 966; Driscoll v. United Health Plans of New England Inc., 94-195 (1995), C.A. No. 94-195, at *1 (R.I. Super. Feb. 6, 1995).)

“A motion to strike an allegation of a legal conclusion as surplusage is, in our opinion, addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and a ruling thereon is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. It may reasonably be argued that in an exercise of that discretion legal conclusions ought not to be stricken from a pleading when supported by appropriate allegations of fact set out therein, but we are persuaded that the real question is whether the pleader has been prejudiced by such a ruling.” (See Ciunci v. Troiano (1964) 99 R.I. 45, 48-49.)

Meet and Confer

“The defendants shall provide to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs shall provide to the defendants, any additional factual and legal arguments to support their respective positions. Both parties must meet and confer to attempt to resolve any remaining issues as to the disputed documents before asking this Court for further hearing.” (See Waltz v. Exxon Mobil Corp., C.A. No. PC 02-2436, at *1 (R.I. Super. Jan. 11, 2007).)

The Court’s Decisions

It is well settled that "[a]lthough a few courts have ruled that a partial summary judgment is not available because a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is the proper procedure, the better approach is to allow Rule 56(d) to be utilized" as [a] motion to strike a defense under Rule 12(f) is extremely limited because no matter outside the pleadings can be considered in deciding the motion.” (See Rowey v. Children's Friend and Service, 98-0136 (2003), C.A. No. 98-0136, at *1 (R.I. Super. Dec. 12, 2003).)

It is also well settled that “the trial court should exercise its discretion and grant the motion to strike only where the defenses are insufficient as a matter of law, immaterial because they bear no essential relationship to claims asserted, or are impertinent in that they do not pertain to the issues in question. The plaintiff may prevail on a motion to strike only where it appears that there is no question of law that the court should hear on the merits.” (See New Bank of New England v. Lindenfeld, 91-0224 (1991), C.A. No. 91-0224, at *1 (R.I. Super. Oct. 17, 1991).)