Motion to Reconsider/Vacate Summary Judgment in Illinois

Purpose and Significance of a Motion to Reconsideration or Vacate

“Summary judgment motions are governed by section 2-1005 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 [West 2010]. Pursuant to that statute, summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bank of N.Y. Mellon Formerly Known Y. to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Buie, 2016 Ill. App. 150808, 5 [Ill. App. Ct. 2016] citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) [West 2010].)

Note that under Day v. Curtin “[a] motion to vacate is properly denied when the evidence was in the movant's possession and could have been presented prior to judgment.” (Day v. Curtin (1989) 192 Ill. App. 3d 251, 255 citing Kosten v. St. Anne's Hospital (1985) 132 Ill. App.3d 1073, 1080.)

Establishing Grounds for Reconsideration or Vacate Summary Judgment

The burden of establishing sufficient grounds to vacate a judgment is on the moving party. (Green v. Bd. of the Municipal Employees (1999) 309 Ill. App. 3d 757, 763 citing Day v. Curtin (1989) 192 Ill. App.3d 251, 254.)

“However, the denial of a motion to vacate must be reversed where the movant's right to fundamental justice has been violated.” (Green, supra, id., citing Kessling v. United States Cheerleaders Ass'n (1991) 215 Ill. App.3d 582, 583; Day, supra, 192 Ill. App.3d at 254.)

Standard of Review and Burdens of Proof for a Motion to Reconsider or Vacate

“The decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate is at the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on review absent an abuse of that discretion.” (Green, supra, id., citing Day, supra, 192 Ill. App.3d at 254.)

Legal Precedents and Case Law on Motions to Reconsideration or Vacate

“[I]t is well established that in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court may draw inferences from the undisputed facts. However, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed facts, the issue should be decided by the trier of fact and the motion should be denied.” (Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maint (1992) 146 Ill. 2d 263, 272 citing Pyne v. Witmer (1989) 129 Ill.2d 351, 358.)

“In light of the standard, the trial court does not have any discretion in deciding the matter. (Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maint (1992) 146 Ill. 2d 263, 272 citing Derby Meadows Utility Co. v. Inter-Continental Real Estate (1990) 202 Ill. App.3d 345, 354.) In cases involving contracts, there is a disputed fact precluding summary judgment when the material writing contains an ambiguity which requires admission of extrinsic evidence. (Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maint (1992) 146 Ill. 2d 263, 272 citing Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc. (1985) 137 Ill. App.3d 550, 558.)