Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Connecticut

What Is a Motion for Preliminary Injunction?

Background

“An injunction is an equitable remedy issued under established principles which guide courts of equity.” (Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 3:09-CV-621 SRU, 2013 WL 789612 [D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2013] citing Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (1984) 732 F.2d 253, 256 [2d Cir.].)

“A preliminary injunction (including a temporary restraining order), as the name suggests, is issued to preserve the status quo while the parties await a final determination on the merits.” (Id.)

“Interim injunctive relief ‘is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” (Mazurek v. Armstrong (1997) 520 U.S. 968, 972 [internal citation omitted].)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“The same standard governs consideration of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.” (Local 1814 lnt'I Longshoreman's Ass'n v. New York Shipping Ass'n (1992) 965 F. 2d 1224, 1228 [2d Cir.].)

In the second circuit, which includes the State of Connecticut, the standard for injunctive relief is well established. To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party “must demonstrate:

that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, and
either:

a likelihood of success on the merits or
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the case to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.”

“Although a showing that irreparable injury will be suffered before a decision on the merits may be reached is insufficient by itself to require the granting of a preliminary injunction, it is nevertheless the most significant condition which must be demonstrated.” (Id.; see also, Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp. (2009) 559 F.3d 110, 118 [2d Cir.].)

Demonstrating Irreparable Harm

To demonstrate irreparable harm, plaintiff must show an “injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” (Id., citing Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead (1999) 175 F.3d 144, 153 [2d Cir.] quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono (1998) 162 F.3d 56, 61 [2d Cir.].)

“A party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate irreparable harm ‘before other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will be considered.’” (Reuters Ltd. v. United Press lnt'I, Inc. (1990) 903 F.2d 904, 907 [2d Cir.].)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“In the absence of an applicable statutory rule to the contrary, [Connecticut Courts] have consistently held that a temporary injunction is not immediately appealable.” (Stamford v. Kovac (1993) 228 Conn. 95, 99 citing, e.g., Pendiman Corp. v. White Oak Corp. (1985) 195 Conn. 393, 396-99; Doublewal Corp. v. Toffolon (1985) 195 Conn. 384, 392-93; Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn. (1977) 173 Conn. 81, 88.)

The Court’s Decision

“[C]ourts have held that preliminary decisions, such as on preliminary injunctions or other temporary orders, are not entitled to preclusive effect, particularly when the court makes clear that it is a ‘tentative ruling ... not intended as a final decision on the merits. Ordinarily, findings of fact and conclusions of law made in a preliminary injunction proceeding do not preclude reexamination of the merits at a subsequent trial.’” (Indep. Party of CT v. Merrill (2019) 330 Conn. 681, 715-16 quoting and citing Irish Lesbian & Gay Organization v. Giuliani (1998) 143 F.3d 638, 644 [2d Cir.]; see also id., at 644–46 [treating District Court's earlier decision as on merits and subject to res judicata effect, rather than about whether to grant preliminary injunction, because it dismissed plaintiff's claims after hearing and “gave no indication that this ruling was tentative or done without prejudice, and [the plaintiff] did not dispute the dismissal at the time.”].)

“[T]he denial of a temporary injunction is a determination that the status quo need not be maintained while the court determines the rights of the parties. By contrast, ‘a permanent injunction effects a final determination of [those] rights.’” (Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal (2007) 281 Conn. 805, 811 quoting Ulichny v. Bridgeport (1994) 230 Conn. 140, 147.) Under this well established law, therefore, the denial by the court of [a] plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction [is] merely an interlocutory order and is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. (Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins., supra, 281 Conn. at 811.)

Documents for Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Connecticut

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CENTERPLAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LLC Et Al v. CITY OF HARTFORD document preview

EXHIBITS A-F to Memorandum in Support of Motion (Re: 733.00 & 734.00)

246 pages

Exhibit A Exhibit B DOCKET NO. X07-HHD-CV16-6069748S : SUPERIOR COURT : CENTERPLAN CONSTRUCTION : COMPANY LLC, DONO HARTFORD LLC, : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DONO PARCEL BCD LLC, DONO PARCEL : HARTFORD E LLC, DONO PARCEL F LLC, and DONO : PARCEL G LLC : …

Case Name CENTERPLAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LLC Et Al v. CITY OF HARTFORD