Demurrer in Mary Elizabeth LeMasters vs. Paul Francis Deninger, et al| Trellis.Law

On July 12, 2019 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Deninger, Paul Francis, Lemasters, Mary Elizabeth, and Deninger, Paul Francis, Does 1-10, for (06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty in the District Court of San Mateo County.

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Hoover O Krepelka, LLP
JAMES J. HOOVER, SBN 217952 F I L E ﬂ
Certiﬁed Family Law Specialist
SAN MATEO COUNTY
KARLINA PAREDES FULK, SBN 291 103
~‘

1 9 2019
‘
EP
1520 The Alamedasuite 200
San Jose, CA 95 126
408—947-7600

Attorneys for Defendant,
PAUL FRANCIS DENINGER

“I IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
w
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
U1
Case No.: 19—CV—03 974
MARY ELIZABETH LEMASTERS,
10 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
11 and DEFENDANT PAUL DENINGER’S
DEMURRER T0 PLAINTIFF’S
12
_
PAUL FRANCIS DBNINGER, VERIFIED COMPLAINT @aé?
Defendant.
13 VVVVVVVVVVVVVVV

And Does 1-10, co-Defendants Date: November 6, 2019
14 Time: 9:00am
Dept: Law and Motion izzésﬂ

15
Complaint Filed: July 12, 2019
16

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1

LEMASTERS V. DENINGER Points and Authorities l9-CV—039741
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

II. ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF
III.COUNSBL MET THEIR OBLIGATION TO MEET AND CONFER PRIOR TO
FILING THIS DEMURRER
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Demurrer

B. Five of Plaintist Causes of Action Fail to State a Cause of Action Upon Which

Relief Can be Granted.

C. Five causes of Action are Time-Barred by the Statute of Limitations;

10 D. Five of Plaintiff’s Alleged Claims Are Void as Defendant was Married at the

11 Time the Alleged Causes of Action Are Alleged to Have Arisen.

12 E. The Elements of A Contract Are Missing From Plaintiffs Complaint.

13 F. Plaintiffs Alleged Claims for Breach of Express or Implied Contract, Promissory

14 Estoppel, Unjust Enrichment, and Quantum Meiruit violate the Statute of Frauds.

15 G. The Last Three (Sixth, Seventh, Eighth) of Plaintiffs Causes of Action Fail to

16 State a Cause of Action Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.

17 H. Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant had any duty to be breached and thus her

18 cause of action for Constructive Fraud Fails.

19 I. Plaintiff Failed T0 Identify Any property held In Constructive Trust therefore Her

20 Claim Fails.

21 J. Without a real dispute, her claim for Declaratory Relief fails.

22 V. CONCLUSION
23

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LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities I9—CV-03 974
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page

Alexander v. Exxon Mobil
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236 ........................................................................ 7

April Enterprises, Inc. v.KTTV
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805 .......................................................................... 6

Barton v. New United Motor Mfg, Inc.

(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200 ......................................................................... 5 »

Bridges v. Bridges
(1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 359 ........................................................................... 8

Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc.
10 (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980 12
.......................................

11 Croslin v.Scott
--

(1 957) 154 Cal.App.2d 767 ......................................................................... 8
12

Donovan v.RRL Corp.
13
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 261 ................................................................................ 9

14
Estate ofMoss
15 (2012) 204 Ca1.App.4th 521 ......................................................................... 7

16 Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County ofSan FranciSco
(2003) 29 Ca1.4th 769 6
................................................................................
17
Gentry v. eBay, Inc.
18
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816 .......................................................................... 5

19
Guardian North Bay, Inc. v.Sup.Ct. (Myers) ‘

(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963 .........................................................................7
20

21 In re Marriage ofNoghrey
(1985) 169 C.A.3d 326 .............................................................................. 7
22
Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass’n
23 (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761 .......................................................................... 9

24 Lee v. Hanley
(2015) 61 Ca1.4th 1225 ............................................................................... 6
25

v26
3

LEMASTERS v. DENINGBR Points and Authorities 19-CV—03974T
J
'

U
Marvin v. Marvin
(1976) 18 Cal.App.3d 660 ........................................................................ 7, 8

McCahan v. McCahan
(1920) 47 Cal.App 173 ............................................................................... 7

Meyer v. Benko
(1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 937 .......................................................................... 9

Newman v. Freitas
(1900) 129 C. 283 .................................................................................... 7

Sacramento E.D.M, Inc. v. Hypes Aviation Industries, Inc.

(E.D.Cal.2013) 965 F.Supp.2d 1141 ..............................................................11

Theisen v. Keough
(1931) 115 Cal.App. 353 ............................................................................ 7
1o

Pereira v. Pereira
11
(1909) 156 C. 1....................................................................................... 7

12
Reichert v. General Ins. C0.
13 (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822 ................................................................................ 6

14 Reid v. City ofSan Diego
(2018) 24 Cal. App.5th 343 ........................................................................ 11
15

Taylor v. Fields
16 ................................................ 8
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 653 ......................... .

17
Trutalli v. Meraviglz'a _

1s (1932) 215 Cal. 698 ................................................................................... 8

19 US Ecology, Inc. v. State ofCalz'f _

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887 ........................................................................ 8
20
Statutes
21
Cal. Civ. Code § 1550 ...................................................................................... 7, 9
22
Cal. Civ. Code § 1565 .......................................................................................... 9
23

Cal. Civ. Code 1573 .......................................................................................10
24 §

25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1580 ........................................................................................ 9

26
4

LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19—CV-03974J
Cal. Civ. Code§ '

10
1624 ...................................................................... ............... 9,

Cal. Civ. Code § 2223 ........................................................................................ 11

Ca1.Civ.Code§2224..........‘...‘ ........................................................................... 11

Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 339(1) ................................................................................ 5

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e) ............................................................................ 5

Cal. Code Civ. Pr‘oc. § 430.50(a) ............................................................................ 5

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 ................................................................................ 12

Rest.2d Contracts §§ 22(1), 23-24 ........................................................................... 9

Rest.2d Contracts §§ 33-34 ................................................................................... 9
10

7
Rest.2d Contracts §§ 71-81 ...................................................................................
11V

Rest.2d, Contracts 190(2) .................................................... .............................. 7
,

12 §

25 ‘

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LBMASTERS v.DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV—03974
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I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before fhe Court pursuant to the demurrers of Defendant PAUL FRANCIS
DENINGER to Plaintiff MARY ELIZABETH LEMASTERS’ Complaint. The Complaint

attempts to state eight causes of action arising out of a non-cohabitating‘ relationship, by Plaintiff

against Defendant. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: Breach of Express Contract,

Breach of Implied Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Quantum Memit, Unjust Enrichment,

Constructive Fraud, Constmctive Trust/Accounting, and Declaratory Relief. Defendant requests

the court sustain his demurrers without leave for LEMASTERS to amend.
II. ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF
LEMASTERS’ original Complaint contains admissions relevént to the Court’s analysis
10
of the instant demurrers:
11

Speciﬁcally: _

12
“Defendant was bicoastal during this time, and throughout the‘parties’ relationship.”
13
“Defendant required that the parties have a house cleaner to cléan their apartment.”
14
“In reliance on Defendant’s promises, Plaintiff maintained the parties’ household and
15
performed van'ous domestic duties such as....cleaning.”
16
“In or around April 2017, the parties’ relationship terminated. ..Toward the end of
17
2017...there were ﬁve months that Defendant did not provide Plaintiff/with the $6,000
18
allowance that had been his custom and practice.”
19
III.COUNSEL MET THEIR OBLIGATION TO MEET AND CONFER PRIOR TO’
20
FILING THIS DEMURRER
21
After Plaintiff ﬁled her initial Complaint, counsel for Defendant advised Plaintiff’s

22
counsel that Defendant intended to ﬁle a demurrer. Counsel for Plaintiff extended the deadline to

23 The met and conferred
respond to the original complaint to September 16, 2019. parties in

24 writing between August 26, 2019 and September 3, 2019. Counsel conducted a telephonic meet

25’
and confer on September 6, 2019. During that time, Defendant’s counsel identiﬁed each of the

26
6

LEMASTERS V. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV—03974
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causes of action challenged by this demurrer and identiﬁed the bases of the deﬁciencies along

with supporting authority for Defendant’s position. During the meet and confer process, the

panics agreed to extensions of Defendant’s deadlines to ﬁle responsive pleadings, ultimately

.p. extending the'deadline t0 September 20, 2019. Despite reasonable and good faith efforts to meet

and confer, the parties were not able to resolve the issues raised in this demurrer. (See

Declaration of Karlina Parades Fulk, Esq., concurrently ﬁled).
Nam

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Demurrer

state-
An objection to a complaint via demurrer is sustainable if “[t]he pleading does nof

facts suﬁicient to constitute a cause of action.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e). A demurrer can
10
be made to an entire complaint or individual causes of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.50(a).
11

A cause of action is subject to demurrer for failure to state a claim if the complaint discloses an
12
afﬁrmative defense on its face, and the plaintiff has not “pleaded around” that defense. Gentry v.

13
eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 824-25. “A trial court does not err in sustaining a
14
demurrer without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is

15
baned by the statute of limitations.” Barton v. New United Motor Mfg, Inc. (1 996) 43
16
Cal.App.4th 1200, 1204.
17
B. Five of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Fail to State a Cause of Action Upon
18 Which Relief Can be Granted.

The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action are time-barred by the
19

statute of limitations, are missing key elements of a contract, and are void on their face and
20

should be dismissed without leave to amend.
21

1. Five causes of Action are Time—Barred by the Statute oi
22
Limitations.

23 Oral and Implied‘Contracts are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Cal. Code Civ.

24 Proc 339(1). This encompasses LEMASTERS’ causes of First, Second, Third, Fourth, and
§

25 Fifth Causes of Action. Without admitting or denying the truth of the matter asserted, Defendant

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LEMASTBRS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV-03974
points to LEMASTERS’ recitation of her facts in the complaint. She states in her c-omplaint that

the relationship with Defendant ended in April of 2017. She ﬁxrther s'tates that immediately at

that time, DENINGER stopped paying LEMASTERS the amount she believed she was owed for

at least ﬁve months in 2017. Even if the court were to accept LEMASTERS termination date for

the relationship of April 2017, that date combined with his proffered failure to pay as alleged by

LEMASTERS, would cause the statute of limitations time period to commence. LEMASTERS
therefore acknowledges Defendant’s alleged breach commenced in April 0f 2017, in line with

.
the termination of their relationship. LEMASTERS then claims “support” resumed in 201 8.

Any later provided support would not give rise to a new cause of action, nor has

LEMASTERS pled as such. She is therefore relying on conduct and assertions prior to April
10
2017 to form the basis of her complaint, the time she alleges Defendant breached his obligations
11

to her. LEMASTERS therefore would have had to bring her claims by April of 2019. H61
12
complaint was not ﬁled with the court until July 2019, three months after the statute oi

limitations ran as to all cauSes of action except constructive fraud, constructive trust, and
14
declaratory relief.
15.
For the statute of limitations argument to succeed, the defect must clearly and
16
afﬁrmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it isnot enough that the complaint shows that
17
the action may be ban‘ed. Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County ofSan Francisco
18
(2003) 29 Ca1.4th 769, 781; Lee v. Hartley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1232. The Complaint is clear

19
the causes of action are baned by the two-year statute of limitations. A cause of action for breach
20.
of an oral agreement ordinarily ‘accrues on the date of breach, absent some doctrine permitting
2I
delayed accrual. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1 968) 68 Ca1.2d 822, 831; April Enterprises, Inc.

22
v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832. Here, the Complaint alleges the breach occurred in

23
April 2017, which is well more than two years before the date the complaint was ﬁled, on July
24
12, 2019.
25

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LEMASTERS v.DENINGER Points and Authorities l9—CV-03974
A demurrer is proper when the complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some
defense that would bar recovery (e.g., dates pleaded in complaint show statute of limitations has

run). Guardian North Bay, Inc. v.Sup. Ct. (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972; Estate 0f

Moss (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 521 ,
535 (citing text); Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219

Cal.App.4th 123 6, 1250. This is the case here, plain from the face of the complaint.

2. Five of Plaintiff’s Alleged Claims Are Void as Defendant was
Married at the Time the Alleged Causes of Action Are Alleged to
Have Arisen.

A contract may be void if,when it was entered into by the parties, one of them was

married. Contracts which promote divorce are against public policy. Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18

10 Cal.App.3d 660, 673. LEMASTERS’ claims for Breach of Express or Implied Contract,

11 Promissmy Estoppel, Unjust Enrichment, and Quantum Meiruit are void as Defendant was

12 married at the time LEMASTERS believes a contract arose.

13
A contract having as its object the dissolution of a marriage, or a contract that facilitates

14
this result, is void. Newman v. Freitas (1900) 129 C. 283, 289; Pereira v.Pereira (1909) 156 C.

1, 5; Moss v. Moss (1942) 20 C.2d 640, 642; McCahan v. McCahan (1920) 47 Cal.App 173, 175;
15

Heisen v. Keough (1931) 115 Cal.App. 353, 357; In re Marriage ofNoghrey (1985) 169 C.A.3d
16

326, 330; Rest.2d, Contracts § 190(2).
17
3. The Elements of A Contract Are Missing From Plaintiff’s
18 Complaint.

19i LEMASTERS does not Show sufﬁcient consideration. Consideration is an essential

20 element of a contract. Cal. Civ. Code § 1550; Rest.2d Contracts §§ 71-81. There was no

21 substantive consideration to form the basis of any contract, and meretricious consideration has

22 the same impact as no consideration. F‘irst,LEMASTERS admits in her complaint that the parties

23 never cohabitated. Without addressing the tmth of the matter asserted, she clearly identiﬁes the

24 Defendant as bicoastal, conﬁrming he always maintained residency on the east coast, where she

25 sometimes visited and allegedly drove a Range Rover. She maintained residency in various

places, but fails to establish cohabitation, which is a necessary pferequisite for valid
26
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LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV-O3974I
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consideration. “Neither Marvin nor any other case to date has allowed recovery to an umnarried

partner without a showing of a stable and signiﬁcant relationship evolving out of cohabitation. A
further requirement is a showing the agreement relied upon does not rest on illicit meretricious

consideration. Plaintiff here simply cannot overcome those two hurdles.” Taylor v. Fields (1986)

178 Cal. App. 3d 653, 661 . The plaintiff in Taylor and LEMASTERS are one and the same. Like

the Taylor plaintiff, LEMASTERS and Defendant never cohabitated and without thai

cohabitation, LEMASTERS’ claims rest solely 0n meretriciohs consideration.

As the Marvin court noted, even prior to its ruling, the enforcement of agreements

between nonmarital partners liVing together had been upheld. Marvin at pp. 667—670; see,

e.g.,Trutalli v. Meravz'glia (1932) 215 Cal. 698;Bridges v. Bridges (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d
10
359; Croslz’n v. Scott (1957) 154 Ca1.App.2d 767 (emphasis added). Marvin therefore is n01
11
without the substantial precedent of prior cases, all 0f which upheld agreements where the parties
1-2

lived together and relied on agreements not- based on meretricious consideration. Taylor, supra,
13
.178 Cal.App. at page 661. InV
Taylor v. Fields, the unmarried mistress of a married man sought
14
relief under Marvin, supra. The parties had not cohabitated. Id. “Unfortunately for Taylor as the
15
woman involved herein, her relationship with Leo was nothing more than that 0f a legally
16
married man and his mistress, albeit a long term one.” Taylor, supra, 178 Cal.App. at page 658.
17
The same is true for LEMASTERS here.
18
LEMASTERS here is claiming promisSory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and quantum
’19
meiruit as a substitute for consideration. While it is true that when a party makes a promise on

20
which another person justiﬁably relies, the promisor may be bound to perform it,despite lack of

21
consideration, that is not true when meretricious consideration is concerned. US Ecology, Inc. v. _

22 901-902; supra 178 Cal.App. page 661.
State ofCalz'f (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, Taylor, at

23 overcome the LEMASTERS’
Any alleged detn'mental reliance cannot initial hurdles suffered by

24 complaint as she is akin to the Taylor plaintiff — the unmarried noncohabitating mistress of a

25 married man.

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LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV-0397
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Every contract requires mutual consent. Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261,

270-271; Civ.C. §§ 1550, 1565] Consent is typically shown by one party's offer, followed by the

other‘s acceptance and its communication to the offeror. Rest.2d Contracts §§ 22(1), 23—24. The

offer must be speciﬁc enough that its acceptance creates a complete contract. Ladas v. California

State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 Ca1.App.4th 761, 770-771; Rest.2d Contracts §§ 33—34. Here,

LEMASTERS fails to show any mutual consent by Defendant. There is no clear
Qm

offer/acceptance/tenns. What, exactly, are the parties bargaining?

0° The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective gather than subj ective criteria,

the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to

10 believe.” Meyer v. Benko (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 937, 943. Outward manifestatiOns thus govern

11 the ﬁnding of mutual consent required by Civil Code sections 1550, 1565 and 1580 for contract

12 formation. Id. Mutual assent is gathered from the reasonable meaning of the words and acts 0f

13 the parties, and not from their unexpreésed intentions or understanding. Id. The parties‘ outward

14 manifestations must show that the parties allagreed “upon the same thing in the same sense.”

15 Cal. Civ.Code § 1580. If there is no evidence establishing a manifestation of assent to the “same

16 thing” by both parties, then there is no mutual consent to contract and no contract

17 formation. Civ.Cod_e §§ 1550, 1565 and 1580. This lack of mutuality between these two parties

13 is the very essence of'LEMASTERS claims. There was never an agreement regarding the same

19 thing in the same sense, and thus, there can be no formation of a contract.

20 4. Plaintiff’s Alleged Claims for Breach of Express or Implied
Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Unjust Enrichment, and Quantum
21 Meiruit violate the Statute of Frauds.

22 LEMASTERS alleged contracts are based on vague and illusory “promises” to suppoﬁ

23 her and to give her portions of real properties, for the rest of her life. Pur‘suant to Cal. Civ. Code

24 Section 1624, such a contract would be invalid if not in writing, and LEMASTERS is clear there

25 was never a writing supporting such vague promises. LEMASTERS alleges there are real

26
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LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV-O3974
‘

properties she may be entitled to, but such causes of action would need to be in writing.

LEMASTERS bases her claims on phrases such as “never havé to worry about ﬁnances again.”

She is claiming an interest in his “real property holdings.” These are not contracts. There are no

'1
writings. They are not enforceable. No amount of amendment can cure this defect. Section 624

statés:

(a) The following contracts arc invalid, unless they, 0r some note or memorandum

thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent:

(1) An agreement‘that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the ‘

making thereoﬁ

1o (3) An agreement for the-leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale

of real property, or of an interest therein; such an ag‘réement, if made by an agent
11

of the parfy sought to be charged, js invalid, unless the authority of the‘agVent is in
12

writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.
.13

(5) An agreement that by its térms is not t6 be performed duringthe lifetime oi
14
the promisorr
15
LEMASTERS élaims thus violate the Statue of Frauds and are on their face
16 I

unenforceable.
17
C. The Last Three (Sixth, Seventh, Eighth) of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Fail to
1s State a Cause of Action Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.

19 5. Plaintiff fails to. show that Defendaﬁt had any'duty {o be breached
and thus her cause of action for Constructive Fraud Fails.
20
California Civil Code Section 1573 states “Constructive fraud cohsists, in any breach of
21
duty which , without an actually'fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to‘the person in fault,.or
22'
any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any

23
one 'claiming under him; or, In any such act or omission as the law specially declares t0 be

24
fraudulent, without reSpect to actual fraud.

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12

LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities 19-CV-03974}
The existence of a ﬁduciary and/or conﬁdential relationship is at the core of a

viable constructive fraud claim under California law, regardless of intent. Sacramento E.D.M,

F.Supp.2d this.
Inc. v. Hynes Aviation Industries, Inc. (E.D.Cal.2013) 96S 1141. Despite that, >

relationship does not exist here. No conﬁdential relationship exists between unmarried partners.

No conﬁdential relationship exists between two people who never cohabitated. Without

overcoming the initial hurdles, LEMASTERS claims necessarily fail. She cannot simply state a

legal conclusion and write the phrase “conﬁdential relationship” and expect that to hold water.

She must state facts sufﬁcient to support that conclusion. She does not.

6. LEMASTERS Failed To Identify Any property held In
Constructive Trust therefore Her Claim Fails.

10 While constructive are authorized case and a constructive
trusts by law statute, trust is

11 24 To
merely a remedy. Reid v. City 0f San Diego (2018) Ca1.App.5th 343', 362. establish a

12 constructive trust, LEMASTERS would need t0 show the following: a speciﬁc, identiﬁable

13 property interest, her right to the property interest, and Defendant’s acquisition or detention of

'14 the property interest by some wrongful act. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2223, 2224. California Civil Code

15 section 2224 provides that a person who gains a thing by fraud, violation of a trust or other

16 wrongful conduct is an involuntary trustee of it for the benefit of the person who would

17 otherwise have had it.Civ. Code § 2224.

18 Here, LEMASTERS fails to identify any property held by Defendant which she believes

he is holding in involuntaly trust for her. This isa necessary element to establish a constructive
19

trust. She also may not simply state “I have a right to this unidentiﬁable property” which isakin
20

t0 Columbus landing in America and claiming itas his own. Such conduct is merely an attempt
21

at acquisition by declaration, which is to say, nothing at all.
22
Further, LEMASTERS does not allege what “wrongful act” led to Defendant’s alleged
23
holding of property she believes she is entitled to. “A constructive trust is an involuntary
24
equitable trust created by operation of law as a remedy to compel the transfer of property from
25
the person wrongfully holding it t0 the rightﬁll owner. ..The essence of the theory of constructive
26
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LEMASTERS v. DENINGER Points and Authorities l9-CV-03974
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trust is to prevent unjust enrichment and to prevent a person from taking advantage of his or her

own wrongdoing. The principal circumstances where constructive trusts are imposed are set forth

in Civil Code sections 2223 and 2224. Section 2223 provides that ‘[o]ne who wrongfully detains

a thing is an involuntary trustee thereof, for the beneﬁt 0f the owner.’ Section 2224 states that

‘[o]ne who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue inﬂuence, the violation of a trust, 01

other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary

trustee of the thing gained, for the beneﬁt of the person who would otherwise have had it.”’

Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990 (emphasisadded). Thus,

one 0f the required elements for a claim to impose a constructive trust is wrongdoing or a

wrongﬁJl act. LEMASTERS here fails to state any wrongﬁll act by Defendant. What act did he
10
take, alleged by LEMASTERS, that was wrong? None as alleged in the Complaint.
11
7. Without a real dispute, her claim for Declaratory Relief fails.
12
Pursuant t0 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 1060, “Any person interested under a written
13
instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or
14
her rights or duties with resPect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with
15
respect to the location of the natural channel of a .
watercourse, may, in cases of actual
16
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties 0f the respective parties, bring an original

17
action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights-and duties in

18
k
the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under

19
the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone_ or

20
with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether

21
or not further relief is 01'could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either afﬁ

Case Info

Judge

Fineman, Nancy L. Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

(Subscribe to View)

Document Filed Date

September 19, 2019

Case Filing Date

July 12, 2019

County

Parties

Deninger, Paul Francis Cross Complainant
Deninger, Paul Francis Defendant
Does 1-10 Cross Defendant
Does 1-10 Defendant
Goldstein, Cary W. Participant (participant)
GOLDSTEIN, CARY W Attorney
HOOVER, JAMES J. Attorneys for Defendants
HOOVER, JAMES J. Attorney for the Defendant
LeMasters, Mary Elizabeth Cross Defendant
LeMasters, Mary Elizabeth Plaintiff
RABIDOUX, RANDALL F. Attorneys for Defendants
RABIDOUX, RANDALL F. Attorney for the Defendant
SABHARWAL, SUNENA Attorney
SABHARWAL, SUNENA Attorney for the Plaintiff
Alexander Jones Attorneys for Defendants
Karlina Paredes Attorneys for Defendants
Debra Schoenberg Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Paul DeMeester Attorney
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Ronald Schoenberg Attorneys for Defendants
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Matthew Brennan Attorney
Debra Recknor Attorneys for Defendants

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Motion-Secondary: Mary Elizabeth LeMasters vs. Paul Francis Deninger, et al

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