Motion for Continuance in Virginia

Understanding the Purpose and Significance of a Motion for Continuance

“A motion for a continuance asks the court to adjourn or postpone a trial or other proceeding to a future date." (See Black's Law Dictionary, 339 (8th ed. 2004); Bryant v. Commonwealth (1994) 248 Va. 179, 182, 445 S.E.2d 667, 669; Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dept (2007) 274 Va. 27, 37.)

“The result of a continuance is the brief delay or rescheduling of a proceeding until a future date, at which time the same issues and parties return to take up where the previous proceeding had stopped.” (See Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dept (2007) 274 Va. 27, 37.)

Virginia Rules and Codes that Govern Continuances

“Code § 8.01-6.1 (trial court may grant continuance to permit parties to amend pleadings or add claims or defenses);

Code § 16.1-274 (juvenile and domestic relations courts may grant continuance for the filing of certain reports);

Code § 19.2-159.1 (continuances shall be granted to allow criminal defendant to obtain counsel and prepare for trial);

Code § 19.2-265.4 (continuance is a remedy for Commonwealth's failure to provide discovery in criminal case);

Code § 19.2-266.2 (continuance permitted for good cause shown in criminal case);

Code § 30-5 (a party or party's attorney who is a member of the General Assembly may receive continuance as a matter of right during time the legislature is in session);

Code § 53.1-210 (continuance available for prisoners); Code § 55-248.25 (continuance available in landlord tenant disputes);

Code § 55-248.25:1 (same);

Rule 3A:2(b)(3) (continuance "includes adjournment or recess");

Rule 7A: 14(a) (district court judge may, by order, delegate to the clerk the power to grant continuances consented to by all parties);

Rule 7C:5(f) (continuance permitted for criminally accused in general district court);

Rule 8:8 (court may grant continuance to allow time for amendments that act as surprise); and

Rule 8:14(a) (juvenile and domestic relations court judge may, by order, delegate to the clerk the power to grant continuances consented to by all parties).”

(See Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dept (2007) 274 Va. 27, 37 n.2.)

Discretion of the Court in Deciding a Motion for Continuance

“The decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and may not be disturbed on appeal unless the record affirmatively shows an abuse of discretion.” (Sams v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1007-96-2, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1997); Cherricks v. Commonwealth (1990) 11 Va. App. 96, 99, 396 S.E.2d 397, 399; Shifflett v. Commonwealth (1977) 218 Va. 25, 30, 235 S.E.2d 316, 319.)

“The circuit court's ruling on a motion for a continuance will be rejected on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the movant.” (See Rahbar v. Clark, Record No. 1985-18-4, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2020).)

“An abuse of discretion occurs only when reasonable jurists could not differ as to the proper decision." (See Allen v. Allen (2016) 66 Va.App. 586, 601; Lambertibotos v. Botos, No. 0385-21-3, at *6 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2021).)

“Mere reference to a need for more time to prepare is insufficient to show that a continuance was improperly denied." (See Ortiz v. Commonwealth (2008) 276 Va. 705, 723; Rahbar v. Clark, Record No. 1985-18-4, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2020).)

“By necessity, a court cannot abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a continuance unless the denied movant suffers some harm as a result.” (See Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dept (2007) 274 Va. 27, 42.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on a Motion for Continuance

It is well settled that “only if the trial court is convinced that the object of the motion is to delay trial and not to prepare, is the continuance not merited.” (See Wilson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2856-00-3, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2001).)

It is also well settled that “while justice, not speed, should be paramount in determining whether a continuance will be granted, the court is not obligated to grant a continuance based on mere speculation.” (See Smith v. Commonwealth (1993) 16 Va. App. 630, 634-35.)