Motion for Continuance in South Dakota

“The circuit court has the power to grant continuances upon a showing of good cause.” (Matter of Adoption of C.T.E, 485 N.W.2d 591, 593 [S.D. 1992] citing Olesen v. Snyder, 277 N.W.2d 729, 732, 9 A.L.R. 4th 1133 [S.D. 1979]; SDCL 15-11-4 [1984].) [...] [T]he grant or denial of a motion for continuance of a hearing or trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Olesen, 277 N.W.2d at 732-33; In re Estate of Williams,88 S.D. 55, 215 N.W.2d 489, 490 [1974]; Farmers and Merchants State Bank v. Mann, 87 S.D. 90, 203 N.W.2d 173, 176 [1973]; Hyde v. Hyde, 78 S.D. 176, 99 N.W.2d 788, 794 [1959].)

The Four Considerations for Continuing Trial Date

“In deciding whether or not to grant a continuance, a trial court must consider:

1. whether the delay resulting from the continuance will be prejudicial to the opposing party;
2. whether the continuance motion was motivated by procrastination, bad planning, dilatory tactics or bad faith on the part of the moving party or his counsel;
3. the prejudice caused to the moving party by the trial court's refusal to grant the continuance; and
4. whether there have been any prior continuances or delays.“

(Matter of Adoption of C.T.E, 485 N.W.2d 591, 594 [S.D. 1992] citing and quoting 17 Am.Jur.2d Continuance § 4; Gaspar v. Kassam,493 F.2d 964, 969 [3rd Cir. 1974]; Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Tp. v. Costle,592 F.2d 164, 172 [3rd Cir. 1979]; Gaspar,493 F.2d at 969; see also Matter of C.J.H.,371 N.W.2d 345, 349 [S.D. 1985]; Kasson State Bank v. Haugen,410 N.W.2d 392, 395 [Minn.App. 1987]; 4 A.L.R. Fed 929 § 4(f) [1970]; 17 Am.Jur.2d Continuance § 35.)

Appellate Cases Upholding Denials of Motion for Continuance

“Finally, RIA asserts that the trial court's denial of its motions for continuance is reversible error as a matter of law or as an abuse of discretion. Once again, RIA alleges it was prejudiced by Wasserburger's failure to respond to its discovery requests in timely manner. Once again, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Olesen v. Snyder,277 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (S.D. 1979). RIA's argument that it was prejudiced by Wasserburger's one day delay in responding to discovery is simply without merit.”(Wasserburger v. Consolidated Management, 502 N.W.2d 256, 262-63 [S.D. 1993].)

“Granting of continuances of hearings or trials is within the sound discretion of the trial court. [...] This general rule was applied to a motion for summary judgment in Chung Wing Ping v. Kennedy, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 294 F.2d 735, cert. den. 368 U.S. 938, 82 S.Ct. 380, 7 L.Ed.2d 337. The court in denying a continuance wrote:

‘At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and on appellants' motion for a continuance, appellants stated that they were unable even to argue effectively the motion for summary judgment without the information they sought to obtain by discovery. It is beyond dispute that a motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. We note that appellants did nothing to obtain discovery until some ten months after filing their complaint, when the merits of their case was called into question by the summary judgment procedure. Diligent prosecution of a cause of action which is dependent for success upon discovery demands that the plaintiff seek discovery in preparation of his case and not as a backdoor defense to a test of the merits of his claim.’”

(Farmers Merchants St. Bank v. Mann, 87 S.D. 90, 95-96 [S.D. 1973] quoting Chung Wing Ping v. Kennedy, id.)