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Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
CIVIL DIVISION
ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 21CV-1936
Vv.
(JUDGE FRYE)
CEVA GROUND US, LP., et al.,
Defendants.
JOURNAL ENTRY
VACATING TRIAL DATE OF APRIL 4, 2022;
and
DENYING BOTH DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FORUM NON CONVENIENS; DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT
SALAD OLOW FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDITION;
and
SCHEDULING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MAY 13, 2022
FOR THE LONG-ARM MOTION PERTINENT
TO CO-DEFENDANT CEVA.
(Amended Motion filed July 9, 2021)
I. Introduction.
This case arose from a fatal motor vehicle accident on April 11, 2019 in Roland,
Oklahoma. (Comp. 1 13). Both plaintiff Abdirizak Abdullahi and defendant Abdinor Salad
Olow are truck drivers who reside in Franklin County, Ohio. (Comp., {I11, 10). At the time of
the accident, Salad Olow was driving a tractor-trailer while Abdullahi was asleep in the
sleeper berth. Unexpectedly the truck collided with a car in front of it on I-40. Tragically,
this resulted in the death of the car’s driver and caused injuries to Mr. Abdullahi who fell out
of the sleeper berth. Abdullahi alleges negligence against defendant Salad Olow (Count I)
and vicarious liability (Count II) and negligent and reckless retention against a business
identified as “CEVA Ground US, LP.” (Count III).
On July 9, 2021, CEVA Ground US, LP and Salad Olow filed an amended motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. CEVA argues that Ohio’s
long-arm statute does not provide personal jurisdiction over it because the actions giving
rise to the cause of action occurred in Oklahoma, not Ohio, and because its principal place
of business is in Houston, Texas. (Affidavit of Cano 5, 9.) Defendants alternatively assert
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that Sequoyah County, Oklahoma is a more convenient venue than Franklin County, Ohio
because that is where the accident took place, and that convenience justifies suspending this
case in favor of a parallel Oklahoma case.
II. Summary of Facts.
Defendant Salad Olow is unquestionably subject to suit here in Ohio. The police
report on the accident shows his residence is in Columbus, Ohio. (Exhibit “B” filed Aug. 11,
2021.)
In the amended motion the business defendant is not identified as CEVA Ground, but
as “CEVA Freight LLC f/k/a CEVA Ground U.S. LP.” Despite that, the affidavit of Antonio
Cano submitted by defendants does not confirm this relationship, or even mention it.
According to the affidavit of Antonio Cano, “Risk Director/Claims Adjuster of CEVA Freight,
LLC (what he too calls “CEVA”) the business defendant is incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Houston. (1 2,5). He further asserts that Salad Olow, the
defendant driver, was not an employee of CEVA. Instead, Mr. Cano says, “[t]he decision to
hire Mr. Salad Olow as an independent contractor occurred in Texas.” (16 — 8). There is
no further information on the hiring process, or Salad Olow’s past work with CEVA.
Importantly, exactly what Mr. Cano means by “the decision to hire” having been made
in Texas is ambiguous. Does that mean some businessperson in CEVA working in Texas
simply approved Salad Olow sight-unseen as a name on a list? The court at this stage may
not construe this ambiguity about “the decision to hire” in favor of defendant.
Although not set out in an affidavit, plaintiff represents that CEVA operates a “large
trucking depot in Franklin County and a fleet of Ohio resident truck drivers that haul CEVA’s
loads from CEVA’s depot in Ohio throughout the country.” The “depot” is said to be in
Groveport, Ohio. (Memorandum of Pltf. Filed July 26, 2021, at p.1.) Attached as Exhibits
to plaintiff's brief are business registration records from the Ohio Secretary of State’s office.
The most recent papers refer to “CEVA Ground U.S., L.P.” Are there no records of “CEVA
Freight, LLC” being registered in Ohio if that is — as defendants argue — the current name of
the same business? And, the names suggest that one entity was a limited partnership while
the other apparently was a limited liability company. A simple name change ordinarily would
not change the legal form of a business.
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Finally, another business may be important here too. It is called “Nonoma
Enterprises, LLC” according to the complaint. (415.) The Reply Memorandum says “CEVA
has an independent contractor agreement with Nonoma who in turn retained Olow” but
argues that CEVA had no “specific contractual relationship with defendant Olow.” (Reply
Mem., p. 2.) What does all that mean?
Given all the confusing references to “CEVA” defendants wisely suggest an
evidentiary hearing. (Reply Mem. filed Aug. 11, 2021, p. 2.)
Il. Analysis.
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction,
a plaintiff must establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Bradley
Shoptaw v. I & A Auto Sales, Inc., 10t Dist. No. 12AP-453, 2012-Ohio-6259 at {] 4; Joffe v.
Cable Tech, Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, 839 N.E.2d 67 (10 Dist.). When
a court considers a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction “without an
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish sufficient evidence to allow reasonable
minds to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction.” Shoptaw, supra at 115;
citing Austin Miller Am. Antiques, Inc. v. Cavallaro, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-400, 2011-Ohio-
6670,17. At that stage, “the trial court ‘must assume the truth of the facts in the nonmoving
party's affidavits and complaint for purposes of [a Civ.R. 12(B)(2)] motion to dismiss’ and
must resolve all reasonable competing inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Id.
Ultimately a court must “determine whether the state's ‘long-arm’ statute and
applicable civil rule confer personal jurisdiction, and, if so, whether granting jurisdiction
under the statute and the rule would deprive the defendant of the right to due process of law
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” U.S. Sprint
Communications Co. P’ship v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 1994-Ohio-
504, 624 N.E.2d 1048. “Where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. [citation omitted].” Ata Logistics, Inc. v. Empire Container Freight Station, Inc.,
12th Dist. Case No. CA2020-01-006, 2020-Ohio-4183, 1 14.
A. The Ohio Long-Arm Statute
Plaintiff asserts that the court has personal jurisdiction over defendants Salad Olow
and CEVA under Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute. Since Salad Olow plaintly appears to live in
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Ohio his portion of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED. “A
State generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum
for redressing injuries ***.” InFrasys, Inc. v. Bros. Pavement Products, Corp., 6t4 Dist. Case
No. E-19-047, 2020-Ohio-1157, 152 N.E.3d 1274, 43, citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).
Jurisdiction over CEVA is more complicated. R.C. § 2703.382(A)(1) states that “a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to
a cause of action arising from the person's transacting any business in this state.” R.C. §
2703.382(A)(1) and Civ. R. 4.3(A)(4) are nearly identical. When determining personal
jurisdiction, the court must find that the nonresident’s ties “create a ‘substantial connection’
with the forum State.” U.S. Sprint, supra, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Ohio gives a “broad interpretation to the term ‘transacting any
business’ 2 ase under the long-arm statute.” Star Seal of Ohio, Inc. v. Tri State Pavement
Supplies, LLC, 10 Dist. No. o9gAP-969, 2010-Ohio-2324, §] 20; Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v.
Mitchell’s Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75 (1990). (A)(1) also recognizes that
personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a person who acts directly or by an agent as toa
cause of action arising from transacting any business in Ohio. Furthermore, if a business
has sufficient continuing activity that meets the federal due process threshold for general
jurisdiction, it will be amendable to any suit in Ohio under the “doing business” standard.
LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed Cir. 2000) (Ohio
law).
Mr. Abdullahi alleges that defendant CEVA purposefully availed itself of the laws of
Ohio by registering with the Ohio Secretary of State to transact business here as well as
designating an agent for service of process in Ohio. Perhaps more importantly, CEVA
allegedly has a trucking depot in Groveport, Ohio where vehicles depart to transport goods
to other parts of Ohio and to other states. Prior to this specific accident, Mr. Abdullahi and
Mr. Salad Olow apparently departed together from that truck depot in Groveport on the trip
in question which took them to Oklahoma. Mr. Abdullahi asserts that the hiring of defendant
Salad Olow in Ohio, as well as defendant CEVA’s truck depot in Groveport, are enough to
establish that defendant CEVA was transacted business in Ohio in accordance with R.C.
2307.382(A)(1).
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It appears that “CEVA Ground US, L.P.” does transact business in Ohio. But, the
relationship between that limited partnership and “CEVA Freight, L.L.C.” referenced in the
affidavit of Antonio Cano is never explained. Adding to the confusion, some entity also
named CEVA allegedly had an independent contractor agreement with an entity called
Nonomo, which in turn hired defendant Salad Olow. As discussed above, the record needs
more evidence about these entities. For instance, is Nonomo another subsidiary of some
CEVA or a regular agent to hire drivers for its business? Does it operate out of an office at
the depot in Groveport? Did Nonomo — whom defendants’ Reply Brief says “retained Olow”
— merely act as an agent for CEVA, or did it also pay and direct Olow’s work on this trip to
Oklahoma? Did Nonomo hire both drivers in Ohio for the unit involved in this accident?
Without more facts it is impossible to accurately determine whether, under R.C.
2307.382(A)(1), the cause of action advanced by Abdullahi ties to CEVA transacting business
within Ohio, either generally or specifically to this case.
Even if Nonomo retained Salad Olow that does not necessarily insulate CEVA. Courts
“have repeatedly held *** that a defendant’s interposition of an independent middleman
between itself and the forum does not by itself place the defendant outside of that forum’s
reach.” Fortis Corporate Ins. v. Viken Ship Management, 450 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 2006).
CEVA points to two Tenth District cases said to establish that this cause of action did
not arise from actions within Ohio. The first case they cite, Simmons v. Budde, is
distinguished from this case. The court in Simmons found that plaintiff failed to prove long-
arm jurisdiction when defendant was living in Missouri, and the accident occurred in
Missouri. 2015-Ohio-3780, 38 N.E.3d 960, 1 2 - 3. The second Tenth District case cited by
defendant, Joffe v. Cable Tech, Inc., involved a plaintiff who moved to Ohio from California
after the defendant, a resident of Iowa, hired him as an independent contractor to do work
in Ohio. 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, 839 N.E.2d 67. The court ultimately found
that Ohio did not have jurisdiction over the defendant because the transactions that caused
the plaintiff to move to Ohio did not happen in Ohio and neither party was in Ohio when the
plaintiff was offered the position. Id. at | 19. These facts are very distinguished from the
present suit.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
The forum non conveniens doctrine assumes that the jurisdiction and venue which a
plaintiff has chosen are proper but presupposes that there is another forum available in
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which the defendant may be sued. Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., 35 Ohio St.3d 123,
519 N.E.2d 370 (1988); Triad Hunter, LLC v. Eagle Natrium, LLC, 7*” Dist. No. 18MO-012,
2019-Ohio-940, 132 N.E.3d 1272, 149. When deciding whether to dismiss an action due to
forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘plaintiffs’ choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed,’ particularly when the plaintiff has chosen his home forum,” but that
“the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends
of justice.” 35 Ohio St.3d, at 127. If a court determines that an alternative forum is more
convenient, the common-law doctrine requires the court to dismiss the action. Id.
CEVA asserts that an alternative forum is available in Oklahoma because the case
involves an accident that occurred in that state. Indeed, Mr. Abdullahi actually sued “CEVA
Ground US, L.P.” in Sequoyah County, Oklahoma District Court in April 2021. So far as the
record shows that parallel case remains pending.
In a forum non conveniens analysis, a court is to determine where jurisdiction is more
convenient. Id. at 126. Doing so requires considering the private interests of the parties and
the public interests of the courts and the citizens of the forum. Id. The important private
interests cited by the court in Chambers, are: 1) relative ease of access to sources of proof, 2)
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses, 3) the possibility of a view of premises, if a jury view would
be appropriate, and 4) any other practical problems that might make trial easier, more
expeditious, or less expensive. Chambers, supra at 126-7.
What seems most relevant in this case are that Ohio residents are the primary parties,
that the alleged location of a CEVA site in Groveport apparently ties to this case, and the ease
of access to evidence. While no doubt some witnesses may be in Oklahoma, there are also
potentially important witnesses in Ohio such as medical witnesses who can more easily
testify here about injuries the plaintiff suffered and for which he was treated. Further,
expenses to obtain testimony in Ohio from Oklahoma witnesses will presumably be greatly
diminished by video depositions and, perhaps, trial testimony by ZOOM.
Chambers also outlines public interest factors to be considered, including: 1) the
administrative difficulties and delay to other litigants caused by congested court calendars,
2) the imposition of jury duty upon the citizens of a community which has very little relation
to the litigation, 3) a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and 4)
the appropriateness of litigating a case in a forum familiar with the applicable law.
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Chambers, supra at 126-7. While Sequoyah County, Oklahoma, does have a smaller ratio of
population to judges, it does not appear that jurisdiction is significantly less congested than
Franklin County, or that choosing Ohio over Oklahoma would cause a more serious delay in
getting this case tried. If, as it appears, this is a simple “rear-ender” in which the essential
facts about the accident are not seriously in dispute, it makes more sense to litigate in Ohio
where presumably most medical evidence about the plaintiff will be obtained. The
importance of having the case tried in the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred is not
so great where few facts are in dispute and no choice-of-law decisions on applicable law are
likely to matter.
Assessing all these factors, the private and public interests in this case weigh more in
favor of this Ohio forum. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens
is therefore DENIED.
IV. Conclusion.
The court assumes all parties have completed some discovery about CEVA, Nonoma,
the Groveport business, and related matters that may need to be explained relative to long-
arm jurisdiction over CEVA. If anything remains to be done such discovery must be
completed quickly.
The current trial date of April 4, 2022 is hereby VACATED.
The court will hold an evidentiary hearing on CEVA’s long-arm motion on May 13,
2022, in Courtroom 5F at 9:30 a.m. The parties shall consult in good faith well before
that hearing about Stipulations of undisputed facts, authenticity of records, and other
matters to fill out the record appropriately. Genuinely disputed facts may be addressed by
live witnesses on May 13. See, InFrasys, Inc., supra, at footnote six. The court allocates 75
minutes to each side for in-person evidence, if needed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
Date: 03-01-2022
Case Title: ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI -VS- CEVA GROUND US LP ET AL
Case Number: 21CV001936
Type: JOURNAL ENTRY
It Is So Ordered.
Cdahank “
Pp
/s/ Judge Richard A. Frye
Electronically signed on 2022-Mar-01 page 8 of 8
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Court Disposition
Case Number: 21CV001936
Case Style: ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI -VS- CEVA GROUND US LP
ETA
Motion Tie Off Information:
1. Motion CMS Document Id: 21CV0019362021-07-0999980000
Document Title: 07-09-2021-MOTION TO DISMISS -
DEFENDANT: CEVA GROUND US LP
Disposition: MOTION RELEASED TO CLEAR DOCKET
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Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y14 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO CIVIL DIVISION ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI, Plaintiff, Case No. 21CV-1936 Vv. (JUDGE FRYE) CEVA GROUND US, LP., et al., Defendants. JOURNAL ENTRY VACATING TRIAL DATE OF APRIL 4, 2022; and DENYING BOTH DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS; DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT SALAD OLOW FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDITION; and SCHEDULING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MAY 13, 2022 FOR THE LONG-ARM MOTION PERTINENT TO CO-DEFENDANT CEVA. (Amended Motion filed July 9, 2021) I. Introduction. This case arose from a fatal motor vehicle accident on April 11, 2019 in Roland, Oklahoma. (Comp. 1 13). Both plaintiff Abdirizak Abdullahi and defendant Abdinor Salad Olow are truck drivers who reside in Franklin County, Ohio. (Comp., {I11, 10). At the time of the accident, Salad Olow was driving a tractor-trailer while Abdullahi was asleep in the sleeper berth. Unexpectedly the truck collided with a car in front of it on I-40. Tragically, this resulted in the death of the car’s driver and caused injuries to Mr. Abdullahi who fell out of the sleeper berth. Abdullahi alleges negligence against defendant Salad Olow (Count I) and vicarious liability (Count II) and negligent and reckless retention against a business identified as “CEVA Ground US, LP.” (Count III). On July 9, 2021, CEVA Ground US, LP and Salad Olow filed an amended motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. CEVA argues that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not provide personal jurisdiction over it because the actions giving rise to the cause of action occurred in Oklahoma, not Ohio, and because its principal place of business is in Houston, Texas. (Affidavit of Cano 5, 9.) Defendants alternatively assert 1 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y1 that Sequoyah County, Oklahoma is a more convenient venue than Franklin County, Ohio because that is where the accident took place, and that convenience justifies suspending this case in favor of a parallel Oklahoma case. II. Summary of Facts. Defendant Salad Olow is unquestionably subject to suit here in Ohio. The police report on the accident shows his residence is in Columbus, Ohio. (Exhibit “B” filed Aug. 11, 2021.) In the amended motion the business defendant is not identified as CEVA Ground, but as “CEVA Freight LLC f/k/a CEVA Ground U.S. LP.” Despite that, the affidavit of Antonio Cano submitted by defendants does not confirm this relationship, or even mention it. According to the affidavit of Antonio Cano, “Risk Director/Claims Adjuster of CEVA Freight, LLC (what he too calls “CEVA”) the business defendant is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Houston. (1 2,5). He further asserts that Salad Olow, the defendant driver, was not an employee of CEVA. Instead, Mr. Cano says, “[t]he decision to hire Mr. Salad Olow as an independent contractor occurred in Texas.” (16 — 8). There is no further information on the hiring process, or Salad Olow’s past work with CEVA. Importantly, exactly what Mr. Cano means by “the decision to hire” having been made in Texas is ambiguous. Does that mean some businessperson in CEVA working in Texas simply approved Salad Olow sight-unseen as a name on a list? The court at this stage may not construe this ambiguity about “the decision to hire” in favor of defendant. Although not set out in an affidavit, plaintiff represents that CEVA operates a “large trucking depot in Franklin County and a fleet of Ohio resident truck drivers that haul CEVA’s loads from CEVA’s depot in Ohio throughout the country.” The “depot” is said to be in Groveport, Ohio. (Memorandum of Pltf. Filed July 26, 2021, at p.1.) Attached as Exhibits to plaintiff's brief are business registration records from the Ohio Secretary of State’s office. The most recent papers refer to “CEVA Ground U.S., L.P.” Are there no records of “CEVA Freight, LLC” being registered in Ohio if that is — as defendants argue — the current name of the same business? And, the names suggest that one entity was a limited partnership while the other apparently was a limited liability company. A simple name change ordinarily would not change the legal form of a business. Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y1 Finally, another business may be important here too. It is called “Nonoma Enterprises, LLC” according to the complaint. (415.) The Reply Memorandum says “CEVA has an independent contractor agreement with Nonoma who in turn retained Olow” but argues that CEVA had no “specific contractual relationship with defendant Olow.” (Reply Mem., p. 2.) What does all that mean? Given all the confusing references to “CEVA” defendants wisely suggest an evidentiary hearing. (Reply Mem. filed Aug. 11, 2021, p. 2.) Il. Analysis. When a defendant files a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Bradley Shoptaw v. I & A Auto Sales, Inc., 10t Dist. No. 12AP-453, 2012-Ohio-6259 at {] 4; Joffe v. Cable Tech, Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, 839 N.E.2d 67 (10 Dist.). When a court considers a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction “without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction.” Shoptaw, supra at 115; citing Austin Miller Am. Antiques, Inc. v. Cavallaro, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-400, 2011-Ohio- 6670,17. At that stage, “the trial court ‘must assume the truth of the facts in the nonmoving party's affidavits and complaint for purposes of [a Civ.R. 12(B)(2)] motion to dismiss’ and must resolve all reasonable competing inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. Ultimately a court must “determine whether the state's ‘long-arm’ statute and applicable civil rule confer personal jurisdiction, and, if so, whether granting jurisdiction under the statute and the rule would deprive the defendant of the right to due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” U.S. Sprint Communications Co. P’ship v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 1994-Ohio- 504, 624 N.E.2d 1048. “Where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. [citation omitted].” Ata Logistics, Inc. v. Empire Container Freight Station, Inc., 12th Dist. Case No. CA2020-01-006, 2020-Ohio-4183, 1 14. A. The Ohio Long-Arm Statute Plaintiff asserts that the court has personal jurisdiction over defendants Salad Olow and CEVA under Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute. Since Salad Olow plaintly appears to live in 3 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y17 Ohio his portion of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED. “A State generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries ***.” InFrasys, Inc. v. Bros. Pavement Products, Corp., 6t4 Dist. Case No. E-19-047, 2020-Ohio-1157, 152 N.E.3d 1274, 43, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). Jurisdiction over CEVA is more complicated. R.C. § 2703.382(A)(1) states that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's transacting any business in this state.” R.C. § 2703.382(A)(1) and Civ. R. 4.3(A)(4) are nearly identical. When determining personal jurisdiction, the court must find that the nonresident’s ties “create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” U.S. Sprint, supra, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Ohio gives a “broad interpretation to the term ‘transacting any business’ 2 ase under the long-arm statute.” Star Seal of Ohio, Inc. v. Tri State Pavement Supplies, LLC, 10 Dist. No. o9gAP-969, 2010-Ohio-2324, §] 20; Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75 (1990). (A)(1) also recognizes that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a person who acts directly or by an agent as toa cause of action arising from transacting any business in Ohio. Furthermore, if a business has sufficient continuing activity that meets the federal due process threshold for general jurisdiction, it will be amendable to any suit in Ohio under the “doing business” standard. LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed Cir. 2000) (Ohio law). Mr. Abdullahi alleges that defendant CEVA purposefully availed itself of the laws of Ohio by registering with the Ohio Secretary of State to transact business here as well as designating an agent for service of process in Ohio. Perhaps more importantly, CEVA allegedly has a trucking depot in Groveport, Ohio where vehicles depart to transport goods to other parts of Ohio and to other states. Prior to this specific accident, Mr. Abdullahi and Mr. Salad Olow apparently departed together from that truck depot in Groveport on the trip in question which took them to Oklahoma. Mr. Abdullahi asserts that the hiring of defendant Salad Olow in Ohio, as well as defendant CEVA’s truck depot in Groveport, are enough to establish that defendant CEVA was transacted business in Ohio in accordance with R.C. 2307.382(A)(1). Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y18 It appears that “CEVA Ground US, L.P.” does transact business in Ohio. But, the relationship between that limited partnership and “CEVA Freight, L.L.C.” referenced in the affidavit of Antonio Cano is never explained. Adding to the confusion, some entity also named CEVA allegedly had an independent contractor agreement with an entity called Nonomo, which in turn hired defendant Salad Olow. As discussed above, the record needs more evidence about these entities. For instance, is Nonomo another subsidiary of some CEVA or a regular agent to hire drivers for its business? Does it operate out of an office at the depot in Groveport? Did Nonomo — whom defendants’ Reply Brief says “retained Olow” — merely act as an agent for CEVA, or did it also pay and direct Olow’s work on this trip to Oklahoma? Did Nonomo hire both drivers in Ohio for the unit involved in this accident? Without more facts it is impossible to accurately determine whether, under R.C. 2307.382(A)(1), the cause of action advanced by Abdullahi ties to CEVA transacting business within Ohio, either generally or specifically to this case. Even if Nonomo retained Salad Olow that does not necessarily insulate CEVA. Courts “have repeatedly held *** that a defendant’s interposition of an independent middleman between itself and the forum does not by itself place the defendant outside of that forum’s reach.” Fortis Corporate Ins. v. Viken Ship Management, 450 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 2006). CEVA points to two Tenth District cases said to establish that this cause of action did not arise from actions within Ohio. The first case they cite, Simmons v. Budde, is distinguished from this case. The court in Simmons found that plaintiff failed to prove long- arm jurisdiction when defendant was living in Missouri, and the accident occurred in Missouri. 2015-Ohio-3780, 38 N.E.3d 960, 1 2 - 3. The second Tenth District case cited by defendant, Joffe v. Cable Tech, Inc., involved a plaintiff who moved to Ohio from California after the defendant, a resident of Iowa, hired him as an independent contractor to do work in Ohio. 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, 839 N.E.2d 67. The court ultimately found that Ohio did not have jurisdiction over the defendant because the transactions that caused the plaintiff to move to Ohio did not happen in Ohio and neither party was in Ohio when the plaintiff was offered the position. Id. at | 19. These facts are very distinguished from the present suit. B. Forum Non Conveniens The forum non conveniens doctrine assumes that the jurisdiction and venue which a plaintiff has chosen are proper but presupposes that there is another forum available in 5 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y1 which the defendant may be sued. Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 519 N.E.2d 370 (1988); Triad Hunter, LLC v. Eagle Natrium, LLC, 7*” Dist. No. 18MO-012, 2019-Ohio-940, 132 N.E.3d 1272, 149. When deciding whether to dismiss an action due to forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘plaintiffs’ choice of forum should rarely be disturbed,’ particularly when the plaintiff has chosen his home forum,” but that “the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.” 35 Ohio St.3d, at 127. If a court determines that an alternative forum is more convenient, the common-law doctrine requires the court to dismiss the action. Id. CEVA asserts that an alternative forum is available in Oklahoma because the case involves an accident that occurred in that state. Indeed, Mr. Abdullahi actually sued “CEVA Ground US, L.P.” in Sequoyah County, Oklahoma District Court in April 2021. So far as the record shows that parallel case remains pending. In a forum non conveniens analysis, a court is to determine where jurisdiction is more convenient. Id. at 126. Doing so requires considering the private interests of the parties and the public interests of the courts and the citizens of the forum. Id. The important private interests cited by the court in Chambers, are: 1) relative ease of access to sources of proof, 2) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, 3) the possibility of a view of premises, if a jury view would be appropriate, and 4) any other practical problems that might make trial easier, more expeditious, or less expensive. Chambers, supra at 126-7. What seems most relevant in this case are that Ohio residents are the primary parties, that the alleged location of a CEVA site in Groveport apparently ties to this case, and the ease of access to evidence. While no doubt some witnesses may be in Oklahoma, there are also potentially important witnesses in Ohio such as medical witnesses who can more easily testify here about injuries the plaintiff suffered and for which he was treated. Further, expenses to obtain testimony in Ohio from Oklahoma witnesses will presumably be greatly diminished by video depositions and, perhaps, trial testimony by ZOOM. Chambers also outlines public interest factors to be considered, including: 1) the administrative difficulties and delay to other litigants caused by congested court calendars, 2) the imposition of jury duty upon the citizens of a community which has very little relation to the litigation, 3) a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and 4) the appropriateness of litigating a case in a forum familiar with the applicable law. 6 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y20 Chambers, supra at 126-7. While Sequoyah County, Oklahoma, does have a smaller ratio of population to judges, it does not appear that jurisdiction is significantly less congested than Franklin County, or that choosing Ohio over Oklahoma would cause a more serious delay in getting this case tried. If, as it appears, this is a simple “rear-ender” in which the essential facts about the accident are not seriously in dispute, it makes more sense to litigate in Ohio where presumably most medical evidence about the plaintiff will be obtained. The importance of having the case tried in the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred is not so great where few facts are in dispute and no choice-of-law decisions on applicable law are likely to matter. Assessing all these factors, the private and public interests in this case weigh more in favor of this Ohio forum. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens is therefore DENIED. IV. Conclusion. The court assumes all parties have completed some discovery about CEVA, Nonoma, the Groveport business, and related matters that may need to be explained relative to long- arm jurisdiction over CEVA. If anything remains to be done such discovery must be completed quickly. The current trial date of April 4, 2022 is hereby VACATED. The court will hold an evidentiary hearing on CEVA’s long-arm motion on May 13, 2022, in Courtroom 5F at 9:30 a.m. The parties shall consult in good faith well before that hearing about Stipulations of undisputed facts, authenticity of records, and other matters to fill out the record appropriately. Genuinely disputed facts may be addressed by live witnesses on May 13. See, InFrasys, Inc., supra, at footnote six. The court allocates 75 minutes to each side for in-person evidence, if needed. IT IS SO ORDERED. Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y21 Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Date: 03-01-2022 Case Title: ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI -VS- CEVA GROUND US LP ET AL Case Number: 21CV001936 Type: JOURNAL ENTRY It Is So Ordered. Cdahank “ Pp /s/ Judge Richard A. Frye Electronically signed on 2022-Mar-01 page 8 of 8 Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2022 Mar 01 3:01 PM-21CV001936 OF827 - Y2 Court Disposition Case Number: 21CV001936 Case Style: ABDIRIZAK ABDULLAHI -VS- CEVA GROUND US LP ETA Motion Tie Off Information: 1. Motion CMS Document Id: 21CV0019362021-07-0999980000 Document Title: 07-09-2021-MOTION TO DISMISS - DEFENDANT: CEVA GROUND US LP Disposition: MOTION RELEASED TO CLEAR DOCKET