Motion to Disqualify or Substitute Judge in Washington

Background

“Judges must recuse themselves when their impartiality may reasonably be questioned.” (See Lane Powell PC v. DeCoursey, No. 69837-1-I, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014).)

“Where an allegation of partiality rests on speculation and illogical assumptions, it is not reasonable.” (See id.)

Instead “judges must recuse themselves when they have a direct, personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in a case.” (See id.)

“Even where judges have financial interests falling short of what would be considered personal or direct, due process may still require recusal.” (See id.)

General Information for Complaints and Motions

“Washington cases have long recognized that judges must recuse themselves when the facts suggest that they are actually or potentially biased.” (See Diimmel v. Campbell (1966) 68 Wash.2d 697, 699, 414 P.2d 1022; Tatham v. Rogers (2012) 283 P.3d 583, 593.)

“It is incumbent upon members of the judiciary to avoid even a cause for suspicion of irregularity in the discharge of their duties.” (See Tatham v. Rogers (2012) 283 P.3d 583, 593.)

“[T]here can be no question but that the common law and the Federal and our state constitutions guarantee to a defendant a trial before an impartial tribunal, be it judge or jury.” (See id.)

“[T]he principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the history of courts.” (See id.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof

“The trial judge is fully informed and is presumed to perform his or her functions regularly and properly without bias or prejudice.” (See Tatham v. Rogers (2012) 283 P.3d 583, 590.)

“Recusal decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (See id.)

“We review a trial court's recusal decision for an abuse of discretion.” (See Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp. v. Martin (2000) 103 Wash.App. 836, 840, 14 P.3d 877; Tatham v. Rogers (2012) 283 P.3d 583, 590.)

“The court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” (See Tatham v. Rogers (2012) 283 P.3d 583, 590.)

The Court’s Decisions

It is well settled that “the trial court is presumed to have properly discharged its official duties without bias or prejudice. The party seeking to overcome that presumption must provide specific facts establishing bias. Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid showing of bias.” (See In re Pers. Restraint of Davis (2004) 152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1; JDH Cranberries, LLC v. O'Hagan, No. 48830-2-II, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2017).)

It is also well settled that “a party litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to a change of judge upon the timely filing of a motion and affidavit of prejudice against a judge about to hear his cause or any substantial portion thereof on the merits. Such a motion and affidavit seasonably filed is deemed to establish prejudice.” (See In re Carpenter (1978) 21 Wn. App. 814, 820.)